1900

Red Sea and Somali Coast

Printed Papers

E
42
8.2.00

(Confidential)

No. 275. E. A.

A copy× of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, etc.,

/sd/ J. B. Wood.
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department.
Fort William,
The 26th January 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential prints:-
Section 1, dated the 21st and 28th November 1899, 7th 8th 9th 11th and 14th December 1899.
Section 2, dated the 29th November 1899, 4th 7th and 11th December 1899.

× With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden

Confidential

No. 929 of 1900.
Political Department.
Bombay Castle, 18th× January 1900

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

H. Woodly
Secretary to Government

Rec'd in Cable, No 568/S. the 22nd Dec/99, from the Secy Foreign Office

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

I.S.C. for Pol. Rest. at Aden

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN. [November 21.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 21.)

(No. 204.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, November* 21, 1899.

I RECEIVED last night following telegram from the Sirdar:—

"It is rumoured that the Khalifa has reached Gedid and that Ahmed Fedil is now at Drefissa, which is a pool situated about 23 miles from the Nile on the road to Gedid. This evening the troops under Wingate and Lewis leave Faki Kohi; and it is hoped Fedil may be surprised to-morrow. The force is composed of six maxims, six mountain guns, 1,700 rifles, two black battalions, and 1,100 Jehadia, with complete transport; also one squadron and 500 of the Camel Corps."

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 28.)

(No. 210.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, November* 28, 1899.

I RECEIVED following telegram from the Sirdar yesterday :—

"I am informed by the Inspector of Kassala Mudiria that an Abyssinian officer has come to Galabat with thirty men for the collection of taxes, giving out that they are instructed to declare the country as far as Doka to be under Abyssinian rule. The market has been closed by the District Officer of Galabat, and the matter referred to me for decision. Claim is also laid to this province by Ras Dagakabda in a letter received by Sheikh Sheraf of Galabat.

"I would advise that Inspector, who requests instructions, should go there and send message to Ras by Abyssinian officer, informing him that negotiations with King Menelek are now proceeding for the settlement of the frontier; natives of Galabat cannot therefore be taxed until these are concluded. He should at the same time tell the officer that the King is meanwhile being informed of the matter, and request him to withdraw his party."

While approving course suggested by Sirdar, I have directed him to point out that Doka is a considerable distance outside the line which Menelek proposed to Harrington.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 92. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, November 23, 1899.*

I HAVE the honour to submit for your Lordship's information copy of a letter, with three inclosures, received from our Consular Agent in Harrar, and of my reply thereto.

It is extraordinary that the Acting Governor of Harrar should have taken upon himself to announce, as a probable fact, that Abyssinian troops will perhaps cross our frontier in pursuit of Ogaden tribes, and to request that the authorities at Berbera be informed in the matter.

I need hardly say that if there be any question of an Abyssinian force crossing the border of the British Protectorate, which it would be most inadvisable to allow in the present instance, the matter could only be considered by Her Majesty's Government on a representation made in a formal manner by the King Menelek.

I would submit for your Lordship's consideration whether it would not be desirable that Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia should take an early opportunity of drawing the King's attention to Gurasmatch Bante's procedure in this matter.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Lord Cromer and to Captain Harrington.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Mr. Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.

Sir, *Harrar, November 7, 1899.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith the copy of two letters I have addressed to Gurasmatch Bante, Acting Governor of Harrar, and the translation of a letter I received from his Excellency concerning the camels looted by Ogaden tribes from our tribes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. GEROLIMATO,
Her Britannic Majesty's Consular Agent, Harrar.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Mr. Gerolimato to the Acting Governor of Harrar.

Excellence, *Harrar, le 31 Octobre, 1899.*

CONFORMÉMENT à la demande verbale de votre Excellence, j'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer ci-jointe une liste des chameaux volés par les tribus de Rer Ali et Rer Haroun, aux tribus Somalis, sujets Anglais.

Le montant de cette liste est de 605 chameaux, et dernièrement ont volé encore les Ogaden 135 chameaux des tribus de Habr Yunis Ganboor près de la place Toyo, le total donc est de 740 chameaux.

Je viens d'apprendre que les Ogaden ont pris encore beaucoup de chameaux des Habr Awal, et 413 chameaux de Abu-bakr-Musa, mais pour cela je n'ai pas encore des nouvelles des autorités de Berbera.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) J. GEROLIMATO.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

The Acting Governor of Harrar to Mr. Gerolimato.

(Translation from Amharic.)

Peace be unto you, *Harrar, 22 Tamkat* 1892 (*November* 1, 1899).

THE letter you addressed to me yesterday, 31st October, 1899 (European date), 21st Tamkat, 1892 (Ethiopian date), and the list of the camels looted by Rer Ali and Rer Haroun, I received, and I have to thank you.

From our side our tribes are asking for some camels looted by your tribes.

The camels looted by Rer Ali and Rer Haroun friendly or by force I will restore them, but I beg to inform you that for this result I am forced to send in Ogaden some troops, and I fear that when our troops arrive there, Ogaden tribes will escape and perhaps will cross the British frontier, and I will be obliged then to follow them, and I ask you to be good enough to inform about that, the authorities of Berbera.

Soon or late I will restore the camels looted.

Salutation.

(Seal.) (Signed) GURASMATCH BANTE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

Mr. Gerolimato to the Acting Governor of Harrar.

Excellence, *Harrar, le 4 Novembre*, 1899.

J'AI reçu la lettre à la date du 22 Tamkat, 1892 (1er Novembre, 1899), que votre Excellence m'a adressé et par laquelle je suis très content d'apprendre que votre Excellence est décidé de nous rendre les chameaux pillés aux tribus Somalis, sujets Anglais, par les Rer Ali et Rer Haroun.

De cette même lettre j'ai compris que votre Excellence, conformément à l'Article Ier du Traité entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Éthiopie, demande la permission de passer la frontière dans le cas où les Rer Ali et Rer Haroun échappant devant les troupes Abyssines entreraient dans le territoire Anglais. Votre Excellence me prie d'informer les autorités de Berbera de cette demande, ce que je ferais par le courrier prochain, informant aussi Mr. J. L. Harrington, Agent Diplomatique de Sa Majesté Britannique en Éthiopie, et qui doit arriver aujourd'hui à Zeyla.

Certainement votre Excellence, pour éviter toutes les graves conséquences, donnera un ordre formel aux troupes Abyssines de ne pas passer la frontière avant la réponse de l'Agent Diplomatique de Sa Majesté Britannique et des autorités de Berbera soit reçue.

Quant à la réclamation des tribus d'Ogaden pour les chameaux pillés par nos tribus je m'étonne, et c'est la première fois que j'entends parler, n'ayant jamais eu aucune nouvelle de cette affaire et je crois que les tribus d'Ogaden font maintenant cette réclamation exprès pour contrebalancer notre réclamation, et je prie votre Excellence de bien noter que je vous ai envoyé concerne les chameaux pillés par les Rer Ali et Rer Haroun seulement cette année, et qu'il y a beaucoup des chameaux pillés à nos tribus les années précédentes par les mêmes tribus Ogaden et que nous n'avons pas réclamé et pour lesquelles nous réservons nos droits.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) J. GEROLIMATO.

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to Mr. Gerolimato.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Berbera, November* 23, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant with inclosures.

It would be undesirable in every respect that the Abyssinian force operating in the Ogaden should cross the frontier of the British Protectorate, and I approve of the communication you made to the Acting Governor of Harrar on the subject in your letter of the 4th instant.

Captain Harrington, to whom you have also referred the matter, should arrive in Harrar within the next few days, and before this reaches you he will doubtless have taken steps to impress on Gurasmatch Bante the necessity of strictly adhering to the terms of the Treaty.

I shall address you again on the subject of the return of the loot claimed by our tribes. Further cases of raids by the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun Ogaden on our tribes have been reported to me, in connection with which inquiries are being instituted to ascertain correctly the number of animals raided and damage done.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

---

o

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 118.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 8, 1899.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 11th ultimo, No. 88, containing your observations on the proposals made to Mr. Harrington by M. Ilg with respect to securing the exemption of the tribes of the British Protectorate from the tax on camels levied by orders of King Menelek at Gildessa.

I am to state that his Lordship concurs in the view of the matter taken by you, and approves of your instructions to the Acting Consul at Zeyla.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H SANDERSON.

[2390 *h*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General de Courcy Perry to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 9.)

(No. 4. Africa. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Antwerp, December* 8, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that last evening Mr. George Paget Walford, one of our principal British merchants here, and the English Director of the Belgian Company who took up Count Leontieff's Concessions for the development of the Equatorial Provinces of Ethiopia, called upon me to talk about Count Leontieff's movements in Abyssinia, which appear to him to be contrary to the plan laid out before the Count's last departure for Africa, insomuch as it was arranged that Count Leontieff should explore between Harrar and Lugh on the Juba.

The Company now received a telegram from Count Leontieff, saying that he is on his way home "viâ Djibouti," and as Mr. Walford thought that the message might be deemed of interest at the Foreign Office he authorized me to communicate its contents confidentially to your Lordship. He also wished me to say that his Company would deprecate and disavow any action on the part of Count Leontieff which might act against English political interest, it being specially stipulated on the Articles of Association that the object that the Company had in view was purely of a commercial nature. Count Leontieff's telegram runs as follows:—

"J'arrive en congé Europe; très satisfait résultat; pays tranquille, administration organisée; Ivoire bétail abondant. J'ai envoyé Chefdœuvre, Leymarie et Docteur explorer entre Lacs Rodolph et Victoria par direction est. Leymarie repatriant moitié Sénégalais par Congo Belge. Sommes installés définitivement embouchure Rivière Omo Lac Rodolph. Contrée ravissante."

Mr. Walford likewise informed me that his Company had just received 10 tons of ivory, and that further consignments are on the way, and that if his presence is needed it would give him great pleasure to call at the Foreign Office on the 16th instant, as about that date he proposed going to London. As far as I could gather from Mr. Walford's conversation last evening, I should say that he does not now place complete faith in Count Leontieff.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. R. DE COURCY PERRY.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 177. Africa.)

My Lord, *Brussels, December* 10, 1899.

I HAVE now since some time noticed that the Congolese papers published in Brussels are more than usually sparing of news from the Independent State, but I have seen one short statement that Captain Chaltin is making good progress with his reinforcements towards Lado Redjaf, and I have no doubt that the so-called commercial expedition under M. de Backer is making equally good progress towards the Nile.

I had occasion a few days ago to hear that a Swedish officer, lately returned from serving at Lado Redjaf, reported that all was well there when he left, and that the Congolese felt themselves now quite safe there from any possible danger.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

[2390 *l*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 120.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 14, 1899.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 91 of the 23rd ultimo, reporting that you had requested the Resident at Aden to withdraw the British officer and extra detachment of native infantry recently stationed at Berbera.

His Lordship approves of your action in this matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

[2390 *o*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 29.)

(No. 211.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, November* 29, 1899.

SIRDAR telegraphed yesterday as follows :—

"Owing to insecurity of roads in El Obeid district, and as there has been much disturbance locally, I suggest dispatch of small force there soon. We have had several protests from Ali Dinar of Darfur concerning the roads ; and the post of friendly Arabs which we have at Bara cannot be trusted to keep order. There is no danger to troops passing through that country.

"Have I your approval?"

I have approved by telegraph.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 4.)

(No. 88.)

My Lord, *Berbera, November* 11, 1899.

AFTER careful consideration of the proposals made by M. Ilg in the accompaniment to Captain Harrington's despatch to your Lordship No. 64 of the 15th September last, I am of opinion that his first proposal, namely, that notes of exemption should be given at Zeyla to the tribes of our Protectorate using the Zeyla–Gildessa caravan route, is the only one we can accept.

There are serious objections to entertaining M. Ilg's alternative proposal that the tax on black Aysa camels should be collected at Zeyla. The raid, I understand, was committed in French territory by tribes belonging to the French Protectorate, with whom we have no particular concern. To tax such of those tribes who use our caravan route at the instance of the Abyssinian Government would throw on us an invidious responsibility which I do not think we should undertake. The difficulty of discriminating between those who should and those who should not be taxed amongst natives coming from the French Protectorate would occur almost to the same extent at Zeyla as it is found to be at Gildessa; whilst the keeping of accounts of a tax which it will take years to recover, the settlement of disputes which would be sure to arise, and the responsibility we should incur of providing against any taxable camels leaving Zeyla without the payment of the tax, would entail considerable extra work on our limited establishments. And there are other reasons why it does not seem to me expedient that we should interfere in the manner suggested by M. Ilg.

Altogether I am of opinion that in this matter of the punitive tax the Abyssinians should be left to make their own arrangements for its recovery from the parties concerned, and that our action should be properly limited to securing exemption for our tribes, who had no connection with the raid on account of which it has been imposed.

I am, accordingly, instructing the Acting Consul at Zeyla in this sense, pending the receipt of any further instructions your Lordship may deem fit to send me.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Captain Harrington through our Consular Agent in Harrar.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 91. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, November 23, 1899.*

AS everything is now quiet on this side of the Protectorate, and I have heard nothing further of any probable advance from the Dolbahanta, it is desirable to relieve the Protectorate of the cost that is being incurred by the employment of extra troops at Berbera.

I have, accordingly, this day requested the Political Resident, Aden, to withdraw the British officer and extra detachment of native infantry when the usual reliefs come round early next month.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

[2390 *g*—2]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 202.)
My Lord, *Cairo, December* 1, 1899.

I HAVE been in communication with Lord Kitchener on the subject of the parties now engaged in surveying the Abyssinian frontier.

I am informed that Lieutenant Gwynne's party has gone to Rosaires.

It is reported that the Sobat is closed. Under these circumstances, Major Austin, who is in command of the southern party, was of opinion that, owing to want of supplies in the country through which he would have to travel, he might be obliged to strike into Abyssinia and to go through the Kaffa territory. It is, however, believed that the Emperor Menelek would view with great jealousy the visit of any Europeans to this country. Both Lord Kitchener and myself are, therefore, of opinion, that it would be undesirable to adopt the course proposed by Major Austin. He has accordingly been instructed to go to Nasser, to survey as far as he can, and to return to Nasser should provisions fail, but on no account to go to Kaffa.

I trust that these measures will meet with your Lordship's approval.

I have informed Captain Harrington of this decision.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

No. 2.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 221.)
My Lord, *Rome, December* 6, 1899.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 105 of the 27th ultimo respecting the settlement of the Abyssinian and Soudanese frontier, I have the honour to report to your Lordship that three interviews have taken place between the Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Sir Rennell Rodd, and myself, at the second of which Signor Martini, the Governor of Erythrea, was present.

I have now the honour to inclose a Memorandum drawn up at the Italian Foreign Office, which gives the substance of the understanding at which we have arrived.

In accordance with this understanding, I have to-day sent to M. Visconti-Venosta a note (of which a copy is inclosed), in the terms of your Lordship's despatch No. 127 of the 8th September.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CURRIE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Memorandum.

LES pourparlers de ces jours ayant abouti à une entente, il y a lieu maintenant de la finir d'une manière formelle; ce qui pourrait se faire au moyen d'un échange de notes entre l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique et le Ministère Royal des Affaires Étrangères.

L'Ambassade remettrait, avec sa note, au Ministère Royal, la carte reproduisant la frontière projetée entre l'Éthiopie et le Soudan. En faisant remarquer que cette frontière s'écarte, sur quelques points, du tracé des Protocoles du 24 Mars et 15 Avril, 1891, l'Ambassade exprimerait le désir de connaître, avant de s'engager envers Ménélik, les vues du Gouvernement Italien à ce sujet. La note de l'Ambassade ferait

en outre ressortir que, le tracé de la frontière devant, d'après la proposition faite par Ménélik au Capitaine Harrington, s'arrêter à Todluc, où cesse le territoire Éthiopien, il y a lieu de compléter ce tracé en procédant entre l'Érythrée et le Soudan, d'après la convenance mutuelle, à un arrangement spécial.

Le Ministère Royal des Affaires Étrangères répondrait par deux notes. Par l'une de ces notes le Gouvernement du Roi déclarerait ne pas objecter à la frontière projetée entre l'Abyssinie et le Soudan; de sorte que la démarcation établie par les Protocoles du 14 Mars et 15 Avril, 1891, serait modifiée d'après cette nouvelle frontière. Par l'autre note, le Gouvernement du Roi se déclarerait prêt à s'entendre avec le Gouvernement de la Reine, en vue de compléter, par une délimitation entre l'Érythrée et le Soudan, la frontière Soudanaise que la négociation Anglo-Abyssinienne ne peut fixer que jusqu'à Todluc, et proposerait que cette délimitation soit confiée aux Gouverneurs respectifs de l'Érythrée et du Soudan.

L'Ambassade pourrait, par une dernière note, accepter pour la délimitation entre l'Érythrée et le Soudan la méthode suggérée par le Gouvernement du Roi.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Lord Currie to the Marquis Visconti-Venosta.

M. le Ministre, *Rome, December* 6, 1899.

YOUR Excellency is aware that discussions have recently taken place between Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia and the Emperor Menelek in regard to the settlement of the frontiers of Abyssinia with the Soudan.

The Italian Ambassador in London has more than once expressed the hope of his Government that they may be made acquainted with the nature of the proposals made by the Emperor Menelek on the subject, and this request is one with which Her Majesty's Government have every wish to comply, and have only deferred doing so until a map had been prepared showing the nature of the proposals which have been made by the Emperor, and which will serve as a basis for the frontier to be eventually agreed upon.

I have now the honour, by order of my Government, to transmit to your Excellency a copy of this map, which, besides defining the exact nature of the proposals in question, shows the line agreed upon in the Protocol of 1891.

Your Excellency will observe that the frontier-line starts on the north from a point assumed to be on the boundary between Erythrea and the Emperor Menelek's dominions, and that in the proposal submitted to Her Majesty's Government the northern portion of the boundary has been drawn to the east of the line laid down by the Protocol of the 15th April, 1891, though, on the other hand, to the south of Famaka, the boundary includes in Abyssinian territory a considerable portion of the sphere assigned to Egypt by the Protocol of the 24th March, 1891.

I am accordingly instructed by the Marquess of Salisbury to invite your Excellency's observations on the proposed frontier, and I am to state that no definite answer has been returned as yet to the Emperor Menelek, and that Her Majesty's Government are desirous of learning the views of the Italian Government before coming to an agreement with Abyssinia.

It would, moreover, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, be desirable that an arrangement should be made with your Excellency for the settlement, in accordance with mutual convenience, of the frontier-line between the Soudan and Erythrea from Todluc, where the Abyssinian frontier ends.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CURRIE.

(Confidential)

No. 343 E.A.

A copy[x] of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, etc.,
(sd) J. B. Wood.
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department,
Fort William,
The 13th February 1900.

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints Sections 1 and 2 dated the 1st November and 9th December 1899 respectively, and Section 3 dated the 20th October and 27th November 1899.

x With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 1073 of 1900.

Political Department.

48 E
15.2.00

Bombay Castle, 8 February 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. F. Sykes
Secretary to Government.
7/2.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Memorandum by Mr. Jenner.

MUHAMAD AGID'S account clearly shows that the Abyssinians are not in possession of the Sakuyu country at any rate, whatever other parts they may have occupied. Their claim to have effectively occupied the Gara (or Gere) country may also be discounted, as I was practically in it when I got opposite Lugh last spring and heard nothing of them. The Karayou Province of Boran which lies between Tertala Boran and Sakuyu Boran they had occupied in their irregular fashion, and probably Tertala also. It is, however, of course a total misuse of the words "effective occupation," as Sir Arthur Hardinge points out, to apply it to the establishment in the countries in question of isolated posts which live by plundering and enslaving the inhabitants, as it is notorious that the Abyssinans do.

Slave raiding appears to be habitually practised by the Abyssinians, and to rely on Menelek's promise to restrain them from so doing would be useless.

(I would like to point out that in the map you sent me Lugh is put on the wrong side of the river and that the word Borana appears south of Menelek's proposed line, whereas the Boran country consists of the various provinces included in his line.)

I think the argument that we ought to use to Menelek is this: That it is most important to both of us that the boundary-line should be of such a kind as to obviate friction and disputes in the future between us: That the traders from the south and east (the coast, in fact) have for the last fifty years at least been a link of connection between Boran and the coast, and that we should suffer material damage by giving up that country to him; Boran caravans come down to Kismayu, but when did a Boran caravan go into Abyssinia? If he takes Boran with a promise to us of freedom of trade and no slavery, disputes will constantly be arising and ill-feeling will ensue between us, as the country is so far from both our centres of government that it is impossible for either of us thoroughly to control our people there: That we on our side will abandon our claims to the coffee-growing hill country north of Boran and discourage the coast traders from going there, and that he should leave Tertala and the rest of Boran to us: That the boundary should follow the northern tribal limits of Boran from Stephanie. Reshiat will thus be left to him, and it will probably gratify his pride to know that his Empire reaches Lake Rudolph. The Upper Juba will also probably be his nearly down to the junction with the Dawa. A Joint Commission could easily settle the boundaries of the Boranas to the north. Sir Arthur Hardinge's proposed line along the Dawa and the 5th parallel would save us Sakuyu and the best part of the Gara, and I think a part of Karayu, including Afalata's big town, but it appears to go right through the Tertala country and would generally not be so convenient as a tribal limit boundary, It is, so it seems to me, important for us to secure the whole of Boran if possible, or part of it in any case, for the following reasons: the trade between Boran and the coast is considerable, as I saw myself last spring.

The Italians cover, so they say themselves, all their expenses, except the rent to the Sultan, with their revenue, the bulk of which comes from the duties on the Boran ivory and the cloth which purchases it.

The country, especially Tertala and Karayu, appears to be healthy highlands with an excellent climate, and though it produces no crops now, because the people are pastoral, the live stock, the camels, donkeys, and cattle, are of excellent quality, far surpassing those of the Somali country.

The people are a gallant and friendly race who have been in communication with us ever since the Company's time, and the abandonment of their country to Abyssinia besides ruining the coast trade will adversely affect our prestige amongst the Somalis.

A. C. W. JENNER.

Swallett House, Christian Malford, Wilts,
November 1, 1899.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 214.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, December* 9, 1899.

IN order to make communication possible with the Upper Nile by breaking up the sudd, a credit of 10,000*l.* has been given to the Governor-General of the Soudan.

I propose that the officer in command be instructed by the Sirdar to take note of the last paragraph but one of your despatch No. 109 of the 2nd August, 1898 (to which please refer).

Since the date of this despatch the situation has been much altered; and about 100 miles north of Lado there is now a Belgian post.

Do you desire any addition to proposed instructions?

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN. [October 20.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 3.

No. 1.

Memorandum by Sir A. Hardinge.

I THINK Menelek's proposals rather audacious. He shoves our northern frontier two parallels of latitude back, and annexes Lake Stephanie, Reshiat, and the whole or two-thirds of Boran. He talks about "effective occupation"; but (*a*) he is not a party to the Berlin Conference, and (*b*) his effective occupation consists of the establishment of a few posts by raiding parties, who make no attempt at forming a settled or regular Government and administration, but simply pillage the tribes and steal cattle and slaves.

Tippoo Tib and Rumaliza might equally have claimed recognition as a State from the Powers when they set up the Arab Power in the east of the Congo Free State, and, from a humanitarian point of view, with more right, for the Congo Arabs were gentlemen compared with the Rases who lead Menelek's raiding parties.* It would be a thousand pities to surrender Boran to these people.

Afulata, as you know, is most anxious for our protection, and keen to trade with Kismayu.

The Abyssinians will, I expect, find the water their great difficulty in operating on a hostile country as Boran would be, for we know how the Gallas detest them; nor is this suprising when one reflects that they only appear to kill, mutilate, and enslave them so that Menelek may make a little money by shipping them in French dhows to Arabia.

If, however, we are prepared to compromise, we might accept a middle term between our original frontier with Italy and the line which Menelek persuaded Harrington to recommend. We might, I should think, make our line run from the junction of the Dawa and the Juba (the point where the Intelligence Department suggested a station in 1897) and follow the river to, say, parallel 5, whence the frontier could be drawn westward so as to include in our sphere Reshiat and all Stephanie. This would give Menelek Konso and Amara in which he has, I believe, already some forts, but would take most of Afulata's country into our sphere; and probably once the frontier was fixed many nomad and pastoral Gallas would come over for safety to our side of it.

I think, on the assumption that we do not mean to be entirely ousted from Boran, the above compromise or something like it should be our "irreducible minimum."

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

South Park, Penshurst, Kent,
October 20, 1899.

---

* The provisions of the Berlin Act in regard to effective occupation only apply to the African *coast*.—H. F.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, November 27, 1899.*

SIR R. RODD and myself met the Foreign Minister and the Governor of Erythræa at the Foreign Office yesterday.

It was settled that notes should be exchanged, in one of which Italy will agree that modifications of the line of 1891 to the south of Tomat shall be recognized. In the other, Italy will recognize the necessity of modifying, north of Tomat, that portion of the above-mentioned line which forms the boundary between the Soudan and Erythræa. It is proposed that the British authorities and the Governor of Erythræa shall settle the boundary on the spot. The latter will arrive in the locality next January.

We have satisfactorily disposed of other local questions.



50 E
19.2.00

India Office,
9 February 1900.

ecretary's.

2. 4.

Sir,

I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for your information, a copy of a letter from the Foreign Office with its enclosures, relative to an application by Messrs Carling and Co., for letters of introduction to assist their senior partner, who is about to visit Abyssinia for the purpose of developing the trade of his firm.

Dated 1 February 1900

There is reason to believe that one, if not the principal, object of Mr Carling's visit may be to extend to Abyssinia the arms trade, with which his firm has been largely connected in the Persian Gulf.

Political Resident,
Aden.

Although

Although, therefore, Mr Carling may properly claim such assistance as is usually given to British subjects for the purpose of developing legitimate trade in foreign countries, care should be taken not to countenance any attempt on his part to establish a trade in arms.

I am to request that you will bear these facts in mind should Mr Carling apply to you for assistance.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

A Godley

Foreign Office to India Office.

---

1 February 1900.

Sir

I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you to be laid before the Secretary of State for India the accompanying copies of correspondence with Messrs E.W. Carling & Co relative to their request for letters of introduction to the Resident at Aden, H.M. Agent at Adis Abeba and the British Consular officers at Harrar and Zeyla in favour of Mr E.W. Carling who is about to visit Abyssinia for the purpose of developing the trade of the firm in that country.

A copy of the instructions which have been sent to Mr Harrington and Consul General Sadler on the subject is also enclosed and I am to suggest that similar instructions should be sent to the Resident at Aden if Lord George Hamilton sees no objection.

I am, &c.,
(Sd) T.H. Sanderson.

Messrs E.W. Carling & Co to the F.O.

Clements Lane
4 January. 00

My Lord,

We beg to inform you that some time ago we established a branch house of our firm in Harrar, Abyssinia principally for the introduction of Manchester fabrics, and have been partially successful in competition with French subjects who hitherto have done nearly the whole trade in Abyssinia, but we find that it will be necessary for one of the partners of our firm to visit Harrar and Adis Abeba for the further development and enlargement of the trade, and the introduction of other British manufactures.

Our senior, Mr E.W. Carling, proposes paying a visit shortly to Harrar and the capital Adis Abeba and we should be extremely obliged if you will be good enough to furnish us with letters of introduction in his favour to the British Residents and Consuls in Aden, Zeyla, Harrar and Adis Abeba, for, as stated by Count Gleichen in his work "with the Mission to Menelek" nearly the whole of the trade in Abyssinia is done through its Port, which is the case, and therefore we should further esteem it a

favour

favour if you would graciously instruct the British Resident in Adis Abeba to assist our Senior in any way he may be able, to facilitate the promotion of audiences he would desire to have with King Menelek.

Awaiting the favour of your reply

We are, &c.,

(Sd) E.W. Carling &Co.

F.O. to Messrs Carling & Co

---

12 January 1900.

Gentlemen,

I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th inst., asking for letters of introduction to the British officials at Aden, Zeyla, Adis Abeba, and Harrar, for Mr E.W. Carling who is about to visit Abyssinia for the purpose of developing the trade carried on by your firm in that country.

I am to enquire whether it is the intention of your firm to carry on a trade in arms at the places mentioned in your letter.

I am, &c.,

(Sd) J.H. Sanderson.

Messrs

Messrs Carling & Co to the F.O.

Clements Inn,
16 January 1900.

My Lord,

We have to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 12th inst, and beg to inform Y.L. that we are not aware that there is any trade in Arms in Abyssinia apart from infrequent small orders for shot guns, and sporting rifles for sporting purposes.

The trade in Abyssinia, as far as our experience goes, is limited to a very great extent, and extends more particularly in any quantity to Lyons and Manchester silks, Manchester Satins, Plushes and Cotton goods, and again a considerable turnover is done in American sheeting.

Our object in visiting Abyssinia, apart from the reasons given in our letter of the 4th instant, is to endeavour to arrange for taking the ~~Queen's~~ King's ivory against cash advances, and obtain, if possible, his orders for the goods above referred to.

We have, &c.,
(Sd) C.W. Carling & Co.

F.O. to Messrs Carling & Co.

F.O.
- January 1900

Gentlemen,

In reply to your letter of the 16th instant I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to inform you that the British officials at Aden, Zeyla, Harrar and Addis Abeba will be duly informed of Mr E.W. Carling's proposed visit to Abyssinia, and of the intentions of your firm with regard to the development of trade in that country.

I am, &c.,
(Sd) —

---

y.

FOREIGN OFFICE.

January 1900.

nfidential.

Sir:-

I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you the accompanying copies of correspondence with Messrs. E. W. Carling and Company, who have asked for letters of introduction to assist their Senior partner Mr. E. W. Carling on a visit which he proposes to make to Abyssinia for the purpose of developing the trade of the firm in that country.

Messrs. Carling state that their principal object is to introduce Manchester fabrics into Abyssinia, but it is known that the usual business of the firm is to carry on a trade in arms. They have in recent years been engaged in a considerable arms traffic in the Persian Gulf although they were aware that the trade was prohibited by the Persian Government.

It

utenant J. L. Harrington,
&c., &c., &c.

2. Colonel Hayes Sadler

It is also believed that Messrs. Carling and Company were recently approached in respect of an Order for the delivery at Jibouti of a large number of Mauser cartridges the ultimate destination of which was not stated.

In view of these facts it is not unlikely that one, if not the principal, object of Mr. Carling's visit may be to push the arms trade in Abyssinia.

Although Mr. Carling may properly claim such assistance as is usually given to British subjects for the purpose of developing legitimate trade in foreign countries, care should be taken not to countenance any attempt on his part to establish a trade in arms, and a watch should be kept on his proceedings.

I request that you will bear these facts in mind should Mr. Carling apply to you for assistance and that you will instruct the British Consular Agent at Harrar in the sense of this despatch.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble Servant,



BRITISH CONSULATE
20 FEB
1900
ZAILA

Dear General

The following information may be of use to you. Here an extract from a letter from Mr. G. W. Lane to me, dated Aden 4th inst:-

" My dear Harold

* * * *

" When I arrived here I was " introduced to a Mr. Carling, " who is going up to Harar, " he said through Zeilah. He " is -X- 15th or 16th instant.

"is expecting a vessel w
" his kit and Camp eq
"I think myself he is going
" through a camp of arms.
" vessel was supposed to be
" war material to Africa
" and has been shadowed
" sometime. ~~past~~ She went
" & then returned and is
" somewhere near
" Forbes - the manager of the
" introduced me + Carling
" shewn up since then. He
" to have left for Zeila
" Merlo, but I think he
" disappeared per French
" to Jibuti. You can

x.
Mr Lane underlining.

take this for what it is worth."
The man is one of the partners"
of the firm which Messalam"
represents x x "

is Harrar now.

---

he are on the Coast out for
Carling here. I suppose he is
in Jibouti but will soon
find out for certain. I do
not think he can pass
any arms & ammunition
up to Harrar & the Jibouti

route, as it closed on
to the hurricane of
hopes bike against the
railway.
I therefore think I shall
Carling here before long &
will of course allow him
land his "camp equipa
or "silk piece goods" (as
calls them?) before I ma
search and a seizure
Please excuse the scraw
write in haste to catch
steamer which returns
Aden via Hodeida.

Yours Sincere

C. Harold

(Confidential)

No. 405 E. A.

A copy[x] of the foregoing print is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, etc.,
(sd) J. B. Wood
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department,
Fort William
The 10th February 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Print, section 3, dated the 18th December, 1899.

[x] With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 1314 of 1900.

Political Department.

Bombay Castle, 16th February 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

J. W. Bazley
Secretary to Government

22/2/00.

I.C. for Pol. Resdt. at Aden.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN.

[December 18.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 18)

(No. 94. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Berbera, December 2, 1899.

IT is reported by some of the Myjertein arrived from their country that about one and a-half months ago Mahomed Abu Bakr Pasha sent a buggalow from Djibouti with rifles and ammunition along the coast to the east of our Protectorate.

The buggalow first touched at Bandar Kasim, where 15 rifles and some ammunition was bought by a brother of the Sultan of the Myjertein. It then proceeded to Ras Alula, in the Italian Protectorate, and commenced selling arms and ammunition to the natives. This was stopped by the Sultan Othman Mahmood, who bought up the whole consignment, said to be, including the 15 rifles sold at Bandar Kasim, 400 rifles and 40,000 rounds of ammunition, for which he is said to have paid between 9,000 and 10,000 rupees.

I have not heard of any connection between Sultan Othman Mahmood and the Dolbahanta, but it is difficult to conceive what the Sultan can want with such a large number of arms, and their presence on the coast is most undesirable, as they could easily find their way thence to the Dolbahanta by land.

I have been unable to ascertain the name of the buggalow and Nakhuda conveying these arms. The pilot of the buggalow was one Ahmed Hassan *alias* Urbeita, a Myjertein of the Abdul Rahman tribe.

Mahomed Abu Bakr Pasha is a son of the Abu Bakr Pasha who was formerly Governor of Zeyla under the Egyptians. He is well known to us, and is now trading at Djibouti, where he is said to act occasionally as Agent to the Abyssinians.

I have informed the Vice-Consul for Italy at Aden and the Political Resident.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

[2390 *s*—3]

No 9/E.A. 11.1.1900.

(Confidential)
No. 2022 E A

A ✳ copy of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay in the Political Department, for information

By order etc,
/sd/ J. B. Wood
Offg Under Secretary to the
Government of India

Foreign Department
Fort William,
The 28th December 1899

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints.
Section 1, dated the 9th September 1899, 22nd September/99, 30th September/99, 3rd October/99 4th October/99, 5th October/99, 9th October/99 12th October/99, 13th October/99, 16th October/99 23rd October/99, 14th October/99 18th October 1899, 20th October/99, 25th October/99 and 30th October 1899 respectively
Section 2, dated the 28th September/99 30th Sept/99, 9th Oct/99, 12th Oct/99, 16th Oct/99 4th Oct/99, 14th Oct/99, 19th Oct/99, 18th Oct/99 23rd Oct/99, 20th Oct/99 and 30th October 1899 respectively
Section 3, dated 28th Sept/99 2nd Oct/99, 9th Oct/99, 16th Oct/99 & 18th Oct/99 respectively.
Section 4, dated the 28th Sept/99 & 16th October/99 respectively
Enclosure in F. O covering letter of 16th Oct/99.
copy of a telegram from Coll. Hayes Sadler to the F. O. d/16/10/99
✳ With 1 spare copy for the Pol. Resident at Aden.

No 11

Confidential

No. 61 of 1900

Political Department

Bombay Castle, 6th January 1900

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

Secretary to Government.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

*Foreign Office to Treasury.**

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 9, 1899.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia,† who is now in England, advocating the grant of a Government guarantee for the purpose of buying out the rights of the French Jibuti-Harrar Railway Company, and replacing that line by one starting from Berbera in the British Somali Coast Protectorate.

Lord Salisbury would be glad to be favoured with any observations which the Lords Commissioners may wish to make on Captain Harrington's despatch.

A similar letter has been addressed to the India Office.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

---

* Also to India Office.

† Captain Harrington, No. 60, August 31, 1899.

[2185 z—1].

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 22, 1899.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to state, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, that in view of the political importance of the continued residence of a British Agent in Abyssinia it becomes necessary to provide for the maintenace of Her Majesty's Mission at Addis Abbeba for a further period.

Their Lordships will remember that by your letter of the 13th August of last year their assent was conveyed to an estimate of 5,106*l.* to meet the expenses of the British Mission for a period of nine months.

It was found necessary, owing to the progress of negotiations with the Emperor Menelek on frontier questions and other matters of Imperial importance, to retain Captain Harrington at Addis Abbeba for a longer period than was estimated for, and the actual duration of his visit was ten and a-half months. It will be seen from the inclosed copy of a despatch from Captain Harrington that the total expenditure incurred by him during this period was 4,417*l.* 7*s.* 11*d.*, and therefore well within the limits of the Estimate, which was calculated for nine months only.

Lord Salisbury is of opinion that, although it is most probable that the British Mission to Abyssinia must ultimately be placed on a permanent footing, it will be sufficient for the present, until the requirements are more fully ascertained by experience, to continue to charge the expenditure of the Mission under the sub-head "Special Missions," and to provide for its maintenance for a further period of ten months.

The arduous and responsible character of the work performed by Her Majesty's Agent, and the half-civilized nature of the country where he is compelled to reside, make it necessary, in Lord Salisbury's opinion, that an Assistant should be attached to the Mission to help Captain Harrington in the work and to take his place during possible periods of illness. During Captain Harrington's stay at Addis Abbeba it was at one time necessary to consider whether an officer should not be sent for this purpose, and it was only owing to the visit to Abyssinia of some English travellers that the immediate necessity of sending out an Assistant was removed.

Their Lordships will find in the second inclosure to Captain Harrington's despatch, transmitted herewith, an estimate of the expenditure of the Mission for a further period of ten months amounting to 5,500*l.* 1*s.* 8*d.*

Lord Salisbury considers that this estimate, including the proposed salary at the rate of 400*l.* a-year to the Assistant, is reasonable, and he trusts that it will receive the favourable consideration of the Lords Commissioners.

As Captain Harrington proposes to start for his post next month, I am to request you to move their Lordships to favour Lord Salisbury with a reply at their early convenience.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

[2185 *s*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 30.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, September* 30, 1899.

THE Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury have had before them Mr. Bertie's letter of the 27th instant, with its inclosures, intimating that the Marquess of Salisbury has taken the necessary steps for the immediate dispatch from India to Berbera of a native cavalry regiment and four companies of native infantry, in order to cope with an incursion of a fanatical Mollah into the Somaliland Protectorate.

My Lords sanction the necessary expenditure connected with this expedition, so far as it cannot be met by Protectorate funds, and will await the further communication as to the provision of funds which is indicated in the last paragraph of the letter under reply.

In the meantime, their Lordships think it well to state the main considerations which will govern the expenditure to be incurred: The whole expenses of the Indian contingent outside India must be repaid to the Government of India, and it will be proper to stipulate beforehand that the pay and allowances of the contingent while serving out of India will be at the precise rates prescribed by Indian Regulations. On this latter basis (which has been agreed to between the Secretary of State and this Board, as recorded in the Treasury letter of the 7th June last), it will be possible to procure from the Government of India an exact estimate per mensem of the pay, &c., of the force; and the cost of transport can similarly be ascertained.

My Lords request that this information may be obtained by telegraph and communicated to them, together with an approximate estimate from the Protectorate of the total local cost per mensem of victualling the force, providing transport, and similar charges in Somaliland. With such data and a statement of the available resources of the Protectorate, my Lords will be in a position to consider at the proper time what should be the amount for which it may be necessary to make application to Parliament before the close of the financial year.

I am, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS MOWATT.

No. 2.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 30.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 30, 1899.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th instant, and to acquaint you in reply that Lord George Hamilton concurs in the dispatch of the required force from India to Somaliland on the understanding that all the expenses, ordinary and extraordinary, connected therewith, will be defrayed from Imperial revenues.

A copy of a telegram which has been addressed to the Viceroy of India is forwarded for the Marquess of Salisbury's information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. WHITMORE SMITH,

Assistant Military Secretary.

Inclosure in No. 2.

Lord G. Hamilton to the Government of India.

India Office, September 29, 1899.

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram of 25th September: Somaliland.

Foreign Office, guided by advice of War Office, ask for a specially-selected native cavalry regiment, and four companies of native infantry to be dispatched as soon as possible to Berbera under an officer of experience. If you have no objection, please arrange accordingly. All expenses to be borne by Imperial Government.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Consul-General Sadler.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October 3, 1899.*

IN continuation of my telegram of the 29th of last month, I have to inform you that a cavalry regiment and four companies of native infantry, to replace those at Aden who will be sent on the expedition, will be supplied by the Indian Government from Bombay.

You will be informed through the Resident when the date is fixed for the departure of the troops from India.

[2233 *c*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 97.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 4, 1899.*

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you a copy of a letter from the India Office,* inclosing a communication from the Government of India on the subject of the export duty levied on live stock exported to Aden from the Somali Coast Protectorate.

You will observe that the Government of India consider that a refund of duty should be granted at Aden on all live stock imported from the Protectorate for the use of the Government.

It is true that such an arrangement was suggested by you in 1897 before the transfer of the Protectorate, but when the administration was taken over by the Imperial Government no reason any longer existed for refunding the duties, and you were instructed accordingly in the despatch from this Office No. 8 of the 9th November, 1898.

It appears that the effect of the duty has not yet been reported to the Government of India, but that the loss to the contractors has been estimated at about 5,720 rupees a-year.

I am to request that you will furnish Lord Salisbury with a report showing what loss would be entailed upon the revenues of the Protectorate if the request of the Government of India were acceded to.

I am, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

No. 2.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 98.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 4, 1899.*

THE Marquess of Salisbury has had under his consideration, in communication with the Secretary of State for India, your despatch No. 58 of the 22nd July last, regarding the transfer of the securities standing to the credit of the Rer Hared Fund in the Aden Treasury to the name of Her Majesty's Consul-General in the Somali Coast Protectorate.

I am directed by his Lordship to inform you that this arrangement is approved by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

No. 3.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 4, 1899.*

I HAVE laid before the Marquess of Salisbury your letter of the 27th ultimo, conveying the sanction of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to the estimate 5,500*l.* 1*s.* 8*d.*, submitted to them for the maintenance of Captain Harrington's mission to Abyssinia for a period of ten months.

I am to state, for their Lordships' information, that Captain Harrington has been consulted with regard to the necessity of continuing to employ two interpreters.

He has replied that at present it would be absolutely impossible for him to dispense with the services of either of them.

I am, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

---

* India Office, September 27, 1899.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Foreign Office to War Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 5, 1899.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you copies of two telegrams received yesterday from Her Majesty's Consul-General on the Somali Coast,* calling attention to the great difficulty of providing food and forage for the regiment of native cavalry which, at Lord Salisbury's request, based on the recommendations in your letter of the 18th ultimo, the Government of India are preparing to send to Berbera.

I am to point out that since the date of that letter the situation has changed in some important respects. The cavalry regiment was requisitioned with a view to the quick pursuit and capture of the Mollah, but, as reported in Colonel Sadler's telegram of the 29th ultimo, the Mollah has now left Burao and retired to Bohotle, in the extreme south of the Protectorate, where it is impossible to proceed against him, and, therefore, the services of such a large body of cavalry would seem no longer so necessary.

The accompanying copy of a despatch received from Colonel Sadler on the 2nd instant† contains his views as to the troops required to meet the situation. Since this despatch was written, he has consulted the Resident at Aden, and they have recommended that the infantry to be employed should be raised to two battalions. The total force which they consider requisite would therefore consist of—

100 cavalry;
2 battalions of native infantry;
2 Maxims;
20 sappers;
A portable search-light, and
2 Norton's tubes.

Lord Salisbury would be glad to be informed as speedily as possible whether the altered circumstances of the situation modify the views expressed in your letter of the 18th September, and, if so, whether Lord Lansdowne considers that the force now proposed by the Resident at Aden and Colonel Sadler is sufficient to insure the accomplishment of the objects desired, namely, the occupation of Burao and the restoration of order, without the risk of a reverse.

I am, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

No. 2.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 5, 1899.

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of yesterday's date, inclosing copies of two telegrams from Colonel Hayes Sadler with regard to the proposed expedition against the Mollah, I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a letter which has been addressed to the War Office by this Department,‡ calling attention to the changed situation owing to the retreat of the Mollah and the difficulties of providing food and forage for a cavalry regiment, and inquiring whether, in these circumstances, the force originally asked for by Colonel Sadler, after consultation with the Resident at Aden, might not be better adapted to the requirements of the situation.

* Consul-General Sadler, Telegraphic, October 3 and 4, 1899.
† Consul-General Sadler, No. 75, September 14, 1899.
‡ No. 1.

A copy of a further despatch from Colonel Sadler is also inclosed, in which he fully explains his views.*

I am to suggest, if Lord George Hamilton sees no objection, that the departure of the force from India might be postponed until a reply has been received from the War Office to the inclosed letter.

A further communication will be addressed to you as soon as that reply has been received.

I am, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

---

* Consul-General Sadler, No. 75, September 14, 1899.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 9.)

(No. 77. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Aden, September* 28, 1899.

FINDING that his Dolbahanta horsemen would not stay any longer so far inside Ishak territory, the Mullah left Odweina and returned to Burao about the 15th instant. His next move was to send a force which attacked the Aysa Musa at Upper Sheikh, burnt the village of the rival religious community situated there, and made off with a quantity of live-stock belonging to the Aysa Musa. About fifteen of the Aysa Musa were killed, and the Mullah's force lost seven or eight persons killed. The above was verified by a party of the Camel Corps which I sent out under the Ressaldar to reconnoitre at Upper Sheikh.

In my telegram of the 20th and 22nd instant I informed your Lordship of the strength of the force which, according to military opinion here it would be necessary to employ for the operations suggested in my telegram of the 12th instant, with which military opinion here was generally in accord.

This force is put down at 100 cavalry, 25 sappers, and two battalions of infantry, with two Maxims. As no grass will be obtainable at this season of the year, all supplies will have to be carried and provision made for water in places, some 1,200 to 1,300 camels will be required, and it is for the convoying of transport beyond Upper Sheikh, the establishment of a strong post at Upper Sheikh, and of intermediate posts between Upper Sheikh and Burao, that one of the two battalions of infantry will be required. The carriage of grass for the horses of the cavalry adds enormously to our difficulties, but cavalry we must have.

Up to the 22nd there was no change in the situation. I am every moment expecting despatches from Berbera, but it is doubtful if they arrive in time to be dealt with by this mail. Any news of importance will be submitted to your Lordship by telegram.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 12, 1899.

I HAVE laid before the Marquess of Salisbury your letter of the 11th instant, inclosing copy of a telegram from the Viceroy inquiring whether two transports, taken up to convey cavalry to Berbera, may now be released.

I am directed by his Lordship to state, for the information of Lord George Hamilton, that as the situation has materially altered in regard to the fanatical Mollah, and the last telegram from Her Majesty's Consul-General on the Somali Coast is to the effect that the Mollah's following is dispersing, Lord Salisbury has therefore decided that a regiment of cavalry will not be wanted, and that the force of cavalry to be employed may be restricted to 100.

His Lordship is still awaiting the views of the War Office as to the force of infantry which should be sent to Berbera.

I am, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 13.)

Sir,

Admiralty, October 13, 1899.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated the 12th instant from the Commander-in-chief on the East Indies Station respecting state of affairs in Somaliland.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Rear-Admiral Bosanquet to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Trincomalee, October* 12, 1899.

FOLLOWING telegram received from "Pomone":—

"Everything is quiet. No further apprehension of disturbances. Presence of a war-ship no longer necessary. Her Majesty's Consul-General at Berbera concurs.

"'Pomone' has been instructed to return to Aden."

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 79. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Aden, October* 4, 1899.

IN my telegram of the 29th ultimo I had the honour of communicating to your Lordship the latest information regarding the Mullah's movements.

On the 23rd ultimo reports were received in Berbera that the force had retired to Ber; on the 26th information was received that the Mullah had evacuated Ber, and was well on his way to Bohotele; and the following day Somalis coming in from Ber reported that place as deserted.

At Ber the Mahmood Girad horsemen left the Mullah in a body. Two conflicting reasons are given for their departure. According to one account, their horses are worn out with want of fodder, and they left to get fresh horses from the Dolbahanta. The other report is that they left the Mullah in disgust, calling him a fraud. They had, they said, been told they would be taken to Berbera, and had been promised loot, which they never got. They had also been told that bullets could not hurt them, and that no harm would come to them, whereas two of their number had been killed at Sheikh by one Aysa Musa bullet, and a number of Dolbahanta men had been seized and taken prisoners to Berbera. Taken in conjunction with the Mullah's retrograde move, the latter reason is the more probable.

The following from the Habr Toljaala are reported to have dispersed to their karias in the neighbourhood of Ber; Sultan Nur is said to have fallen out with the Mullah, and to have moved with the Musa Ismaïl and some of the Rer Yusuf to their usual haunts in the Arori plain, and the only people now with the Mullah are probably the Aligheri, who inhabit the country round about Bohotele, and a few of the principal men of the Adan Madoba, who are his chief advisers.

There are reports, which have not yet been confirmed, that Sultan Yusuf Ali, of the Mijjertein, hearing that the Mullah had sent his Karia to Lasader, aware of the trouble he had brought on the people, and fearing that he might move further east and establish himself near him, had warned his subjects not to allow his Karia in or near their country, and that the Mullah, on this news reaching him, at once recalled his Karia to Bohotele.

The Girad Farih, the Chief of the Dolbahanta, has lately sent in a caravan to Berbera with a letter and message. The letter was illegible, but the message was to the effect that his old relations with us remained unchanged, though, owing to the evil influence of the Mullah, his orders were no longer obeyed in the Dolbahanta. It seems very doubtful whether the Girad has received letters which I sent him on two occasions. The Mullah is said to be much incensed against him, and to have threatened to proceed against him.

All this points to a probable revulsion of feeling against this fanatic in the eastern Darod country, and if I am able to get in some of the principal Dolbahanta sections, one of his lines of retreat through the Ain Valley eastwards may possibly be cut off.

The Habr Toljaala have gained nothing by this movement, whilst they have had to contribute largely in the matter of provisions. For the last month Berbera has been practically closed to them for supplies; they are now said to be seeking a way out of their difficulties, and though I can as yet be by no means certain of their attitude, influenced as they are by Duali Elmi, the Headman of the Rer Yusuf, I do not anticipate that they will of themselves offer any opposition to our expedition. They are far more likely to come in and ask to be forgiven.

As to the Mullah's intentions, it is impossible to express any definite opinion. I doubt if he knows himself what he will do. If left to himself it does not seem likely that he will contemplate another move northwards till the next spring rains. His move against the western Habr Yunis was not altogether a success, and the combina-

tion of tribes west of Odweina must have shown him that he is not likely to meet with a favourable reception in that direction.

We cannot, however, allow him a free hand over the tribes in our hinterland any longer, and it is just as important that we should occupy Burao and settle the Habr Toljaala country now that the Mullah has retreated south, as it was when he occupied Burao.

It is just possible that as a final effort to maintain his position and retain his hold over the tribes who have so far followed him, the Mullah may proclaim a jehad when we advance.

How far such a call would be responded to would, of course, depend on the temper of the southern tribes, which is not likely to be definitely ascertained till we get to Burao. I should, however, say that none but the remoter tribes, such as the Aligheri, who do not know our power, would answer such a call, and with them it would be doubtful.

Now that he is back again in the Dolbahanta he is in a more favourable position to collect a large following than he was at Burao. He might, under the most favourable conditions, get together a following of up to 10,000 men, which he would be unable to keep together for more than a few days. I do not, however, think it probable either that he will raise a jehad, or that if he does he will succeed in getting together such a number of followers as that noted above, both because, apart from his own preaching, the religious sense of the country would be opposed to such a call, and because his principal advisers, being men from, or acquainted with, Aden, and aware of our resources, would know that any effectual opposition to our arms would be hopeless.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 2.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 80.)
My Lord, *Aden, October* 4, 1899.

I VENTURED to telegraph to your Lordship to-day, and suggest that, owing to the difficulties which the transport of grass would undoubtedly entail if a whole regiment of native cavalry be employed on the expedition, it would, in my opinion, be desirable that the infantry should predominate; that this was the view held here by the military authorities; and that they had represented this view to the Government of India.

As a matter of fact no grass can be guaranteed between Berbera and Burao; the year is a dry one, and the little grass there was south of Sheikh has been consumed by the Mullah's horsemen. Rain is reported to have fallen at Sheikh, but I have no information yet as to the extent or how far it will affect the question of fodder.

Consequently the carriage of grass for a regiment of native cavalry would be a very serious difficulty, and would add largely to the number of transport animals and followers, and considerably enhance the cost of the expedition.

Subsequently to the dispatch of this telegram the General Officer Commanding at Aden received a wire from the Lieutenant-General commanding Bombay asking whether I concurred in the proposals which the General Officer Commanding at Aden had submitted by despatch on the 24th ultimo as to the composition of the force to be employed on the expedition, which I communicated to your Lordship in my telegrams of the 20th and 22nd, and my despatch No. 77 of the 28th ultimo.

To this the General Officer Commanding at Aden has, with my consent, sent the following reply:—

"The Consul-General concurred entirely with my proposals as to the composition of force with the exception of the second battalion, in regard to which his opinion is that if it is necessary from a military point of view it should be sent. I consider it necessary as already explained."

These proposals were made partly before and partly after my arrival here; they were framed on the information I supplied as to the political situation and the character of the country, and were formulated before the composition of the force had been settled by the War Office.

As previously stated, the opinion held here is that one battalion of infantry will be required to establish a post at Upper Sheikh, with intermediate posts between there and Burao, and to convoy the large number of transport animals that will be required.

If the War Office would be inclined to reconsider the composition of the force, I am certainly of opinion that a reduction in the cavalry and an increase to the infantry would be more suited to the present conditions of the country.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 3.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 81. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Aden, October 5, 1899.

I HAVE already intimated in previous despatches the general plan of operations I would propose for the expeditionary force. These were to oust the Mullah from Burao, drive him back if he moved westwards, occupy Burao, and leaving a strong post there move through the Habr Toljaala country.

The fact of the Mullah having left Burao and retreated south will not materially affect this general plan of action. The first object of the expedition must be to occupy Burao. In the meanwhile I shall call in the Headmen of the principal sections of the Habr Toljaala, and make such arrangements as may be necessary to withdraw the tribes from the pernicious influence of this Mullah and settle that part of the country.

How far we shall be able to move through the Habr Toljaala country, and in what strength, will depend upon the circumstances as we find them on reaching Burao, and must, to a great extent, be dependent on the available water supply.

Any move beyond Ber, 20 miles south of Burao, will be very difficult with regular troops owing to the absence of proper water; I would propose to report by telegraph from Burao, in consultation with the Officer Commanding the expedition, as to whether a further advance south is to be recommended on the conditions as we find them.

It is with a view to search for water that the supply of two Norton's tubes has been suggested.

With regard to my dealings with the Habr Toljaala and other tribes round Burao it has to be borne in mind that these tribes are aware that they have incurred our displeasure, and that if they think operations are directed against them they will flee ahead of us with their flocks, and either get into an inaccessible part of the country or go straight over to the Mullah. This is a contingency I am particularly anxious to avoid. I, therefore, do not propose any punitive operations against tribes not actually found in arms with the Mullah.

I would propose, with your Lordship's approval, to issue a Proclamation to the tribes concerned previous to the departure of the expedition, stating that the object of the expedition is to restore order in the Habr Toljaala and Habr Yunis country, and calling upon the Headmen of the principal sections to come in to me at Burao, adding that there will be "aman" for all who come in, but that tribes who do not send in their Headmen or who run away from us will be considered as hostile to the Government.

With regard to Sultan Nur, it is very doubtful whether he should be again recognized by us, and the western Habr Yunis, who have held aloof from this movement, would now probably refuse to acknowledge him.

Had the Mullah held fast at Burao or moved westwards, the employment of friendlies might have been useful. Under present conditions they would only hamper me in dealing with the Habr Toljaala and eastern Habr Yunis, and in the general settlement of the country; it would be difficult to restrain them from committing reprisals at a distance from the line of march, and were they to accompany us, I should have difficulty in getting the tribes to come in. I would, therefore, not employ friendlies on this expedition; and for other reasons it is better that we should depend on our own resources.

It will be desirable to recoup the friendlies for the loss they have suffered at the hands of the Mullah's followers, also certain of our officials, who have been looted solely because they are in our service. This will best be done, after the claims have been carefully investigated, by putting a punitive tax on all Habr Toljaala, eastern Habr Yunis, and Dolbahanta camels entering our ports; 2 rupees per camel is the amount I should at present be inclined to fix.

I consider, also, that a portion of the expenses of the expedition should be recovered in the same manner; but on this point the questson as to how long the tax can continue to be imposed will have to be taken into acconnt with trade considerations.

I propose to give the tribes to clearly understand that if they have any further dealings with the Mullah they will be considered as hostile to the Administration, and will be dealt with as such. Over many of them we could exercise an effective control by the threat of a blockade of the refractory tribe in both Aden and Berbera, besides inflicting loss on them in their live-stock.

The Resident at Aden is quite in accord with that part of these proposals which relates to the operations of the expeditionary force and the non-employment of friendlies.

I venture to ask that I may be informed by telegram if the line of procedure noted in this despatch meets with your Lordship's approval.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

---

o

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 23.)

(No. 82. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Aden, October* 12, 1899.

THE only information of importance received in Berbera up to the 6th instant was the confirmation of previous reports that the Mollah's following had dispersed, and that he himself was supposed to have left Bohotele for a place further east, so as to be within easy reach of Lasader. Reports regarding him are becoming day by day more vague and meagre.

It is pretty generally believed that a Government expedition is on foot, and the Habr Toljaala and eastern Habr Yunis tribes are now reported to be anxious to make their peace with the Administration. Some of the sections are coming surreptitiously into Berbera and posing as peaceful citizens, others are sending in Petitions to show that they had nothing ts do with the Mollah, or had suffered at his hands.

This is all very well. It is a natural sequence to the Mollah's retirement. But we have to guard as far as possible against a repetition of recent events in the nearer portions of our Hinterland, and show the tribes by a display of force in their country, of which they have hitherto had no experience, that we will not allow them to play fast and loose with us, and that the means of punishing them are at hand if they do.

Her Majesty's Government will doubtless consider whether it is worth while to incur the cost of an expedition now that the Mollah's following has dispersed, and he may be said to be out of our reach. This view of the situation has not escaped me. Personally, I have never had much hope of catching the Mollah. It could only be done had he stood his ground and awaited our advance, or were he to remain with a small following in the nearer portions of the Protectorate long enough for a surprise to be effected.

Neither of these eventualities were at any time to be depended upon. He is said to have taken extraordinary precautions to safeguard his person, amongst others retaining a bodyguard of Midgans with poisoned arrows, and these precautions would point to his not exposing himself in a position where he would be liable to be caught.

With the Habr Toljaala and the eastern Habr Yunis the events of the past few months now force us to exercise greater interference than I should have contemplated for some time to come. Our hands have, so to say, been forced by this movement which originated in the Dolbahanta, and by the necessity which has now arisen of breaking the Mollah's influence over the Ishak tribes.

As the situation at present is, it is most important to secure a proper control over the Habr Toljaala and the eastern Habr Yunis. This can partly be done from Berbera by checking their supplies, but we see that measures taken from Berbera are not of themselves effective when the tribes move south and are for the time being independent of our port towns. To effect this control we should for a time hold the water supply at Burao, and by a show of force in that direction and in parts of the Habr Toljaala country make it evident to the people that we will not allow any of the Ishak sections to be with us at one time of the year when they are dependent on us for supplies, and against us at another when they are not so dependent. The control of the wells at Burao and the move of an expedition will at once make this position clear to them.

How long we should hold Burao, and whether or not it will be necessary to keep a permanent post there will, depend upon circumstances. The present is an

opportune time to occupy the wells, as the neighbouring tribes are dependent on them till next March.

If we do not move now and content ourselves with taking action against those who hold aloof from us in our coast towns, we shall have no guarantee against the repetition in Ishak territory of recent events as soon as the next spring rains fall, or indeed at any time it may suit the Mollah to again attempt an incursion into Ishak country. The people will think us apathetic, and when the Mollah appears again, as he is certain to do unless it is made plain that he will be opposed by us, the people, uncertain as to whether we will employ force or not, will be apt to think they are left to themselves, with the result that they will be more or less thrown into his hands. Although most of the Ishak sections who have been affected by this movement have suffered thereby, the way has, in a manner, been paved for a fresh iucursion by the Mollah against them, and for the extension of his influence over them ; it is these results we have now to counteract.

There is another reason why any delay in the despatch of an expedition would be inadvisable. For some time past I have been aware of a feeling in the Protectorate that with its severance from Aden the Administration has been left to its own resources, and that troops would not be available for offensive operations. An impression has also gained ground amongst the Somalis that the expedition of Friendlies against the Rer Hared in 1895 was not approved by Government, and that that was to be the last expedition into the interior. These ideas are mischievous, they may have had something to do with the late troubles, and the sooner they are dispelled the better.

For the above reasons I am of opinion that the retirement of the Mollah has not materially altered the situation, except in so far that he no longer threatens Berbera, and that it is necessary to proceed with the expedition on the general line of operations submitted in my despatch No. 81 of the 5th instant.

This leaves the Dolbahanta out of the question for the time being. The settlement of that part of the country is not so important to us at present as that of the nearer Habr Toljaala, and it would be difficult to devise measures by which this could be effected without great cost, certainly till we know more about the attitude of the tribes than we do now. As matters stand the gradual weaning of the tribes from the influence of the Mollah, coupled with the closing of our ports to those who shelter him or afford him assistance, are the measures I would rely on for the present in dealing with the Dolbahanta Later on other means may, perhaps, be found practicable, but in the first instance we must make sure of the Habr Toljaala. This done, and our hold established over the Ishak country, many of the Darod (Dolbahanta) sections may be expected to see that they have more to gain by peacefully trading with our ports than by following in the wake of this fanatical priest.

It has been ascertained that the rainfall has not been sufficient to raise a fresh crop of grass between Sheikh and Burao.

As regards the possible co-operation of the Abyssinians in any offensive movement against the Mollah, it is to be observed that this line of retreat through the Ogaden, only one of his lines of retreat, would be at a considerable distance from the Harrar frontier, that it would be difficult for an Abyssinian force to effectually guard our frontier at that distance from its base, and that in all probability it would loot every Ogaden tribe it came across.

An Abyssinian force carries no rations, and depends for its supplies on what it can make the country supply. It is true that some of the Ogaden were with the Mollah at Burao, these were probably from tribes situated within the immediate range of his influence; on the other hand, the Ogaden are sending in their caravans much as usual, and I have no grounds for assuming that the tribes of the Ogaden are as a body in any way opposed to us. Under these circumstances, it appears to me very questionable whether the reasons advanced in my despatch No. 57 of the 22nd July last against an early movement of the Abyssinians in the Ogaden would not still outweigh any advantage we might hope to gain from the appearance of their force to the south of our Protectorate with the view of cutting off the Mollah's retreat. Such is my opinion at present ; it may be modified if any further development takes place.

As a matter of fact, I hear from Harrar that a force of 4,000 men has been assembled at Jigjiga. I had previously heard that an expedition was contemplated against the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun Ogaden, who had failed to comply with the demands of the Abyssinians to restore certain loot to our tribes which lately formed the subject of correspondence. But this number is in excess of what would be required

for this purpose, and it is probable that the force was concentrated on news reaching Harrar through Hargaisa of a probable advance of the Mollah in the direction of Hargaisa.

I have kept Mr. Gerolimato informed of the Mollah's movements as reported from time to time.

A copy of this despatch and of previous despatches in this connection is being sent to Viscount Cromer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Secy. Pol. Secret. Dept. No. 49- 9/3/1899

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 14.)

Sir, *India Office, October* 14, 1899.

WITH reference to recent correspondence on the subject of dispatching certain of Her Majesty's Indian forces to the Somali Coast, Lord George Hamilton has had under his consideration the question whether, in the event of these forces being ordered to proceed to Africa, the case would be one to which section 54 of Act 21 and 22 Vict., cap. 106, would be applicable, requiring due communication of the fact to both Houses of Parliament.

The view which his Lordship holds on this subject is that the section in question does not apply to the present case, on the ground that an order directing Indian troops to be sent to Somaliland, to be used there for the security of British-protected territory and property, and not for the invasion of foreign territory, is not an order "directing the actual commencement of hostilities," although the troops may have to fight.

Section 55 of the same Act is obviously not applicable, as it has not been proposed to defray the cost of any military operations that may be undertaken out of Indian revenues.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 2.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 14.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *India Office, October* 14, 1899.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th October, and, in reply, to forward herewith, for the information of the Marquess of Salisbury, copy of a telegram which has been addressed to the Viceroy of India.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. WHITMORE SMITH,
Assistant Military Secretary.

Inclosure in No. 2.

Lord G. Hamilton to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *India Office, October* 13, 1899.

YOUR telegram of 11th October, Somaliland. One hundred cavalry only will be required instead of cavalry regiment. Further information regarding infantry will be sent later. Possibly two battalions will be required.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 18.)

Sir, *India Office, October* 17, 1899.

IN continuation of the letter from this Office of the 14th October, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Marquess of Salisbury, copy of a telegram which has been received from the Viceroy of India.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. STEDMAN, *Major-General,*
Military Secretary.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

YOUR telegram of the 13th October. Berbera. We can send 100 cavalry at once, if it be desired. No native infantry have been sent yet, except reliefs, but remainder 10th Bombay Infantry can be sent from Aden, when relieved by 5th Bombay Infantry. We should be glad to receive definite instructions as soon as possible.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 19.)

Sir, *War Office, October* 18, 1899.

IN reply to your letter of the 5th instant, inclosing copies of further telegrams which have been received from the Consul-General of the Somali Coast, together with a copy of his despatch of the 14th ultimo, I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that in view of the difficulty which the Consul-General appears to anticipate in obtaining a sufficiency of grass on the Somali plateau at this season, Lord Lansdowne is prepared to agree to the reduction of the cavalry, previously recommended in War Office letter of the 18th ultimo, to 100 men as recommended by the Consul-General, after consultation with the Resident at Aden, in his despatch of the 14th ultimo.

I am, however, to observe that the question under consideration appears to have entirely changed in character since your letter was written. From Colonel Sadler's telegram of the 9th instant, Lord Lansdowne gathers that all immediate danger has disappeared, that no resistance is to be anticipated, and that, in fact, in order to re-establish British influence in the hinterland of the Somali Protectorate all that is now necessary is to march a small force as far as Burao, and to occupy that place until complete order is restored. In these altered circumstances, I am to state that his Lordship hardly feels any longer called upon to express any opinion respecting the strength of the force which may be required—this question being one which might perhaps more conveniently be arranged between the Foreign Office and the Consul-General; but I am to say that, in the event of the Mollah reappearing later on with a force of Dolbahanta men at his back numbering from 8,000 to 10,000, a contingency which, though perhaps remote, was considered by the Consul-General, according to the statement in his telegram of the 29th ultimo, to be not impossible, Lord Lansdowne is of opinion that the force mentioned in the letter under reply should certainly be sufficient to accomplish the occupation of Burao, and probably the complete restoration of order without risk of a reverse.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. H. KNOX.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 24, 1899.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 20th instant I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you a copy of a telegram which was sent yesterday to Her Majesty's Consul-General for the Somali Coast Protectorate,* informing him that it is considered expedient to postpone any military operations in the interior of the Protectorate, and to take for the present only such measures as are necessary for the security of the ports, for which object it is hoped that such assistance as Aden can supply will be sufficient.

A telegram has been received from Colonel Sadler in reply, of which a copy is also inclosed,† stating that he can procure sufficient aid from Aden to reinforce the ports before the spring, should this be necessary.

In these circumstances the dispatch of troops from India is no longer required, and I am to request that Lord G. Hamilton will inform the Government of India accordingly, and ask that orders may be given for releasing at once, as quietly as possible, the two transports which had been taken up for conveyance of troops to Berbera.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

---

* To Colonel Sadler, October 23, 1899.

† Colonel Sadler, October 24, 1899.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 108.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 20, 1899.

I HAVE received your telegram No. 190 of the 20th respecting the Abyssinian frontier, and I approve your suggestions for instructions to Mr. Harrington as to the attitude he should observe in his interviews with King Menelek on this subject.

[2233 *u*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 103.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 25, 1899.

THE Marquess of Salisbury has received your despatch No. 78 of the 1st instant on the subject of the claims preferred against the Administration of the French Settlement at Jibuti in connection with the late raid in the British Protectorate.

I am directed by his Lordship to inform you that, in the circumstances stated in your despatch, he approves your action in authorizing an advance from the Protectorate revenues of two sums of 5,432 rupees, and 405 rupees, as compensation to the families who suffered loss either of relations or property during the raid.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

[2233 *bb*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 30.)

Sir, *India Office, October 28, 1899.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 24th October, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Marquess of Salisbury, copy of a telegram dated the 25th October, 1899, which has been addressed to the Viceroy of India.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. STEDMAN, *Major-General,*
Military Secretary.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *India Office, October 25, 1899.*

YOUR telegram of the 16th October.

Somaliland. Troops from India not now required. Release transports as quickly as possible.

No. 2.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir E. Monson.

(No. 349.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 30, 1899.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch which has been received from Her Majesty's Consul-General for the Somali Coast,* on the subject of the claims preferred against the Administration of the French Settlement at Jibuti in connection with the late raid in the British Protectorate.

Your Excellency should take an opportunity of mentioning this matter to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs with a view to obtaining a settlement of the claims.

Copies of the previous despatches on this subject received from Colonel Hayes Sadler are inclosed for convenience of reference.†

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

---

* Consul-General Sadler, No. 78.

† Consul-General Sadler, No. 6, February 19; No. 7, February 28; No. 8, March 4; No. 9, March 7; No. 17, March 27; and No. 41, May 15, 1899.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 28.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, September* 27, 1899.

WITH reference to your letter of the 22nd instant on the subject of the proposed extension for a further period of ten months of Her Majesty's Mission at Adis Abeba, I am directed by the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to state that, on the recommendation of the Marquess of Salisbury, they sanction the salary of 400*l.* per annum for an Assistant to be attached to the Mission and the estimate of expenditure submitted by Captain Harrington at a total of 5,500*l.* 1*s.* 8*d.* for the ten months (including 537*l.* on account of the salary and expenses of the Assistant and 245*l.* for contingencies).

I am, however, to refer to the provision for two Interpreters, and to inquire whether Captain Harrington now finds it impossible to dispense with one of them, as he had hoped to do after a few months (*vide* his letter of the 28th July, 1898, inclosed in yours of the 13th August, 1898).

My Lords approve of the proposal of the Secretary of State to continue to charge the expenditure for the further period to the Special Mission Sub-head of the Diplomatic and Consular Vote.

I am, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS MOWATT.

No. 2.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 28.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 27, 1899.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th ultimo, and to inform you that as the Government of India appear to have agreed to the transfer of the securities of the "Rer Hared Fund" to the name of Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Somali Coast Protectorate, subject to 150 rupees per annum being placed at the disposal of the Political Agent at Aden to provide passages for indigent and sick Somalis, the Secretary of State for India in Council has no objection to the transfer being completed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Consul-General Sadler.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September* 30, 1899.

WAR Office have considered your telegram of the 22nd instant as to the composition of the force to operate against the Mollah. In their opinion the troops to be employed should be furnished from India and not drawn from Aden, and should consist of four companies of native infantry, a specially selected native cavalry regiment, and the two machine-guns which should have arrived at Aden on the 22nd instant.

The Government of India will be instructed to dispatch this force to Berbera and to put in command a fully qualified officer, to whom you should allow a free hand as far as possible.

The Abyssinians may offer to assist, but Her Majesty's Government do not consider it desirable that Abyssinian troops should operate within the limits of the British Somali Coast Protectorate.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 194. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Brussels, October 7, 1899.*

WHEN I was with M. de Cuvelier this afternon, I took the opportunity of inviting his attention to the article, herewith inclosed, from the "Métropole" of Antwerp, respecting the ivory raiding expedition which is said to be proceeding from the Congo State into the Bahr-el-Ghazal, and I reminded him of the warning I had given him in May and June of this year that Her Majesty's Government would not recognize the right of the King to take action of this nature in that country.

M. de Cuvelier inquired whether this was an official communication which I had been instructed by your Lordship to make, or only a friendly hint coming from myself.

I said that I had not yet called your Lordship's attention to the article from the "Métropole," but that I knew I was faithfully expressing your views in warning the Congolese Government that Her Majesty's Government would not recognize the right of the King to authorize an expedition into the Bahr-el-Ghazal, under the pretence of the lease of 1894, to seize whatever depôts of ivory might still exist there.

I reminded him that the battle of Omdurman had made great changes since the Convention of 1894 was signed, and that I had expressly warned the King and the Congo Government in May and June last that one result of that campaign was to revive the rights of Egypt, through British intervention, over the Bahr-el-Ghazal.

M. de Cuvelier would not admit the correctness of our contention, but said he had no authority to discuss the question with me at present.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Patriote" of October 7, 1899.

LA "Métropole," feuille favorable au Congo, dit à ce sujet :—

"Malgré l'excitation créée par les affaires du Transvaal, la presse Anglaise ne se désintéresse pas du Bahr-el-Ghazal et signale bruyamment une invasion Belge dans cette région, contraire, prétend-elle, aux Traités.

"Il s'agit tout simplement de l'expédition Chaltin et de la Mission de la Société Générale Africaine. Cette Société a été fondée il y a dix-huit mois à Bruxelles, au capital de 30 millions; elle a envoyé de Matadi une expédition de 300 soldats et 700 porteurs, sous le commandement d'un ancien sous-officier, M. de Backer. Cette expédition opérerait, dit-on, sa jonction avec la colonne Chaltin, dans le Bahr-el-Ghazal, et s'emparerait des stocks d'ivoire qui s'y trouvent.

"Le départ du Commandant Chaltin pour le Bahr-el-Ghazal a fait l'objet de plusieurs démentis officieux. Il paraît qu'elle se vérifie aujourd'hui. On commence à voir clair, mais il a fallu voir pour croire.

"L'État démentira-t-il encore ? Si oui, on se demandera avec raison dans quel but il continue un jeu de cache-cache auquel plus personne ne se laisse prendre."

No. 2.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 9.)

(No. 197.)

Brussels, October 8, 1899.

My Lord,

NOT only M. de Cuvelier, but also one of my diplomatic colleagues, has pressed me this last week to tell them what view Her Majesty's Government now take of the Anglo-Congolese Convention of the 12th May, 1894. Is that Convention still considered to be in force, or not?

The reason for the colleague asking the question was that he imagines the King will take advantage of our difficulties in the Transvaal to push his occupation of the Bahr-el-Ghazal. M. de Cuvelier asked me the question, but only in his personal name, during the conversation reported in my despatch No. 194, Confidential, of yesterday's date.

I have replied to both that the battle of Omdurman has made many changes, and had revived the claims of Egypt, and that the moment was not now opportune for raising further discussion.

As this question will probably be pressed on me again, I shall be grateful to hear whether this reply is approved.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 199.)

My Lord, *Brussels, October* 11, 1899.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 194, Confidential, of the 7th instant, I have the honour to inclose what has the appearance of being a semi-official Declaration of the Congo State Government published in the "Étoile Belge" of this morning.

It affirms that the Sovereign of the Congo State has not dispatched any expedition to occupy the Bahr-el-Ghazal in his name, and is not preparing any military expedition in view of such occupation.

Your Lordship will notice that this does not allude to the so-called commercial expedition under M. de Backer, to which we have every reason to believe Captain Chaltin, of the Congo State service, is to give aid and assistance, and in which the Sovereign of the Congo State is said to be personally largely interested as shareholder in the Company sending the expedition.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Étoile Belge" of October 11, 1899.

LE Souverain de l'État du Congo n'a envoyé aucune expédition chargée d'occuper en son nom Bahr-el-Ghazal. Il n'a aucune expédition militaire en préparation en vue d'occuper le Bahr-el-Ghazal.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 185.)

My Lord, *Cairo, October 6, 1899.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copies of two Orders, putting in force the Soudan Code of Criminal Procedure and the Soudan Penal Code, which after having received the sanction of the Council of Ministers, have been published in the "Official Journal" of the 4th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the Egyptian "Journal Officiel" of October 4, 1899.

An Order putting the Soudan Code of Criminal Procedure in Force.

WHEREAS a Soudan Code of Criminal Procedure, a copy of which is hereto annexed, has been prepared, and copies thereof have been, or will shortly be, placed at the Mudiriehs and Governorates; and whereas the Code is expressed to take effect in such parts of the Soudan as the Governor-General may from time to time by Notice published in the "Soudan Gazette" order; and whereas the judicial administration of the country is not yet completely organized;

It is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The said Soudan Code of Criminal Procedure shall, subject to the later provisions of this Order, take effect in the Provinces of Khartoum, Dongola, Berber, and Sennaar, and in the districts of Wady Halfa and Suakin, as from the 2nd day of October, 1899, or from the date (if later) at which copies thereof shall be placed in the hands of the officers charged with the administration thereof.

2. Until further order, the following provisions shall take effect:—

(1.) The provisions of the Code relating to any act or proceedings to be done or taken by or before any Magistrate or Court shall be applied with such modifications not affecting the substance as, in the opinion of the Magistrate or Court, the circumstances may render necessary.

(2.) The duties under the Code of police officers and of Mamurs acting as Magistrates of the third class shall be performed according to instructions, conformable to the spirit of the Code, to be issued, with due regard to all the circumstances of the case, by the Mudir or Governor of each province or district.

(3.) Cases awaiting trial at the date as from which the Code comes into force shall, so far as circumstances admit, be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Code.

(4.) Copies of the Code shall be open to inspection at the Mudirieh or Governorate of each of the said provinces and districts.

(Signed) KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM,
Governor-General.

Arrêté rendant exécutoire le Code de Procédure Criminelle du Soudan.

Attendu qu'un Code de Procédure Criminelle pour le Soudan, dont ci-joint un exemplaire, a été préparé, et que des exemplaires en ont été ou seront prochainement déposés aux Moudiriehs et Gouvernorats; attendu qu'il est stipulé que ce Code entrera en vigueur dans telles parties du Soudan que le Gouverneur-Général pourrait désigner,

de temps à autre, par un Avis publié dans la "Soudan Gazette," et attendu que l'administration judiciaire du pays n'est pas complètement organisée :

Il est arrêté ce qui suit :

1. Le dit Code de Procédure Criminelle du Soudan sera, sous les restrictions des dispositions finales du présent Arrêté, exécutoire dans les provinces de Khartoum, Dongola, Berber, et Sennaar, et les districts de Wady-Halfa et Suakin, à partir du 2 Octobre, 1899, ou du jour (s'il suit cette date) où les exemplaires de ce Code seront remis aux officiers chargés de l'administration de ces provinces.

2. Jusqu'à nouvel ordre, les dispositions suivantes seront observées :—

(1.) Les Articles du Code relatifs aux actes devant être accomplis par un Magistrat ou une Cour quelconque ainsi que la procédure à suivre devant ces juridictions subiront, dans leur application, telles modifications n'affectant pas la substance de la loi, que le Magistrat ou la Cour jugera nécessaire d'y apporter eu égard aux circonstances.

(2.) Les officiers de police et Mamours, agissant comme Magistrats de la troisième classe, se conformeront, en ce qui concerne l'exercice des attributions que leur confère le Code, aux instructions qui leur seront données par le Moudir ou le Gouverneur de chaque province ou district conformément à l'esprit du Code et après examen de toutes les circonstances du fait.

(3.) Les causes non encore jugées au moment où le Code deviendra exécutoire seront, autant que les circonstances le permettront, vidées conformément aux dispositions de ce Code.

(4.) Des exemplaires du Code seront déposés aux Moudiriehs et Gouvernorats des provinces et districts précités où le public pourra en prendre connaissance.

Approuvé par le Conseil des Ministres dans sa séance du Samedi, 30 Septembre, 1899.

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres,
(Signé) MOUSTAPHA FEHMY.

An Order putting the Soudan Penal Code in Force.

Whereas a Soudan Penal Code, a copy of which is hereto annexed, has been prepared, and copies thereof have been, or will shortly be, placed at the Mudiriehs and Governorates; and whereas such Code is expressed to take effect in such parts of the Soudan as the Governor-General may from time to time by Notice published in the "Soudan Gazette" order :

It is hereby enacted as follows :—

1. The said Soudan Penal Code shall take effect in the Provinces of Khartoum, Dongola, Berber, and Sennaar, and the districts of Wady-Halfa and Suakin as from the 2nd day of October, 1899, or from the date (if later) at which copies thereof may be placed in the hands of the officers charged with the administration thereof.

2. All offences committed prior to the date as from which the Code takes effect and awaiting trial at that date shall, if punishable under the Code, be punished in accordance with its provisions.

3. Copies of the Code shall be open to inspection at the Mudiriehs and Governorates of the said provinces and districts.

(Signed) KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM,
Governor-General.

Arrêté rendant exécutoire le Code Pénal du Soudan.

Attendu qu'un Code Pénal pour le Soudan, dont ci-joint un exemplaire, a été préparé, et que des exemplaires en ont été ou seront prochainement déposés aux Moudiriehs et aux Gouvernorats, et attendu qu'il est stipulé que ce Code entrera en vigueur dans telles parties du Soudan que le Gouverneur-Général pourrait désigner, de temps à autre, par un Avis publié dans le "Soudan Gazette,"

Il est arrêté ce qui suit :

1. Le dit Code Pénal du Soudan sera exécutoire dans les Provinces de Khartoum, Dongola, Berber, et Sennaar, et les districts de Wady Halfa et Souakin, à partir du 2 Octobre, 1899, ou du jour (s'il suit cette date) où les exemplaires de ce Code seront remis aux officiers chargés de l'administration de ces provinces.

2. Toutes les infractions commises antérieurement au jour où le Code sera devenu obligatoire et non encore jugées à ce moment seront, si elles restent punissables aux termes de ce Code, jugées conformément à ses dispositions.

Des exemplaires du Code seront déposés aux Moudiriehs et Gouvernorats des provinces et districts précités où le public pourra en prendre connaissance.

Approuvé par le Conseil des Ministres dans sa séance du Samedi, 30 Septembre, 1899.

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres,
(Signé) MOUSTAPHA FEHMY.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October 4.*)

(No. 181.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, October 4, 1899.

SIRDAR informs me that the force to be employed against the Khalifa consists of two infantry brigades, four squadrons of cavalry, eight Maxims, and five companies of camel corps. A portion of this force has already been dispatched to Naka from Omdurman. The remainder will follow in a few days' time.

The Sirdar should have obtained proper authority for the dispatch of this expedition; I recommend, however, that his proceedings should be approved, as I entertain no objection to the measures on their own merits.

Gedir, which is on the map, is believed to be the place where the Khalifa's camp now is. I think that there is nothing to be done but to trust to the Sirdar's discretion as to how far he should continue to follow the Khalifa if he retires westward, as I find it very difficult to frame any definite instructions.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 14.)

(No. 187.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, October* 14, 1899.

THE Sirdar telegraphed as follows last night from Goz Abu Goma :—

"I hope to reach Kaka about the 16th instant .As mounted troops will have to be brought up by steamer for the last 50 miles it will take some days to concentrate the force. From Kaka to the Khalifa's position will be an eight days' march. According to recent reports the Khalifa is at Gerada, near Gedir, where he intends to remain. Accounts of the road and Khalifa's position are far from satisfactory from our point of view."

I have sent the following reply to this telegram :—

"You may rely on full support whatever course you adopt. You must decide what to do."

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Consul-General Sadler.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 19, 1899.

I AM in receipt of your telegram of yesterday's date.

Taking into consideration the demands for the employment of Her Majesty's forces elsewhere, I have come to the conclusion that any expedition against the Mollah or among the tribes must be postponed, and that operations must in any case be restricted to the occupation of Burao.

If you remain of opinion that such occupation is really necessary, please state what force you require for this purpose beyond that already at your disposal.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir F. Plunkett.

(No. 120. Africa.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1899.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 197, Africa, of the 8th instant, reporting the language held by you to M. de Cuvelier and to one of your colleagues respecting the Anglo-Congolese Convention of 1894.

I approve the terms in which you replied to their inquiries on the subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 2.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir F. Plunkett.

(No. 121. Africa.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1899.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 194, Africa, of the 7th instant, reporting a conversation which you had had with M. de Cuvelier on the subject of the Bahr-el-Ghazal.

I approve your language on the occasion in question as reported.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 23.)

(No. 118. Africa. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Brussels, October* 21, 1899.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 119, Africa, of the 16th instant, I have the honour to report that Marquis Imperiali spoke to me at the time of his conversation at the Congo State Department respecting the right claimed by the King to occupy the Bahr-el-Ghazal under the lease of 1894, and I am probably the high English Official to whom he alludes as having told him that Her Majesty's Government contested this view.

I told him Her Majesty's Government did not in any way admit such a right.

Marquis Imperiali had this conversation with M. de Cavelier.

I have not seen any member of the Congo State Department now for some time. In the continued absence of Baron van Eetvelde, who still is nominally Secretary of State, there is little use in speaking with M. de Cavelier except on direct and definite instructions, for he is too much in awe of his royal master to give any interesting information or assume any responsibility without authority from the Palace.

Your Lordship will recollect that no official reply has yet been made to the message from the King sent in Mr. Raikes' despatch No. 129, Africa, of the 24th June last, and I reported in my despatches No. 194 and No. 197 of the 7th and 8th instant that M. de Cavelier asked me again what view Her Majesty's Government now take of the Convention of 1894. Meanwhile I much fear that the Sovereign of the Congo State will do his utmost to favour the advance of the so-called Commercial expedition which he claims he has a right to authorize in the districts leased to him by Great Britain.

His Majesty will do this all the more that he supposes Great Britain to be too much occupied with the Transvaal to care to interfere at present with his proceedings in the Bahr-el-Ghazal, and a relatively short time may suffice for his agents to seize whatever stocks of ivory they may discover in those regions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

No. 2.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Consul-General Sadler.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 23, 1899.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 82, of the 12th instant, and your telegram of the 22nd instant.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that in the circumstances described you should for the present confine all military measures to what is requisite for ensuring the security of the ports, and that any operations in the interior of the Protectorate should be deferred.

You may, with the concurrence of the Resident at Aden, ask for troops not exceeding 100 cavalry and 300 infantry if you consider any reinforcements from India necessary for the security of the ports.

It is the hope of Her Majesty's Government that with such assistance as Aden can furnish, you will find it possible to manage until next Spring. If so, you should inform me in order that the transports which have been taken up to convey troops to Berbera may be quietly released by the Government of India.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 190.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, October 20, 1899.*

ABYSSINIAN frontiers.

The course of affairs in the Transvaal will probably render Harrington's negotiations more easy to carry on, but I think it would be well to instruct him not to press matters. If, however, he is obliged to enter into a discussion with King Menelek, it seems necessary to give him a discretionary power to speak, in order to avoid putting him in an awkward position, which would incur a loss of influence with the King.

I propose, therefore, to instruct him to tell Menelek, if obliged, that we agree to the line proposed for the eastern frontier provisionally, pending the settlement of details.

The delimitation of that frontier cannot be carried on until our boundary with Erythræa, to the east and south of Kassala, has been fixed, and negotiations with this object are now in progress at Rome.

The demarcation of the frontier in the Sobat and Fazokli countries depends on tribal divisions, and survey parties are being sent to ascertain these. As to Metemmeh there could be no harm in putting forward the solution suggested by Sir R. Rodd in his despatch No. 149 of the 10th August.

With regard to the southern frontier, I would suggest that Harrington should be authorized to state that further communications will be made on the subject, while avoiding pledging himself to any particular line. It is always to be apprehended that the Abyssinians will continue to advance southwards, if nothing is said. If, however, he can manage to bring Menelek to put forward fresh suggestions of a more advantageous nature than those he made before, he might take note of them and report them.

Does your Lordship agree?

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 30.)

(No. 190. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Cairo, October 21, 1899.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 190 of the 20th instant, and to your Lordship's reply No. 105 of the same date, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have this day addressed to Captain Harrington, embodying instructions as to the attitude to be observed by him in dealing with the question of the Abyssinian frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to Captain Harrington.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Cairo, October 21, 1899.

I AM directed by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to convey to you the following instructions with respect to the frontier negotiations in progress with the Emperor Menelek:—

Generally speaking, it will be advisable at the present moment not to press matters, but to watch the progress of events which may afford you more favourable opportunities for discussion. If pressed, however, for information as to the attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards the proposals which have been submitted, you may state that the frontier line agreed upon to the east of the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan is accepted provisionally, pending the arrangement of details.

But before any definite and final agreement can be come to, it is necessary for us to arrange with the Italian Government our frontier south and east of Kassala, in order to make clear the starting-point for delimitation with Ethiopia. Negotiations with this object are now in progress in Rome. We are also sending out survey parties to report on the tribal divisions both in the neighbourhood of Fazogli and on the Sobat River, in accordance with the principle laid down that delimitation should, as far as possible, follow the boundaries of occupation of the several tribes.

Should the Emperor Menelek press for an answer on the question of Metemmeh, the solution suggested in Sir R. Rodd's despatch No. 149 of the 10th August last might safely be put forward.

With regard to the southern frontier, the line proposed is not considered satisfactory, but Her Majesty's Government are not yet prepared to make definite counter-propositions. You should, therefore, without committing yourself to any special line, inform the Emperor that the matter will form the subject of further communication. At the same time, if you are able to induce him to make any more favourable proposals than those which have been submitted, you should listen to them and submit them for consideration.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 28.)

(No. 178.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, September 28, 1899.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 95, I have the honour to state that the day before yesterday Reuter's agent called upon me and asked as to the truth of the news which, he informed me, had been published in the "Daily Telegraph." I replied that the Sirdar was now studying the situation, but that no decision had as yet been taken about an expedition.

My telegram to your Lordship was based on a private letter from the Sirdar, which I have not communicated to any one, and on a subsequent telegram from him. From information which has reached me, however, I fear that the Egyptian War Office have made some injudicious communication as to the preparations at the front to the correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph," but I am causing further inquiries to be made into the matter.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Consul-General Sadler.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 2, 1899.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 30th ultimo, I have obtained the sanction of the Treasury for the expenses of the expedition in so far as the funds of the Protectorate cannot meet them.

They desire to be furnished by telegraph with an approximate estimate of total local cost per mensem of victualling transport and charges of the same nature in Somaliland, as well as with a statement of the available resources of the Protectorate at the present moment.

No. 2.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Lieutenant Harold.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 2, 1899.

AT Captain Harrington's request following is sent to you :—

You should instruct British Consular Agent at Harrar to inform King Menelek that a small force is being dispatched from India for the purpose of repelling the Dolbahanta Mullah.

Care will of course be taken to restrict all operations within British Protectorate limits.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN.

[October 9.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 9.)

(No. 185.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, October* 9, 1899.

EXPEDITION against Khalifa: I have authorized the Sirdar to leave Khartoum to-morrow in command of the Egyptian forces.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir F. Plunkett.

(No. 119. Africa. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 16, 1899.

THE Italian Ambassador at this Court told Sir Martin Gosselin on the 5th instant that the Marquis Imperiali, Italian Chargé d'Affaires at Brussels, had recently had a conversation with an Under-Secretary at the Congo Ministry for Foreign Affairs (his Excellency could neither remember nor recognize the name), on the reported advance of Congo troops into the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province; the Marquis Imperiali gathered from the conversation that the Congo Government considered themselves to possess a perfect right, under the Agreement of 1894, to occupy the whole province.

M. de Renzis professed ignorance as to whether any steps were being taken by the Congo Government to establish themselves in the Bahr-el-Ghazal; but, as he had recently heard from "a high English official" that Her Majesty's Government contested this view, he thought that Marquis Imperiali's remarks would be of interest.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1899.

I UNDERSTAND from your Lordship's telegram No. 189 of the 17th October that Mr. Harrington wishes to be informed whether he cannot be authorized to make some further communication to the Emperor Menelek, when he returns to Abyssinia, as regards both the eastern and southern frontiers.

The necessity of obtaining the concurrence of Italy before making a definite agreement as to the eastern frontier somewhat hampers us in discussing that part of the question.

You will be able, however, to judge whether Menelek's proposal could be safely accepted by Her Majesty's Government, pending the arrangement of details, as a provisional boundary.

The matter of the southern frontier is one of more difficulty. Although the proposal made by Menelek is not satisfactory, we have no means at present of enforcing our claims by effective occupation of the territory.

In the meantime, I am consulting experts on this question, but beyond saying that the Emperor's proposal is under consideration, I do not see that Mr. Harrington can make any statement at present.

[2233 *s*—3]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 28.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 27, 1899.

I AM directed by Lord George Hamilton to forward herewith, for any observations the Marquess of Salisbury may have to offer thereon, a copy of a Secret letter from the Government of India, dated the 17th August last, and inclosures, calling attention to the increase of the contract rate for meat supplied to the troops at Aden, consequent upon the levy of duty on live-stock exported from the Somali Coast Protectorate.

2. Lord Salisbury will observe that the Government of India consider that a refund of duty should be granted at Aden on all live-stock imported from the Somali Coast for Government purposes.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

(Secret.)

My Lord, *Simla, August* 17, 1899.

WITH reference to the Secret despatch from Lord Elgin's Government, dated the 17th March, 1898, and to the connected correspondence regarding the transfer to Her Majesty's Government of the control of the Somali Coast Protectorate, we have the honour to forward a copy of a letter from the Government of Bombay, regarding the duty on live-stock exported from the Protectorate and the consequent increase in the contract rate for meat supplied to the troops at Aden.

2. The effect of the duty has not yet been reported to us owing to a contract for the supply of meat to the Aden garrison having been entered into before the duty was introduced. The loss to the contractors, based upon the average consumption of the garrison for the three years which ended in 1898, is, however, estimated at about 5,720 rupees a year. This loss would eventually fall, either directly or indirectly, upon Indian revenues. In the circumstances, we are of opinion that a refund of duty should be granted at Aden on all live-stock exported from the Protectorate for Government purposes, and that this refund should have retrospective effect from the 16th December, 1898, the date from which it is understood that the duty has been levied.

We have, &c.
(Signed) CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
W. S. A. LOCKHART.
E. H. H. COLLEN.
C. M. RIVAZ.
C. E. DAWKINS.
T. RALEIGH.
R. GARDINER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

Bombay Castle, June 23, 1899.

I AM directed to transmit herewith, for such action as his Excellency the Governor-General in Council may consider necessary, a copy of a Confidential letter from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 12th May last, and of its inclosures, regarding the levy of a duty on live-stock exported from the Somali Coast Protectorate

and the consequent increase in the contract rate for meat supplied to the troops at Aden.

2. In connection with this matter, I am to invite attention to my Confidential letter dated the 22nd December, 1897, and its inclosures, and to state that, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, the transfer of the control of the Somali Coast to the Foreign Office of the Home Government should not have affected the question of a refund of export duty on live-stock ultimately purchased for the Indian Government at Aden.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Political Resident, Aden, to Government of Bombay.

Aden Residency, May 12, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of Government, a copy of a portion of Consul-General Sadler's tariff revision for the Somali Coast Protectorate, and also that of his letter in reply to my query as to whether a refund was contemplated in the matter of meat supplied to the troops in this garrison.

These are marked respectively (A) and (B).

These export fees on live-stock have never been charged hitherto. The result is an increase in the contract rate for meat, and the cost must, unless removed, be borne by the Indian Government.

2. I would invite attention to Government Confidential letter, dated the 26th September, 1896, Political Department, forwarding inclosures, and relative to the proposed separation of the Somali Coast Protectorate. In it was embodied the following opinion of the Government of India:—

"As regards the food supply of Aden, which hitherto has been the motive for the maintenance of our establishments on the Somali Coast, we see no reason why the arrangements now in force should not be equally secured when the control of the coast is tranferred to Her Majesty's Government."

(No. 74 of the 22nd April, 1896, to Secretary of State.)

The Secretary of State for India remarked thus in reply:—

"So long as Aden depends upon the Protectorate for its supplies I agree that the connection between it and the Somali Coast ports is vital."

3. It is true that with the transfer of that Protectorate to Her Majesty's Foreign Office, we have no cause to apprehend any diminution in the quantity of live-stock imported thence into the garrison.

Former arrangements cannot, however, be described as "equally secured" now that Government have to pay more for these food supplies than was the rule when Somaliland was controlled from Aden. Had the Somali Coast ports been ceded to Abyssinia, there can be no doubt but that Government would have provisionally precluded any such imposition as is now levied by the Consul-General. I would remind Government of the magnanimity and forbearance of the Egyptian Government who, when a remonstrance was addressed them in 1875 on their proposal to tax exports of live-stock from Berbera and Bulhar to Aden, immediately abandoned the scheme (*vide* letter dated 13th December, 1876, from Secretary Mr. Gonne to Brigadier-General Schneider and accompaniments).

4. Again, see letter from Political Agent for Somali Coast (confidential), of the 19th November, 1897 (paragraph 8), forwarded with my indorsement (confidential) of the 20th idem. Here it was proposed that "a refund be given at Aden for all live-stock exported from the coast for Government purposes."

Vide also my telegram of the 13th May, 1898, urging the adoption of the new Tariff recently proposed and Goverment of India's reply thereto embodied in your telegram of the 11th June following, in which the export fees were discountenanced unless there were substantial grounds for apprehension of embarrassment in respect of the food supplies of Aden. The imposition, even had it been permitted, would not have affected Aden nor the incidence have touched the Indian revenues.

5. Major-General Hobday, the Commissary-General-in-chief, who was deputed to inquire whether the retention of British ports in Somaliland was essentially necessary to provide the Aden food supply, writing from Aden to the Government of India on the

16th February, 1897, showed, working on the past four years' actuals, that the average annual consumption in Aden was—

Of cattle	2,000
Of sheep and goats	82,700

coming from the Somali Coast ports—

Cattle	1,000
Sheep and goats	79,400

the remainder 1,000 and 3,300, respectively, being imported from Arabia.

The average annual supply to the troops in garrison was 1,100 cattle and 6,000 sheep.

6. Were the Hinterland of Arabia opened up by the abolition of transit dues levied by local Chiefs, about which I will address Government later on, and a railway, as suggested by me, constructed it is not rash to predict that our dependence on the Somali Coast would become a negligeable quantity.

As matters now stand, some special provision is recommended in the interests of this garrison and the Indian Government, and I would suggest that the Foreign Office, London, be addressed with a view to a rebate of export duty on articles supplied for the garrison of Aden.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

Notice.

WITH effect from the 16th December, 1898, the import duty of 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, levied at Zeyla, will be reduced on the following articles :—

* * * * * *

2. With effect from the same date a duty will be charged on live-stock exported from the Somali Coast Protectorate at the following rates :—

	Rs.	a.	p.
For each horse	8	0	0
For each horned cattle and camel	4	0	0
For sheep and goats	0	4	0

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER,
Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Somali Coast.

Her Majesty's Somali Coast Protectorate,
Zeyla, November 30, 1898.

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Political Resident, Aden.

Berbera, January 3, 1899.

IN reply to your letter dated the 20th ultimo, I have the honour to say that the proposal to refund the export duty on cattle and sheep imported into Aden for the use of the garrison was made at a time when the Somali Coast was under the control of the Indian Government.

The Protectorate has since been transferred to Her Majesty's Government, and it is not now, I understand, the intention to allow the refund in question.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 78.)

My Lord, *Aden, October* 1, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to solicit a reference to my despatch No. 41 of the 15th May last.

I have as yet received no reply from the Governor of Jibuti on the subject of the claims preferred on the Administration of the French Settlement in connection with the late raid in the British Protectorate, although I wrote again in August last inviting the Governor's attention to the matter.

In the meanwhile the tribes have been several times to the Acting Consul at Zeyla pressing for an early settlement.

The only reply Lieutenant Harold could give them was that their claims had been registered after due inquiry, and that the matter was under reference with the Administration of Jibuti.

I now hear from Lieutenant Harold that during the last fortnight three deputations have come to him asking for the payment of their claims. There has been a partial failure of rain in the Zeyla district, the tribes are becoming impatient at the delay that has occurred in giving them what they rightly consider the compensation due to them, and there is some fear that if further delay occurs they may proceed themselves to Jibuti and try and effect a settlement there, which would be most undesirable in every way. Lieutenant Harold writes that the matter is becoming urgent.

I consider it desirable to avoid the discontent which further delay in the payment of these claims would undoubtedly cause; I have accordingly authorized the Acting Consul to disburse the two amounts of 5,432 rupees, on account of compensation to the families of the killed and wounded during the raid, and 405 rupees on account of property lost, to the parties concerned from Protectorate revenues.

These disbursements will be treated as "advances recoverable."

I trust that this action, which I consider necessary under the circumstances, may meet with your Lordship's approval.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

[2233 *q*—4]

(Copy)

Enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter of 16th October 1899.

Telegraphic

Colonel Hayes Sadler to the Foreign Office, dated Aden, 16th October, 1899.

There are no further developments. Mollah is in direction last reported apparently inactive. Deputations from many refractory tribes are coming in.

22 E
23.1.1900

[Confidential]

No. 69 E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

Foreign Department,
Fort William;
The 8th January 1900

By order, etc.,
Sd. J. B. Wood,
Officiating Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

North East Africa and Soudan confidential prints:—
Section 1, dated the 26th and 29th October 1899, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 10th, 11th and 13th November 1899.
Section 2, dated the 24th 25th October 1899 and 4th November 1899.
Section 3, dated the 19th September 1899
Section 4, dated the 30th October 1899.

*With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 301 of 1900

Political Department
Bombay Castle 15 January 1900

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden for information

E. R. Ridsdale

Secretary to Government.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 26.)

(No. 203.)

My Lord, *Rome, October* 23, 1899.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 184 of the 14th ultimo, respecting the proposed frontier between Abyssinia and the Soudan, I have the honour to report that M. Visconti Venosta has informed me that he is now prepared to enter into negotiations as to any modification which it may be thought desirable to introduce into the boundary-line of the Italian sphere as laid down in the Protocol of 1891.

I shall be glad if your Lordship will furnish me with instructions on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CURRIE.

[2233 *cc*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 29.)

(No. 196.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, October* 29, 1899.

ERYTHRÆAN frontier.

Sir R. Rodd is intimately acquainted with this subject, and, in my opinion, the best course to pursue would be to send him to Rome to complete the negotiations with the Italian Government.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN.

[November 3.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 3.)

(No. 197.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, November 3, 1899.

HARRINGTON telegraphs that a letter has arrived for him at Aden from Menelek, stating that he hopes the settlement of the frontier will not be delayed by the survey operations, to which, however, he has no objections.

[2327 *c*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 107.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 4, 1899.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you the papers marked in the margin,* relative to an International Conference, to be held at London in the first week in January next, on the subject of the protection of wild animals, birds, and fishes in Africa.

His Lordship considers that it would be well that some gentleman acquainted with the subject, as affecting the Somaliland Protectorate, should be available to furnish information to the Conference, and I am to inquire whom you would suggest for the purpose. It is desirable, if possible, that it should be some official of the Protectorate who would be on leave in England at the time.

His Lordship would also be glad of any views which you may yourself wish to express on the subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

* To Sir F. Lascelles, No. ; Circular to Representatives; and to Colonial Office.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 112.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November 7, 1899.*

ABYSSINIAN frontier negotiations.

On the 10th instant a Memorandum by Sir A. Hardinge and Vice-Consul Jenner will be forwarded to your Lordship and to Captain Harrington. They will enable Captain Harrington, should he consider it necessary, to discuss the proposals made by the Emperor Menelek for the southern frontier of Abyssinia where it abuts on the British sphere.

I hardly think that the present moment is favourable for the negotiations, and would prefer, before giving any instructions, to hear more of the Emperor's disposition.

I have to request that you will inform Captain Harrington of the above.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 469.)
My Lord,

Paris, November 9, 1899.

IN compliance with your Lordship's despatch No. 349 of the 30th ultimo I mentioned yesterday to M. Delcassé the case of the raid into the Somali Protectorate from Jibuti, and in order that there should be no delay in dealing with this matter I gave his Excellency a short Memorandum recapitulating the chief points of the incident as reported by Consul-General Sadler.

M. Delcassé said that he had never heard of it before, and at once made a note upon my Memorandum for instant reference to the Minister of the Colonies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 2.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Harrington.

(No. 36. Confidential.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, November 10, 1899.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copy of a telegram which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Cairo,* and of which the substance will have already been communicated to you by his Lordship, with regard to the southern frontier of Abyssinia.

Copies of the Memoranda, by Sir A. Hardinge and Mr. Jenner, referred to in that telegram, are inclosed herewith, as well as copy of a despatch from the Sub-Commissioner at Mombasa on the same subject.†

The Memoranda are accompanied by a map on which are approximately traced the lines of frontier to the east of Lake Rudolf, as suggested by Sir A. Hardinge and Mr. Jenner respectively.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 3.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 234. Confidential.)
My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 10, 1899.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 112 of the 7th instant I transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of Memoranda by Sir Arthur Hardinge and Mr. Jenner, as well as a despatch from the Sub-Commissioner at Mombasa, with regard to the proposals of the Emperor Menelek respecting the southern frontier of Abyssinia.† The Memoranda are accompanied by a map on which are approximately traced in black ink the lines of frontier east of Lake Rudolf as suggested by Sir A. Hardinge and Mr. Jenner respectively.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

---

* To Lord Cromer, No. 112, Telegraphic.
† Sir A. Hardinge, October 20; Mr. Jenner, November 1, 1899; Mr. Craufurd, No. 72; Map.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 109.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 11, 1899.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 84 of the 24th ultimo relative to the ammunition which appears to have been passed throngh Zeyla by Ato Josef under false pretences, and to inform you that his Lordship approves your action in desiring M. Gerolimato to request the Governor of Harrar to hold an inquiry into the matter, and attach all such arms and ammunition not destined for the King.

Before coming to a decision on the proposals which you make for further action in the matter, Lord Salisbury will await the report which Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia will no doubt make on the steps taken by him in the matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

[2327 *l*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 84.)

My Lord, *Aden, October* 24, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to submit copy of a communication I addressed to our Consular Agent at Harrar on the 9th instant in connection with a quantity of ammunition which it now appears has been passed through Zeyla by Ato Josef, the Agent of King Menelek, in the name of the King, but really destined for himself and other Abyssinian merchants.

On the 26th September last the Acting Consul at Zeyla wrote to me as follows:—

"There is now little doubt that Ato Josef has passed a considerable amount of ammunition through Zeyla under a false declaration, *i.e.*, that a certain amount of the ammunition was never destined for His Majesty the Emperor Menelek, but belonged to private merchants in Jibuti and Harrar, to Ato Josef himself, and other Abyssinians. My information is based on inquiries made by Her Britannic Majesty's Consular Agent, Harrar, who states that Ato Josef passed through Zeyla the following quantities for the following different people:—

1.	For Serkis Terezian	200	cases ammunition.
2.	„ Degiay Berato	100	„ „
3.	„ Ato Dingo	100	„ „
4.	„ Gabretadik	40	„ „
5.	„ Apli Wold	4	„ „
6.	„ Waldi Ott	1	„ „
7.	„ Himself (Ato Josef)	200	„ „
8.	„ Abito (Ato Josef's servant)	4	„ „
	Total	649	„ „

Mr. Gerolimato states he received this information from Abito (No. 8 above, who was in Zeyla with Ato Josef), and heard Abito admit before Ato Josef and the chief of the Harrar Customs, Ato Bapti, that he (Abito) had sold his own four cases on the road, which must have been at Gildessa.

In a further communication Mr. Gerolimato says that he has also been informed that Ato Josef received a bribe from Serkis Terezian for passing his 200 cases through Zeyla under the name of the Emperor Menelek, and that some 250 cases of arms and ammunition belonging to other merchants were also passed through Zeyla by Ato Josef.

Ato Josef came here from Addis Abbaba armed with a letter from Captain Harrington, Her Britannic Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia, and was sent to Captain Harrington by the Emperor himself with a letter.

Some time after Ato Josef had left Zeyla I heard from Somalis that some ammunition he had passed through here was being sold at Gildessa. Inquiries were set on foot, with the above result.

On the 3rd instant the Acting Consul at Zeyla wrote again as follows:—

"I have just received a further letter from Mr. Gerolimato, from which the following is an extract:—

"'Ato Marcia, the Governor of Gildessa, arrived here (Harrar) three days ago, and told me that Somalis had brought into Gildessa some arms and ammunition, and that these belonged to the Armenian Serkis Terezian; and as Ato Josef had passed them through Zeyla in the name of King Menelek, he (Ato Marcia) had seized them.'"

Mr. Gerolimato goes on to say that Serkis Terezian is claiming his arms and ammunition, but that Ato Marcia refuses to deliver them up to him.

There can be little doubt but that the concession which was allowed to King Menelek of importing arms and ammunition for State purposes through our Protectorate has been grossly abused by his Agent, Ato Josef, with the probable result that arms and ammunition have found their way to our tribes, and the Ogaden tribes to the south of the Protectorate.

I have already desired Mr. Gerolimato to request the Governor of Harrar to hold an inquiry into the matter, and attach all arms and ammunition which were passed through Zeyla, and which were not destined for the King. The King should now be moved to take proceedings against Ato Josef and the merchants implicated in these fraudulent transactions. The Abyssinians may be trusted to confiscate all the arms and ammunition fraudulently passed through Zeyla upon which they can lay their hands, and it seems to me matter for consideration whether the Protectorate should not claim import duty on all consignments so found to have been passed, should such a claim in no way prejudice the negotiations at present pending with Abyssinia.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Britannic Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia for such action as he may deem expedient.

King Menelek will be able to ascertain how many arms and how much ammunition have reached his troops, and as the quantity passed through Zeyla is accurately known, there should be no difficulty in discovering the extent to which these frauds have been perpetrated.

For the future I propose not to allow any arms or ammunition to pass through the Protectorate, or any goods said to be destined for the King to pass duty-free through Zeyla, without an intimation received in the case of each consignment from Her Britannic Majesty's Agent with King Menelek that it is actually required for the use of the King.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to Mr. Gerolimato.

Sir, *Aden, October* 9, 1899.

THE Acting Consul, Zeyla, informs me that there is reason to believe that Ato Josef, the Agent of King Menelek, has been passing through Zeyla, free of duty, in the name of the King, arms and ammunition which were not destined for His Majesty, and I understand a seizure of such arms and ammunition has already been made at Gildessa by the Governor of that place.

I shall be obliged if you will kindly represent the matter to the Acting Governor of Harrar, and request him to hold an inquiry, at which you would do well to be present, and attach all arms and ammunition passed through Zeyla by Ato Josef which may be found to be elsewhere than on their way to the King.

In this connection it will be useful to remember that all the arms and ammunition passed through Zeyla by Ato Josef were so passed in the name of the King, as destined for His Majesty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 24.)

(No. 194.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, October* 24, 1899.

THE Greek Government have instructed their Representative here to inquire whether Her Majesty's Government would be willing to allow Mr. Harrington to take charge of Greek interests in Abyssinia, where at present they have no Representative.

Has your Lordship any objection?

Mr. Harrington thinks it would be desirable, and states that at Harrar, where there is a considerable Greek settlement, the Abyssinian authorities always consult our Consular Agent on questions concerning Greek subjects.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November 4.*)

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, November 4, 1899.*

SIR RENNELL RODD has received a letter from M. Ilg, stating that King Menelek will not allow him to proceed on his proposed visit to Europe until Captain Harrington arrives at Addis Abbaba. I gather that the King is very anxious for an early settlement of the frontier question.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Law Officers of the Crown to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 19.)

My Lord, *Royal Courts of Justice, September* 18, 1899.

WE were honoured with your Lordship's commands signified in Sir Thomas Sanderson's letter of the 12th ultimo, transmitting, for our consideration and approval, the inclosed draft of an Order in Council for the administration of justice in the territories comprised in the Somaliland Protectorate, which had recently been transferred by the Government of India to the Imperial Government.

We have taken the matter into our consideration, and, in obedience to your Lordship's commands, have the honour to

Report—

That, in our opinion, the draft Order in Council as initialled by us may properly be submitted to the Queen in Council for the approval of Her Majesty.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RICHARD E. WEBSTER.
ROBERT B. FINLAY.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 30.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Rome, October 30, 1899.

YOUR Lordship's telegram to Lord Cromer No. 109.

With reference to my despatch No. 184 of the 14th ultimo, respecting the Abyssinia–Soudan frontier, I beg leave to call attention to the reserve made by M. Visconti-Venosta in regard to territory north-west of a line drawn from Todluk to Touat. His Excellency has lately repeated his declaration that north of Touat actual frontier of Erythræa is the Italian boundary of 1891, but that he would be prepared to negotiate on this point. He would be willing that negotiations should take place on the spot when general principle has been settled.

I am of opinion that M. Visconti-Venosta's views would be met if, in the first Protocol, the territory between Rivers Juba and Stetit were treated, and if the second Protocol declared that Egyptian and Italian officers should delimit the boundary north of the Stetit River.

[2233 *gg*—4]

1 S.C. for Roll: Headt:, Adm.

26 EA.
25.1.1900

(Confidential)

No 122 E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, etc,
(sd) J. B. Wood.
Offg Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department
Fort William
The 13th January 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints.
Section 2, dated the 13th November 1899
do 5, dated the 30th October 1899
do 1, dated the 22nd October 18th 20th 23rd
24th 25th 26th and 27th November 1899.
do 2, dated the 15th and 25th November 1899.
do 3, dated the 30th October and 13th Novr 1899.

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 420 of 1900.
Political Department.
Bombay Castle, 19 January 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

E W Edgerley
Secretary to Government.

Rec'd with Letter No 53 of the 1st Dec 1899, from the Secy Foreign Dept
[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 85. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Aden, October 29, 1899.*

IN continuation of my telegram of the 27th instant, I have the honour to submit copy of a Confidential despatch, dated the 17th instant, from our Consular Agent in Harrar, conveying a request from King Menelek that our operations in the interior may be postponed, on the ground that the King wishes to co-operate with us against the Mollah. Attached is a copy of my reply.

In another communication of the same date Mr. Gerolimato informs me that the Abyssinians have now not more than 2,000 men in the Ogaden, but that it is rumoured that Dejatch Berato, who left for Addis Abbaba with another 2,000 men about the 13th instant, would be likely to be recalled on the news being received that we proposed to form an expedition. Mr. Gerolimato has further received information that it is in contemplation to send 2,000 cavalry down from Addis Abbaba to operate in the Ogaden, and he tells me that preparations are being made in Harrar for the advance of the expedition.

It is probable that the object of our expedition, which has since been postponed, has been misrepresented to the King by interested parties at Addis Abbaba, and that the anxiety shown by the King may not be altogether due to a desire to co-operate with us. Information should have reached Addis Abbaba before this of the retreat of the Mollah, and of the absence of any apprehension now of a move on his part against the Abyssinian frontier, if such was ever intended.

Further news from Abyssinia is that Ras Mangasha, who was in Addis Abbaba without constraint, has lately been enchained and confined in the fortress of Ankober owing to a revolt of the Tigrins against Ras Makunnan. It is also reported that Leontieff has returned to Addis Abbaba, where it is rumoured he has lost the confidence of the King.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

P.S.—A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer and to Captain Harrington.

J. H. S.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Mr. Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Harrar, October 17, 1899.*

ACCORDING to instructions I received from Her Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul, Zeyla, I have informed by telephone His Majesty King Menelek about the expedition against the Mollah, Mohamed-ben-Abdullah. I stated that the operations will, of course, be most carefully confined to the limits of the British Protectorate.

Before yesterday, the 15th October, His Majesty the Emperor Menelek called me in the telephone, and told me to inform you that his desire is to postpone the expedition till after October, as he intends to send Abyssinian troops in Ogaden to co-operate with the British expedition against the Mollah, and that now it is very hot in the Ogaden and Dolbahanta.

His Majesty expects your reply anxiously.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. GEROLIMATO

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to Mr. Gerolimato.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Aden, October* 28, 1899.

IN reply to your Confidential letter of the 17th instant, I have the honour to request that you will inform King Menelek, by telephone, with my compliments, that I will communicate to Her Majesty's Government His Majesty's desire to co-operate with us in the suppression of the Mollah, Mohamed Abdullah, and that for the present our expedition has been postponed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Lord Currie.

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1899.

IT has been suggested by Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Cairo that Sir R. Rodd should be instructed to proceed to Rome to help you in discussing with the Italian Government the modifications in the provisions of the Protocol, necessitated by the present frontier negotiations with Abyssinia.

I have given my consent, and have requested him to arrange with you with regard to the date of Sir R. Rodd's visit.

[2233 *gg*—5]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 22.)

(No. 193.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, October* 22, 1899.

THE Sirdar telegraphs from Goz Abu Goma, under date of the 21st October, as follows:—

"The remarkable dryness of the season has dried up the water on the roads previously reconnoitred, and I consequently resolved to proceed by the Fungor route to Gedir instead, as I learn from cavalry reconnaissances that there is plenty of water at Fungor, and the country presents few difficulties, although it is rather inclosed. Fungor is 50 miles from the river, and I have arranged water stations along the road, this stretch being otherwise waterless. I count on getting the entire force concentrated at Fungor by the 25th instant; one battalion has gone there from the river to-day. By the 28th we ought to be in contact with the enemy.

"The latest information I have received is five days old, and encourages me to hope that the Khalifa will not have moved from his position before we come up. At that time he was ignorant of our advance, and I am keeping everything as secret as possible. The troops are all well, and the concentration here was effected most satisfactorily.

"Unless any unexpected incident occurs, I will send news from Gedir by messengers to the end of the telegraph."

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 18.)

(No. 65. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Aden, November* 2, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a letter from His Majesty King Menelek, and a translation of the same, dated the 5th October.

Your Lordship will observe that His Majesty has given the necessary orders concerning the Soudan survey parties, and expresses a wish that the surveys may not delay the settlement of affairs between the two countries.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

Inclosure in No. 1.

King Menelek to Mr. Harrington.

(Traduction.)

Lion vainqueur de la tribu de Juda Ménélek II, élu du Seigneur Roi des Rois d'Éthiopie, à Mr. Harrington, Agent Diplomatique du Gouvernement Anglais. Salut !

J'AI bien reçu votre lettre du 8 Septembre, et j'ai été très content d'apprendre que les affaires que nous avions discutées ensemble ont trouvées un accueil favorable auprès du Gouvernement Anglais. J'ai appris aussi avec plaisir que vous allez envoyer des gens pour établir les cartes du côté du Soudan et du Lac Rodolph, et j'ai donné les ordres nécessaires à mes fonctionnaires en cas de rencontre de bien les recevoir et j'ai ordonné aussi qu'ils étudient les pays d'accord avec les vôtres.

J'espère cependant que les affaires que nous avions traitées ne subissent pas nn retard à cause de ces études cartographiques et je vous attend ici avec impatience sous peu, me rappelant la promesse que vous m'aviez fait en partant d'ici d'être de retour à Addis Abbaba vers le 15 Octobre.

Écrit à Addis Abbaba, le 5 Octobre, 1899.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN.

[November 20.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 225.)

My Lord,

Brussels, November 18, 1899.

I HAVE not conversed with any of the Congolese officials for some time, and I have seen nothing new of importance with regard to the Bahr-el-Ghazal since I addressed to your Lordship my despatch No. 130, Africa, of the 30th ultimo.

I notice, however, in the Census Returns of the European population of the Congo State, forwarded to your Lordship to-day in my despatch No. 152, Africa, that, on the 1st January, 1899, there were in the district of Lado Redjaf:—

Belgians	50
Danes	3
Egyptians	1
Norwegians	4
Swedes	4
Total	62

It is fair to suppose that all these were officials in the service of the Congo State, and your Lordship will notice that there were no English at all, although our countrymen figure, to a greater or lesser extent, in the Returns furnished from most of the other divisions of the Independent State.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 23, 2·30 P.M.)

(No. 205.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Cairo, November* 23, 1899, 1·10 P.M.

FOLLOWING from Sirdar to-day:—

"Wingate found Drefissa evacuated, and pushed on to Abu Adil, 4 miles further, where Ahmed Fedil's force was found encamped. They were at once engaged by mounted troops under Mahon, with four Maxims, two guns, and Jehadia under Gorringe.

"Dervishes charged with all their old dash to within 80 yards of guns. Wingate with infantry arrived in time to support Mahon and cleared the whole dem, Dervishes bolting through the bush, followed by mounted troops.

"Wingate estimates Fedil's force to have been 2,400, of which 400 have been killed. He has also taken a considerable number of prisoners, quantity of grain, rifles, spears, &c.

"Our casualties are one Egyptian captain mortally wounded, one trooper Camel Corps and one Jehadia slightly.

"Wingate's further movements depend on his finding water. All troops well. I consider operations have been carried out in most creditable manner."

Sirdar's telegram ends.

I am publishing this here.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 113.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 24, 1899.

THE Marquess of Salisbury has had under his consideration the drafts of the Regulations respecting mines and minerals, the use of fire-arms, and the importation of alcoholic liquors which are to be issued by you under "The Somaliland Order in Council, 1899."

The Regulations respecting mines and minerals and the use of fire-arms have received his Lordship's approval, and instructions for their issue will shortly be sent to you.

With regard to the Regulations for the importation and sale of alcoholic liquors, I am to inform you that they have been revised in consultation with Mr. Gray, and I am to transmit to you a printed copy showing the form in which they at present stand.* Mr. Gray, however, points out that in certain passages reference is made to licences, but that no provision is made with respect to their issue or conditions.

The Zanzibar Ordinance, on which your draft was founded, itself contained no special provision as to licences, but it was expressly stated that they would continue to be regulated by the Ordinance of the 31st May, 1892.

It would seem convenient in the present case that the Regulations respecting the importation and sale of alcoholic liquors should also contain provision for the issue of licences; and I am therefore to request that you will frame an additional Regulation to deal with that point.

For this purpose it may be useful to compare the Zanzibar Ordinance of 1892 and the British Central Africa Regulations, of which copies are inclosed.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

* Draft Alcoholic Regulations.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 25, 11·30 A.M.)

(No. 207.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Cairo, November* 25, 1899.

FOLLOWING from Sirdar:—

"Wingate and his force came up with Khalifa's force 7 miles south-east of Gedid, attacked and, after sharp fight, took the position. Khalifa, surrounded by bodyguard of Emirs, was killed. All principal Emirs were killed or taken prisoners except Osman Digna, who escaped. Whole camp, women, cattle, &c., were taken, and thousands of prisoners, most of whom surrendered. Force is marching back to river. Our loss slight. Will wire you further details later. Soudan may now be declared open."

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 25, 3·10 P.M.)

(No. 208.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Cairo, November* 25, 1899, 2·40 P.M.

FOLLOWING is summary of further details received from Wingate through Sirdar:—

"Force marched by moonlight from Gedid and found Khalifa at Om Debrikat; Dervishes attacked at 5·15, and subsequently whole Egyptian line advanced and swept through Dervish position for 2 miles. List of Emirs killed and wounded is given; it includes, besides Khalifa, Ahmed Fedil, Ali Wad Helu, also two brothers of the Khalifa and Mahdi's son. Osman Digna left directly firing began; Wingate hopes to capture him. He speaks most highly of behaviour and endurance of troops, who marched 60 miles and fought two decisive actions in sixty-one hours. Egyptian loss, 3 killed, 12 wounded."

No. 3.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, November* 25, 1899, 7·30 P.M.

HER Majesty's Government have received the news of the victories over the Khalifa's forces with great satisfaction. Please convey our hearty congratulations to the Khedive, and assure the Sirdar, Wingate, and all concerned of our high appreciation of their brilliant services.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 26, 1 P.M.)

(No. 209.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Cairo, November 26, 1899.

WINGATE has reached the river. Troops all well. He reports having taken 9,000 men, women, and children.

Osman Digna is not yet found.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir N. O'Conor to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 27.)

(No. 538.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 22, 1899.

A RECENT number of the "Maloumat" of Constantinople reported the arrival at Wadai of a body of Turkish troops which had set out from Tripoli. The expedition, I am informed, consisted of two regiments of cavalry, and took no less than forty days to accomplish the journey.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a précis of another article from the same paper, commenting on this event.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Maloumat" of November 16, 1899.

THE "Servet" quotes an article from the "Maloumat," describing the arrival of Turkish troops at Wadai. The writer dwells on the fact that the Sultan is the sole protector of all Moslems throughout the world, and expresses joy at this accession of more than 2,000,000 to the total of Ottoman subjects.

In all probability the example will be followed by the people of Bournou, Baghirmi, Dar-el-Emana, Shikah, Massalit, whose total is at least 15,000,000 of Mussulmans.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 15.)

(No. 202.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, November* 15, 1899.

DELIMITATION of Abyssinian frontier.

Sir Rennell Rodd will leave Cairo to-morrow for Rome. Her Majesty's Ambassador has been informed.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 25.)

(No. 195.)

My Lord, *Cairo, November* 15, 1899.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 228 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a note, drawn up by Mr. E. Bonham-Carter, the Judicial Adviser to the Soudan Government, giving the substance of the police Regulations under which the sale of alcoholic liquors in the Soudan is placed, in accordance with section 4 of the Licence (Liquor) Ordinance of 1899.

In forwarding this note to me, Lord Kitchener states that he is quite satisfied that at present there is no traffic in liquor to natives in the Soudan, and that he is prepared to take further steps in the matter, should any such be found necessary hereafter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Memorandum by Mr. E. Bonham-Carter.

SECTION 4 of "The Licence (Liquor) Ordinance, 1899," puts the sale of alcoholic liquors strictly under police Regulations. These Regulations provide, amongst other matters:—

"The licencee will deposit in the Local Government Treasury the sum of 50*l.*, which will be liable to forfeiture if he does not strictly comply with these Regulations, as well as those issued by the local authorities.

"Any licencee detected in possession of liquors of a deleterious character will be liable to have his whole stock confiscated, his licence withdrawn, and his deposit of 50*l.* forfeited.

"Medical officers will examine liquors in the possession of licencees from time to time."

The Mudirs (local Governors) have been ordered to take precautions to insure that no liquor is sold to natives. They have full power to forfeit the deposit of 50*l.*, or to refuse the renewal of any licence. It is believed that hitherto the expressed intention of the Government that there shall be no sale of alcoholic liquors to natives is fully carried out.

Owing to the requirements of the Ordinance, the import duties, and the cost of carriage, the price of spirits is so high as to be beyond the means of natives. And the licences, which have been issued, have been strictly limited in number, and have been confined to places where there is a European population.

(Signed) E. BONHAM-CARTER.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 30.)

(No. 205.)

My Lord, *Rome, October* 26, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a Report which I have received from Colonel Needham, Military Attaché to Her Majesty's Embassy, respecting the movements of King Menelek.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CURRIE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Colonel Needham to Lord Currie.

(No. 46.)

My Lord, *Rome, October* 24, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for the information of your Excellency, the translation of an extract from an Italian military paper, which indicates the opinion of the press on the motive of the Emperor Menelek's concentration of troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES NEEDHAM, *Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Newspaper Extract.

MENELEK ON THE MARCH.

THE "Stampa" publishes a letter from Aden, which asserts that Menelek will shortly advance to suppress a rebellion in Tigre.

The writer fears that Menelek will take advantage of this opportunity for insisting on a settlement of the question of boundaries between Italy and Abyssinia.

News of Menelek's impending advance was given in the "Italia Militare e Marina" some twelve days ago. We did not think then, nor do we now, that he has any intention of moving on Tigre, nor that there is any question of the boundaries of Erythræa.

Menelek has heard that the English have a big war on hand in South Africa. He remembers that at the time of the Fashoda episode the gathering of his troops at Borumieda and his threats at Metemmah (the Abyssinian gate of the Soudan) caused messengers to be sent him from England, and everyone knows that messengers from England to barbarian Monarchs do not arrive with their hands empty. Now, Menelek is anxious to repeat this farce; to advance in order that his retirement may be paid for, nothing more.

It must not be forgotten that the French and Russian instigators of Menelek have no interest just now in inciting him against Italy, but, on the other hand, they have every interest in inciting him against England in the Soudan.

We believe the boundaries of Erythræa are the last thing Menelek is thinking of.

"*Italia Militare e Marina,*" *Rome,*
October 22, 1899.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 201.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, November* 13, 1899.

ACCORDING to a message which left Siwah on the 23rd ultimo, Sheikh Senoussi has started from the Kafra Oasis in the direction of Bornu.

I have communicated this information to the French Agent here, as I thought it would be courteous to do so.

(Confidential)

No. 146 E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing print is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, etc.
(sd) P. T. Spence
Asst. Secretary to the
Government of India

Foreign Department,
Fort William,
The 16th January 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Print, Section 2, dated the 23rd November 1899.

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden

---

30 E.A.
1.2.00

Confidential No. 427 of 1900.

Political Department
Bombay Castle, 20th January 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

F. R. Wigley.
Secretary to Government
19/1

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 23.)

Sir, *India Office, November* 21, 1899.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to forward a copy of a letter from the Government of India, dated the 27th July last, with its inclosures, regarding the incidence of the leave allowances and pensions of officers employed in the Somali Coast Protectorate.

So far as regards those whose service is entirely rendered in the Protectorate, the view of tho Government of India appears to be in accordance with your letter to the Treasury of the 4th August, 1898, and Sir Francis Mowatt's reply, dated the 16th of that month, accepting such a liability estimated as equal to a present payment of 9,000 rupees a-year.

With reference to the case of officers who have served under the Government of India, as distinct from the Protectorate, and who remain in the latter territory, of which the case of Mr. Malcolm Jones, mentioned in your letter of the 8th September last, is an example, it appears to Lord George Hamilton that they are entitled to the benefits of the Superannuation Act of 1892 and the Rules issued thereunder. If this view is accepted by the Treasury, the pension for the whole joint service would be divided ratably between the respective Administrations, Indian revenues bearing the charge due for service under the Government of India out of Somaliland, subject, however, to the maximum limits admissible by the Indian Regulations for service under that Government.

As regards officers of the Indian service who are temporarily paid from the local revenues of the Protectorate, Lord George Hamilton concurs in the view of the Government of India that they should be required to pay to the Comptroller of India Treasuries the prescribed contribution, and that Indian revenues should bear the charge of their leave allowances and pensions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton.

My Lord, *Simla, July* 27, 1899.

WE have the honour to forward a copy of a letter from the Government of Bombay regarding the incidence of the leave allowances and pension charges of the two officers of the Bombay Political Department (Lieutenants Harold and Cordeaux), whose services have been lent to the Somali Coast Administration.

2. We understand that from the 1st October, 1898, when the control of the Somali Coast Protectorate was transferred to Her Majesty's Government—

(i.) All pensions awarded for service exclusively in the Protectorate will be paid by Her Majesty's Government from the Somali Coast revenues;

(ii.) Pensions to officers who remain permanently in the Protectorate, and who have had previous service in India (as distinct from the Protectorate), will be divided between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India in the proportions indicated in Article 517 of the Civil Service Regulations; and

(iii.) Officers of the Indian services lent for temporary service in the Protectorate, like Lieutenants Harold and Cordeaux, should pay the contributions for leave allowances and pension prescribed in the Civil Service Regulations for officers in foreign service of the first kind.

I.S.C. for Pol. Resd. at Aden.

3. We shall be glad to learn whether these views are indorsed by Her Majesty's Government.

We have, &c.
(Signed) CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
W. S. A. LOCKHART.
E. H. H. COLLEN.
C. M. RIVAZ.
C. E. DAWKINS.
T. RALEIGH.
R. GARDINER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

Bombay Castle, April 11, 1899.

I AM directed to submit, for the consideration and orders of the Government of India, the question of the incidence of the leave allowance and pension charges of the two officers of the Bombay Political Department (Lieutenants Harold and H. E. S. Cordeaux), whose services have been lent to the Somali Coast Administration.

2. There is no rule in the Civil Service Regulations which covers the case of the officers of the Aden Political Residency transferred to the Foreign Office, London, with the Somali Coast Protectorate, but on the analogy of Articles 516 and 517 of the Civil Service Regulations, the pensions of such officers would appear, on their final retirement from the service, to be divisible between the Indian and English Governments in the proportion of their qualifying service under these Governments, as so many sixtieths of the average emoluments of their qualifying service under the Indian Government and so many sixtieths of the average emoluments under the English Government. The leave allowances also of these officers would appear to be divisible between the English and the Indian Governments in the proportion of service rendered to these Governments.

3. In the absence of any specific ruling on the subject, I am to request that the Government of India may be moved to pass orders in the matter, and to decide whether any contribution for leave or pension should be recovered on account of these officers.

574

(Confidential)

No. 184 E. A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, etc.
(sd) J. B. Wood
Offg Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department
Fort William;
The 19th January 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential prints:- Section 1, dated the 29th and 30th November 1899 and 4th December 1899.
Section 2, dated the 27th November 1899.

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

---

32 EA.
1.2.00

Confidential No. 622 of 1900.
Political Department.
Bombay Castle, 27th January 1900

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

E. W. Ridsdale
Secretary to Government

1° C for Pol. Asst. at Aden.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 114.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 29, 1899.*

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a despatch which has been addressed to Her Majesty's Commissioners in East Africa, Central Africa, and Uganda,* requesting them to issue Regulations in their respective Administrations for securing details of the game killed by holders of licences.

I am to inquire whether you consider that a similar Regulation could usefully be applied in the Somali Coast Protectorate, and to request that, if so, you will take the necessary action.

I am, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

* To Sir H. Johnston, No. 226; Sub-Commissioner Craufurd, No. 190; and Commissioner Sharpe, No. 203.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 115.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 30, 1899.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 43 of the 23rd May, I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you, for such observations as you may have to offer, copy of a letter from the India Office regarding the incidence of the leave allowances and pensions of officers employed in the Somaliland Protectorate.*

Lord Salisbury understands that the sum of 9,000 rupees provided for in your estimates is intended to meet the case of the officers of the Indian Service temporarily paid from the revenues of the Protectorate, and not, as would appear from the India Office letter, those whose service is entirely rendered in the Protectorate.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

* India Office, November 1899.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 89. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, November* 14, 1899.

I WOULD wish to avert a misapprehension which may possibly have arisen as to the number of troops by which the garrisons on the coast were strengthened during the recent disturbances.

The reliefs sent round by the Resident at Aden numbered two native officers and 129 rank and file of the 10th Bombay Light Infantry, under a British officer.

As reported in my despatch No. 74 of the 10th September, I retained the British officer, one native officer, and fifty-three rank and file, at Berbera, with the old relief; at Bulhar and Zeyla the old reliefs were relieved by the new reliefs, and no reinforcements were retained.

The additional number of troops employed on the coast since the 1st September last is, therefore, one British officer, one native officer, and fifty-three rank and file; and not 200 men, as would seem to be the impression from the earlier correspondence on the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

[2390 *d*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 27.)

(No. 87. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, November* 10, 1899.

ACCOUNTS from the Dolbahanta are very unsatisfactory. Reports, which have since been confirmed, have been received that about three weeks ago the Chief of the Dolbahanta, Ali Girad, of the Girad Farih, was treacherously murdered by order of the Mullah. The reasons assigned for this deed are that the Girad, who had always been well disposed towards us, refused to join the Mullah, and, contrary to his injunctions, had sent in a caravan with letters to Berbera, and had written to Sultan Jusuf Ali, of the Mijjertain, for assistance. Doubtless, another reason the Mullah had was to overawe the whole of the Dolbahanta. He is said to be still at Lasader, in the recesses of the Dolbahanta, and to have in contemplation the seizure of the twelve principal Sheikhs in that district, so as to get it completely under his control.

A few caravans have come in from the Dolbahanta, and these report that the Mullah is preparing for another move, in what direction is not known. The Jama Siad section of the Mahmood Girad report that he has impressed several hundred of their horses. Plentiful rain has now fallen throughout the Protectorate, which would facilitate a move by a body of horse.

In the Habr Toljaala country matters are quiet, except for raids and counter-raids between the friendly Mahomed Aysa and the tribes who were implicated in the recent attacks on the friendlies. Several sections of the Habr Toljaala and of the eastern Habr Yunis have come in, asking for Aman and to be allowed to draw supplies as usual from our ports. These I am at present engaged in dealing with.

Although caravans are coming in from the Dolbahanta, no representative deputations from the various tribes have yet appeared. It is probable that after the murder of the Girad the principal Sheikhs will for some time be afraid to come to Berbera. I should mention that some of the persons employed to murder the Girad were of his own tribe, doubtless selected by the Mullah, so as to prevent a rising of the tribe against him.

All is quiet in the western districts on the Berbera side and in the Zeyla districts. At Zeyla there was some apprehension of scarcity owing to absence of rain; this has happily been dissipated by a timely and plentiful fall.

The stoppage of supplies to the eastern districts, except of small quantities required for the use of caravans, since the commencement of September has been productive of fairly good results. As stated above, several of the refractory tribes have come in, and deputations from others are expected.

To such tribes and sections as send in responsible deputations, I am now giving permission to take supplies from our ports, subject to the condition that they hold aloof entirely from the Mullah's movement, and engage to make good all loss and damage done by them during the recent disturbances, and abstain from selling supplies to any of the tribes who have not yet made their submission.

On all supplies going to the eastern districts a levy is being made of 2 rupees per camel, and of 8 annas per donkey. Certain sections, whom I know not to have been implicated, have been told that the amount levied from them will be refunded. Others, whose complicity is doubtful, have been told that the tax will be removed as soon as it has been ascertained whether there are any claims against them or not. Whilst with those tribes who are responsible for most of the mischief the tax will have to continue in operation till their liabilities have been made good. But under no circumstances do I deem it advisable to let any supplies into the eastern districts free of the tax till I have received deputations from the majority of the Habr Toljaala and eastern Habr Yunis tribes. The Somalis play into each other's hands, and any supplies taken in free would be likely to find their way to the tribes who have not yet come in, and probably delay the arrival of their deputations.

In the case of certain specific acts hostile to the Administration, such as the

574 Sad 5012
230/1

seizure of our Baladiyahs and sending them to the Mullah, I am inflicting fines which have to be paid before supplies are allowed to be taken.

Circumstances have, unfortunately, prevented my summoning the deputations of the various tribes to meet me in the interior, where I should have been in a stronger position to deal with them. As it is, I have tried to make the best of the present position. The difficulty has been to take sufficient notice of past misdemeanours, and at the same time avoid any retributive measures which would have the effect of alienating the tribes from us, and throwing them into the hands of the Mullah. If these measures err, they err on the side of leniency. They are the best I can adopt under present conditions, and I trust they may meet with your Lordship's approval.

As regards the Dolbahanta, the most I can do until responsible deputations come in is to allow caravans to take supplies on payment of the tax, and with such precautions against supplies reaching the Mullah as it is possible to take. Any retributive measures against caravans belonging to Dolbahanta tribes who joined the Mullah would simply assist him to divert our trade from our ports.

There will be a certain amount of leakage at the flag ports, and the imposition of the tax will act as a stimulant to the non-duty-paid trade of those ports. This I cannot help. The effect will be but transitory, and with the present disturbed state of the Dolbahanta I have not yet seen my way to locate small detachments of our police in such isolated positions as Hais and Mait to control revenue collections—a measure for which I have already solicited and obtained your Lordship's sanction.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

(Confidential)

No 248 E.A.

A copy[x] of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay in the Political Department, for information.

By order, etc.,
(sd) J.B. Wood
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department,
Fort William,
The 15th February 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints, Section 1, dated the 28th October, 15th 18th, 21st 22nd 23rd 25th 27th and 29th December, 1899 and 1st and 3rd January 1900.
Section 2, dated the 28th November and 19th December, 1899.
Section 3, dated the 29th November 1899.

[x] With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident Aden

Confidential

No 1570 of 1900.

55 Q
1.3.00

Political Department.

Bombay Castle, 23rd February 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

F.K. Ogilvy
Secretary to Government.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 109. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 28, 1899.

MODIFICATION of boundary-line of Italian sphere as laid down in Protocol of 1891.

I am informed that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is now prepared to negotiate on the subject, but unless you send an officer to Rome for this purpose I scarcely see how the details can be settled there.

I would suggest a Protocol or exchange of notes, in which it should be stated that the Italian Government, in view of the altered circumstances since the Protocol of 1891 was signed, agree that Her Majesty's Government shall be at liberty to negotiate with Abyssinia the frontier between the River Juba and the River Mareb, irrespective of the line of division as laid down in the Protocols between the British and Italian spheres of influence.

It might be further agreed that the line of division already laid down from Ras Kasar to Sabderat between the territories under Egyptian and Italian administration shall be further drawn between Sabderat and the Abyssinian frontier by Egyptian and Italian officers appointed to discuss the question at Cairo.

I shall be glad to have your opinion on this matter.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 121.)

Sir, *Foreign Office. December* 15, 1899.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 87 of the 10th ultimo, reporting on the situation in the Dolbahanta and the measures adopted by you in dealing with deputations from the refractory tribes.

Your action, as reported in this despatch, is approved by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 206.)

My Lord, *Cairo, December* 7, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that after consultation with the Governor-General of the Soudan and Sir William Garstin, it has been decided to open a credit of 10,000*l.* for the work of cutting through the sudd in the Upper Nile.

The object of the contemplated operations is twofold. In the first place it is hoped that it will be found possible to open the riverway to direct communication with Uganda, and in the second place valuable information will be gained, which will complete the studies of the Nile waterflow in the interests of Egyptian irrigation.

Of this credit of 10,000*l.*, the sum of about 1,000*l.* will be required for the purchase of material, while the remaining 9,000*l.* will be devoted to the pay and maintenance of the Dervish prisoners, who will be employed upon the work.

I have urged upon the Governor-General the necessity for securing the services of an efficient doctor to look after the escort and the workmen in regions where fever is prevalent during a great part of the year.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

[2390 *s*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Captain Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 66.)

My Lord, *Harrar, November 27, 1899.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a force said to be 6,000 strong under the command of Dejasmatch Biratou, nephew of Ras Makunan, has to-day left Harrar with the avowed object of operating against the Somali Mullah should he be in Abyssinian territory, and punishing the Rer Ali, Rer Haroon, and Rer Ughaz divisions of the Ogaden tribe.

Dejasmatch Biratou, whom I saw this morning before he started, informed me that he awaits further orders from the King as to the route which he is to follow; he could give me no indication as to the extent of ground which his operations were likely to cover, beyond saying that he expected to descend the Webi Shebeyle.

In view of the uncertainty of his movements, I thought it well to warn him against crossing the British Somali frontier, or interfering with any British Somali tribes who may be pasturing their flocks on Abyssinian territory, according to Treaty rights, and I supplied him with a map on which the frontier is clearly marked. He assured me that he would be most careful on these points.

As he could not tell me how far south he might eventually go, I thought it advisable to furnish him with a letter, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, addressed to the Commander of any British post or party with whom he might come in contact.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Consul-General on the Somali Coast, and to Her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General in the East Africa Protectorate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Captain Harrington to the Commander of any British Post or Party into whose hands this may come.

Sir, *Harrar, November 27, 1899.*

DEJASMATCH BERATOU, to whom this letter is given, is the Commander of an Abyssinian punitive expedition into the Ogaden country. Should he meet any British party he has been instructed to enter into friendly relations with it; and I have the honour to request that he may be treated in a friendly manner and every effort made to prevent complications.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

Given to Dejasmatch Beratou at Harrar, the 27th November, 1899.

No 2.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 263.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 21, 1899.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 202 of the 1st instant on the subject of the parties now engaged in surveying the Abyssinian frontier.

I approve the instructions which your Excellency reports having been given to Major Austin.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 3.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 124.)

Foreign Office, December 21, 1899.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 92 of the 23rd ultimo, inclosing correspondence with the British Consular Agent at Harrar, from which it appears that the Acting Governor of Harrar has announced the probability of Abyssinian troops crossing the frontier of the Protectorate in pursuit of Ogaden tribes.

Lord Salisbury concurs in your approval of Mr. Gerolimato's reply to the Acting Governor of Harrar. Mr. Harrington will be authorized to call the attention of the Emperor Menelek to this matter, should he think it desirable to do so.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Lord Currie.

(No. 159.)

Foreign Office, December 22, 1899.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 221 of the 6th instant, reporting the result of the interviews which your Excellency aud Sir Rennell Rodd have had with the Marquis Visconti-Venosta respecting the settlement of the Abyssinian and Soudanese frontier.

I approve the course which it is proposed to follow in this matter, as well as the terms of the note which your Excellency has addressed to the Marquis Visconti-Venosta on the subject.

I am. &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Intelligence Division to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 23.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and with reference to Mr. de Courcy Perry's despatch No. 4, Africa, Confidential, dated 8th December, would wish to draw particular attention to Count Leontieff's telegram, which discloses facts of considerable importance at the present time when the southern and western boundaries of Abyssinia are under consideration.

Passing over the statement that his subordinates are at the present time engaged in an exploring expedition within the British sphere of influence, and that he proposes to send half his Senegalese home through Belgian Congo, and therefore across a large tract within our sphere, Leontieff reports himself as definitely settled on Lake Rudolf, at a point now under dispute, being within our sphere according to the Agreement with Italy of 1891, but within the Abyssinian boundary as claimed recently by Menelek. Bearing in mind that Menelek recently suggested a settlement of the boundary based on effective occupation, he can hardly fail to urge the present position of his concessionary Leontieff in substantiating his claim to the north of Lake Rudolf.

18, *Queen Anne's Gate, S.W.*,
December 21, 1899.

[2390 *z*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 25.)

(No. 8. Africa.)

My Lord, *Cairo, December* 11, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches Nos. 77 and 78 of the 6th and 7th ultimo, which I have submitted to Lord Kitchener. His observations on the Belgian expeditions in the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province are contained in the letter, copy of which is inclosed herewith.

Lord Kitchener appears to be under the impression that the arrangements under the Agreement of the 12th May, 1894, by which the Sovereign of the Congo State was authorized conditionally to occupy the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province, and the left bank of the Nile up to Fashoda, have been terminated by His Majesty's renunciation of these rights subsequently published in the Agreement concluded by His Majesty with the French Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Lord Kitchener to Viscount Cromer.

My Lord, *Omdurman, December* 6, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to return the despatches, marked in the margin,* forwarded with your Lordship's No. 22 on the subject of an armed Belgian expedition from the Congo State penetrating into the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province of the Soudan, and to state that I deprecate any such action on the part of the Belgian authorities, and trust that the aggressive policy thus demonstrated by them may not be persisted in.

Should trading Companies of Belgians or others desire to establish themselves in the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province under the Soudan jurisdiction and laws, there would, of course, be no objection to such a course; but permission should be asked, and a detailed statement should be given of what it is wished to exploit; otherwise, it will be impossible to deal with such cases, and public security in the district may be disturbed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM.

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 25.)

(No. 211.)

My Lord, *Cairo, December* 11, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 75, of the 3rd ultimo, forwarding copies of correspondence which has passed between the Foreign Office and the Intelligence Division of the War Office respecting a proposed expedition from Uganda to the Bahr-el-Ghazal.

* Foreign Office, No. 77, Africa, November 6; ditto, No. 78, Africa, November 7, 1899.

This correspondence has been submitted to Lord Kitchener, who makes the following observations:—

He does not consider that "in the present circumstances an expedition from Uganda merely to report on what is going on in the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province would repay the outlay. If the sudd in the Bahr Zeraf or Bahr Jebel is cleared, it will be easy to send a force from Shambeh to look after that country; in the meantime, when El Obeid is occupied, Shakka will no doubt form a post from which the Bahr-el-Ghazal can be reached."

With these observations of Lord Kitchener's I have the honour to agree.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Harrington.

(No. 49.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 27, 1899.

YOU will have received from Her Majesty's Consul-General on the Somali Coast a copy of his despatch No. 92 of the 23rd ultimo, inclosing correspondence with M. Gerolimato, from which it appears that the Acting Governor of Harrar announced the probability of Abyssinian troops crossing the frontier of the British Protectorate in pursuit of Ogaden tribes.

You are authorized to draw the Emperor Menelek's attention to this matter if you should think it desirable to do so, and to request that strict orders may be given that the Abyssinian forces shall not cross the British frontier.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

[2390 *dd*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Sir H. Johnston.

(No. 278. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 29, 1899.

WITH reference to Colonel Ternan's despatches No. 227 and 232 of the 23rd and 27th September, I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit, for your information, copies of the papers, marked in the margin,* relating to the question of the present validity of the lease of the Bahr-el-Ghazal country to the King of the Belgians as Sovereign of the Congo Free State.

No special agreement has been come to on the subject since Lord Salisbury's despatch to Sir F. Plunkett, No. 46, of the 25th April last; and I am directed by his Lordship to instruct you to confine your action in the matter for the present to watching and reporting the movements of the King's forces within the sphere comprised in the lease.

I am, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

To Sir F. Plunkett, No. 46, April 25; Inclosure in ditto, Lord Salisbury's Memorandum, April 7, 1899.

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 1, 1900.)

(No. 97. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, December* 8, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to submit copy of a Memorandum of an interview I had this day with Chevalier Pestalozza, the Consul-General for Italy at Zanzibar, who called in at Berbera to see me on the subjects noted in the Memorandum on his way to Ras Alula to inquire into the late importation of arms and ammunition at that place from Jibuti.

I was glad of the opportunity of discussing with Chevalier Pestalozza matters of interest common to both our Protectorates, and of ascertaining personally from Sultan Yusif Ali that the Mijjertein are opposed to the movement which originated in the Dolbahanta.

With regard to this subject of arms, after some experience of the question in Persia, in Eastern and Western Arabia, and on the Somali Coast, the only conclusion I can come to is that, given a source of supply and a savage or semi-savage race wanting arms, the only effectual way of preventing arms reaching them is to cut off the source of supply, whether this be in Jibuti, in Europe, or elsewhere. Failing this any measures which are taken at sea, or locally, with the conditions as they obtain at present on the coast-lines of the countries mentioned, can, in their results, be at the best but partial and unsatisfactory.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

N.B.—A copy of this despatch and inclosure is being sent to Viscount Cromer and Captain Harrington, and a copy of the inclosure to the Political Resident, Aden.

J. H. S.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Memorandum of an Interview with the Consul-General for Italy at Zanzibar.

(Confidential.)

CHEVALIER PESTALOZZA, Consul-General for Italy at Zanzibar, arrived early this morning from Aden in the cruiser "Governolo," and called upon me shortly after his arrival. He was accompanied by Captain Bixio, commanding the "Governolo," who was present at the commencement of our interview, and by Sultan Yusuf Ali of the Mijjertein, who was present during the latter part of our conversation. Lieutenant Cordeaux was present throughout.

After the interchange of friendly compliments, Chevalier Pestalozza told me he had called at Berbera on his way to Ras Alula with a view to consulting me as to what arrangements could be made to stop the importation of arms into the British and Italian Protectorates, which he believed to be going on, and also to inquire what news there was of the movements of the Mollah Muhammad Abdullah, as Sultan Yusuf Ali had lately been threatened by him and was now returning to Oppia on this account.

With regard to the question of arms the Consul-General for Italy observed that there was a trade in arms between Muscat and the southern coast of Arabia and the Somali coast ports. These arms, he said, all came from Jibuti. He told me he had heard that arms were introduced into the interior through Berbera. This, I said, was not possible. Careful precautions in this respect were taken, and in all three ports, Berbera, Bulhar, and Zeyla, the police are always on the look-out for any smuggling of arms and ammunition, and of this the natives were well aware. Cases had occurred, I added, of arms being brought into our Protectorate from Jibuti in small numbers by

land by avoiding Zeyla, and in two instances the capture of the smuggled arms had been effected. So long as arms are freely sold at Jibuti it was unlikely that the introduction of a certain number into the interior could be stopped.

The Consul-General had already heard of the arms and ammunition landed at Ras Alula, which formed the subject of my despatch No. 94 of the 2nd instant, whilst on his way from Zanzibar to Aden—240 rifles was the number he heard had reached the Sultan, and he was now proceeding to Ras Alula to try and obtain possession of them. The serious part of the business, he said, was that these arms and the ammunition which accompanied them were actually a present from Mohamed Abubakr Pasha, who is an Agent of King Menelek's at Jibuti, to a Sultan in the Italian Protectorate, and that this is the first instance of a large consignment of arms being sent to the coast direct from Jibuti; it would doubtless soon be followed by others.

Chevalier Pestalozza asked me whether I thought the buggalow carrying these arms had gone direct from Jibuti to Bandar Kasim, or had put in at any of our ports. It carried the French flag. I replied that no intimation of it having touched at our ports had reached me, and that I thought it would have had every reason to avoid doing so. Asked whether I should consider myself justified in detaining a native craft putting into our ports and laden with arms and under the French flag, I replied that I should have no hesitation in detaining any craft entering our ports with a consignment of arms irrespective of the flag it carried.

We were both agreed that the introduction of arms along the coast-line of the two Protectorates could not be effectually stopped by cruising, should such a trade be carried on in native craft. We further agreed that so long as the export of arms was freely allowed by sea and by land from Jibuti, all the precautions we could take, under present conditions, against arms finding their way into the interior of our Protectorates, such as prohibition to natives, seizure and confiscation of arms, when possible, and the punishment of offenders, were insufficient to cope with the evil—they would mitigate it, but not stop it.

The Consul-General asked me whether the closing of Aden and Indian ports to tribes who persisted in supplying themselves with arms against our orders would not be effectual in stopping the traffic. I said I thought it probably would, but that matters had not yet come to that pass certainly in the British Protectorate. I also reminded the Consul-General that this would be a matter for determination by the Aden authorities and the Government of India, and that any suggestion of the kind would be for the consideration of our respective Governments.

I informed the Consul-General of the latest news there was regarding the movements of the Mollah. There was but little to tell him. The Mollah was believed to be somewhere south of Bohotele outside our Protectorate with a small following, and there were indications that the Dolbahanta was getting too hot for him, the Mahmood Girad having now combined against him, and that consequently there were reports that he intended to repair to Wal Wal in the Ogaden, where he is said to have already sent the loot he has accumulated.

Sultan Yusuf Ali was then called in. After the usual compliments, he told me that in the spring the Mollah had sent him two camels with a request for assistance in arms, and that he had sent back a return present of sheep, and refused to send any arms. This coincided with what I had already heard. The Sultan further said that no arms had reached the Dolbahanta either from Ras Alula or the Benadir coast; and Chevalier Pestalozza added that from the inquiries he had made he was unable to find that any arms had come in that way. I said that I was sure it was not to the interests of the Mijjertein Sultans to supply the Mollah with arms, and that I was satisfied such had not been the case; but I observed that my information in the spring certainly was that arms had reached him from the Mijjertein, from which direction I could not say, and that it was conceivable that this had happened without the knowledge of the Sultans, more especially as a traffic in arms with their coast was said to be carried on.

The Consul-General then asked me to support him in what he had previously told Sultan Yusuf Ali and had particularly impressed upon him, viz., that both the British and Italian Governments were at one accord in the suppression of the illicit introduction of arms into the African Protectorates, and that it was in every way to his interest and that of his people to keep arms out of his country, and use every endeavour to prevent his tribes arming themselves with rifles. To this I willingly consented. Sultan Yusuf Ali said that he recognized that all that was said was true. He then asked whether assistance would be given him by the British or Italians in the event of his being attacked by the Dolbahanta Mollah, evidently leading up to a request for arms. He was told by the Consul-General for Italy not to raise questions of that kind at present, that we should

know what to do should occasion arise, and the former injunction against obtaining arms was repeated.

Sultan Yusuf Ali said he was quite ready to turn back the Mollah if he comes in his direction, which he was told was not likely. After some further conversation on unimportant matters the interview terminated.

Before leaving, Chevalier Pestalozza asked me what news had been received of the movements of the Abyssinians in the Ogaden. I told him of the operations of the Abyssinians against the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun, and generally of the reports which had reached me of a further force moving into the Ogaden ostensibly against the Mollah Muhammad Abdullah.

He asked me whether I thought it possible for arms and ammunition to reach the Dolbahanta through Ras Alula. I replied that I saw nothing to prevent it. If the Sultan allowed his people to obtain arms they would naturally sell them in the best market.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Berbera, December 8, 1899.

No. 2.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 1, 1900.)

(No. 98. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, December* 14, 1899.

THE position of affairs in the eastern portion of the Protectorate has much improved since my despatch No. 87 of the 10th ultimo was written.

The measures which, on my return from Aden, I initiated in dealing with the various Eastern tribes and their sections, and which were reported to your Lordship in the above-quoted despatch, have resulted in the almost complete restoration of order in the Habr Toljaala country, all the tribes of which, with the exception of a portion of the Rer Yusuf and the Eastern Habr Yunis, have now come in. The sections of the Eastern Habr Yunis which have not yet appeared are far off in the interior, and may be expected to come in later.

All these tribes have declared against any further connection with the Mollah, whom they now freely abuse.

In the Dolbahanta the powerful Mahmood Girad, one of whose sections—the Jama Siad—furnished the Mollah with many of his horsemen at Burao, have all joined against him and threatened to attack him, partly owing to their disapproval of the murder of the Girad of the Ahmed Girad, and partly because it has been made clear to them by recent measures taken here that it is to their interest to keep open their trade with our ports, from which they draw their supplies.

Other sections of the Dolbahanta have followed their lead, and large caravans from the Dolbahanta are now coming in to Berbera.

In consequence of this altered attitude of a large portion of the Dolbahanta, and threats of attack by the Mahmood Girad, the Mollah found it convenient to leave Lasader and repair to Bohotele. There one of the three large sections of the Aligheri, who have hitherto been amongst his principal supporters, is reported to have deserted his cause. He is now said to be from three to four days' journey south of Bohotele in the Ogaden country beyond the limits of our Protectorate. It is believed that all the loot he has acquired in camels and other live-stock is collected at Wal Wal further south in the Ogaden, and reports are current that he intends to take up his residence at or near that place.

It is quite impossible to predict what he may or may not do, but reliable information has been received that he has been inciting the Ibrahim Ogaden to loot all Ishak caravans, which lends colour to the presumption that he has accepted the fact that the Ishak tribes—the Habr Toljaala and Habr Gerhajis—have severed their connection with him, and are now declared against him. The remaining Ishak tribe, the Habr Awal, were so from the first.

I cannot say what assistance he will receive from the Ogaden tribes; he will probably always find some of the young men of the tribes ready for mischief and loot, and he will doubtless try and harass the Habr Yunis when they migrate to the south;

but as most of these tribes deal freely with our ports, it does not seem likely that the Ogaden tribes as a body will risk their trade with Berbera and Bulhar to favour what is now generally looked upon as a losing cause.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer and to Captain Harrington.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

P.S.—Mr. Gerolimato at Harrar is always kept informed of the Mollah's movements so far as they are known here.

J. H. S.

---

o

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 3, 1900.)

(No. 226.)

My Lord, *Rome, December* 29, 1899.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 221 of the 6th instant, respecting the delimitation of the Soudan-Abyssinian and the Soudan-Erythræan frontiers, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship copies and translations of two notes which I have received from the Marquis Visconti-Venosta in reply to my note of the 6th instant respecting those two subjects.

Your Lordship will observe that in the first of his Excellency's notes the Italian Government state that they have no objection to make to the proposed frontier betwen Abyssinia and the Soudan in so far as the line laid down by the Anglo-Italian Protocols of the 24th March and the 15th April, 1891, would thereby be modified on the basis of the line traced on the map accompanying my note.

In M. Visconti-Venosta's second note his Excellency states that the Italian Government is disposed to come to an agreement with that of Her Majesty for the completion, by a delimitation between Erythræa and the Soudan, of the Soudanese frontier-line, which the pending Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement can only fix as far as Todluk. He suggests that it would be well if the negotiations for such delimitation were conducted directly between the Governors of the Soudan and of Erythræa.

I have the honour to transmit a copy of my answer to M. Visconti-Venosta accepting the method of procedure which he suggests.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CURRIE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Marquis Visconti-Venosta to Lord Currie.

(Translation.) *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, December* 26, 1899.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

I HAVE had the honour to receive the note of the 6th instant, in which your Excellency, after referring to the negotiations pending between Ethiopia and England for the regulation of the Abyssinian frontier towards the Soudan and to the exchange of ideas which has taken place in London on this subject between the Italian Ambassador and Her Majesty's Prime Minister, forwards to me, in the name of your Government, a map ("Skeleton Map of Abyssinia and surrounding countries"), on which are traced the frontier-line between Ethiopia and the Soudan as proposed by Menelek, and the line laid down by the Anglo-Italian Protocols of the 24th March and the 15th April, 1891.

Your Excellency calls my attention to the fact that the frontier proposed by Menelek, starting from a point which is held to be on the border between Erythræa and Ethiopia, is drawn to the east of the line agreed upon in the Protocol of the 15th April, 1891, and to the south of Famaka, leaves to Abyssinia part of the sphere apportioned to Egypt by the Protocol of the 24th March, 1891.

As a consequence of this, you have been instructed by the Marquess of Salisbury to ask whether I have any observations to make as to the proposed frontier, and you assure me that no definitive reply has as yet been given to the Emperor Menelek, Her Majesty's Government wishing first to be informed of the views of the Italian Government before coming to an arrangement with Ethiopia.

Finally, you conclude by saying that your Government think that it would be desirable to come to some arrangement with us for the settlement, in accordance with mutual convenience, of the frontier between the Soudan and Erythræa, starting from Todluk, where Ethiopian territory ends.

Reserving my reply as to this last point for communication in a separate note, I beg your Excellency to make known to the Marquess of Salisbury that the Italian Government has no objections to make to the proposed frontier between Abyssinia and the Soudan, so that the line laid down by the Anglo-Italian Protocols of the 24th March and the 15th April, 1891, would thereby be modified on the basis of the line traced on the above-mentioned map.

I have, &c.
(Signed) VISCONTI-VENOSTA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Marquis Visconti-Venosta to Lord Currie.

(Translation.)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, December 26, 1899.

M. l'Ambrasadeur,

IN the note which your Excellency did me the honour to address to me on the 6th instant, you express, in the name of your Government, a desire to come to an arrangement for the settlement, in accordance with mutual convenience, of the frontier between the Soudan and Erythræa, starting from Todluk, where Ethiopian territory ends.

I have the honour to inform you that the Italian Government is disposed to come to an agreement with that of Her Majesty for the completion, by a delimitation between Erythræa and the Soudan, of the Soudanese frontier-line, which the pending Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement can only fix as far as Todluk.

In the opinion of the Italian Government, it would be well if the negotiations for such delimitation were conducted directly between the two Governors of the Soudan and of Erythræa.

I shall be glad to know whether Her Majesty's Government accepts this *modus procedendi*.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) VISCONTI-VENOSTA.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Lord Currie to Marquis Visconti-Venosta.

Rome, December 29, 1899.

M. le Ministre,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 26th instant, stating, in reply to my communication on the subject, that the Italian Government is willing to come to an agreement with that of Her Majesty for the completion, by a delimitation between Erythræa and the Soudan, of the Soudanese frontier-line, which the pending Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement can only fix as far as Todluk.

Your Excellency suggests that it would be desirable that the negotiations for the delimitation in question should be conducted directly between the Governors of the Soudan and of Erythræa.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that this method of procedure is agreeable to Her Majesty's Government, and that instructions will be sent to the Governor-General of the Soudan to that effect.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) CURRIE.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Lord Currie.

(No. 140.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 28, 1899.

SO far as we can judge here, the arrangement proposed with regard to the Abyssinian frontier, as reported in your telegram No. 104 of the 27th instant, appears to be highly satisfactory.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Acting Commissioner Ternan to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 246.)

My Lord, *Port Alice, October* 10, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of a correspondence which I have to-day received from the Officer Commanding the Nile District relative to an unauthorized reconnaissance down the Nile, which is apparently being undertaken by Lieutenant Gage, in conjunction with Congo Free State troops.

I am not aware to what orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Martyr Lieutenant Gage refers, but in any case the latter must be well aware that no such orders can hold good after Lieutenant-Colonel Martyr relinquished command of the Nile District.

I am writing to the Officer Commanding Nile Military District that Lieutenant Gage's action is entirely irregular, unnecessary, and contrary to my wishes, and that Lieutenant Gage and the troops with him are to be recalled, if possible, at once.

Dr. Milne, as Senior Medical Officer of the Nile District, was entirely wrong, as he must be aware, in leaving his district without authority, and his so doing is most indefensible.

I propose to treat both these officers as regards pay as absent without leave, with a view to preventing a recurrence of unauthorized escapades of this kind.

I will report to your Lordship immediately further information is received concerning the movements of Lieutenant Gage and Dr. Milne.

Dr. Milne will be replaced in medical charge of the Nile District by Dr. Walker, and on the return of the former he will revert to the rank of Medical Officer, Fort Berkeley.

I have, &c.

(Signed) TREVOR TERNAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Lieutenant Gage to Captain Radcliffe.

Sir, *Fort Berkeley, September* 9, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to report that, acting on the instructions left here by Lieutenant-Colonel Martyr, D.S.O., I am leaving here this day, in company with Commandant Henry [?], commanding the Congo State troops on the Nile, to endeavour, conjointly with him, to overcome the obstacles barring the passage of the Nile to Khartoum.

He has informed me that he has reliable information which leads him to suppose that this can be successfully effected, and has therefore suggested to me that we should undertake the task together. On these, to my mind, very strong grounds, I consider it my duty, knowing how important it is that the route should be opened, to acquiesce in this proposal. I am therefore leaving Sergeant F. Osborne in temporary command during my absence, with full instructions as to daily routine, &c.

He will reply to all ordinary correspondence as far as he is able.

I am taking 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 10 men with me, with 80 rounds per man.

Trusting my action in this matter will meet with your approval, I have, &c.

(Signed) MORETON F. GAGE, *Lieutenant*,
Uganda Rifles.

P.S.—1. Commandant Henry has just informed me that he has been as far as Shambe, where he found a French post established consisting of a captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 sous-officier, and 40 soldiers. They contemplate, however, evacuating this post when possible.

2. Dr. A. D. Milne is accompanying this reconnaissance. I have not given any orders to him one way or the other, as I understand he is not under the orders of the Officer Commanding Station.

3. I regret extremely that I have not been able to ask your permission to carry out this reconnaissance, but Commandant Henry only arrived to-day, and he tells me there must be no delay, for the river is constantly changing, and may become impassable at Shambe at any moment.

I am therefore taking Colonel Martyr's instructions, which I hope to forward with my Report as sufficient authority.

M. F. G.

Minute.

The Senior Staff Officer, Uganda Rifles, Kampala:

Forwarded for the information of the Commandant. I have no knowledge of any special instructions left by Lieutenant-Colonel Martyr, D.S.O., but presume, as they appear to have been effective beyond the date of Colonel Martyr's handing over the command of the Nile District, that they have been submitted to and approved by the Commandant.

Should this not be the case, I should be glad to know what action the Commandant wishes taken. It was my intention to proceed viâ Lamogi after the next mail from head-quarters arrived here. I am now, however, proceeding direct to Afuddu by the steel boat expected back to-day. From there I shall proceed at once to Fort Berkeley.

Lieutenant Gage has not handed over the command of his company to Captain Dugmore, and makes no mention of the date on which he may return.

(Signed) C. DELMÉ RADCLIFFE, *Captain, Uganda Rifles, Commanding Nile Military District.*

Wadelai, September 29, 1899.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Dr. Milne to the Acting Principal Medical Officer, Kampala.

Sir, *Fort Berkeley, September* 9, 1899.

AS I am going off on the expedition starting from Fort Berkeley to-morrow to try and open up the route to Khartoum, I have to point out that my estimates for the Nile District will be delayed in being made up, and will not be forwarded as soon as I intended. I have been waiting to see Captain Delmé Radcliffe to confer with him about hospitals, &c., and it is possible this may delay the meeting still longer.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. D. MILNE.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN. [November 29.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 3.

No. 1.

Deputy-Commissioner Ternan to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 29.)

(No. 227.)

My Lord, *Port Alice, September* 23, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to report that Lieutenant Bryde, of the Congo Free State, has arrived at Tunguru, on the west shore of the north end of Lake Albert, where he is about to establish a station.

It would appear probable that in the interests of local administration, it will be desirable, before long, to mark out on the ground, the border between British territory and the portion leased to the Congo Free State.

I have, &c.

(Signed) TREVOR TERNAN.

No. 2.

Deputy-Commissioner Ternan to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received November* 29.)

(No. 232.)

My Lord, *Port Alice, September* 27, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to report that Captain Hicks, Commanding the troops at Fadfow, reports that Lieutenant Bryde's party at Tunguru's Mahagi, consists of 100 soldiers; Congo dwarfs about 4½ feet high.

This party apparently has left Tunguru's and has moved south towards Kavalli's.

Natives report that a large force which is following this advanced party, and is coming from the direction of Dufilé, is proceeding to occupy the Kavalli's district.

I have, &c.

(Signed) TREVOR TERNAN.

(Confidential)

No 461 E.A

A copy[x] of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, etc,
(sd) J. B. Wood
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department
Fort William,
The 17th February 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints, Section 1, dated the 3rd, 5th and 8th January, 1900, Sections 4 and 5 dated the 18th December, 1899.

x With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 1511 of 1900.

Political Department.

Bombay Castle, 23rd February 1900.

59 E
1.3.00.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

F. W. Ogilvy
Secretary to Government

I.S.C. for Pol. Asst. at Aden.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Lord Currie

(No. 1.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 3, 1900.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul-General on the Somali Coast,* reporting the dispatch of arms and ammunition from Jibuti along the coast east of the British Protectorate.

Your Excellency may think it desirable to mention the facts reported by Colonel Hayes Sadler to the Italian Government, although that officer has already communicated them to the Italian Vice-Consul at Aden.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

* Consul-General Sadler, No. 94, December 2, 1899.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 5, 1900.*

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that he referred to Her Majesty's Consul-General on the Somali Coast your letter of the 27th September, 1899, respecting the desire of the Government of India that a refund of duty should be granted at Aden on all live stock imported for Government purposes from the Somali Coast Protectorate.

I am now to inclose a copy of Colonel Hayes Sadler's reply,* from which it will be seen that, apart from the difficulties which would arise in settling the amount of duty to be refunded, he does not consider that the claim of the Government of India is admissible, or that the revenues of the Protectorate could bear such a charge.

Lord Salisbury concurs in the views expressed by Colonel Hayes Sadler.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

* Consul-General Sadler, No. 90, November 22, 1899.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 8, 1900.)

(No. 67.)

My Lord. *Camp Garsa, December* 4, 1899.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 66 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I have to-day received a telephonic message from M. Ilg, Counsellor to His Majesty the Emperor Menelek, to the effect that the force which started on the 28th ultimo under Dejasmatch Berato, with a view to operate against the Somali Mullah, has been recalled.

M. Ilg informs me that this step has been taken in consequence of the decision of Her Majesty's Government not to take any active measures against the Mullah at present.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to Viscount Cromer, to Consul-General Sadler, and to Her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General in the East African Protectorate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 4.

No. 1.

Foreign Office to the Law Officers of the Crown.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, December* 18, 1899.

I HAVE the honour, by direction of the Marquess of Salisbury, to state that the draft Order in Council for the Somaliland Protectorate, which formed the subject of your Report of the 18th September last, received the approval of the Queen in Council on the 7th October.

Lord Salisbury's attention has, however, been drawn to the fact that the Somaliland Order in Council of 1889, which, owing to certain practical difficulties, was never brought into force, has not been expressly repealed by the recently passed Order of 1899. Copies of both Orders are inclosed herewith.*

Although it is unquestionable that the Order of 1889 has no operation, the necessary directions for putting it into force never having been given by the Secretary of State, it appears possible that misunderstanding and inconvenience may arise if it be maintained on the list of effective Orders in Council.

Lord Salisbury understands that the removal of the Order in question from that list can only be effected by repeal, and I am accordingly to transmit the accompanying draft of an Order in Council which has been framed to meet the case.

It has been thought advisable to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the repeal of the Somali Order in Council to repeal at the same time "The Brunei Order in Council, 1890." This Order was passed under a misapprehension as to the numbers of British subjects affected by it, but it has never been brought into force by the means provided in Articles 116 (3) and 117.

Sir Charles Mitchell, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, when he visited Brunei in 1896 in his capacity of High Commissioner and Consul-General for the Sultan's territory, was empowered to exercise his discretion in bringing the Order into operation. He, however, reported that he had decided, after a very full consideration, not to complete the technical steps necessary to make it of force, and that he did not recommend that he should be directed to take such steps. Sir Charles stated, as his reasons for arriving at this decision, that the British subjects resident in Brunei were not of British birth; that the machinery necessary for bringing an appeal was altogether too cumbrous; and that the simpler system—which still obtains—of asking the intervention and assistance of Her Majesty's Consul was all that was really necessary.

It was at that time suggested by the Colonial Office that an Order in Council should be passed suspending the Order of 1890 until the Secretary of State should instruct the Consul to exhibit it in his office at Brunei, but as the latter Order had never come into force, Lord Salisbury considered that the better course would be to repeal the Order on the first favourable opportunity which occurred for this being done, without thereby drawing attention to the delay which had occurred in bringing it into force.

The draft Order for the repeal of the Somaliland Order in Council of 1889 has accordingly been drawn so as to include in its provisions the repeal of the Brunei Order in Council of 1890.

I am to inclose, for convenience of reference, a copy of "The Brunei Order in Council, 1890,"† together with a copy of the paragraph in Sir C. Mitchell's Report which deals with the question.‡

I am to request that you will take the draft "Somali and Brunei (Repeal) Order in Council, 1899," into your consideration, and favour Lord Salisbury with your opinion whether it can properly be submitted to Her Majesty in Council in its present form, and, if not, that you will indicate such amendments or modifications as you may consider necessary or desirable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

* "The Somali Order in Council, 1889;" ditto, 1899. † "The Brunei Order in Council, 1890."
‡ Sir C. Mitchell, No. 4, November 16, 1896 (Extract).

Inclosure in No. 1.

Draft Order in Council.

SOMALI AND BRUNEI.

"*The Somali and Brunei (Repeal) Order in Council*, 1900."

WHEREAS by Treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful means, Her Majesty the Queen has power and jurisdiction in the territories comprised within the limits of "The Somali Order in Council, 1889," and "The Brunei Order in Council, 1890";

And whereas, since the passing of the said Orders, other provision has been made for the exercise of Her Majesty's jurisdiction in the said territories respectively, and it is expedient that the said Orders should be expressly repealed:

Now, therefore, Her Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of the powers in this behalf by "The Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890," or otherwise in Her Majesty vested, is pleased, by and with the advice of her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:—

1. "The Somali Order in Council, 1889," and "The Brunei Order in Council, 1890," are hereby repealed as from the passing of this Order.

2. This Order may be cited as "The Somali and Brunei (Repeal) Order in Council, 1900."

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to Mr. Hopwood.—(*Received December* 18.)

Dear Mr. Hopwood, *Berbera, November* 25, 1899.

I INCLOSE, unofficially, copy of an interesting note I have received from Mr. Gerolimato.

This was received with the correspondence with which I dealt in my despatch No. 92 of the 23rd instant.

The French are certain to have misrepresented the object of our expedition into the interior, and they are not likely to have lost the opportunity of trying to make capital out of the Transvaal war.

Yours very truly,
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

I have no further information regarding Leontieff and the incident of the flags. We shall hear more about the movements of this 6,000 towards the Ogaden. It all points, as I have previously reported, to an effective occupation of, at least, the Western Ogaden.

J. H. S.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Mr. Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.

My dear Sir, *Harrar, November* 7, 1899.

IT is probable, I think, that our object in moving into the interior has been misrepresented to the King; but you know the Abyssinians are of bad faith, and my private opinion is they will now occupy the Ogaden permanently, and we shall have more trouble with them: for that I am sorry that the expedition has been postponed just at present. Menelek's proposition was only made to get the necessary time to prepare himself. The proof is the fact that the postponement of our expedition has had no effect on their preparations; on the contrary, they are making more preparations, as the Frenchmen have told them we have no more troops now owing to the war in the Transvaal. I believe it would have a very good impression bringing to Hargaisa some 500 or 1,000 troops, to prove to them that we have troops disposable at all times. The 6,000 men for the Ogaden left Addis Abbaba some days ago. They will perhaps pass through Harrar, as Dejaj Berato is expecting them here.

From the translation of the letter sent me by Garasmatch Bante you will see that he now pretends that some camels have been looted by our tribes from the Ogaden tribes. You see my reply. I am telling him that the Ogaden tribes want to counterbalance our claim, although I know this is Garasmatch Bante's own claim. Four days ago there arrived here two of our Akils, by name Jusuf Farih, of the Ayal Samanter Abdillah, and Ali Ismail Hursi, of the Sheikhdone Ahmed Abdillah. Garasmatch Bante gave them the Abyssinian Schama, shirts, clothes, and money, and afterwards they came to me, asking for clothes and money, saying they are British subjects. These two men were with the Abyssinians in the Ogaden when they, the Abyssinians, looted more than 1,000 camels.

About the desire of Garasmatch Bante to cross the frontier, I think it is better not to allow that, as we shall afterwards have a good deal to do with them. They

make razzias and loots as always, and our interest is to avoid all that. I am also writing to Captain Harrington about all this. I hope he is now *en route* for Harrar.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) J. GEROLIMATO.

N.B.—Just now, by telephone, a friend in Addis Abbaba informs me that Leontieff, who has returned to Addis Abbaba, found British flags on the north-east of Lake Rudolf. He took them out and replaced them by Abyssinian flags. The friend who gives me this news is a very honest man, and I have confidence in him.

J. G.

---

o

(Confidential)

No. 557 E. A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, etc.,

(sd) J. B. Wood.
Under Secretary to the
Government of India

Foreign Department,
Fort William.
The 28th February 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints, Section 1, dated the 9th 12th and 13th January 1900, Section 2, dated the 29th December 1899 and 1st January 1900.

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 1847 of 1900.
Political Department.
Bombay Castle, 8th March 1900.

61 E/20.3.00

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Lee-Warner

Acting Secretary to Government

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Harrington.

(No. 2.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 9, 1900.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 66 of the 27th November, 1899, reporting your action in regard to the dispatch of an Abyssinian force under Dejasmateh Birato for the purpose of operating against the Somali Mullah in case he should be in Abyssinian territory.

Your proceedings in this matter are approved.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 12.)

(No. 19. Africa.)

My Lord, *Brussels, January* 11, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1, Africa, of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to invite your Lordship's attention to the inclosed extract from the "Soir" of last night, which states that the Congolese force under Captain Henry has succeeded in forcing a passage through the sudd, and now proposes to steam down to Khartoum with the small French detachment which was met with at Shambé.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Soir" of January 11, 1900.

LES BELGES AU BAHR-EL-GHAZAL.—Nous avons rapporté, il y a quelque temps, que le Commandant Henry, s'avançant de Kéro vers le nord, à bord du "Van Kerkhoven," avait cherché à se relier aux Anglais du Soudan, mais qu'arrêté par un barrage de roseaux il n'avait pu pousser plus avant.

D'après une lettre du Commandant adressée à un de ses anciens adjoints, le Capitaine Derclaye, la tentative a été renouvelée et a réussi; le barrage a été franchi.

A Gaba-Shambé, Henry a trouvé un poste Français commandé par un officier, un sous-officier, et quarante Sénégalais. Les Français ont reçu les Belges avec la plus franche cordialité.

Au moment où il écrivait, le Commandant Henry avait l'intention de descendre le Nil jusque Khartoum, et de repatrier en même temps le poste Français établi à Gaba-Shambé; les difficultés ne devaient pas être trop grandes et il était certain de réussir dans cette nouvelle expédition.

Les Belges occupent sur la rive gauche du Nil trois points principaux et très bien fortifiés: Redjaf, Lado (ancienne station d'Émin Pacha), et Kéro, poste établi à l'extrémité de la partie nord de l'enclave. D'autres postes sont établis dans la partie sud; les Anglais occupent la rive droite du Nil et ont un poste presque en face de Redjaf.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 3.)

My Lord, *Rome, January* 10, 1900.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship translation of a note which I have received from the Italian Government, and in which it is suggested that the proposed delimitation of the Soudan and Erythræan frontier should take place in the month of March.

I have informed Lord Cromer by telegraph.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CURRIE.

Inclosure in No. 1.

The Marquis Visconti-Venosta to Lord Currie.

(Translation.)

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Foreign Office, Rome, January* 9, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 29th ultimo and of your private letter of the same date, in which your Excellency informs me that Her Majesty's Government accepts the proposal made by the Italian Government for arriving at an agreement for the delimitation of the frontier between Erythræa and the Soudan.

I thank your Excellency.

In regard to the meeting, which, in furtherance of this object, is to take place between Signor Martini and Colonel Wingate, I beg leave to inform you that the Royal Civil Commissioner of Erythræa, being obliged to be at Kassala towards the month of March, for the inauguration of a Memorial to those who fell fighting for Italy against the Dervishes, will avail himself of the opportunity to confer with Colonel Wingate.

In any case, however, Signor Martini, who will shortly leave for Erythræa, will, on his arrival, communicate more precise details on the subject to Lord Cromer through the Italian Agency in Cairo.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) VISCONTI-VENOSTA.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Law Officers of the Crown to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received December* 29.)

My Lord, *Royal Courts of Justice, December* 29, 1899.

WE were honoured with your Lordship's commands signified in Mr. Villiers' letter of the 18th instant, stating that the draft Order in Council for the Somaliland Protectorate, which formed the subject of our Report of the 18th September last, had received the approval of the Queen in Council on the 7th October.

That your Lordship's attention had, however, been drawn to the fact that the Somaliland Order in Council of 1889, which, owing to certain practical difficulties, had never been brought into force, had not been expressly repealed by the recently passed Order of 1899;

That, although it was unquestionable that the Order of 1889 had no operation, the necessary directions for putting it into force never having been given by the Secretary of State, it appeared possible that misunderstanding and inconvenience might arise if it were maintained on the list of effective Orders in Council;

That your Lordship understood that the removal of the Order in question from that list could only be effected by repeal, and that Mr. Villiers was accordingly to transmit to us the accompanying draft of an Order in Council which had been framed to meet the case;

That it had been thought advisable to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the repeal of the Somali Order in Council to repeal at the same time "The Brunei Order in Council, 1890;" that this Order was passed under a misapprehension as to the numbers of British subjects affected by it, but it had never been brought into force by the means provided in Articles 116 (3) and 117;

That Sir Charles Mitchell, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, when he visited Brunei in 1896 in his capacity of High Commissioner and Consul-General for the Sultan's territory, was empowered to exercise his discretion in bringing the Order into operation; that he, however, reported that he had decided, after a very careful consideration, not to complete the technical steps necessary to make it of force, and that he did not recommend that he should be directed to take such steps. That Sir Charles stated as his reasons for arriving at this decision, that the British subjects residing in Brunei were not of British birth; that the machinery necessary for bringing an appeal was altogether too cumbrous; and that the simpler system, which still obtained, of asking the intervention and assistance of Her Majesty's Consul was all that was really necessary;

That it was at that time suggested by the Colonial Office that an Order in Council should be passed suspending the Order of 1890 until the Secretary of State should instruct the Consul to exhibit it in his office at Brunei; but as the latter Order had never come into force, your Lordship had considered that the better course would be to repeal the Order on the first favourable opportunity which occurred for this being done without thereby drawing attention to the delay which had occurred in bringing it into force;

That the draft Order for the repeal of the Somaliland Order in Council of 1889 had accordingly been drawn so as to include in its provisions the repeal of the Brunei Order in Council of 1890;

That Mr. Villiers was to inclose, for convenience of reference, a copy of "The Brunei Order in Council, 1890," together with a copy of the paragraph in Sir C. Mitchell's Report which dealt with the question.

Finally, Mr. Villiers was to request that we would take the draft "Somali and Brunei (Repeal) Order in Council, 1899," into our consideration, and favour your Lordship with

our opinion whether it could properly be submitted to Her Majesty in Council in its present form, and if not, that we would indicate such amendments or modifications as we might consider necessary or desirable.

In obedience to your Lordship's commands we have the honour to

Report—

That in our opinion the accompanying draft Order in Council, as initialled by us, may properly be submitted to the Queen in Council for Her Majesty's approval.

We have, &c.

(Signed) RICHARD E. WEBSTER.
ROBERT B. FINLAY.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Draft Order in Council.

SOMALI AND BRUNEI.

"*The Somali and Brunei (Repeal) Order in Council*, 1900."

WHEREAS by Treaty, capitulation. grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful means, Her Majesty the Queen has power and jurisdiction in the territories comprised within the limits of "The Somali Order in Council, 1889," and "The Brunei Order in Council, 1890";

And whereas, since the passing of the said Orders, other provision has been made for the exercise of Her Majesty's jurisdiction in the said territories respectively, and it is expedient that the said Orders should be expressly repealed:

Now, therefore, Her Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of the powers in this behalf by "The Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890," or otherwise in Her Majesty vested, is pleased by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:—

1. "The Somali Order in Council, 1889," and "The Brunei Order in Council, 1890," are hereby repealed as from the passing of this Order.

2. This Order may be cited as "The Somali and Brunei (Repeal) Order in Council, 1900."

R. E. W.
R. B. F.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Consul-General Sadler.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1900.

NATIVE infantry detachment at Zeyla.

I approve the proposal to dispense with this detachment, as suggested in your telegram of the 21st ultimo.

18c. for Poll. Resolved that

(Confidential)

No. 638 E.A.

A copy of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department for information.

By order, etc.,

(sd) J. B. Wood

Under Secretary to the
Government of India

Foreign Department,
Fort William,
The 8th March 1900.

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints;
Section 1, dated the 22nd January 1900.
Section 2, dated the 9th and 13th January 1900.
Section 3, dated the 3rd January 1900.

× With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden

Confidential

No. 1951 of 1900.

Political Department

Bombay Castle, 13th March 1900.

62 E
20.3.00

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Hudson

Acting Secretary to Govt

mhc.

I.S.C. for Pol. Resdt at Aden.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 22.)

(No. 7.)

My Lord, *Rome, January* 17, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship copy and translation of an article in the "Tribuna" of the 15th instant, giving an account of the plans for the construction of railways in Erythræa.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CURRIE.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Tribuna" of January 15, 1900.

(Translation.)

ERYTHRÆA RAILWAY.—We have already announced that for the prolongation of the railway from Saati through the table-land, the Government had authorized M. Martini to make use of the available balance of the Colony. Surveys for the new line have been made for a distance of 12 kilom.; the construction of 8 kilom. has been already contracted for by the firm of Paganelli. The work has already been begun, since the matter was put into the hands of the contractor on the 2nd January.

These 8 kilom. of line run from Saati to the torrent of Digdigta, crossing a bridge 42 metres in length.

The construction of the other 4 kilom. of railway already surveyed—and it is believed that the funds necessary for this purpose can be obtained from the surplus of the present Budget—would bring the railway from the torrent of Digdigta to the entrance of the plain of Saberguma.

There the railway would effect a juncture with the ordinary road to Saberguma, which is 6 metres broad and furnished with solid constructural works, having been finished only a short time ago. On this road to Saberguma, rails on the Decauville system may be laid down, such rails being already stored in the warehouses of the Colony.

The plan which is being carried out solves the important problem of quick communication between Massowah and the table-land. At the point from which the proposed line will be extended, the hot fever zone comes to an end, and the Dongollo chain is entirely covered with woods.

Saberguma is connected with Ghinda by 15 kilom. of ordinary road, already constructed, which is now undergoing alteration and improvement.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 9.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, January* 9, 1900.

FOLLOWING telegram, dated the 29th December, received from Harrington to-day:—

"King Menelek shows marked friendliness. Dogs and horses have arrived, and he is much pleased with them.

"Notwithstanding the strong opposition of foreigners, Lane has been granted concessions for mining on his own terms, which seems to me a proof of King's friendly attitude.

"He also assures me that the incident at Gallabat (see my telegram No. 210 of the 28th November, 1899), took place contrary to his orders, and that he knew nothing of it.

"Ilg left yesterday for Jibuti."

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 13.)

(No. 20. Africa.)

My Lord, *Brussels, January* 12, 1900.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 19, Africa, of yesterday, I have the honour to inclose an extract from the "Soir" of last night, giving further details respecting the small French detachment which was found at Shambé by Captain Henry, of the Congolese army.

This French detachment seems to consist of Lieutenant de Tanguidu and Sergeant Salpin with fifty Senegalese.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Soir" of January 12, 1900.

LES BELGES SUR LE NIL.—Ainsi que nous l'avons dit hier, le Commandant Henry s'étant avancé sur le fleuve, avait rencontré un poste Français, qu'il avait l'intention de rapatrier par le Congo Belge. On ne sait encore si c'est chose accomplie, mais la présence d'un poste Français à cet endroit n'a pas laissé d'étonner assez vivement.

Renseignements pris, le fait est exact. Il en résulte que le Commandant Henry a rencontré le poste susdit à Shambé, près du confluent du Bahr-el-Ghebel et du Bahr-el-Zaraf.

Le Lieutenant Français de Tanguidu, qui commandait le poste, avait sous ses ordres un sous-officier blanc, le Sergent Salpin, et une cinquantaine de Sénégalais.

Le poste, installé fort rudimentairement, n'était plus ravitaillé que pour peu de temps. On n'a pas d'autres explications sur sa présence à cet endroit. A-t-il été laissé là par Marchand? En tout cas, jusqu'ici on n'en avait jamais parlé.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 3.)

(No. 1. Africa.)

My Lord, *Brussels, January* 2, 1900.

THE inclosed paragraph from the "Étoile Belge" of to-day, which has appeared also in one of the Congolese papers here, shows that the officers of the Independent State at Redjaf Lado are trying with their steamer to force a passage through the sudd, and to open communications with the British forces in the Soudan.

I beg to call attention to the statement here made that the Congolese expedition under Lieutenant Henry came across a small French detachment commanded by a Lieutenant of Marines still stationed on the banks of the Nile, and in a miserable state of want.

When I saw M. de Cuvelier last on the 27th ultimo, I asked him if he had heard anything new lately from Lado Redjaf. He replied merely that all was as usual there, and changed the subject. As I had then not yet heard of the statement now made, I did not press him further.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Étoile Belge" of January 2, 1900.

ON n'était pas sans inquiétudes sur le sort du Commandant Henry, le vaillant officier commandant l'expédition Belge au Nil, qui était parti à bord du steamer le "Vankerchoven," pour descendre le fleuve. Le dernier courrier vient d'annoncer le retour à Redjaf, en bonne santé, de notre compatriote, qui a descendu le fleuve jusqu'aux environs de Fashoda. On annonce le retour en Belgique du Commandant pour la fin du mois de Février. Il paraît que le steamer le "Vankerchoven," dont le transport au Nil constitue un véritable tour de force, se comporte parfaitement. Voilà qui fait honneur aux "petits Belges." Le but de l'excursion du Commandant Henry était de tâcher de se lier aux Anglais du Soudan. Arrêté malheureusement après plusieurs degrés de navigation, par un barrage de roseaux de 200 mètres d'épaisseur, il a dû retourner à Kéro pour y prendre le matériel nécessaire au percement de l'obstacle. Il a rencontré sur les bords du Nil uu poste Français commandé par un Lieutenant d'Infanterie de Marine. Cette petite troupe, dernier vestige de l'expédition Marchand, manquait de vivres et demandait instamment à être rapatriée.

(Confidential)

No. 698 E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing print is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, etc.,
/sd/ J.B. Wood
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department
Fort William,
The 16th March 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Print, Section 1, dated the 2nd February 1900.

*With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden

Confidential

No. 2138 of 1900.

682
29.3.00.

Political Department.
Bombay Castle, 20th March 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Hewson

Acting Secretary to Government

Rec'd with Letter No 6, of the 9th July 1900, from the Secy, Colonial Office Dept.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord, *Rome, January 27, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a précis of an article which appeared in the "Popolo Romano" of the 23rd instant, in regard to the applications for gold-mining concessions in Erythræa which have been addressed to the Italian Government.

The merits of the different applications are still being considered by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who inform me that in all probability the concessions will be granted to a single society.

Meanwhile Signor Martini, the Governor of Erythræa, has deferred his departure until the 7th February.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CURRIE.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Popolo Romano" of January 23, 1900.

WHEN the question of the mines came before the Chamber, the Government, in reply to observations on the subject, after stating that at various periods explorations had been made with poor results owing to insufficient technical assistance, and that those undertaken by Signor Martini with competent English engineers had had the results known to the public, proceeded to make the following declaration:—

"The Government is in a position to say that gold exists in Erythræa and that hopes exist that the deposits may become remunerative. More it cannot say, nor can it estimate the extent and richness of the deposits.

"The whole Colony is seamed with auriferous quartz, but the explorations made up to now are not sufficient, because made within a narrow area, to a small depth, and during a short time.

"The explorations continue exclusively on account of the Government, which will examine with care applications which may be presented by private individuals for the 'exploitation.'"

Since then two inquiries have been received by the Government, which do not conflict with each other, the Government not intending to concede the monopoly to any one.

The question having been examined with the assistance of the Administration of Mines, it has been decided to give well-defined concessions for localities which are either already in course of exploration on account of the State, or which will continue to be explored on account of the Government, or for those of which private enterprise will undertake the exploration.

Naturally each of these concessions is subordinated to technical conditions and to special financial agreements.

As an example let us suppose that one or more groups of capitalists apply for concessions for all or part of the points in which explorations have already been made and when existence of gold is assured; the Government will give the concession to the highest bidder, assigning to him the mine or mines to be worked in the manner laid down, or on new system which may be approved by the Government.

The concessions are thus limited to specified mines or localities. These being assigned to the concessionnaires, the Government of the Colony, all the territory being seamed with auriferous quartz, will undertake new explorations in the other likely localities, and when these succeed and applications are received for exploitation, the concessions will continue to be given to the highest bidder.

Thus if applications are received by the Government for exploration concessions, these also will be given (as is the practice in the Kingdom) at the risk and peril of the concessionnaires, and on conditions naturally much easier than those required for localities already explored with a certain measure of success at the expense of the Administration.

It will thus be seen that the determination to limit to specified localities concessions, either for exploration or for working the mines of which the exploration has already been begun, excludes a monopoly.

And it is well that it is so, since if in the course of explorations made by the Colonial Administration some extensive deposits should come to light and be found to be of important value, it can then be decided whether it be desirable or not to concede their working to private industry.

(Confidential)

No. 2 E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, etc,
/sd/ J. B. Wood
Under Secretary to the Govt. of India

Foreign Department,
Simla,
The 28th March 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints,
Section 1, dated the 14th, 15th, 17th, 20th, 26th, 27th and 31st January and 3rd and 10th February 1900;
Section 2, dated the 7th November, 1899.
Section 3, dated the 27th January 1900.

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 2574 of 1900.

Political Department,
Bombay Castle 4th April 1900

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Hudson

Acting Secretary to Government.

77

W.H.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury—(*Received January* 14.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, January* 14, 1900.

HARRINGTON telegraphs as follows, dated the 1st January, Addis Abbaba:—

"Leontieff, whom I passed at Harrar on his way to Europe, was recalled from Lake Rudolph by Menelek. The latter is very angry with him for having disobeyed his orders, and sent a party down the west side of the Lake. He will very likely be forbidden to return. I am inquiring as to the establishment of a post on the Lake, which I rather doubt. It will take some time to obtain information."

[1714 *o*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN. [January 15.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 15.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, January* 15, 1900.

HAS your Lordship any objection to Zobeir Pasha returning to the Soudan? He s anxious to go, and the Sirdar and I see no reason for refusing him permission.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 17.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, January* 17, 1900.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 4: I do not think there is any cause for anxiety. Zobeir is going to the Soudan to look after his property, and a close watch will be kept over him. I do not anticipate his giving any trouble ; but he would be immediately sent back to Egypt at the first indication of his doing so.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 20.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Cairo, January* 20, 1900.

OSMAN DIGNA captured near Suakin. Will be sent to Rosetta, where there are some other Dervish prisoners.

No. 2.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January* 20, 1900.

I HAVE received your Lordship's telegram No. 14 of to-day's date respecting the reported discovery of a French post at Shambeh.

The accounts published in the Belgian press state that Captain Henry, who is in command of the Belgian expedition proceeding down the Nile, has found a French post established at Shambeh, whom he will endeavour to repatriate. This report seems authentic, but we have no further information.

[1714 *u*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1

No. 1.

Intelligence Division to Foreign Office.—(*Received January* 26.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to transmit herewith some extracts from a letter recently received from Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable M. G. Talbot, R.E., Director of Military Intelligence in Egypt, giving some account of the progress of the survey parties working on the Egyptian-Abyssinian frontier.

18, *Queen Anne's Gate, London,*
January 25, 1900.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. M. G. Talbot, R.E., to Intelligence Division.

(Extract.) [*Undated.*]

BOTH expeditions have been most unfortunate in the time selected. They arrived in Cairo while we were in the throes of the Jebel Gedir expedition and at Omdurman, while every boat was taken up in the final struggle with the Dervishes; and now the river is so low that Gwynn had to go up the Blue Nile in sailing-boats, instead of steaming up gaily as in any ordinary year, while Austin will have to march from Sobat to Nasser, or most of the way. This will interfere very seriously with his plans, so much so, that I doubt his being able to get down to Lake Rudolf. Instead of being able to store food for their return journey at Nasser and arrange for boats to bring them down, as we had hoped and expected, it will be as much as I can do to store it at Sobat. Meanwhile four boats have gone up to cut the sudd, and the last could only just get over the shallows between Goz Abu Guma and Jebelein. It seems quite probable that we shall be unable to keep this bit open. There's only 3 feet of water now where Abu Zeit ford is marked. It's very distracting. The difficulty is to feed these people, as there's no food to be got south. . . . .

I fear Gwynn will overstay his leave. The original plan was that, having worked down to the Baro, he should go to Nasser and come back by boat.

I have had to wire to him, firstly, that he would find no food at Nasser, nor boats to bring him down; secondly, that owing to the possibility of the White Nile being blocked, he had better come back by Blue Nile. This means a very long march, which will probably cause delay.

There is little news here. To-day I got a letter from Shakka, saying that the French evacuated Dun Jubeis and other places in the Bahr Ghazal about the 17th October, and returned whence they came. No idea if it is true or not. Our emissaries there report very badly of Ali Dinar. Of course, he is intriguing to establish *de facto* occupation as far as he can before we come actually in contact with him. Whether he will give trouble afterwards or not I can't say. Kitchener was very averse to occupying Darfur. It would cost a lot and bring in little, and be very unpopular with the army. It's so far off. There's no anxiety amongst the Egyptians to go to El Obeid even. However, 300 men of 2nd Battalion (Egyptian) are starting off for it. Egyptians are wanted to rebuild barracks, &c.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 27.)

(No. 1.)

Berbera, January 8, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that rain has fallen plenteously throughout the maritime plain. It is not yet known how far it has extended into the uplands, but there is reason to believe that it has been fairly general in the Protectorate.

In Berbera there was a continuous downpour for forty-eight hours from the 4th to the 6th instant, which flooded the houses in the official quarter and the town. In the official quarter some damage has been done to the less securely built houses occupied by the native staff, which will be repaired at a small cost. In the town some twenty-seven mud and stone houses have been more or less damaged. Similar damage is reported from Bulhar.

The merchants of Berbera were unfortunate in having just landed a large consignment of rice from Calcutta which they were unable to protect from the wet, all their warehouses being 1 or 2 feet under water.

Plentiful rain had been previously reported from Zeyla.

Such rain has not been known in Berbera for many years. In the interior, following a scanty rainfall for several seasons, it will be of incalculable benefit to the people. A rich supply of grazing, which had become scarce, is now insured, prices are falling, and the tribes are looking forward to a large increase in their live stock, which suffered heavily from the drought of the winter of 1897–98, and from disease in the last year.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

[1714 *dd*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 8.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1900.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you herewith copies of "The Somaliland Order in Council, 1899," which was approved by the Queen in Council on the 7th October, 1899.

I am to request that you will take the necessary steps for bringing this Order into force within the Protectorate in accordance with the provisions of Article 42.

At the same time I am to inclose, for your information, a copy of "The Somali and Brunei (Repeal) Order in Council, 1900," which was approved by the Queen in Council on the 11th instant. It will be seen that this Order repeals "The Somali Order in Council, 1889," which, owing to certain practical difficulties, was never brought into force.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 2.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 113 of the 24th November, I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you the drafts of Queen's Regulations, which his Lordship has allowed, dealing with the use of fire-arms and with mines and minerals in the Somaliland Protectorate.

You are authorized to issue these Regulations as soon as possible after the receipt of my despatch, making use for the purpose of the accompanying form of notification.

Each set of Regulations should be issued separately, and should be exhibited in the principal office of the Protectorate at Berbera; certified copies should be sent home, showing the date on which they were issued, that on which they come into effect, and the number they bear in the series of Somaliland Regulations.

These instructions will apply *mutatis mutandis* to any future Regulations which may have to be issued under the Order in Council.

Fifty copies of the Regulations are inclosed for use in the Protectorate.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 3.)

(No. 13.)

My Lord, *Cairo, January* 24, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of a note which has been drawn up at the Egyptian War Office, describing the circumstances of the capture of Osman Digna. This information has been communicated to the press.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Memorandum.

TELEGRAPHIC news has been received from Suakin to the effect that Osman Digna left that town yesterday in His Highness' ship "Behera." On arrival at Suez he will be sent to Rosetta, and will be interned there with the other Dervish prisoners. His capture was brought about in the following manner :—

The loyal Gemilab Sheikh named Mohammed Ali Or, informed the Administrator of Suakin by letter that Osman was in his country, and that with assistance he could be caught.

In consequence of this information, two parties of men mounted on camels under El Bimbashi Burges and the Mamur Mohammed Ahmed Bey, consisting of twelve police and eight Slavery Department, left Suakin on the 8th and 16th January respectively, and proceeded in a south-westerly direction, guided by a relative of the Gemilab Sheikh till they reached the southern spur of the Warriba range, some 40 miles west of Khor Baraka, and 90 miles south-west of Suakin. Halting and dismounting at the foot of a hill formed by huge boulders with many natural caves, the party cautiously advanced.

Meanwhile Osman Digna, who had been lured from his hiding-place to the foot of the hill by another relative of the Sheikh who had killed a sheep in his sight, and had prepared a meal for his wily companion, suddenly caught sight of the party and fled up the hill closely pursued, but the coloured patches on his gibba betrayed his whereabouts. He was seen crossing between two boulders high up the hill, and the police, rushing in, secured him without resistance. He had no arms or followers of any sort.

Intelligence Department, January 23, 1900.

No. 2.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 3.)

(No. 11.)

My Lord, *Rome, January* 30, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 227, Confidential, of the 16th November, 1898, in regard to the question in dispute between the Italian and French Governments as to the possession of territory on the Red Sea Coast in the neighbourhood of Raheita, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy of a Protocol on the subject which was signed at Rome on the 24th instant by the French Ambassador and the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

This document fixes the limits of the French and Italian possessions on the Red Sea Coast by a line commencing at the extremity of Ras Dumeira, and following the

water-parting in a south-westerly direction in such a way as to leave the caravan route from Assab towards Aussa in the Italian sphere.

The Contracting Parties reserve for future consideration the question of the small island opposite Ras Dumeira, each agreeing in the meantime neither to oocupy it nor to allow it to be occupied by another Power.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CURRIE.

Inclosure in No. 2.

Protocole Signed at Rome, January 24, 1900.

LES Gouvernements d'Italie et de France ayant convenu de procéder à la délimitation mutuelle de leurs possessions dans la région côtière de la Mer Rouge et du Golfe d'Aden, les Soussignés, dûment autorisés à cet effet, ont stipulé ce qui suit :—

Article 1er. Les possessions Italiennes et les possessions Françaises sur la côte de la Mer Rouge sont séparées par une ligne ayant son point de départ à l'extrémité du Ras Doumeirah, suivant la ligne de partage des eaux du promontoire de ce nom, et se prolongeant ensuite, dans la direction du sud-ouest, pour atteindre, après un parcours d'environ 60 kilom. depuis Ras Doumeirah, un point à fixer d'après les données suivantes :—

Après avoir pris comme point de repère, sur une ligne suivant, à environ 60 kilom. d'écart, la direction générale de la côte de la Mer Rouge, le point équidistant du littoral Italien d'Assab et du littoral Français de Tadjourah, on fixera, comme point extrême de la ligne de démarcation dont il est question ci-dessus, un point an nord-ouest du point de repère, à une distance de 15 à 20 kilom. Le point extrême et la direction de la ligne de démarcation devront, en tout état, laisser du côté Italien les routes caravanières se dirigeant de la côte d'Assab vers l'Aussa.

Art. 2. Des Commissaires spéciaux, délégués à cet effet par les deux Gouvernements, procéderont sur les lieux, d'après les données énoncées à l'Article précédent, à une démarcation effective. En prenant pour point de départ de la frontière le Ras Doumeirah, et en déterminant le tracé de cette frontière, ils feront en sorte que le point extrême de la ligne puisse être facilement identifié par le choix d'un mamelon, d'un rocher, ou d'un autre accident de terrain.

Art. 3. Les deux Gouvernements se réservent de régler plus tard la situation de l'Ile Doumeirah et des îlots sans nom adjacents à cette île. En attendant, ils s'engagent à ne les pas occuper, et à s'opposer, le cas échéant, à toute tentative, de la part d'une tierce Puissance, de s'y arroger des droits quelconques.

En foi de quoi, le présent Protocole a été signé en double exemplaire.

Fait à Rome, ce 24 Janvier, 1900.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de
Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie.
(L.S.) VISCONTI-VENOSTA.
L'Ambassadeur de France.
(L.S.) C. BARRÈRE.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 10.)

(No. 21.)

My Lord, *Cairo, February* 3, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a translation of the Arabic text of a letter addressed by His Highness the Khedive to the Sirdar on the eve of his departure for Omdurman, having reference to the acts of insubordination on the part of two of the Soudanese battalions, which have formed the subject of telegraphic correspondence with your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Letter from His Highness the Khedive to the Sirdar.

(Translation.)

TO the Sirdar of our army, the Governor-General of the Soudan, his Excellency Wingate Pasha:

It has come to our knowledge that, within the last two days, rumours have been current that certain officers and men of our army have transgressed order and military discipline. We are much displeased at this report, which, even should it not be altogether untrue, must assuredly be exaggerated, and as your Excellency has taken leave of us to proceed to the Soudan, and in view of your sincere devotion to us, and the necessity for preserving discipline, we trust that, on your arrival in the Soudan, you will investigate this matter. Should you find the report confirmed you will spare no effort for the re-establishment of good order in accordance with those military Regulations to which it is our special desire to see every man of our army conform his conduct. In that case nothing reflecting in any way on their military honour would be reported. You will further impress upon all the officers and men of our army that they are constantly to watch over the honour of the army and to preserve irreproachable conduct. We have issued this our order to your Excellency, so that you may adopt such measures as its tenour demands.

(Signed) ABBAS HELMY.

January 29, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Mr. A. Gray.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 7, 1899.

WITH reference to your letter of the 12th September last, I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you proofs of three sets of Queen's Regulations,* intended for the Somaliland Protectorate.

You have already had under your consideration the Regulations respecting mines and minerals and those respecting the use of fire-arms, but you have not yet had before you those for the importation and sale of alcoholic liquors.

As these are the first Queen's Regulations under "The Somaliland Order in Council, 1899," of which a copy is annexed for convenience of reference,† Lord Salisbury considers it of special importance that the form should be in all respects regular and according to precedent, so that, should further Queen's Regulations be necessary, the Consul-General may readily be able to draft them in proper form.

You will observe that the present headings of the Regulations are not uniform.

I am, therefore, to request that you will take these Regulations into consideration, with a view to securing their regularity and uniformity, and return them with any observations or alterations which you may wish to suggest.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

* Not printed. † "The Somaliland Order in Council, 1899."

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 3.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 8.)

My Lord, *Cairo, January* 16, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith two copies of the "Sudan Gazette" (No. 8 of the 2nd instant), containing "The Mining (Prospecting Licence) Ordinance, 1900," which has recently been promulgated in the usual manner.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Sudan Gazette" of January 2, 1900.

SUDAN LAWS.

Proclamation.

THE following Law for the good Government of the Soudan is hereby issued by Proclamation in pursuance of the powers to that effect which are vested in the Gov ernor General of the Soudan:—

"The Mining (Prospecting Licence) Ordinance, 1899."

(Signed) REGINALD WINGATE,
Governor-General.

An Ordinance regulating Prospecting for Metals, Minerals, and Precious Stones, and Prohibiting the Working of Mines without the Authority of the Governor-General.

WHEREAS all metals, minerals, mineral substances, and precious stones, as well lying in, under, or on lands, in private tenure, as in, under, or on untenanted lands, are the property of the Government:

And whereas it is expedient to authorize prospecting for metals, minerals, mineral substances and precious stones, and to make such other Regulations as to prospecting and mining as are hereinafter contained:

It is hereby enacted as follows:—

1. This Ordinance may be cited as "The Mining (Prospecting Licence) Ordinance, 1899."

2. In this Ordinance, unless the contrary appears from the context—

Words importing the masculine include the feminine;

Words importing the singular number include the plural number, and words importing the plural number include the singular number; words signifying an individual include a body corporate;

"Prescribed" means prescribed by the Governor-General, by notice in the "Sudan Gazette."

3. Prospecting licences may be issued under this Ordinance to persons applying for the same upon payment in advance of the prescribed fees, or, if the prescribed fees are not applicable, of such fees as shall be agreed upon by the Governor-General. They shall be of two descriptions, namely, General Licences and Exclusive Licences, and shall be in the prescribed forms, subject in any particular case to such omissions, variations, and additions as the Governor-General may consider advisable.

4. Every application for a general prospecting licence shall be made in writing, and shall contain a statement of the following particulars:

(1.) The name, address, and nationality of the applicant.

(2.) The district within which the applicant desires to prospect.

5. Every application for an exclusive prospecting licence shall be made in writing, and shall contain a statement of the following particulars:

(1.) The name, address, and nationality of the applicant.

(2.) The position, boundaries, and approximate area of the land in respect of which the application is made.

(3.) Whether and to what extent the land, in respect of which the application is made, is land of private tenure, or is occupied, or used in any way.

(4.) The metals, minerals, mineral substances, and precious stones for which it is proposed to prospect.

6. Every prospecting licence may confer such rights and privileges and contain such conditions and provisions as the Governor-General may think advisable in each particular case, but unless otherwise expressly agreed, it shall confer on the licensee such rights and privileges, and impose upon him such conditions and liabilities, as are herein expressed with reference thereto.

7. Unless otherwise expressly agreed, a general prospecting licence shall confer and impose on the licensee the following rights and conditions, that is to say:—

(1.) It shall confer on the licensee the right personally, with workmen and labourers, to prospect for all metals, minerals, mineral substances, and precious stones on all untenanted lands situated in the district or districts specified in the licence, other than lands for the time being comprised in an exclusive prospecting licence, and also on all such lands in private tenure situated in the same district or districts as shall have been placed at his disposal for the purpose by the owners and occupiers.

(2.) The term of a general prospecting licence shall be one year.

(3.) A general prospecting licence shall not be transferable.

(4.) A general prospecting licence shall confer no exclusive or preferential rights or privileges.

8. Unless otherwise expressly agreed, an exclusive prospecting licence shall confer and impose on the licensee the following rights and conditions, that is to say:—

(1.) It shall confer on the licensee the exclusive right personally, or by his named agent, with workmen and labourers, to prospect for all such metals, minerals, mineral substances, and precious stones as are specified in the licence within an area therein defined. The area may either be limited by the length of a radius from a fixed point, the length of such radius, and the position of the fixed point being declared by the licence, or may be defined by boundaries specified in the licence. The licence shall give to the licensee no right to prospect lands in private tenure, except with the consent of the owners and occupiers thereof.

(2.) The term of an exclusive prospecting licence shall be one year. If upon the expiration of the first year the licensee shall prove to the satisfaction of the Governor-General that he has completed a reasonable amount of prospecting, and has in all respects complied with this Ordinance and the conditions of his licence, he shall be entitled, upon payment of the prescribed fees, to receive a new licence in respect of any such part of the land comprised in his former licence as he may select, provided that the land so selected shall not exceed one-half of the land comprised in the former licence, and shall lie in one block.

(3.) An exclusive prospecting licence shall not be transferable, nor shall any right or interest thereunder be assigned or charged without the consent of the Governor-General.

(4.) An exclusive prospecting licence shall imply no preferential right to the grant of mining rights, but in any exclusive prospecting licence such preferential rights as the Governor-General thinks advisable to grant may be expressly granted.

9. Unless otherwise expressly agreed, every prospecting licence shall confer and impose on the licensee the following additional rights, privileges, conditions, and liabilities, that is to say:—

(1.) The licensee may remove and dispose of all metals, minerals, mineral substances, and precious stones raised or discovered in the course of prospecting operations, subject to the payment of the prescribed royalty.

(2.) He shall give notice to the Governor-General of any find which he may have made of gold, silver, or precious stones, previously to alienating or exporting the same.

(3.) He shall have the right to undertake and continue such work only as shall be necessary to thoroughly test the mineral and metalliferous qualities of the land.

(4.) He shall permit the Governor-General, or any public officer authorized by the Governor-General, at all reasonable times to inspect any work which may have been executed or is in progress under the licence.

(5.) He shall produce his licence, when called for by any public officer, or by any other holder of a prospecting licence, who produces his licence.

(6.) Every prospecting licence shall be liable to be summarily revoked upon breach by the licensee, his agents, servants, workmen, or labourers, of any of the conditions thereof, or of any of the provisions of this Ordinance.

(7.) The Courts of Justice established in the Soudan shall be the only Courts having jurisdiction to determine any question or dispute between the Government and the licensee with reference to a prospecting licence.

10. Any person, whether holding or not holding a prospecting licence, who alienates or exports, or attempts to alienate or export, any find which he may have made of gold, silver, or precious stones, without having previously given notice of such find to the Governor-General, shall forfeit the same, and any money or profit received for the same, to the Government, and in addition shall be liable to a fine which may amount to £ E. 100, and in default of payment of the fine to imprisonment, which may extend to three months.

(1.) Any person who, whether upon land in private tenure, or upon untenanted land, shall prospect for metals, minerals, mineral substances, or precious stones, without a prospecting licence, or shall commence or carry on any mining operations without a mining lease or other sufficient authority from the Governor-General, shall be liable to a fine which may amount to £ E. 100, and, in default of payment of the fine, to imprisonment, which may extend to three months.

(2.) Provided, nevertheless, that any owner of land may, upon giving notice to the Governor-General, prospect upon the land in his tenure without a prospecting licence.

(Signed) REGINALD WINGATE,
Governor-General.

1 S.C. for Pol: Revol. at Ha

(Confidential)

No 848 E.A

A copy of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, &c.
(sd) J. B. Wood
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department,
Simla,
the 14th April 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints
Section 1, dated the 4th, 16th, 23rd, 28th, 29th and 30th January and 5th, 17th and 19th February 1900,
Section 2, dated the 26th, 27th, 30th and 31st January and 3rd, 10th, and 19th February 1900.
Section 3, dated the 10th and 19th February 1900.
Sections 4 and 5 dated the 10th February 1900.

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 2796 of 1900

29 E
4.5.00.

Political Department.
Bombay Castle, 19th April 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. D. Wood

Acting Secretary to Government

I.S.C. for Pol. Resident at Aden.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received January* 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of letters from the Political Resident at Aden, dated the 21st and 22nd December, and inclosures, regarding the Turks in Northern Africa.

India Office, January 3, 1900.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Brigadier-General Creagh to Government of Bombay.

Sir, *Aden, December* 21, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, extract from an Arabic newspaper:—

"The Ottoman Government colonising North Africa.

"Amir Yusuf-bin-Ibrahim, of Wadai, has acknowledged the sovereignty of the Prince of the Faithful, and has asked him to occupy his country. The Porte has dispatched to him seven battalions of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, together with six batteries of artillery, and it has sent with them a Firman establishing the Amir. The Sublime Government has established along the route between Tripoli and Wadai military stations (*i.e.*, magazines for ammunition and stores) and sent some machinery for sinking wells and procuring water.

"Reuter, from Stamboul, states that the Turkish Expedition sent by our Government to Wadai has reached its [*sic*], and hoisted the Ottoman flag over it. The object of this expedition is to establish Turkish sovereignty over all countries in the south-west of Tripoli, including Lake Chad.

"*December* 5, 1899.

"The correspondent of the 'Standard' in Stamboul says that great energy is being displayed to establish the rule of Islam in all Africa, as a counterpoise to the great European conquests, and many expeditions are being sent to Morocco and the like, and continual communications are going on between Stamboul, Yemen, and Kabul, and all Islami regions, whether near or remote [*sic*].

"The same journal, in its issue of the 12th December, says that the Porte is arming the Tripolians, and drilling them properly, and has, with the assistance of its true friend, the German Emperor, resolved to establish its rule in those territories which belong to Turkey, and which are declared by the Anglo-French Agreement to come within the sphere of France, that the nobility of Tunis have besought His Majesty the Sultan to assist them in getting rid of France. His Majesty has put off this project until now, when he saw the English feelings have been aroused by the French press. His Majesty has informed them that Turkey would occupy Tunis, as it is one of its appendages, and His Majesty has obtained a promise of neutrality from England and Germany."

The paper thinks that "the matter may be accomplished by political differences rather than by war, to which France will have to submit, or if war breaks out France will be the aggressor, and Russia will have to remain neutral as a spectator."

2. Copies have been dispatched to the India Office and the Quartermaster-General in India, Intelligence Branch, Simla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) O'M. CREAGH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Brigadier-General Creagh to Government of Bombay.

Aden, December 22, 1899.

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter of the 21st instant giving extracts from an Arabic newspaper, I have the honour to inclose copy of an extract from the "Overland Mail" of the 24th November, 1899, relating to the same subject as the extracts from the Arabic newspaper.

This paragraph would have been noticed sooner but the paper from which it is an extract went to India, and was returned by last mail.

The correspondence said to have been established between the Governor-General of Yemen and the most influential Sheikh in the neighbourhood of Aden, would appear to refer to the matter reported in this Office letter of the 31st August, 1899.

Copies have been forwarded to the India Office and the Quartermaster-General in India, Intelligence Branch, Simla.

I have, &c.

(Signed) O'M. CREAGH.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Extract from the "Overland Mail" of November 24, 1899.

THE correspondent of the "Standard" telegraphs from Constantinople:—

I hear from a good source that the Pan-Islamic Synod has recently been developing great activity, and that it is especially busy in North and Central Africa, with a view of binding together the various Sheikhs and princelets to resist the overflowing tide of European invasions. Two influential Chiefs of the *entourage* of Senussi have been granted subsidies, and a special Mission sent to Morocco resulted in the dispatch of a representative from that Court to Stamboul. Correspondence has also been established through the Governor-General of Yemen with the most influential Sheikh in the neighbourhood of Aden, and another Mission has now reached Cabul.

All these intrigues may result in nothing, but they seem to point to an attempt being made to found a group of Moslem feudalties, under control from the centre here, comprising Albanians, Arabs, Soudanese and others, making up a species of Moslem Confederation after the German pattern.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 25. Africa.)

Brussels, January 15, 1900.

My Lord,

THE "Mouvement Géographique," which has just reached me, contains a paragraph, herewith inclosed, giving more information respecting Captain Henry's expedition down the Nile alluded to in my despatch No. 23, Africa, Confidential, of yesterday.

It also mentions the interesting fact that Captain Chaltin had arrived at Lado Redjaf on the 30th October, and resumed command of the Congolese forces in the Nile regions.

Your Lordship will recollect that I reported in my despatch No. 34 of the 4th March and other despatches last summer, after Captain Chaltin left Brussels, that he was supposed to be intended to act privately in concert with the commercial expedition under M. de Backer, which is believed to be going to raid ivory and make, if possible, a settlement in the territory which the King still claims to be leased to him.

The Congo Department have never admitted that any such connection exists, but the rapidity with which Captain Chaltin is now shown to have reached Lado Redjaf confirms the suspicions I have always entertained since I first heard of his intended return to Lado and of M. de Backer's expedition to the Bahr-el-Ghazal.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Mouvement Géographique" of January 14, 1900.

LE COMMANDANT HENRY SUR LE HAUT-NIL.—Une lettre du Haut-Nil nous annonce l'arrivée à Redjaf, le 30 Octobre, de M. le Commandant Chaltin, qui a pris la direction des opérations sur le Nil, dont l'intérim avait été fait, jusqu'à ce moment, avec une très grande activité, par le Commandant Henry.

Celui-ci a fait diverses reconnaissances sur le Nil, à bord de la canonnière le "Vankerkhoven." Dans une première course, il est parvenu à descendre le Nil avec son bateau jusqu'au Lac No, c'est-à-dire jusqu'au confluent du Bahr-el-Ghazal (10° de latitude). Dans une seconde, il a fait une découverte assez curieuse.

Partie de Kéro, le 27 Juillet, ayant à son bord les Commandants Henry et Adam, le Lieutenant Nielsen, le mécanicien Mulders et soixante-dix soldats, la canonnière, arrivée le 31 Juillet en face de la bifurcation du Bahr-el-Gebel et du Bahr-el-Zaraf (par environ 8° de latitude), trouva, à la rive gauche du Nil, un poste sur lequel flottait le pavillon Français. C'était un détachement appartenant aux renforts envoyés à l'expédition Marchand. Il était commandé par le Lieutenant Tonquoucley, de l'Infanterie de Marine, ayant sous ses ordres le sous-officier Falten et quarante soldats Sénégalais. Son Chef avait connaissance du Traité intervenu entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne et de l'abandon aux Anglais du Bahr-el-Gazal; mais il était sans instructions et attendait qu'on lui fournit les moyens de se rapatrier.

Le Commandant Henry, poursuivant son voyage vers le nord, trouva, au delà du village de Shambe, un large développement du fleuve, mais très peu de profondeur d'eau. Plus en aval, le Nil était barré par d'immenses végétations.

Le "Vankerkhoven" reprit l'amont et rentra à Kéro le 4 Septembre.

Depuis lors, le Commandant Henry a entrepris un troisième voyage ayant pour but de poursuivre ses reconnaissances plus avant. Il a quitté Kéro en compagnie du Lieutenant Anglais Gasch, comptant rapatrier le poste Français, à Khartoum, après avoir franchi la région du Sedd.

Le résultat de cette expédition n'est pas encore connu. Tout ce que l'on peut dire, c'est qu'elle n'est pas arrivée à Khartoum, attendu qu'aucune dépêche n'est encore parvenue de cette ville.

Au cours de ces diverses courses, le Commandant Henry n'a constaté nulle part la présence de Derviches. Le pays voisin du Nil est complètement tranquille.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 18.)
Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, January 23, 1900.*

ACCORDING to a report received from the Officer Commanding at Fashoda, under date the 27th December, Austin and his party had been towed for 90 miles at the Sobat. From this point, accompanied by guides, they started to march. The report adds that he then proceeded up the Bahr Zeraf for 130 miles. At this point the river is no longer navigable and shoals rapidly. A Dinka Sheikh from Bor on his way to Omdurman, whom he met, reported that there was "a small post of Turks in a fort at Bor." I imagine this must be the Belgian party under Henri, or the French party referred to in my telegram No. 5, Africa.

Great anxiety is caused here by the unprecedented lowness of the Nile. Any attempt to cut through the sudd and thus open up communication with Uganda will almost certainly have to be postponed to another year.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 28.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, January* 28, 1900.

ONE of the Soudanese battalions which showed signs of insubordination has not given in any of its ammunition. The other has handed over 8,000 rounds, but there are 10,000 to account for. No important arrests have been effected up to the present, but an inquiry is being carried on.

[1714 *ee*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January 29.*)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, January 29, 1900.*

REPORTS have been received from Peake to the effect that the Nile has risen a foot at the junction of the Bahr-Leraf owing to the partial removal of the sudd.

It is desirable not to publish this at present for local reasons.

I would suggest that Mrs. Gage, whose address is Russell's Hotel, Curzon Street, be informed about her son.

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January 29.*)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, January 29, 1900.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 22 of to-day's date I have seen the French Consul-General, and have informed him that I will do all I can to facilitate any arrangements which the French Government may wish to be made about the French party in the Soudan.

I am also going to inform the Belgian Consul-General that every courtesy will be extended to the Belgian party. Does your Lordship wish me to say anything further ?

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received January* 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Lord George Hamilton, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a despatch to the Government of India, dated the 25th instant, regarding Aden and Somali Coast affairs.

India Office, January 29, 1900.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India.

My Lord, *India Office, January* 25, 1900.

I HAVE received and considered in Council the letter of your Excellency's Government, in the foreign Department, dated the 17th August, 1899, on the subject of the grant at Aden of a refund of duty on all live-stock imported for Government purposes from the Somali Coast Protectorate.

2. From the inclosed correspondence, it will be observed that the Marquess of Salisbury concurs in the opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hayes Sadler, to whom the question was referred, that, apart from the difficulties which would arise in settling the amount of duty to be refunded, the claim of the Government is inadmissible, and that the revenues of the Protectorate could not bear such a charge. I accept this view and request that the Resident at Aden may be informed accordingly.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

No. 2.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 9.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1900.

I HAVE received your telegram No. 24 of yesterday, reporting communications to the French and Belgian Consuls-General, respecting the arrangements about the French and Belgian parties now on their way from Omdurman, and the Upper Nile to Cairo.

I do not think that it is necessary for your Lordship to add anything to the communications thus made.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 5.)

My Lord, *Berbera, January 20, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to submit copy of a Memorandum which Captain Picton, Commanding Royal Engineers at Aden and Consulting Engineer to the Protectorate, has at my request sent me.

This Memorandum embodies the result of Captain Picton's observations, particularly as regards the railway question, on the progress in Jibuti made during a recent visit of a few hours to the French Settlement.

Varying accounts reach me of the work at the railhead. From all I can gather, work there appears to be proceeding but slowly.

Rumours have lately been current that the Aysa are inclined to give further trouble over the railway.

A copy of this despatch and inclosure is being sent to Lord Cromer and to Captain Harrington.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Memorandum by Captain Picton, R.E., on the Progress of Affairs at Jibuti.

THE French Settlement or Colony of Jibuti, which I visited for a few hours on the 22nd December, appears to be developing considerably.

New Town.—A new town is springing up on the small peninsula situated to the north-east of the old town. These two towns are connected by a newly-constructed embankment along the isthmus.

Messageries Maritimes.—On this peninsula the Messageries Maritimes have gone to considerable expense in erecting costly buildings, and here also are established the head-quarters of the officials of the Imperial Ethiopian Railway Company and the terminus of the railway itself.

Railway Terminus.—This terminus comprises not only a substantial composite iron and masonry railway station now in course of erection, but also two buildings nearly completed and a third just commenced for officers, &c., with quarters above.

Engine-sheds.—There are also two commodious and well-built engine-houses. These are iron structures with panels formed of strong wire network, some of which had been plastered in with Portland cement. The roof is of similar construction. These engine-sheds are very nearly adapted to their purpose, giving plenty of air and light. Their cost must be considerable.

I was not permitted to enter these sheds, but four separate lines of rails led into each, showing that each would contain at least four express passenger engines, or eight smaller ones.

Locomotives.—A magnificent express passenger engine was stationed at the entrance to one of these sheds. It was of Swiss make, and had not been run. A tender for another locomotive of similar pattern was in a barge and about to be landed, and indicated that more of this type of engine might be expected to arrive at an early date.

I noticed four smaller engines undergoing repairs, and all located near a repairing shop. There must also have been one or more engines up the line and at railhead, where work was proceeding.

Italian Work People.—The workmen employed are mostly Italians, but considerable dissatisfaction exists amongst them, because one month's pay was always held in arrears. This is evidently done to give the Railway Company some hold over the men, so as to prevent the latter from throwing up their job, and quitting Jibuti on account of Esa raids.

From what I could gather, these people feared the Esa very considerably, and often fled when opportunity offered, notwithstanding that they were guarded at railhead by Senegalese troops and enlisted Arabs and Somalis.

The railway is a metre-gauge single line, laid down with iron sleepers. From what I could gather there appears to be no great constructional difficulties to be met with, though here and there short tunnels may have to be constructed and a few bridges erected.

The railway magazine for explosives stood near the line some little way south of the old town.

Railway Material.—Many miles of railway material, including some plate girders and a few 50 to 60-feet plate-girder bridges complete, were stacked in the vicinity of the terminus.

All this, with the rolling-stock, of which there seemed to be plenty, and including the costly buildings erected and in course of erection, must represent a very large capital outlay.

In addition to the foregoing, the railway has been prolonged by means of a high embankment and some cutting from the terminal station to a new pier in course of construction opposite the Messageries Maritimes' premises.

New Pier.—For this pier many thousands of concrete blocks weighing from 2 to 4 tons have already been prepared, and are intended for use when the pier reaches deep water. The present completed length of pier including a single line of rails would be about 200 yards; but the work of ordinary stone extends, in an unfinished state, at least another 300 yards, and beyond this point, no doubt, the concrete blocks will be laid.

At the time of my visit work upon this pier was apparently stopped, and at about 100 yards from the shore end, a gap or cut had been made right through the pier. Here a steam crane on rails was busy lifting out railway material from a lighter moored in this cut or gap. The pier may be joint concern of the Messageries Maritimes and the Railway Company.

Various smaller buildings were jotted about on this peninsula including an ice factory, but they were not approached as time did not permit.

Piped Water Supply.—A piped water supply is being introduced into Jibuti. This means some few miles of piping to the sources of supply where pumps and reservoir will be erected. The pipes, 4 inches in diameter, had already been laid in the main leading from the source to the town, but the trenches had not been filled in. A large stack of pipes was also noticed, possibly a reserve stock, or for extension purposes.

Iron Tanks.—Several new galvanized iron cylindrical tanks were noticed in railway trucks, evidently ready for transport up the line, for water supply purposes.

Frontier Posts.—In passing the French frontier post on the road between Zeyla and Jibuti, the posts were noticed to be in sad need of repair. Several posts of similar construction, but evidently not of recent date, were noticed in the distance around Jibuti, and had evidently been erected as guard houses when Jibuti was first occupied by the French.

The alignment of the railway in the distant hills was also indicated by posts here and there, and in the near and middle distance the line of iron telegraph poles carrying two wires, told how the railroad ran.

Native Town.—The native town of Jibuti was also clean and well laid out. In the European quarters many hotels and cafés have sprung up, the consequence, no doubt, of Jibuti being now a point of call for most Messageries Maritimes' steamers which coal here.

Progressive Jibuti.—The foregoing points to a progressive and hopeful spirit animating affairs at Jibuti. This is evidently staked upon the future of the railway, which is destined to tap the trade of Abyssinia and thereby reduce the British town of Zeyla to a fishing village. A few years may accomplish this, and Jibuti will then become a self-supporting Colony.

Meanwhile one can only wonder what the full terms of the Railway Concession with Abyssinia must be, and who is the powerful guarantor at the back of the Company, to justify what I can only characterize as a most lavish, extravagant, and absolutely unnecessary expenditure upon railway and adjunct work at Jibuti.

Prudence would have dictated something very different from the elaborate and expensive buildings, &c., now being erected. This extravagance is perhaps characteristic of the French in their Colonial enterprise.

Nevertheless, I am of opinion that in this instance they mean to push the railway to completion "coûte que coûte."

(Signed) R. E. PICTON, *Captain, R.E.*

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul Alvarez to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 17.)

(No. 2. Africa.)

My Lord Marquess, *Bengazi, January* 29, 1900.

WITH reference to Es Sennsy's departure from Kufra and establishment at Guri or Geru, it is not impossible that, after all, his stay there may be provisional, as I hear he intends visiting a spring called Ayn Kula and then Jebel Murra, which is described as a mountain far north of Darfur. The first place may, I think, be identified with Galakka in the centre of Borku.

The Akhwan and others, referred to in my despatch No. 9, Africa, of the 27th June, 1899, had arrived at a place called Labeyad (Elbeyad) in the north of Darfur, and had already begun their propaganda.

It is generally believed among the Akhwan here that at last Es Sennsy will proclaim himself Mahdy in the course of the year, and in proof of this belief it is asserted that those who go to pay him homage do not return.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JUSTIN ALVAREZ.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 19.)

(No. 24. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Cairo, February* 7, 1900.

IN illustration of the unsatisfactory spirit prevailing among a section of the native officers of the Egyptian army, which has led to the acts of insubordination at Khartoum elsewhere reported, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a Report made to the Sirdar by a member of the Intelligence Department on a conversation which he had had with an Egyptian officer recently arrived from Halfa, in connection with which I may add that the story of an anonymous letter sent to Colonel Maxwell is confirmed.

I have also the honour to inclose a Memorandum drawn up by Slatin Pasha, embodying the information which he has gathered on this subject, and making certain suggestions as to the treatment which should be accorded to the black troops in the Soudan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Report to the Sirdar.

Intelligence Department, War Office, Cairo, January 27, 1900.

Sir,

THIS morning an officer in the Egyptian army, arriving newly from Halfa, came to make me a visit in the Office.

On asking him about the state of affairs in Halfa, he said that it was not at all satisfactory.

1. The Egyptian officers were glad of the transfer of Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, as he was very hard on them.

2. It has been rumoured at Halfa that an anonymous letter was addressed to Maxwell Pasha by some Egyptian officers, in which they tell him that, if he does not treat them better, he will be the only one responsible for his own safety.

3. I told my informant that Maxwell Pasha is a nice officer and a gentleman; how is it that officers address him in such language? He said, "They say he has now taken Lord Kitchener's line."

4. My informant added that the Egyptian officers make frequent meetings now, and they watch the Transvaal news carefully; but the spirit they show, and which can easily be felt, is a very unfriendly spirit to the English.

5. They also mix with natives, and transmit their spirit to them.

In accordance with your wishes I put this on paper.

(Signed) S. SHOUCAIR.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Memorandum.

Sirdar,

IN accordance with your wishes, I made the necessary inquiries about the state of affairs in the Soudan from new arrivals.

I found out that the state of affairs in the Soudan is not very satisfactory. Trade is impossible, as there is no capital in the hands of the inhabitants. Cultivation is difficult owing to the liberation of slaves who used to assist their masters, and owing to the scarcity of cattle for the Sakias.

A great part of the formerly male slaves who have not been enlisted in the black battalions have no money, no land, and as by nature all blacks are lazy, they are consequently obliged to steal or beg in order to support themselves.

The former female slaves joined the black battalions in such a number that it is said that every man has at least four or five female followers. The result of this is a great loss of working hands in the country.

Also there are in our black battalions who have been recruited just after the capture of Omdurman, and who are enlisted against their will, wish to return to their masters.

I should therefore recommend that a certain number of those newly recruited blacks who wish to return to their masters should be allowed to do so under the condition that they should return and assist them in cultivating lands.

Those who have no masters and wish to be released from military service should be granted a piece of land which they should be held responsible to cultivate.

The female followers to soldiers in the black battalions should be limited.

I should also recommend the creation of Government farms and work-houses, where non-enlisted blacks, who have no masters, should be placed and made to cultivate certain pieces of land.

It is reported that parties of soldiers are still over the country under the pretext of recruiting blacks, and thus causing great annoyance to natives, which, if true, should be stopped at once.

I should recommend that soldiers, especially blacks, should be held by a strong discipline. Kindness and all available assistance should be used in dealing with natives, and also their traditions and feelings should be considered as far as possible.

The price of corn was reduced from P. T. 140 to P. T. 90 an ardeb. The reason of this is that the Western Arabs of Kordofan, who have been living in the gezira, are now selling their store and returning to their country.

Please take these as short notes, and not as a complete Report.

(Signed) R. v. SLATIN.

Cairo, January 27, 1900.

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 19.)

(No. 25.)

Cairo, February 8, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith translations of a number of articles from the native press dealing with recent incidents in the Soudan. These articles are somewhat imperfectly rendered into English, having been translated by native or Syrian clerks at the War Office, but they will suffice to illustrate the tone which prevails in the journals hostile to the occupation, in which category by far the largest number are included.

Among these articles is one from a journal called the " Lewa," of the 1st February, which deals with the subject of Christian missionary enterprise in the Soudan. In view of the renewed agitation in favour of the establishment of an Anglican Bishopric for Egypt and the Soudan, I have forwarded a copy of this translation to the Bishop of Jerusalem, and have informed him that the objections I originally entertained to the project have been strongly enhanced by recent events, that the present time is, in my opinion, most inopportune for the encouragement of missionary enterprises in tho Soudan, and that those who do encourage them will incur a very grave responsibility.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 2.

Extracts from Arabic Newspapers.

Extract from "El-Liwa" of February 7, 1900.

RELIGIOUS MISSIONS TO THE SOUDAN.

(Translation.)

European papers have published various articles about the religious Missions going daily to the Soudan in order to spread the principles of Christianity among the natives, and thus induce them to alienate themselves from the Mahommedan precepts which their fathers and grandfathers embraced. It was stated that a Protestant Mission had settled in Khartoum, that two Catholic ones had gone to the Soudan, and that religious Societies in Europe have resolved to support the Missions with money, and men, as well as to enable them to establish Christian institutions and do away with all Mahommedan sentiments.

The latest news we read on this subject deals with the intentions of the Rev. Ohrwalder (who was a prisoner of the Khalifa) to go to the Soudan and spread the Christian teaching in that country. A rich Society in England has offered him a small steamer to use in travelling on the Nile,

This matter is undoubtedly of great importance, since the Soudan is a Moslem country and not an unowned land which may be overrun by different Missions without any objection. Although the Government has set at nought the Imperial Decrees, and all engagements with Europe by concluding the Agreement which makes the Soudan the common property of England and Egypt, they still owe to Islam a duty which must be performed; otherwise they will have rendered themselves guilty of a great and unpardonable crime against our nation. We have never heard of any people permitting foreigners to come in and abolish the precepts of their religion. Does our Government follow the example of the old nations of the East, or of the modern peoples of Europe? If the former, they should honour and defend their religion, and, if the latter, they should equally honour and respect their faith.

If the Governments profess to allow freedom of belief, we answer that we should be allowed to go to the Soudan, deliver speeches and establish schools, and thus resist the tide of Christianity. If not, then this implies that the Government support Christianity, which fact is one which neither the Government nor we desire to hear stated.

We have now only to ask the rich and learned in Egypt to establish Societies and Missions for this purpose. They will thus have imitated European countries and modern civilization. As a service to the nation and to the faith, we shall write again on this subject, and are ready to publish all articles we may receive in connection with it.

Extract from the "Lewa" of February 4, 1900.

THE IMPORTANT ACCIDENT IN THE SOUDAN.

We wrote something yesterday, and the day before, about the mutiny of the officers and soldiers in the Soudan, as well as the uprise of the natives, drawing our information from authentic sources. The Government has tried to sooth matters by disproving those real news through some of the men whom she ordered to declare that the case is of no importance and that the Decree sent by His Highness the Khedive contains merely the appointment of Sir Wingate Pasha as Governor-General of the Soudan, and that nothing is mentioned therein about quelling the insurrection, and ordering the soldiers to be in perfect obedience to their superiors.

The truth is, however, what we have stated and one can intuitively conjecture that it is the interest of the English to hold away such news from the world so that the failure of their policy everywhere be not widely spread. But, however effective the measures used for hiding the news may be, still we know how to draw every detail and reveal it to our readers.

A brief account of what occurred in the Soudan may be summed in the following. The officers and soldiers exhibited great feats of courage in the recapture of the Soudan,

such as the English themselves admired. They were, however, soon greatly insulted, an insult which no other army in the world has experienced; for they saw the British flag floating over Khartoum. When the army asked Kitchener Pasha the reason for lifting up the British flag, he answered that this was done simply as a sign of mourning on the late Gordon Pasha; but it was found that this mourning was endless. It was further seen that an agreement was passed between England and Egypt which made the Soudan a common possession of both; giving the reconquered country one-half of the reconquered country in name, but the whole in fact. The regret was greater when it was further noticed that the Governor-General was English and not Egyptian. The officers and soldiers felt, moreover, that the English are still ill-treating them, and manifesting towards them such contempt as is not decent for servants; then how much less for officers of high rank?

They learned in addition that the English were smuggling war implements and ammunitions through the Soudan, and that they were planning to send to Transvaal some of the officers and soldiers, and such intelligence was the direct cause of the insurrection.

We are informed that the officers and soldiers in the army have demanhed many reforms, chief among which was the appointment of an Egyptian Governor-General and Egyptian Mudirs in all the Soudan districts; they asked, too, that their pay be raised and that the ammunition taken from the battalion be restored to it.

We undoubtedly are very sorry that our army is in a state of mutiny, and we desire greatly that it should be the model of discipline and implicit obedience. It is, however, a clear fact that the uprise is a natural one, aud that had the Ministers themselves been in the place of the officers and so ill-treated, they would have done worse. What army in the world will sacrifice the life of its men for conqueriong a country and then see the conquered land under the sway of a foreign Power, and not get enraged? What army in the world can experience the misery of our soldiers without getting into despair? What army, like ours, will erect a building, such as that of the Sirdar's residence, and be rewarded by roughness and contempt without complaining? Those who require onr soldiers to bear all this wretchedness with pleasure and gratitude, ask the same to be inanimate statues rather than sensitive men.

The responsibility of the mutiny in the Soudan, therefore, lies entirely upon the Government and the English, and the duty of the Ministry at present is to study the demands of the army and try to answer such as are right.

We have no doubt that the officers and soldiers will obey the orders of His Highness and prove what they have manifested of loyalty and respect to the Khedive. Moreover, what we know of the Khedive's love to his men, show that His Highness will try to comply with their demands.

After writing the preceding article, we learnt that the 14th Battalion, when asked to lay down their arms, one of the soldiers killed a policeman on the spot, and then the whole body rushed upon the store of ammunition and took 20,000 cartrides.

Extract from the "Lewa" of February 5, 1900.

THE ARMY AFFAIR: AN INTERVIEW WITH AN OFFICER OF A HIGH RANK.

The Government takes very cautious measures to hold away the Soudan news from all papers, and tries meanwhile to disprove what we have published (before any other paper) about the fact that His Highness sent orders to the officers, soldiers, and natives to remain in implicit obedience to their superiors, and that Sir Wingate Pasha carried the orders with him.

We now state in addition that Mahmoud Pasha Fahm, Chief of the Khedivial Arabic Bureau, was called in to write the order, and His Highness signed it the night previous to the Sirdar's departure.

We learned from an authentic source that the uprise in the Soudan has become general, and that if the Government will not sooth matters by complying with the demands of the army, the evil will be beyond repair.

We had an interview yesterday with an Egyptian officer of high rank, and asked him about many questions, which he answered frankly.

"What do you think about the mutiny in the Soudan?" we asked.

He answered, "I believe that the officers and soldiers are in great distress, and have for a long time been uneasy on account of the ill-treatment shown to them by the English, who behave themselves so despotically as never heard in history. We cannot depict the hardships and fatigues which we have very patiently and satisfactorily endured, thinking that we were thereby rendering a great service to our country as well as His Majesty the Sultan, His Highness the Khedive. When we entered Khartoum, however, we saw the British flag floating over the city, and our sorrow was excessive. One of the officers asked the Sirdar about the reason, and Kitchener Pasha answered that it was merely the sign of mourning for the late Gordon Pasha, and that the flag was to be taken away within a short time.

"The Sirdar wanted to comfort us with these words, but we found out that the Government has supported this foreign banner by an agreement passed between the two nations (for which agreement we feel a great resentment).

"What made the whole matter worse is the fact that we asked for help but received none. Finally we learned that the English desired to send us to South Africa to raise their flag over Pretoria, as we did at Khartoum. How can our officers remain silent after all that?"

"And what will be the result of the mutiny of the Soudanese soldiers?"

"The English," said he, "have kindly treated the Soudanese army thinking that they will gain them in future; but late events have shown them that all their measures were unavailable. They learned that the Soudanese would follow their own opinion, and if they resolve upon something, they must accomplish it; which fact is of great moment."

"Do you think that the Egyptian and Soudanese armies will consent on going to the Transvaal?"

"That is impossible; for no sooner the army hears that some of their number are to be sent to the Transvaal than a mutiny will take place, and consequence thereof will be beyond calculation. Furthermore, I think that the English will not make any such attempt; not only because it is incongruous with the alliances of the Powers and the Decrees of the Sultan, but because of the great uprise which the army will naturally make."

"What do Egyptian officers claim?"

"Our greatest demands are that we should be treated in as good a manner as the English, and that the Governor-General and Mudirs of the Soudan be Egyptians. We believe that if the Government desires to do any such thing, it can be performed without any objection on the part of the English."

"What will be the effect of the orders sent by the Khedive?"

"The officers and soldiers will certainly act in accordance with the wishes of His Highness, which they honour, and without which we would not have gone to recapture the Soudan. You can tell anybody that the Egyptian army is the best disposed army to obey its rules. The Khedive is the legal Representative of His Majesty the Sultan, who is our Commander-General and real Chief. I therefore cannot doubt that the mutiny will stop as soon as the orders of the Khedive be delivered; and I hope that His Highness will do his utmost in the way of our help."

That is the discourse that took place between us and the said officer. We state in full so that the readers may know the demands of the army, and we may repeat here that the duty of the Government is to take the complaints of officers and soldiers into consideration and try to meet their desires.

Extract from "El Muayad" of February 6, 1900.

THE ARMY QUESTION AT OMDURMAN.

Many letters (some from friends, others from relatives) have reached the city yesterday; and all gave similar accounts of the army questions at Omdurman. The purport of great many of these has been sent to us, of which we chose the most exhaustive. Some wrote from Halfaya and others from Omdurman on the 23rd, 25th, and 26th ultimo, stating the following:—

"Few weeks ago the Soudan Government laid a strict and exclusive censorship on Egyptian newspapers, so that in a short time all news about Egypt were held away from

officers, merchants, and the natives as well. Those among us who had a deeper insight did not find anything strange in such censorship, as all papers unexceptionally stated the fact of the triumph of the Boers over the English, and the latter did not like these news to be known by the Soudanese.

Whether right or wrong in their policy, still these measures which they took led to sundry and different explanations and suspicions as to the grounds of it. We did not continue long in this condition before the Deputy Governor-General in the Soudan started looking about all whom he suspected as bearing arms, and he did in such a rough (?) and ambiguous way to create great doubts in the minds of the natives. He next proceeded to the army and took from the soldiers their ammunition, and all his actions were unintelligible, and his strict observance of every individual among the natives aroused the suspicion of the natives.

The result was that when orders were given to the Commandant of the 14th Battalion on the 22nd ultimo at 5 P.M. to take from the soldiers all their ammunition, and the Sagh requested the Sol to discharge the order, a great murmer took place between the men.

All gave up their ammunition save the 7th Company, who were slow in obeying, but not utterly resisting in discharging the order, but asked the Sol to give them time to perform their duty until the next morning. The Sol was thus obliged to comply with their demands.

The whole battalion then began to talk about the evil results of their giving all of their ammunition, since the natives who have been ill-treated by the soldiers through the orders of the Deputy Governor-General, were now suspicious and doubtful. This led to the fact that those who had given their ammunition determined to take them back, and thus at midnight they went to the stores and the Sol could not prevent them, but he performed his duty and went to the Sagh and reported the matter to him; the latter informed the Commandant, Sallum Bey. This Commandant gathered the battalion at 12·45 P.M. and ordered them to deliver their ammunition; but some of the soldiers answered: "Who will defend us in case of any attempt against us, as the country had been not long ago in a state of rebellion, and the natives are not yet in a tranquil condition.

The Commandant then called the 13th Battalion (Soudanese too) to come and surround the 14th Battalion whom he considered disobedient. The 13th Battalion had been deprived of its ammunition, and said that if all provisions be given back to them they will discharge the orders, but not defenceless as they were. The Commandant then put some soldiers to guard the storehouse lest the remainder of the ammunition be taken, and on the morning he sent all that was in the store to another place.

At 10 A.M. the Commandant told Lewa Maxwell Pasha *re* everything that happened, and at 12 A.M. the latter went to the battalion and ordered them to deliver the ammunitions. The Yushbashis of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th companies told him that they had talked a great deal with the soldiers but found them in great fear and say that "if the Soudauese whom we have subdued only a short while ago would know that we are now destitute of all ammunitions, they would attack us and wreak vengeance from us."

The Commandant answered that this was merely whimsical and that the ammunitions were taken only because they were no more availabte and better ammunitions were to be given to them in the stead.

The soldiers answered that this has been the case with other companies, but no ammunition was restored to them, and that if the Commandant be sincere in what he says, why should he not leave the present ammunition with them until a better one is provided?

In some of these letters it was stated that a Soudanese Bash-Shaweesh talked roughly unto a Soudanese soldier and the latter shot him down.

This is all that we have learnt about the question, and this shows that there is no mutiny, for had the case been such the Commandant could not have called the 14th Battalion at midnight; but the truth is that the soldiers are in a very frenzy state of fear. If this fear is considered shameful, more shameful is the act of the English officers, who have started depriving the natives and soldiers of their arms and ammunition in a very rough and doubtful manner.

Moreover, it is entirely unwise of the English to create a new question which they call the conspiracy of the officers against their superiors. Thus they imprison the one, suspect the other, and give an attentive ear to slanderings and calumnies from this and that source, which is the worst policy in the army. A wise General like Sir Reginald Wingate Pasha should watch any such action.

Extract from the "Lewa" of February 3, 1900.

The Important Incidence at the Soudan.

We wrote yesterday an article about the mutiny at the Soudan, showing that the source thereof was the neglect of His Highness to his rights.

Fresh news report that Sir Wingate Pasha has ordered some officers to be imprisoned, as they were responsible for all that occurred. The Government says that the insurgents will obey the orders of the Khedive. We agree to this, but state that the English do not acknowledge the authority of His Highness save when they need it. If Egyptians say that the ultimate power in the country lies in the hands of the Khedive, the Occupation answers that Egypt is democratic and the reins of the Government are with the Ministers. Egypt, however, cannot be democratic since the Ministers are under the sway of English advisers.

If the English own the Khedive's authority in urgent cases, then if our Ministers be honest, they should stick to this fact and honour the rights of His Highness.

What we should conclude from events as the Soudan are —

"1. That the Government by making the Soudan Agreement with the English has violated the Decrees of the Sultan as well as the alliances of the Powers, and has trespassed the rights of the natives, who did everything in the way of recapturing the Soudan, thinking that they were offering a service to their country and not to the English.

"2. The Egyptian Government should appoint an Egyptirn Governor-General in the Soudan to co-operate with the English one, since both nations have the same rights in the conquered country.

"Self-interested men cannot say that Sir Wingate Pasha is an Egyptian Governor-General since the 'tarboush' on his head does not change his nationality. Moreover, we have seen how Kitchener Pasha left his office without taking the leave of the Egyptian Government, and went to South Africa without bidding His Highness the Khedive adieu.

"3. If the Government thinks that by force the Egyptian army can be suppressed, then she is mistaken; to compulsive measures are the sources of meeting. She would rather honour the rights of Egyptian officers and soldiers who are offended and ill-treated, there being a wide difference between their mode of life and that of the English army. We advise the Government to change her course of action towards them not temporarily but permanently, and thus every further discussion will be evaded.

"4. The Government should not allow the English to smuggle war implements and ammunition to South Africa by the Soudan way, for Egypt is subject to the Ottoman Power, which is one of the isolated countries in the present war."

We hope that the Ministers will read what we write with pleasure and gratitude, for we do not mean but to have their rights honoured and their authority increased.

This, however, cannot come about by following the suggestions of the Occupation.

The Language and the Nation.

After illustrating intimate connection between the language and the nation the writer proceeded to show how some countries have greatly profited by the said fact.

. . . . These are some of the benefits which a nation strictly careful of, and greatly attached to, its language gets. This truth has been revealed to Europeans by the history of divers nations, *e.g.*, the Arabs, who conquered many countries, but ignored the importance and necessity of spreading their language among the subdued people, and therefore their power soon declined and decayed.

Out of these annals Europe learned the very good lesson of trying to obliterate the language of the subdued nations, and thus loosen all religious and native bonds.

That's why European nations do not openly ask their Mahommedan subjects to be converted, but take obligatory measures to spread their language among Moslems, and the result is that all religious and patriotic sentiments die away.

Do Egyptians know that such is the weapon used by England against us, and not feel? Do they feel, and have no pain? Do they have pain, but have given themselves up?

Oh God, blow into them the spirit of sentiment, for Thou are omnipotent!

Extract from the "Basir" of February 5, 1900.

THE INCIDENT ABOUT THE OFFICERS.

We learned to-day that the officers in the Soudan did not mutiny, save because their demands under the lead of the previous Sirdar were not answered, and the result was, as we know, that all ammunitions and arms were taken from them after the end of the war.

This latter fact enraged them and they started again offering the same complaints, and this led to the imprisionment of some of them for their not waiting until the occasion comes when the Government will be able to grant them their wishes. When the officers here learned about it they agreed that they will offer their resignation if their comrades in the Soudan will not have their demands.

That's what I have learned to-day about this incident, which, I think, must have been over after the arrival of Sir Wingate Pasha to the Soudan, for the insight of his Excellency will warrant to us the most expedient proceedings. Anyhow the case is trifling, and does not require so much trouble and caution.

Extract from the "Lewa" of February 6, 1900.

FROM AN ARTICLE ON THE LEGAL AUTHORITY IN EGYPT.

. . . . But the chief reason of the calamities of this wretched country and the success of the English in Egypt is the utter inactivity of the natives in claim of their rights, which fact is considered by all political circles as a sign of normal death which is worse than the physical one.

The Khedive has openly declared his patriotic principles and appealed unto the nation for the defence of his rights and struggle for his independence. What was the answer on our part? We merely admired His Highness and came to love him a great deal more. But shall we stop so far or shall we proceed to fulfil the sacred duties our country expects from us?

If the Khedive calls the nation to his help, why should we not give voice to our views in every question and object to every act done by the good and incompatible with the welfare of the public? We can thus show the English that we are sensitive, and reveal unto His Highness that we are ready to offer him all succour and thus encourage him to stick fast unto his claims.

Of the many instances which show that an open declaration of the nation as to its views is very beneficial to the country, we may state the incident of pilgrimage which the Good decided is aturish, but when the people rose in objection and manifested their discontent, the Khedive declared in the Ministry Court that if neither the nation nor His Highness agree to such a decision how can it be passed?

These herald you principles. Egyptians so that justice be done unto you and declare publicly you sentiments that you may gain your freedom. Help your Khedive, for this is the noblest service you can render unto your country and religion. Let all countries know that you are a patriotic people, and be sure that the nation is its own support, and that had you only willed it you could have been the greatest and happiest people.

Extract from the "Lewa" of February 7, 1900.

(From our correspondent at Alexandria.)

I received a letter from one of the brightest officers at Omdurman on the 26th ultimo. It gives an account of the Soudan incident as it actually happened. I was greatly struck when I noticed that the occupation editorials tried to disprove what the "Lewa" wrote about the question, and I therefore state in full the details I received so that the Egyptians may know how news is held away from them.

"The Deputy Governor-General ordered that all ammunitions be taken from every battalion at Omdurman, so that they may be kept in the stores. The soldiers guessed that the real purpose of these measures was the security of the English against any future mutiny, and they thought that the latter might proceed later to disarm them entirely. They therefore united, got back the ammunitions and restored them to the battalions respectively. These acts frightened Maxwell Pasha, and he called Miralat Fathi Bey to stop the course of matters. Meanwhile the 14th Battalion had mutinied against their Commandant, and compelled him to release seven of their number whom he had imprisoned. Maxwell Pasha and Fathi Bey considered these displays a surprise, and ordered the 1st Battalion to get ready for punishing the 14th Battalion, but the orders were disregarded."

Extract from "Al Muayad" of February 7, 1900.

THE ARMY QUESTION AT OMDURMAN.

We add to what we learned yesterday about "the army question at Omdurman" some fresh details in connection which we lately received.

In a letter, dated the 22nd January, we were informed that the number of Maxim cannons is eleven and not ten. These were taken from Khartoum to Cairo, to be sent thence to South Africa with the saddles we mentioned in a former article, and 390 cartridges as well. It was further reported that on that day there was a rumour that orders were given to take the rest of the ammunitions with the soldiers.

In another letter on the 25th ultimo, that up to date the ammunitions were not taken from the 14th battalion. In the evening an order was given to the Commandant-General to give to the soldiers of the army twice as much ammunition as they formerly had. The officers thanked Maxwell Pasha thereupon, considering his act as real proof of his implicit faith in the army.

That's an account of all that took place between the 22nd and 25th ultimo, and which the occupation papers called mutiny. The greatest proof of the falsity of this rumour is that during these three days they did not rise against an officer or leader, and finally they were given back their ammunitions which they received with thanks. Had Maxwell Pasha known that they had any evil intentions, he would not have restored unto them what they had been deprived of.

We state now that all the reports we received point to the fact that the incident which was called a mutiny began on the 22nd ultimo, and that the Sirdar did not tell the Khedive anything about it, neither to the President of the Council of Ministers, save on the 29th ultimo, which was the day in which the Sirdar left for the Soudan. It follows that either Maxwell Pasha telegraphed to the Sirdar on the 23rd, and the latter did not report it to the Khedive, which fact is a great error in the relations between the General and the legal authority; or that the news did not reach the Sirdar in time, which is equally wrong. We hope that the truth of the matter be less than what we suppose, or else the responsibility on the English leaders will be greater than that of the soldiers, if what was attributed to the latter be true.

No. 3.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 19.)

(No. 27. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Cairo, February* 10, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship telegraphic correspondence which has passed between the Sirdar and myself respecting the acts of insubordination displayed by the 11th and 14th Soudanese battalions, the causes which led up to them, and the measures which are being taken to restore discipline.

The sequence of events is clearly expressed in these telegrams, and further comment is unnecessary.

With reference to Inclosures 7, 8, 10, and 11, I should explain that on the departure of the Sirdar for the Soudan, the Khedive gave him a letter, translation of which was forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch No. 21 of the 3rd instant, in which he expressed his hopes that the reported acts of insubordination had been exaggerated, and desired him to make known to the army his grave displeasure, should they prove to have foundation, while authorising him to take all necessary steps for punishing the guilty.

Upon the receipt of the Sirdar's reports from Khartoum, the Khedive prepared a draft telegram (Inclosure 8) which was designed still further to strengthen Sir R. Wingate's hands. Before dispatching it, however, his Highness caused it to be submitted to me, and at my request refrained from sending it in its original terms, as I was of opinion that any undertaking to consider claims or grievances should be made conditional on, and subsequent to, the restoration of discipline and the punishment of offenders.

After discussing the matter with His Highness, I requested the Sirdar to furnish me with the draft of a telegram to be sent by the Khedive which would meet the object desired, and he accordingly furnished me with the text which will be found in my Inclosure 10. A telegram in this sense has now been forwarded to him in Arabic.

The Sirdar further subsequently expressed his desire to be furnished with a message from the Government, which could be read in the Court of Enquiry which he proposes to hold, having reference to the investigation of grievances after he is satisfied that discipline has been restored. (See Inclosure 12.)

The substance of the message, drafted by the Sirdar himself (Inclosure 16) will be telegraphed to Khartoum by the Minister of War.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Omdurman, February* 5, 1900.

I EXAMINED yesterday with Jackson the evidence which he has collected with regard to the recent very serious incident. I will state briefly what occurred on the night after Maxwell had issued his unfortunate order for the recall of the ammunition to the stores.

Several Egyptian officers were discussing the situation in a Greek café, and wild stories were being told about the state of affairs in Cairo, arising partly from the Transvaal war news, the recall of British officers, and the withdrawal of Maxim guns.

The ammunition had now been collected at the quarter guard, and the officers, excited by this talk, appear to have decided to take it back, and resist the order which had been issued.

There seems to have been an idea among the Black troops that they were to be sent to the Cape, and they needed no persuasion to follow their officers. A considerable quantity of ammunition was carried off by the men of the 11th and 14th Soudanese to their barrack rooms, the guards having been easily forced. Matthews, who commands the 11th, in trying to stop his men, received a few blows. He then placed sentries with fixed bayonets over each exit from barracks in order to search for the ammunition. A serious disturbance was now with difficulty prevented, as the soldiers' wives came to the help of their husbands armed with sticks and knives.

Maxwell now gave out that 500 rounds per battalion would be allowed to be kept for guard purposes. As Commanders also kept their ammunition under their respective quarter guards, and did not return it to stores, a quieting effect was produced. As soon as Jackson arrived almost all the ammunition unaccounted for was returned by the 11th Battalion. He has made every effort to induce the 14th to do likewise, but has so far been unsuccessful. A few of the older men were at last persuaded, under pledge of secrecy, to confess that their Egyptian officers had prevented their compliance with the order, also that their Commandant, Sloman, was very unpopular.

Two men, who did return a little of the ammunition, were made prisoners, but wisely released by Jackson at once.

Evidence is being collected against a certain Captain Mehemet Mukhtar, of the 14th, who, there is reason to believe, was instrumental in exciting this movement. No further arrests have been made, though several other native officers are suspected.

Jackson's services are worthy of the highest praise; he has done much to avert a mutiny. But I cannot consider the incident closed so long as the 14th Battalion refuse to return the ammunition they have stolen.

At a public reception of civilians and military which I held to-day at Omdurman I announced that I would receive any officer after the levée who wished to speak to me.

A large number came to me with complaints, both individual and collective. These were, with slight additions, the same as those referred to in my letter to you of the 31st January.

The officers showed no disrespect, but I could see that there had been a preconcerted plan of action to represent themselves as badly treated.

I had no complaint from any officer above the rank of Adjutant, but some of the senior officers had previously assured me that, while admitting serious grievances, they did not sympathize with the methods of the junior officers, but wished to prevent them. Those who complained hinted that a fresh start might be made if the arrested officer were released, but I told them that I could do nothing until the 14th Battalion complied with their orders. If this were done, their complaints might be laid before the Government. They would give no reason for their insubordination, only replying that the Soudanese were liable to entertain foolish notions.

I agree with Jackson in thinking that the (? rank and file) of the Soudanese are with us, but have been terrorized by a clique of Egyptian officers. We have doubtless to deal with a wide-spread conspiracy, which is, however, confined principally to the junior ranks. Though some of the officers must be put on half-pay or pension, I think a rather lenient treatment will be advisable if the ammunition is given up. If this is not done, Captain Mehemet Mukhtar ought to be at once brought to trial on a very serious charge. What the consequences of this may be it is difficult to foresee.

In the former case, I would urge a close scrutiny of officers' complaints, but a firm attitude must, in the alternative case, be taken up; and until the insubordination has been dealt with no complaints can be considered. No doubt a few days will show us whether they intend to give up ammunition or not.

Personally, I think that there has been much mismanagement of officers for some time past, and that many of them have real reasons for complaint. The opportunity was given them by the most injudicious order for the return of the ammunition, and I cannot help thinking that it was injudicious treatment to a great extent which gave rise to this trouble.

I have to-day pointed out to the Egyptian officers that they could not expect to obtain any redress of grievances by such acts of insubordination.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Khartoum, February* 5, 1900.

I PROPOSE, when the 14th Battalion comply with orders, to appoint a Commission, composed of the senior Egyptian officers, to carefully collect evidence from the officers with a view to putting their complaints before Government. After careful deliberation, this appears to me to be the best course.

The senior officers, I am practically certain, are thoroughly ashamed of the conduct of the juniors, but they hesitate to interfere. They would probably have sifted the whole matter to the bottom had they been officially told to take it up. Some of the British Commanding Officers are, I think, to some extent to blame for not having kept sufficiently in touch with their troops.

A large number of the young native officers here have inbibed pseudo-patriotic ideas, and their moral conduct is undisciplined, irresponsible, and anything but satisfactory. I am anxious to try and establish an Officers' Club, under the control of senior officers, and under the patronage of the Khedive. At present a good deal of drinking of inferior liquor, sold by Greeks, is going on.

Inclosure 3 in No. 3.

Viscount Cromer to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

(No. 5 A.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, February* 6, 1900.

I FULLY approve of all you have done, as reported in your telegrams Nos. 13 and 14.

Until the ammunition is given up, it is, I think, quite out of the question to make concessions.

There appear to be two methods of proceeding when dealing with the complaints eventually.

Either to appoint a Commission as you propose—which would, however, take time—or to come to some immediate decision as to what concessions are possible, and announce them when you consider the proper time for doing so has come. Do not lose sight of the fact that we are almost certain not to be able to satisfy all the complaints whatever we do.

Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. Which do you consider best? The question of what concessions can be made is, in the meanwhile, being considered here. Judging the situation from here, I should say that punishment of the ringleaders in some form or other should precede, or, at all events, be simultaneous with, the adoption of either course.

Do you wish any more English troops sent you? What do you think of disbanding the 14th Battalion? I merely put this forward as a suggestion.

Inclosure 4 in No. 3.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Omdurman, February* 6, 1900.

I HAVE told the officers that the Khedive specifically charged me to express to them his anger at the recent events, and his resolution to put an end to them, but I have not yet made use of his letter.

I intend, if the ammunition is not soon handed in, to call a Court of Inquiry, which will be composed chiefly of senior Egyptian officers, under the presidency of Jackson, and to open proceedings by reading publicly the Khedive's letter.

There is, I think, a marked change for the better in the general situation. I can observe an alteration in the attitude of the officers. A few hundred rounds of ammunition have been surrendered, and I hear more is forthcoming from the 14th Battalion.

I have made the officers clearly understand that until all the ammunition is handed in, and the honour of the army vindicated, there shall be no question of redressing grievances.

Inclosure 5 in No. 3.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Omdurman, February* 6, 1900.

I AM very glad to hear you approve my action.

In reply to your question as to further steps to be taken, I think that, if the ammunition is handed over, it will be sufficient to hold a Court of Inquiry, as already proposed. Otherwise, it will, in my opinion, be necessary to try Mukhtar Effendi by court-martial, and to defer making any kind of concession until punishment has been inflicted on him.

In the event of a Court of Inquiry being held, it would be the duty of that Court to collect evidence officially against officers, and to advise as to the degree in which officers were implicated in the recent incident.

In my opinion, it is unnecessary to take any further steps than this for the present.

I do not think we require any more British troops here at present.

If the 14th Battalion maintains its attitude of insubordination indefinitely, we may have to consider the question of disbandment, but I trust we shall be able to avoid taking such an extreme measure.

I should like to be able to hold out a prospect of eventual concessions if I feel confident that matters are really getting better, but I am unwilling to give any hope of concessions until I can report that the discipline of the army is satisfactory.

I feel sure that the Khedive's name and influence have much weight on the army, and I think it very doubtful whether the officers would have taken their recent action unless they had received some sort of tacit encouragement from high quarters. Nevertheless, it would, I think, be unwise to let the Khedive perceive that we distrust him at all; rather we should insist on his strong support in punishing insubordination and in preserving strict discipline.

Inclosure 6 in No. 3.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Omdurman, February* 7, 1900.

THE 14th Soudanese Battalion have handed in 3,000 rounds, leaving 7,000 still to be returned. I trust that the greater part of this will also be given up. The ammunition is being handed in through three old Soudanese officers promoted from the ranks, whom Jackson told off for this purpose. I consider it both significant and satisfactory that no ammunition has been handed in through the Egyptian officers of the battalion.

Inclosure 7 in No. 3.

Viscount Cromer to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, February* 7, 1900.

THE Khedive will receive me at 11 A.M. to-morrow. I have prevented him from sending you a telegram, which I believe to have been well meant, but which would have done more harm than good.

Please let me have at once, by telegraph, the text of such a telegram from the Khedive to yourself as you think would be of use to you. I will give it to him after it has been translated into Arabic.

Inclosure 8 in No. 3.

His Highness the Khedive to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.) *February* 7, 1900.

YOUR Excellency's telegram dated the 6th instant has been submitted to us, and we have learned from it with deep regret that the efforts which you have made have up to now failed to bring about the good results for which we looked.

It is, therefore, our will and pleasure that, should the state of affairs continue as at present, your Excellency should assemble the officers together and read to them our order which we gave to you on the evening of the day of your departure from Cairo (29th January), as well as this our telegraphic rescript, and that you should authoritatively demand of them that they remain quiet and safeguard their military honour, not transgressing those laws which impose upon them obedience to their superiors. You will inform them that we will look into their claims, in accordance with the promise which your Excellency has made to them; and, being convinced of their sincere loyalty and devotion to us, we are well assured that they will hasten to conform to this our order.

Inclosure 9 in No. 3.

Viscount Cromer to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, February* 7, 1900.

IT appears now that it would have been wiser not to have consented to the proposal to send the Maxims to South Africa. For this mistake I take the whole responsibility.

I can still stop their dispatch, but I rather think that such a step would now do more harm than good.

What is your opinion ?

Inclosure 10 in No. 3.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Omdurman, February* 8, 1900.

I WOULD suggest that His Highness should send me a telegram in the following terms:—

"It is with great regret that I learn that the cases of insubordination and breach of discipline in our army, as reported by you before leaving Cairo, have not yet ceased. Under these circumstances, should it appear to you desirable and necessary to enforce the measures sanctioned in our letter to you of the 29th January, we hereby give you full power to that effect, feeling convinced that you will employ such authority in the manner most conducive to the maintenance of good discipline and order among our troops, and that you will bear in mind that any contravention of the same must be repressed without fail, and immediate steps be taken to punish the offenders."

It would be as well to have this telegram ready in case I ask for it, but, in view of the general improvement in the situation, I think it is still a question whether it will be required.

In the event of the whole of the ammunition being returned, I think the next step should be to assemble the Court of Inquiry as already proposed, and proceed to read to the members the exact text of the letter which the Khedive addressed to me on the 29th January.

Inclosure 11 in No. 3.

Viscount Cromer to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, February* 8, 1900.

I GAVE the telegram to the Khedive in French; he will send it to you in Arabic; I hope the translation will be accurate. He wishes to pose as having settled the matter himself, and would evidently like you to use his name. You must judge entirely by the state of affairs on the spot; but I have, personally, no objection to this within reasonable limits. I think I can manage to keep him in hand; and it is on this, I am sure, that all depends.

He puts the blame for the insubordination of the junior officers upon the seniors. This incident will no doubt be settled, but the important thing is to settle it so as to avoid sowing the seeds of any further disturbance in the army later on. I consider it essential to punish the most guilty parties eventually in whatever way you may consider just and advisable.

Inclosure 12 in No. 3.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Omdurman, February* 8, 1900.

MY immediately preceding telegram: last paragraph.

I have every hope that the situation will continue to improve. If it does so, the Court of Inquiry might, I think, with advantage go into the grievances of which the officers and men complain. If you agree with me in this, I should propose to read in open Court, in addition to the Khedive's letter, a communication of some sort from the Government whose purport should be to the effect that if I consider the complaints to have some foundation, I should inform the Government of them with a view to their examination.

Further, if I feel convinced that all insubordination is at an end, it might, I think, be well for me to hold out, in this communication some vague hope of redress.

The foregoing is a purely tentative suggestion. I am quite ready to deal with the case without Government intervention, if you think that course more advisable.

Inclosure 13 in No. 3.

Viscount Cromer to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, February* 8, 1900.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 25, you had better telegraph to me the text of the message you would wish the Government to send to you. I presume you would like it to be signed by the Minister of War? If not, by whom?

No objection will be raised here to the granting of concessions intended to remedy real grievances, but you must bear in mind that on each of the four occasions when mutiny broke out in the army in the time of Ismail and Tewfik Pasha, concessions had been made but no punishments inflicted, the result being a fresh outbreak in order to obtain further concessions. I am far from advocating excessive, and still less, vindictive punishment, but I cannot help thinking that you will not for the future be able to feel much confidence in your army unless the younger officers are on this occasion made to feel the displeasure of the Government.

Inclosure 14 in No. 3.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 26.) *Omdurman, February* 8, 1900.
(Telegraphic.) P.

YOUR No. 12:

I am quite prepared to share in the responsibility for having concurred in the despatch of the Maxims to the Cape. Their withdrawal had undoubtedly something to do with the incident, but it was only one of many causes. I consider that it will now do no harm to let the six go, as under the present arrangement. The other four are going back, as well as four Krupp guns which will take the place of the six Maxims, pending the arrival of the new Maxims from England to make up the full number.

Inclosure 15 in No. 3.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 28.) *Omdurman, February* 8, 1900.
(Telegraphic.) P.

THE 14th Battalion have to-day handed in 800 more rounds of ammunition.

Inclosure 16 in No. 3.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 33.) *Omdurman, February* 9, 1900.
(Telegraphic.) P.

THE Khedive has sent me a telegram, which is practically identic with the text I proposed. In reply, I have thanked him for his message and for the anxiety he shows in the welfare of the army, informing him that I will report further as soon as the measures now being adopted are completed.

I have not yet taken any official action on His Highness' telegram, though I have made no secret of its receipt. The Court of Inquiry will meet in a day or two, and I will then read in open Court both the telegram and the letter.

I believe the Khedive's attitude puzzles the officers, both senior and junior, very much, and that they are now considerably alarmed at the situation they have brought about. I am inclined to think that the seniors are also involved in the matter, but, with their usual duplicity, are sheltering themselves behind their juniors. I pointed out to the senior officers at my first interview that they were responsible for any disorder among their subordinates inasmuch as they were responsible for their training.

The questions of grievances and of insubordination are so intimately connected that the same Court must, I think, deal with both, but I should not think of allowing the former to be discussed until the latter has been settled.

I suggest that the following message, subject to any alterations or omissions you think desirable, should be sent me by the Minister of War. It will, I hope, make clear to you the train of my ideas:—

"I have heard with profound regret of the acts of insubordination and of the conduct contrary to discipline which have occurred in the army, whose unsatisfactory behaviour is at present occupying the attention of the Government of His Highness the Khedive; and I have to inform you that the Government desires that the matter shall be rigorously inquired into, in order that the ringleaders may be brought to justice.

"The Government has not lost sight of your report calling attention to certain grievances which exist as to pay and pension, but I must inform you that His Highness' Government, although quite prepared to go into any complaints of this nature which you think fit to represent, will refuse absolutely to do anything of the sort until your Excellency is satisfied that these intrigues have been fathomed, and that the steps taken for the punishment of the guilty are sufficient to preclude the recurrence of similar incidents in the future.

"You will not fail to instruct the officers intrusted with the inquiry that they are to impress on those accused of inciting the soldiers to these acts of insubordination that they can only hope to obtain an alleviation of the punishment they have incurred by such a breach of military law by a frank confession of the motives which guided their action.

They are, at the same time, to warn the accused that the examination into the alleged grievances cannot take place until the Government is satisfied that the discipline of the army is beyond all suspicion."

Inclosure 17 in No. 3.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.)
(Extract.) P. *Omdurman, February* 9, 1900.

THE situation is improving, and ammunition continues to come in slowly. The receipt of the Khedive's telegram has caused rather a sensation among the senior officers.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Consul-General Sadler.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January* 26, 1900.

I SANCTION the expenditure which you propose in your telegram of to-day to incur in connection with the increase of the native force in the Protectorate. I trust, however, that you will find it possible to keep your total expenditure within the limit of the revenues of the Protectorate. Please give the earliest possible notice if excess proves to be unavoidable.

With regard to your anxiety to have the services of Captain Swayne, we are pressing the Government of India to send an officer to relieve him in Uganda.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 27.)

(No. 3. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, January* 11, 1900.

AFFAIRS in the eastern portion of the Protectorate have progressed satisfactorily since my despatch No. 98 of the 14th ultimo was written.

More of the tribes have come in. Notably deputations with caravans from the Ararsama and Ba Ararsama, two large sections of the Girad Farih who were much implicated in the Mullah's movement. They profess to have broken off all connection with the Mullah, but I am not yet inclined to place much faith in their protestations. The Girad Farih and the Aligheri, who have not yet come in, are probably now the only tribes in the Protectorate who would, of their own accord, join the Mullah should he return to his old haunts at Bohotele.

I have allowed the Ararsama and Ba Ararsama caravans to take supplies from our ports on the payment of the punitive tax and subject to the conditions which have already been specified. As I have previously explained, this is the best, and, in fact, the only way of dealing with them now that the Mullah is not in their vicinity. In the case of the Ba Ararsama, who were mainly responsible for the loot of the Ba Idur, the section of the Girad Farih to which the late Girad belonged, I have further taken a security for good behaviour of 1,000 rupees in cash.

I am further arranging with these two sections for the return of the property looted from the Ba Idur, from whom a deputation, headed by the son of the late Girad, has now arrived in Berbera with a caravan.

On the other hand, I think that we can rely on the powerful Mahmood Girad tribe, one of whose sections, it will be remembered, supplied the Mullah with horsemen at Burao, not only not to join the Mullah, but to actively oppose him should he appear again in the vicinity of Lasader.

Two other sections of the Mahmood Girad, the Ba Idris, and the Elmi Naliya, who inhabit the country to the south of Hais and Mait, have now come in with caravans. The former have not been seen in Berbera for five years, and the latter have never been here before. I am encouraging these people as it is important that they should be attracted to Berbera, and once they bring in their caravans regularly a large portion of the trade which now goes to the flag ports will be brought to Berbera.

I lately sent out the Camel Corps to clear the Miriya Pass in the Habr Toljaala country, which was reported to be closed by certain sections of the Noh, who have frequently been addicted to stopping and plundering caravans. This was successfully accomplished without any recourse to force being necessary, and several of the Headmen were brought in. This is the first time any force has been seen in the Habr Toljaala country so far east, and the effect has been all that could be desired.

It was mainly owing to the reported security of the caravan routes in the northern Habr Toljaala country consequent on this move, the news of which rapidly spread, that the above-noted sections of the Mahmood Girad were induced to come in with their caravans. They tell me that other sections living 150 miles to the east of Berbera will bring in their caravans now that they are secured from any molestation at the passes.

The operations of the Mullah have now been shifted from the limits of the Protectorate to the Ogaden, where he is still able to give us a lot of trouble. I have already reported that he is trying to unite the Ogaden tribes to join him, and had instigated them to plunder Ishak caravans.

The Ogaden tribes who trade with our ports may be divided into two main divisions. (*Vide* Cox' "Genealogies of the Somal—(1) the Makhahil, and (2) the Mihrwalal."

Of the former the principal tribe is the Ibrahim. A portion of this tribe was with the Mullah from the first, and the whole tribe is now said to have joined his cause, with the exception of one or two unimportant sections. None of the Ibrahim caravans have appeared at our ports since the Mullah's movement originated.

The Mihrwalal consist of the Rer Abdillehalso, known as the Ba Awadleh, and the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun, of whom frequent mention has been made. Emissaries of the Mullah are known to be with the Rer Abdilleh, who inhabit the country between the Ibrahim and the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun, and one of their chief men, by name Abdi, is brother-in-law to the Mullah and his active agent in the tribe. Some of the Rer Abdilleh are said to have joined the Mullah's movement, but it is generally reported that the tribe as a whole wish to be left alone to trade peacefully with our ports. Pressure will doubtless be brought to bear on them.

It is not known how far the Rer Ali have been yet affected, but the Rer Haroun are reported to have turned back the Mullah's agents with an intimation that they will have none of him.

Many of the Ishak traders, principally Habr Awal Ayal Ahmed, in the Ogaden, have been looted by the Mullah's followers, and for the last fortnight hardly a day has passed but two or three have come in, having been deprived of their camels and all their possessions, and, as they say, barely escaping with their lives.

In one or two instances it is believed that some of the Ishak traders have been killed, and it is impossible to say how many may have been detained. Being scattered all over the country they could not receive the warnings which were given the Ishak tribes to avoid the Ogaden tribes for the present.

These depredations have hitherto been committed almost exclusively by the Mullah's individual followers and by the Ibrahim. It is to be hoped that the infection will not spread to the Rer Abdilleh and the other Mihrwalal tribes, but the Mullah is reported to be trying to combine all the Ogaden against our tribes, and the only hold we have over the Mihrwalal is their trade with our coast. Luckily this is a fairly good hold, but we cannot be sure that it will stand the tension to which it may be exposed. The Rer Abdilleh have written me letters; both they and the Rer Haroun have a large caravan now in Berbera, and I am writing to them warning them of the consequences of interfering with our people.

Our ports would now be closed to the Ibrahim, and I should attach any caravans they send in; this, however, they are not likely to do yet awhile; they and the Mullah's followers are said to be getting supplies from Faf in the Ogaden, where jowari is cultivated. Similarly should the Rer Abdilleh molest our traders it will be necessary to close our ports against them, but I do not wish to take this step till it is absolutely necessary, that is to say, when the tribes as a whole have proved themselves to be hostile, which I trust may not be the case.

Unfortunately the Habr Yunis, who, it will be remembered, gave the Mullah his first footing in Ishak territory, but are now against him, and the Aidagalleh have complicated matters by fighting the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun over the Daror water. The fight was a big one, and over 100 are said to have been killed on each side. The Habr Yunis also lost a quantity of their live-stock. Daror is outside our territory in the tracts lately ceded to Abyssinia. Our tribes have always watered there, and for years have been in an almost chronic state of warfare with the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun. This outburst of hostilities is naturally calculated to give the Mullah a hold over the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun in his designs against our tribes.

I have written a stern warning to both the Habr Yunis and Aidagalleh about the fight at Daror, and told them to return to the Protectorate limits, but in their present state of irritation it will be difficult to restrain them should they again attempt to try conclusions with their adversaries to regain what they have lost.

No complaints have been made to me by our tribes in connection with the Daror fight, and it is unlikely that either the Rer Ali or Rer Haroun will complain to the Abyssinians, whom they do not recognize; nevertheless, each of these fights outside our border is, theoretically, a breach of the Treaty with Abyssinia. Who commenced the fight in this instance it is impossible to say.

The Habr Awal, too, are getting excited over this plundering of their traders in the Ogaden, and if it continues it is not unlikely that they may make common cause with the Habr Yunis and the Aidagalleh against the Ogaden generally.

So far the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun are on good terms with the Habr Awal, whose property they have in several instances safeguarded from the Mullah's followers, and so far as caravans, are concerned our tribes have as yet no complaints against them except in isolated cases, which do not affect the attitude of the tribe as a whole. After the fight at Daror they never interfered with Habr Yunis caravans.

The situation in the Ogaden is very complicated; it will turn on the attitude that may be taken by the Rer Abdilleh, and this will require to be carefully watched.

Should the Abyssinians, knowing as they do that the Mullah is in the Ogaden, send an expedition into the Ogaden against him, this would probably result in a coalition of the Ogaden tribes against them headed by the Mullah, and then the question would be whether they could bring a sufficient force to insure success. A failure would at once establish the Mullah's position on a stronger basis than it is now.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

N.B.—A copy of this despatch is being sent to Lord Cromer and to Captain Harrington.

J. H. S.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 30.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, January* 30, 1900.

COLONEL MAXWELL telegraphs that he has arrested one officer named Moukhtar though he does not think that this person was the chief mover in the recent incident, but he has hopes yet of finding out the ringleader, of whom a severe example should be made.

He states that the outbreak was certainly instigated by the junior officers, among whom a rugular conspiracy exists, but he thinks that most of the men are ashamed of their conduct.

Many petitions are being received asking for better pay and pension; these have lately been improved.

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 30.)

(No. 26. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, January* 30, 1900.

I SAW the Khedive this morning on the question of the insubordination at Khartoum; His Highness' language was very satisfactory. He deprecates more English officers being removed at present. He has given the Sirdar a letter, assuring him of his strong support, and condemning all attempts at insubordination, of which Wingate can make use.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 28.)

My Lord, *Brussels, January* 30, 1900.

MY telegram No. 4, Africa, of yesterday, will have reached your Lordship just about the moment when your Lordship's despatch No. 10 was being posted to me, inclosing copy of the telegram from Viscount Cromer announcing that a British expedition cutting through the sudd had met with the British, Congolese, and French officers coming together down the Nile from Uganda and the Bahr-el-Ghazal.

When M. de Cuvelier was with me yesterday the account he gave me of the Belgian telegram, which he, however, said was brief, had conveyed to my mind the impression that the forcing the way down had been done entirely by Captain Henry and his men with their British companions.

He never alluded to their having been met by another English expedition forcing its way up the stream; as regards the French detachment found at Shambé, he declared his telegram to be silent, and said he knew nothing more than had been learnt some time back of its existence.

Therefore, as I happened to receive this morning a visit from M. de Favereau, who, after other business, expressed the pleasure with which the Belgian Government had heard of the opening of a passage down the Nile, and the arrival of the Congolese and English officers together at Djibelain, I thought it well to read to his Excellency the substance of Lord Cromer's telegram in order to show him that the forcing of the sudd had been done by the English.

The object of M. de Cuvelier's visit yesterday was to convey to me the assurance of the Sovereign of the Congo State that the expedition under Captain Henry had no political or official character, and had been sent only with the view of seeking for ways of communication through the regions which the success of British arms had rescued from the Mahdists.

I was careful in my conversation with M. de Cuvelier to restrict myself to thanking for this message, and expressed no opinion when he laid stress on the presence with Captain Henry of two English officers from Uganda, as a proof of the innocent nature of the expedition.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

No. 2.

Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received January* 31.)

(No. 2.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, January* 31, 1900.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs is very grateful for the attention shown by Lord Cromer to the remaining members of M. Marchand's Mission at Khartoum, as reported in his telegram No. 24. M. Delcassé had only just heard of their arrival on the Nile from the French Consul-General at Cairo. His Excellency presumes that they will proceed direct by railway to Cairo, and the French Representative there will be instructed to forward them at once to France.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 3.)

(No. 14.)

My Lord, *Cairo, January* 24, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to draw your Lordship's attention to the inclosed extract from the "Mouvement Géographique" published at Brussels, in which it is stated that Commandant Henry had descended the Nile in a steamer as far as Lake No, at the junction of the Bahr-el-Ghazal and the White Nile, a little south of latitude 10° north.

It would be interesting to learn whether there is any truth in the rumour, as, if true, it would not only imply that the Sovereign of the Congo State still maintains the full validity of the leases accorded by the Agreement of the 12th May, 1894; but it would also establish that the Bahr-el-Jebel, which has been reported here as entirely closed by the sudd between Shambeh and Lake No, is open at certain seasons of the year.

It is stated that in a subsequent voyage, begun at the end of July, Commandant Henry found the river closed north of Shambeh.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from "Le Mouvement Géographique" of January 14, 1900.

LE COMMANDANT HENRY SUR LE HAUT-NIL.—Une lettre du Haut-Nil nous annonce l'arrivée à Redjaf, le 30 Octobre, de M. le Commandant Chaltin, qui a pris la direction des opérations sur le Nil, dont l'intérim avait été fait, jusqu'à ce moment, avec une très grande activité, par M. le Commandant Henry.

Celui-ci a fait diverses reconnaissances sur le Nil, à bord de la canonnière le "Vankerkhoven." Dans une première course, il est parvenu à descendre le Nil avec son bateau jusqu'au Lac No, c'est-à-dire jusqu'au confluent du Bahr-el-Ghazal (10° de latitude). Dans une seconde, il a fait une découverte assez curieuse.

Partie de Kéro le 27 Juillet, ayant à son bord les Commandants Henry et Adam, le Lieutenant Nielsen, le mécanicien Mulders et soixante-dix soldats, la canonnière, arrivée le 30 Juillet en face de la bifurcation du Bahr-el-Gebel et du Bahr-el-Zaraf) par environ 8° de latitude), trouva, à la rive gauche du Nil, un poste sur lequel ffottait le pavillon Français. C'était un détachement appartenant aux renforts envoyés à l'expédition Marchand. Il était commandé par le Lieutenant Tonquoucley, de l'infanterie de marine, ayant sous ses ordres le sous-officier Falten et quarante soldats Sénégalais. Son chef avait connaissance du Traité intervenu entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne et de l'abandon aux Anglais du Bahr-el-Ghazal; mais il était sans instructions et attendait qu'on lui fournit les moyens de se rapatrier.

Le Commandant Henry, poursuivant son voyage vers le nord, trouva, au delà du village de Shambé, un large développement de fleuve, mais très peu de profondeur d'eau. Plus en aval, le Nil était barré par d'immenses végétations.

Le "Vankerkhoven" reprit l'amont et rentra à Kéro, le 4 Septembre.

Depuis lors, le Commandant Henry a enterpris un troisième voyage ayant pour but de poursuivre ses reconnaissances plus avant. Il a quitté Kéro en compagnie du Lieutenant Anglais Gasch, comptant rapatrier le poste Français, à Khartum, après avoir franchi la région du sudd.

Le résultat de cette expédition n'est pas encore connu. Tout ce que l'on peut dire, c'est qu'elle n'est pas arrivée à Khartum, attendu qu'aucune dépêche n'est encore parvenue de cette ville.

Au cours de ees diverses courses, le Commandant Henry n'a constaté nulle part la présence de Derviches. Le pays voisin du Nil est complètement tranquille.

No. 2.

Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 3.)

(No. 51.)

Paris, February 1, 1900.

My Lord,

M. DELCASSÉ informed me yesterday that he had only that morning received from M. de Cogordan the telegram announcing the arrival at Khartoum of the remaining members of the French expedition under M. Marchand, who had been left behind on the Bahr-el-Ghazal.

I said that I knew that Lord Cromer was anxious to afford them every facility and comfort in his power for the prosecution of their journey down the Nile. and that if his Excellency had any suggestion or request to make I would at once transmit it to his Lordship.

M. Delcassé thanked me and said that he was very sensible of Lord Cromer's courtesy. He presumed that his countrymen would travel by railway to Cairo, and he should at once telegraph to M. de Cogordan to receive them and forward them to France by the first opportunity.

In reply to his Excellency's inquiry, I said that I knew nothing about the train service from Khartoum, but that I believed that there was a good hotel at the latter place, and that the members of the expedition would find themselves already surrounded by the general characteristics of civilized life.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 28.)

My Lord, *Cairo, January 29, 1900.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 13 of the 24th instant, I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a comprehensive account of the circumstances which led to the capture of Osman Digna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Correspondence respecting the Capture of Osman Digna.

The Administrator, Suakin, to the Governor-General of the Soudan.

Sir, *Suakin, January* , 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 7th January I received a telegram from the Mudir of Kassala (copy marked (A) inclosed), and the same day at 1 P.M. the "Clysma" left to patrol the coast south as far as Ras Kasar, and search all sambuks and return them to Suakin or Akik—instructions were also sent to Mamur, Tokar, to send out a patrol to Jebel Warriba, and to Muawin Akik and other out-stations on the coast to collect the sambuks and keep them under observation until further orders. Sheikh Ahmed Darakabi also left Suakin that night to watch all the roads north from Suakin to Dissibl with his Arabs.

January 8.—Bimbashi Cope, Slavery Department, left at 8 A.M. with a patrol of his men for Sinkat and Erkowit with letters for the Sheikhs, informing them of the reward of 100*l.* for the capture of Osman Digna; there was also a report of fifty-four slaves concealed in the neighbourhood of Erkowit.

At 9 A.M. a post of one N.C.O. and three men of the civil police left for Mersa Haidoub to watch this, as there is water (fresh) there, and it is a favourite spot for sambuks to put in.

Another patrol of the Slavery Department left for Sheikh Barghout at 1 P.M. with orders to patrol north to Darur and south for a similar distance. Bimb. Burgess with two N.C.O.'s and four men, civil police, and two Arab police left at 1·45 P.M. with letters from me to Sheikh Mohamed Ali Or and Sheikh Hassai, both of the Gemilab tribe, and Bimb. Burgess was to search for Osman Digna at Jebel Warriba, in accordance with wire from Mudir, Kassala.

January 9.—The Yusbashi and eight N.C.O.'s and men of the Slavery Department with one guide left for Harasab, western side of Erkowit, with a man who arrived the previous evening, who said that he had seen the slaves at that place.

January 13.—"Clysma" returned at noon with her small boat smashed through bad weather.

Bimb. Cope returned with his patrol and his Yusbashis about 3 P.M. He had learnt no further news of Osman Digna; he had given letters to Sheikh Ahmed Badei and Sheikh Omar Tita; had searched Harasab, at which place he met his Yusbashi, for the supposed slaves, but he found none there, or elsewhere, or any traces of them, or of their having been there.

January 15.—"Clysma" left again for south on patrol duty, having taken in coal and water and been supplied with another small boat.

In the evening I received the letter from Sheikh Mohamed Ali Or (translation

inclosed marked (B)); it was brought in by an Arab from near Erkowit, where he said Sheik Mohamed Ali Or was.

January 16.—I sent Mohamed Bey Ahmed, two civil police, two Arab police, and eight N.C.O.'s and men of the Slavery Department off at 4·30 A.M. with the Arab who brought in the letter from Sheikh Mohamed Ali Or (I inclose a translation of his Report marked (C), and Bimb. Burges' Report marked (D)). They all returned to-day, 21st January, with Osman Digna.

In addition to the above-mentioned individuals who have given great assistance, I must not forget to mention that El Yusbashi Mohamed Eff. Ghalib, Mamur, Suakin, whose name does not appear above, has been most useful and hard working in assisting me in carrying out the various arrangements as quickly as possible.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. T. GODDEN, *Kaïmakam.*

(A.)

From Collinson, Kassala, to Commandant, Suakin.

(Telegraphic.) *January* 7, 1900.

Osman Digna crossed the Atbara six days ago, and has gone to Jebel Warriba, near Tokar. He wants to cross to the Arabian coast. Some of the Hadendowas are helping him with food and money.

Wire Sirdar asking him authority to offer 100*l.* for his capture. Watch your coast-line near Akik carefully.

Am wiring Governor, Erythræa, as he may try through Italian territory. Am sending parties out after him. He is reported to have cut off his beard, and has one man with him.

(B.)

To the Governor, Suakin.

(Translation.) [*Undated.*]

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

I beg to inform you that I am writing to you this letter in order to obtain from the Egyptian Government honour and distinction, as the merciful God has caused Osman Abu Bakr Digna to fall into my hands, and he is now in safe custody in my hands.

On the receipt of this, please send at once, and without delay, some policemen, and I will come to see you.

This letter should be kept strictly secret.

Please let me know in your reply the rank and honour which will be bestowed by the Government upon me.

(Signed) Sheikh MOHAMED ALI OMAR.

(C.)

Muhafiz, Suakin.

(Translation.)

In accordance with your order, I left the Deputy of Sheikh Mohamed Ali Omar Or on the 16th instant at 4·30 A.M., and arrived at Siterab at 5·30 P.M. of the same day. I subsequently left there at 12 midnight, and marching quickly, arrived at 6 P.M. at the Agaba of Hadrot, which leads to Gemilab country. As I crossed it I met Bimb. Burges, Inspector, Suakin, at 6·30. He informed me that he had not found the Gemilab Sheikh. I told him that a Deputy had come from that Sheikh with a letter to the Governor, Suakin, informing him that Osman Digna was at Arbab, in his hands, and that on the 18th January, 1900, he would go to a place twenty minutes' march from where Osman Digna was. We then went together to the place appointed by the said Sheikh. We arrived there at 12 noon on the 18th, where we met with the Sheikh of the Gemilab. He informed us that Osman Digna was still at Sabidna [?] Hill, and that he had resource to trickery and finesse to bring him down the hill. He said that he had informed Osman

Digna that the patrol which was with Bimb. Burges had returned unsuccessful to Suakin. He had killed a goat for him, and had brought him milk, and had left one of his cousins and another man with him to prepare the goat for eating. He suggested to us to go and catch him on foot, as the road was very stony and difficult.

We went, accompanied by the messenger who brought the letter to guide us and show us the hiding-place. When we arrived we found all that Sheikh Mohamed Ali Omar Or told us was true. We found Osman Digna under a stone, and we captured him. He had no arms whatever, but simply a skin containing some dom fruit. He was wearing a turban and jibba, and, according to orders, we placed him in chains, and then all returned together.

I am of opinion that Sheikh Mohamed Ali Omar Or, of the Gemilab tribe, has rendered a valuable service to the Government, and deserves to be rewarded.

He promised to be at Suakin two days after our arrival, but his messenger, Mohamed Mahmud, returned with us.

(Signed) MOHAMED AHMED,
Officer commanding Civil and Arab Police.

(D.)

The Administrator, Suakin.

Suakin, January 21, 1900.

Herewith report on the patrol sent out by your orders on the afternoon of the 8th instant to try and secure Osman Digna, who was reported to be in the neighbourhood of the Warriba Range, and to give two letters to Sheikhs Hassai and Ali Omar Or, of the Gemilab tribe, in whose territory Osman Digna was supposed to be.

The patrol, consisting of Bimbashi Burges, two Arab police, and six non-commissioned officers and men of the civil police, left Suakin on the 8th instant and marched 16 miles in a south-westerly direction.

On the 9th instant the Kassala–Suakin road was picked up, and Siterab reached about 3·30. Water brackish. Camels were watered here and water-skins refilled. Total march, 37 miles.

On the 10th instant one of the Arab police was dispatched with one letter to Sheikh Hassai, who was reported to be near Jebel Shaba; the entrance to Khor Muis, which is south of Jebel Muis, was reached at noon, and a north-westerly direction pursued up the Khor to the pool of the Hadroyah Pass, which was reached at 5 P.M. The pass is high and steep, and the summit was not reached till 8 P.M. Two camels, which had been sent up the Khor Gash for water 6 miles from the pool of the pass, came in at 9 P.M.

On the 10th instant the patrol descended the pass in a northerly direction, and after proceeding 8 miles in a westerly direction, entered the Warriba Range, and travelled in a south-westerly direction to Derem Waieb, where the camels were watered and skins refilled; there is good running water for about 10 feet in the rock.

On the 12th instant, still pursuing a south-westerly direction in the Warriba Hills, after marching 8 miles, an open plain was reached and some tukls were seen. On questioning a woman there she reported that she had heard that twelve days before Osman Digna had come into the Gemilab country that he had 3 reals on him and one Artega man with him, and that Sheikh Ali Or, of the Gemilab tribe, on hearing of his arrival, had gone to him and taken him in a south-westerly direction. Taking a guide from these tukls, who declined to give any information at all, the patrol proceeded, and the above intelligence was confirmed by a boy further on. About noon the dom palm country was reached, general direction south-west; the first 20 miles was over a very rocky dry country; after this the khors were thick with bush and dom palms. Water was procured 8 miles before halting.

The object now was to try and find Sheikh Ali Omar Or, but I could get no intelligence from the Gemilab at all, except the whereabouts of water. The Gemilab men effected ignorance; it was only from boys tending sheep and old women that any information was procured at all. After great difficulty the tukls of Ali Or were reached about 2 P.M., but we only found his wives and children, who declined to give any information about Osman Digna, and said that Sheikh Ali Or had gone twelve days before to the Warriba Range to buy tobs, but a black slave told me that Sheikh Omar

Tita, of Erkowit, had come to this place twelve days before, and that Sheikh Ali Or and Sheikh Omar Tita had gone away together.

The camels were watered at a place called Dwigaya, 6 miles west, and the day was spent in trying to get intelligence. The junction of the Langeb and Baraka was said to be 90 miles east, and the Kassala–Suakin road 60 miles east. Khor Langabe was crossed 3 miles north-west of this encampment.

Patrol returned along the Warriba range trying to get information, and reached Derouwaiel on the night of the 16th instant.

The patrol marched through the Warriba Hills to the foot of Hadroyah or pass, where the patrol of Mohammed Bey Ahmed, consisting of two civil police, two Arab police, and eight men of the Slavery Department, was met. Mohammed Bey Ahmed, Commandant of the Suakin Police, informed me that he had with him Mohammed Mohammed, cousin of Sheikh Ali Or, who reported that Ali Or had Osman Digna marched down, and would lead us to a place where we could capture him.

The two patrols left at 11·30 P.M., and marched 37 miles in a south-westerly direction along the same route the first patrol had taken, reaching Derouwaiel at 4·30 A.M., and at 10 A.M. reached the spot where Sheikh Ali Or had arranged to meet his cousin. The camels were here unloaded and concealed in a khor with thick bush. After waiting two hours, Sheikh Ali Omer Or reported to me that Osman Digna was in the Khor Ordo at the base of Jebel Sebilan. This spot was 6 miles east of where the woman and boy gave me information about Osman Digna, and about 1 mile from where the patrol were halted. The men here removed their boots and tarbouches, and were led by Sheikh Ali Or's cousin, Mahmoud Mohammed, keeping in the bush and along the low ground, when the cover stopped about 400 yards from the base of the hill.

The patrol made a rush for the spot where Osman Digna was supposed to be. The Jebel Sebilan is composed of enormous boulders, which have rolled down from the top of the hill. Between these boulders are spaces from 6 to 10 feet high, and an equal length and breadth, forming innumerable chambers. The Jebel is between 500 and 600 feet high, and is one of the most southerly spurs of the Warriba Range. Osman Digna, on catching sight of the advancing force, ran up between these boulders, and was caught sight of 40 feet up. Sending flankers round on each side, he was caught by the central party and brought down. Osman Digna reported he had lived for eighteen days in one of these spaces at the top of the hill, and had there been supplied with food by Sheikh Ali Omar Or, and had only come down that morning, as the Sheikh reported that the patrol had left the Warriba neighbourhood, and so he killed a sheep for him, the skin of which was lying in the chamber he had vacated. An Arab policeman was at once dispatched with the news of the capture. After securing Osman Digna, the patrol proceeded 20 miles north-east to Derouwaiel, where they watered.

Left Derouwaiel, marched 38 miles to Jebel, and on the 20th, marching between Erkowit and Sinhul, halted 6 miles north of Tamanib, and on the 21st came in to Foualin at 1·30, when Osman Digna was handed over to the police office.

I should like to bring to your notice the invaluable ussistance Sheikh Ali Omar Or, of the Gemilab tribe, rendered, for without his assistance and connivance it would have been most difficult to catch Osman Digna, owing to the cavernous nature of the hill; also the great assistance Mohammed Bey Ahmed rendered owing to his knowledge of the Hadendowa language and the general assistance he rendered; also the police and men of the Slavery, of the patrol, who worked very hard throughout, as you will see from the distances travelled.

Osman Digna informed me that, when he came to the Gemilab, Sheikh Ali Or took him to the Darebed Hills, and that he had been there eighteen days; that Ali Or had said that he was getting his men together to get some money, and make arrangements for a boat in which he could cross to the Arabian coast in order to go to Mecca; that he had received no assistance from anybody since the battle of El Jedid, except that a Nograb Artiga Ali Alad Ahmed had brought him from the Atbara to the Gemilab country.

Sheikh Ali Omar Or reported to me that Osman Digna had come to him and tried to induce him to make a rebellion among his people, but he declined; but said he would help him to the Darebed Range, and came and reported what he had done. After Osman Digna was captured none of the Gemilab tribe would come in the presence of Osman Digna, and the guide left me when Osman Digna was located. Osman Digna was wearing a Jibba when he was captured, and had no arms in his possession, only a skin with dom nuts.

(Signed) BURGES, *Bimbashi, Inspector, Suakin.*

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 19.)

(No. 1.)

My Lord, *Cairo, February* 8, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a telegram which I have received from the Sirdar explaining the circumstances under which British and Belgian officers from the Upper Nile have together penetrated the sudd region and arrived at Khartoum.

The information as to the state of the sudd conveyed in this telegram shows, in the opinion of Sir W. Garstin, that the work before the expedition under Major Peake is less formidable than had been anticipated, and he considers it probable that they will succeed in opening the channel before next summer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Omdurman, February* 7, 1900.

CAPTAIN GAGE informs me that on the 8th September Commandant Henry visited him at Fort Berkeley, 10 miles south of Regage,* and informed him that he had proceeded in his steamer "Van Kerckhoven" as far as Lake No, where a large sudd barrier prevented his further progress. He invited Gage to join him in his efforts to cut through sudd in order to open communication with Khartoum, whence he hoped in future to draw his supplies for his garrisons. Gage, who was to have been relieved at Fort Berkeley by Dugmore, who was on his way, decided to accept the invitation, and proceeded north with his small launch, accompanying Henry in his steamer. Gage left Sergeant Osborne in command at Fort Berkeley with 120 men, and reported his departure to officer commanding Nile district direct at Duffile.

British and Belgian parties encountered first sudd barrier at approximately latitude 8° 34′, showing that Henry was entirely mistaken in his idea that he had ever reached Lake No. Sudd cutting was undertaken for eighteen days, but finding barrier still continued they reconnoitered along the marshes bordering the right bank of the Bahr-el-Gebel for a distance of 25 miles, where the free river was again struck. Three more blocks of sudd were then encountered and cut through, and whilst cutting their way through the further block our gun-boats were met. The French party under Lieutenant Tonquedec, who arrived some time before at Shambe, and who had interviewed Gage and Henry on their way north, having waited some two months for their return, decided to follow them down in canoes, believing that the river must be open. The parties met near the beginning of the sudd, and then all continued their reconnaissance northwards together. Gage estimates that from the place where Peake now is up to the place where the Belgian and Uganda steamers were left, a distance of about 70 miles, there are many open stretches, and not more than a total of 10 miles of sudd to be actually cut through. Gage and Henry left orders with their steamers that if they did not return by the 30th March, the steamers were to return to Fort Berkeley and Regage.*

---

* *Sic*? Rejaf.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 10, 1900.)

(No 71. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, December* 28, 1899.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Ilg left Addis Abbaba to-day for Europe, with the intention, I believe, of remaining there some time.

M. Ilg paid me a visit this morning, and said that the Emperor had expressed surprise that I had not mentioned the frontier question at the audience which His Majesty had granted me yesterday. I reminded him that, before taking leave of the Emperor, I had asked His Majesty whether there were any matters on which he would like to speak to me, to which His Majesty replied that he would see me again.

I gathered from M. Ilg's remarks that my omission to mention the frontier question had aroused, both in his mind and in that of the Emperor, suspicions that Her Majesty's Government were not satisfied with His Majesty's proposals, and that further concessions would be demanded from him.

I have on previous occasions reported to your Lordship with what mistrust the Emperor and his adviser look on all our acts. I thought it advisable, therefore, to calm M. Ilg by informing him, in accordance with instructions contained in Lord Cromer's letter of the 21st October last, that the western frontier proposed by His Majesty had been accepted as a basis of settlement; that the ultimate line must depend on geographical and tribal considerations, which could only be decided on the spot. This applied in particular to the neighbourhood of the Sobat, where, in view of the possible construction of a railway from the Cape to Cairo, Her Majesty's Government could not agree to the proposed line before they had satisfied themselves that there was ground within the Anglo-Soudanese territory on which the railway could be laid. Until the completion of the survey which was now being carried out in that district, it was impossible to say whether some modification of the proposed line might not be necessary.

With regard to Gallabat, I said that, with every desire to meet the Emperor's wishes, Her Majesty's Government had found it impossible to cede him that town, but they proposed that the old division of the town should be maintained, and that the part lying east of the Khor Abnakara should be considered as Abyssinian.

As regards the southern frontier, I said that that was a question which we must discuss again on his return from Europe.

M. Ilg seemed satisfied with the suggestion regarding Gallabat, and altogether relieved by my communication.

I could not help telling him that his constant mistrust of us seemed to me, to say the least, unreasonable, and I once more repeated to him that Her Majesty's Government's intentions had never been anything but peaceful, to which M. Ilg replied: "Let us indeed hope that it is so."

I think it, however, only fair to M. Ilg to say that I believe he has of late been honestly exerting his great influence with the Emperor in our favour. Mr. Lane tells me that throughout his recent negotiations regarding a Mining Concession, referred to in my despatch No. 70 of to-day's date, M. Ilg's attitude has been most friendly, and that the rapid and satisfactory result he has obtained is to a great extent due to the care with which M. Ilg explained the various proposals to the Emperor, and to the support which he gave him.

I venture to dwell on this point because I think there is no doubt that M. Ilg is one of the most important factors in this country. Notwithstanding various attempts on the part of the Representatives of other nations to discredit him, I believe his influence with the Emperor to be stronger than ever. His Majesty has taken a solemn oath, in the presence of numerous witnesses, that he will not transact any important business in connection with foreign affairs during M. Ilg's absence.

I think, therefore, that there may be some value in the assurance given me by M. Ilg to-day that His Majesty was convinced that his interests impelled him to cultivate the friendship of his neighbours rather than to listen to the counsels of others with whom he had no immediate concern, but who would gladly see him on bad terms with us.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 19.)

(No. 1.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, January* 5, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 70 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, a translation of the Concession granted by the Emperor Menelek II to Mr. Lane, to prospect for gold or other minerals in the Beni Schongul country, as well as a letter addressed by the Emperor to Mr. Lane, in which His Majesty defines the frontiers of the country to which the Concession applies.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Concession granted to Mr. Lane.

(Translation.)

(The seal of Emperor Menelek II.)

I, MENELEK II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, for me and for my heirs, to Mr. George William Lane, and to the Englishmen in the city of London who are his Company, I have given permission to (act according to) the wording of this letter.

1. I have given permission to Mr. Lane to search for gold, silver, and anything else that can be got out of the earth in the whole of the Beni Schongul country, for four years, the said four years to begin from the time when he starts digging the earth. I am giving these four years to Mr. Lane and his men only, that they may search until the end of these four years; to no other person will any such permission be given in the Beni Schongul country; but the inhabitants of the country will not be stopped from extracting the gold, as they have done hitherto. In these four years, if gold, silver, or anything else that can be extracted from the earth is found by Mr. Lane's men, I have given to himself and his Company my permission to work the said gold, silver, or anything else that can be extracted from the earth for a period of fifty years.

2. I have given permission to Mr. Lane and his Company to bring all the materials, machinery, and steamships which are necessary for extracting gold, silver, or anything else which may be got out of the earth, and to lay railways, and put up telegraph wires and make canals and roads in the Beni Schongul country. But the permission I am giving to-day does not annul the permission already given to other people.

3. I have given permission that everything necessary for extracting gold, silver, or anything else that can be got out of the earth, *i.e.*, machinery, gunpowder, dynamite, or anything else required for breaking up the rocks (is) to pass through Ethiopia into Beni Schongul without paying duty.

4. I have given permission to Mr. Lane and the men of his Company, to pass through my dominions, backwards and forwards, without let or hindrance.

5. If the men who are in the service of Mr. Lane's Company fight among themselves, the man who is appointed a Magistrate by the Company will settle (disputes) and (punish) offenders; but in the case of murder, the Emperor will himself judge the case.

In return for the Concession hereby granted by the Emperor Menelek II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, to Mr. Lane and his Company, Mr. Lane and his Company are to pay to the Ethiopian Government 8 per cent. of the gold, silver, or anything else that they extract from the earth; and if this 8 per cent. which they give yearly does not come up to 500 ounces, Mr. Lane's Company are to make good the 500 ounces of gold,

and give them to the Ethiopian Government. Also, all of the money collected, or to be collected, with a view to extracting gold, silver, or anything else that can be extracted from the earth, by Mr. Lane's Company, a share will be given to the Ethiopian Government amounting to not less than 5 per cent. of the total capital in fully paid-up shares.

The Emperor will see that all materials, buildings, and all men belonging to Mr. Lane and his Company are not interfered with, and will uphold their interests in the same manner as those of the Ethiopian nation. In order that the Company may obtain Ethiopian workmen, the Emperor will cause the latter to be informed that he wishes them (to work for the country); but the inhabitants of Beni Schongul are not to be forcibly impressed into the service of the country.

This letter is written in duplicate, one copy remaining in the hands of the Ethiopian Government, and the other in those of Mr. Lane.

Written at Addis Abbaba on the 17th Tehsas, 1892 (the 25th December, 1899).

I, Mr. Lane, accept this Concession of the Emperor Menelek II, in proof of which acceptance I affix my signature.

(Signed) G. W. LANE.

Witnesses:

(Signed) ALFRED ILG.
H. B. WEATHERALL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

King Menelek II to Mr. Lane.

(Translation.)

THE Lion from the tribe of Judah hath prevailed. Menelek II, King of Kings of Ethiopia. Salutations to Mr. Lane.

With regard to the Agreement which was ratified and given to you to-day respecting the Beni Schongul country where you are going to search for gold: the limits (of the country referred to) are to the north, Fazogli; to the south, the Songa and the Dabus River; to the east, the Dabus River; to the west, the frontier-line to be agreed upon with the British Government.

The 17th Tehsas, 1892 (the 25th December, 1899).

Written at Addis Abbaba.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 10.)

(No. 17.)

My Lord, *Cairo, January* 30, 1900.

I HAVE on several occasions been urged by the Bishop of Jerusalem and by others interested in missionary work to advocate the project of establishing a Bishopric for Egypt and the Soudan, and generally to encourage missionary enterprise in the latter province.

I am of opinion that the present moment is inopportune for moving in either direction. This opinion was shared by Lord Kitchener, and is also entertained by his successor.

I should mention that in deprecating any attempt to encourage missionary enterprise, I am only alluding to those portions of the Soudan which are inhabited by a Moslem population. My remarks do not refer to the Upper Valley of the Nile, which is inhabited by Pagans.

The Bishop of Jerusalem has recently brought to notice another point in connection with this subject which certainly deserves attention.

It is that no provision has so far been made for the spiritual guidance of the British detachment of about 250 men now quartered at Khartoum.

The Bishop has offered to assist Sir Francis Wingate in obtaining a clergyman to supply this want. Both Sir F. Wingate and myself are decidedly of opinion that the want is one which should be supplied. Indeed, had I not been aware that the war in South Africa has caused very unusual calls to be made on all the branches of the War Office, I should have brought the matter to notice some while ago. Sir F. Wingate is now writing to the War Office on the subject, and is suggesting that when an army chaplain can be spared he should be sent to Khartoum. I entirely concur in this view. I think that, under all the circumstances of the case, the appointment of an army chaplain would be the most suitable method of meeting the difficulty. It is very possible that for the moment no army chaplain is available, but I venture to express a hope that the matter will be borne in mind, and that when some relief is obtained from the present pressure by reason of the war, it will be found possible to adopt Sir F. Wingate's suggestion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 10, 1900.)

(No. 69.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, December* 28, 1899.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to report that, after answering His Majesty's questions respecting the horses and dogs presented to him by Her Majesty the Queen, I said that there were some other matters on which I wished to speak to him, and asked when it would be convenient to deal with them. The Emperor replied that he would hear me at once.

I should have preferred to have confined myself at this audience to matters connected with the Queen's gifts, but knowing that the Emperor was leaving to-morrow for Bulga, and having heard that M. Ilg was on the point of leaving for a stay of some length in Europe, and knowing the difficulty of transacting any serious business with the Emperor during M. Ilg's absence, I thought it best to seize this opportunity.

The officers who surrounded His Majesty while the Queen's presents were being shown withdrew, with the exception of M. Ilg.

I then said to His Majesty that I had learnt with pleasure that he had lately granted a Mining Concession to the representative of an English Syndicate. Although His Majesty had frequently expressed his friendly sentiments towards Her Majesty's Government, and although I personally had been convinced that he wished to be on good terms with us, I never concealed from him that I had hitherto been unable to lay before your Lordship any substantial proofs of the sentiments with which I believed him to be imbued. By granting this Concession to British capitalists, His Majesty had passed from the region of fair words, and had demonstrated in a practical manner his goodwill towards my countrymen. I hoped that his dealings with the British capitalists to whom he had just given the Concession would be satisfactory, and that they might lead to further transactions with British capitalists in the future. I asked for no special advantages for my fellow-countrymen, but I hoped that His Majesty would at least give them an equal chance with foreigners of making an offer for any other Concession which he might in the future think of granting.

I was now forced to bring to His Majesty's notice some matters of a less agreeable nature.

I had lately received a telegram from Lord Cromer stating that an Abyssinian officer and thirty soldiers had arrived at Gallabat to levy taxes, and, further, that Sheikh Sharaf, of Gallabat, had received a letter from the Abyssinian authorities stating that the whole of the Province of Gallabat belonged to Abyssinia. In view of the discussions which I had had with His Majesty regarding the proposed western frontier of His Majesty's territory which had resulted in His Majesty agreeing to consider the Province of Gallabat outside his dominions, I could not understand the behaviour of the Abyssinian officers.

The Emperor expressed ignorance of these incidents; he had given orders with the object of preventing such occurrences, and he promised to inquire into the matter.

The next question which I had to mention to His Majesty was of a similar nature. In connection with this I could not but feel that His Majesty had hardly treated me fairly. Last spring, when I inquired what province was to be assigned to Dejasmatch Leontieff, I was informed that he would be given a country near Walamo. Had I known that his territory was to extend so far south as that lately occupied by him I should have suggested for His Majesty's consideration whether it would not have been more prudent to assign to Dejasmatch Leontieff a district further removed from the region about which negotiations were in progress between His Majesty and my Government.

I had received reliable information that Dejasmatch Leontieff had sent an expedition down the western side of Lake Rudolf into territory well to the south of the frontier proposed by His Majesty.

Dejasmatch Leontieff, himself, had publicly boasted that he had been to Murle and had hauled down two British flags which he had found in the neighbourhood.

I had felt convinced that these events could not have taken place with His Majesty's sanction, and therefore I had not forthwith reported them to my Government; but I was sure His Majesty would understand, in view of such incidents, how difficult it was for me to persuade Her Majesty's Government of His Majesty's friendly feelings towards them.

The Emperor showed considerable annoyance at the mention of Dejasmatch Leontieff's name. "What?" he said, angrily, to M. Ilg, "has he been down there, too?"

M. Ilg then begged me not to press the matter with the Emperor before I had heard what he had to say on the subject. Knowing the awkward position in which His Majesty had been placed by Dejasmatch Leontieff's proceedings, I told His Majesty that I realized the difficulty of the situation, and would await M. Ilg's explanation. Did His Majesty not think, however, that considering the manner in which we had behaved with regard to his flags at Fazokl and Gallabat, it was only fair that our flags should again be hoisted where they were found? At Fazokl and Gallabat, although these posts had been occupied by Anglo-Egyptian troops by right of conquest, his flags had been left flying, pending the definite settlement of the frontier. Under no circumstances had Dejasmatch Leontieff any right to haul down a British flag.

The Emperor agreed to have the flags hoisted again, adding that he was glad I had not reported the matter to my Government, as a misunderstanding would very likely have resulted. He, himself, had suffered much by Dejasmatch Leontieff's proceedings; the latter had now left the country and His Majesty said that he had a long score to settle with him.

In conclusion, the King begged me not to credit him with unfriendly intentions towards Her Majesty's Government on the strength of the unauthorized acts of some of his officers in the distant frontiers of his Empire; he wished for nothing more than to convince Her Majesty's Government of his desire to be on good terms with them.

I repeated to His Majesty that I was persuaded of his friendly feelings towards us, and that I hoped I had proved this to him by not reporting without first referring to him, the serious question of the removal of our flags by one of his officers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

(Confidential)
No 949 E.A

A copy× of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, etc,
(Sd) J.B. Wood
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department
Simla;
The 3rd May 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints, Section 1, dated the 6th, 7th, 9th, 14th, 21st, 24th, 26th and 28th February and 3rd, 5th, 7th and 12th March 1900;
Section 2, dated the 17th February and 5th March, 1900
Section 3, dated the 5th March 1900;
Section 4, dated the 19th February and 5th March 1900.
Section 5, dated the 5th March 1900;
Section 6, dated the 10th February, 1900.

× With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden

Confidential

No 3388 of 1900
Political Department
Bombay Castle 9th May 1900

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

(Sd) W. Hudson
Acting Secretary to Govt

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN.

[February 6.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February 6.*)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 6, 1900.

ACCORDING to a report from the Commandant of Rosaires, there is an Abyssinian force at Gebel Mandi; the Commander has hoisted a flag at Abud, and means to advance. These movements have alarmed the local tribes. Sirdar has told Commandant that provisional frontier of Abyssinia includes these places, and has instructed him, in case of any encroachment, to ask Abyssinian officer to refer to Menelek, and report the matter; meanwhile his attitude should be conciliatory.

Should the rumour of their advance be confirmed, Sirdar will send British officer to Famaka, at present in charge of an Egyptian officer, with fifty Soudanese.

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February 6.*)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 6, 1900.

SEVERAL lengthy telegrams which I have received from the Sirdar represent the situation at Omdurman as very serious. It appears that some of the junior Egyptian officers, actuated by various reasons, have worked on the feelings of the black troops, and that now but little reliance can be placed on the subordination and discipline of the black battalions. I think the Sirdar is showing great judgment in his mode of dealing with the situation generally.

I should be grateful if your Lordship would assist me in the following matter.

The Sirdar, for reasons too long to explain by telegraph, is very anxious that Sloman should leave Omdurman. Unless it were for service in South Africa, it would, however, at present, be most objectionable to order him away. The Sirdar, therefore, earnestly begs that Sloman and Doran, the latter having been asked for by the War Office, may be ordered to South Africa at once. Though apparently a detail, this is a matter of much importance, and I greatly hope the War Office will be able to help us. I should be glad of a reply on this matter as soon as possible.

No. 3.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February 6.*)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 6, 1900.

INFORMATION has been received from the Commandant at El Obeid of an attack upon two Egyptian officers by a corporal of the Camel Corps on the 25th January. A Lieutenant was shot dead and a captain wounded. I see no connection between this incident and the recent disturbances at Omdurman. The corporal has been hanged.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 7.)

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, February* 7, 1900.

THE Sirdar informs me that "there is a distinct improvement in the general situation in the Soudan." The last news is to the effect that the mutinous battalion has given up a few hundred rounds of ammunition, and that more is said to be coming in.

The Sirdar does not consider that more British troops will at present be required.

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 7.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, February* 7, 1900.

FOLLOWING received from Sirdar:—

"The Khedive's name and influence in the army are, I am confident, very considerable, and unless the officers have received encouragement from a high quarter, I very much doubt their acting as they have done."

This is the same story over again as Ismaïl Pasha and his army. For years the Khedive has been using foolish language and listening sympathetically to silly complaints. He is now frightened at the consequences of his own conduct, and is desirous to help to put matters straight. I shall, at the right time, let him see that he is in a great degree responsible for whatever has and whatever may take place, but, for the moment, it will be best to show confidence.

No. 3.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 7.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Cairo, February* 7, 1900.

BRITISH, French, and Belgian parties have arrived at Omdurman. Their reports are favourable as to prospect of cutting through the sudd.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 9.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, February 9, 1900.

THE Sirdar reports to me that the 14th Battalion yesterday handed in 800 more rounds of ammunition.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to War Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 14, 1900.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt,* suggesting the appointment of an Army Chaplain at Khartoum as soon as one may be available.

Lord Salisbury concurs with Lord Cromer and the Sirdar in thinking that such an appointment is desirable, and he hopes that the Marquess of Lansdowne will give this matter his favourable consideration.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

* Lord Cromer, No. 17.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, February* 21, 1900.

I HAVE received a telegram from the Sirdar to the effect that nine persons have been arrested preaching Mahdism in Omdurman. They state that one out of every ten of the population of Omdurman are still earnest Mahdists. The Sirdar thinks that this is an exaggeration. They themselves boldly profess their belief, and state that they are ready to suffer death, if necessary. The Sirdar has sent the prisoners to Wady Halfa.

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, February* 21, 1900.

I AM informed by the Sirdar that the Abyssinian Ras near Fazogli has sent him a letter couched in very friendly terms. (See my telegram No. 31.)

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 36.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 24, 1900.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 2, Africa, of the 9th instant, inclosing a paraphrase of a telegram from the Sirdar respecting the Belgian and French expeditions which recently arrived at Khartoum.

I concur in your Lordship's approval of the course followed by Major Peake in dealing with these expeditions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 26.)

(No. 9.)

My Lord, *Berbera, February* 9, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to submit two Statements showing the progressive Receipts and Expenditure of the Protectorate for the first three quarters of the financial year ending the 31st March, 1900.

The Receipts for last month, January, amounted to 18,187 rupees at Zeyla, and 33,218 rupees at Berbera and Bulhar; in each case the highest figures yet recorded.

It is now assured that the Receipts for the year will exceed the Budget Estimate. The Expenditure for the year, excluding extraneous Government of India charges which cannot yet be known, will be less than the Estimate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

STATEMENT of Receipts from April to December, 1899 (three Quarters).

Month.	Schedule No. 1. Customs Duties. Total Budget Estimate, Rs. 3,25,100.	Schedule No. 2. Port Dues. Total Budget Estimate, Rs. 1,600.	Schedule No. 3. Law and Justice. Total Budget Estimate. Rs. 2,700.	Schedule No. 4. Miscellaneous. Total Budget Estimate, Rs. 1,600.	Refunds.	Total Estimated Revenue for 1899-1900, Rs. 3,31,000.
1899.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
April	28,252 13 9	297 1 6	844 0 0	80 10 6	..	29,474 9 9
May	25,970 5 0	168 3 0	437 3 0	27 4 0	..	26,602 15 0
June	26,194 12 9	196 12 0	560 0 0	567 6 6	..	27,518 15 3
July	21,051 8 6	123 14 0	29 0 0	29 3 0	..	21,233 9 6
August	23,390 12 0	46 7 0	523 0 0	263 8 0	..	24,223 11 0
September	22,757 5 6	217 2 0	227 10 0	1,150 13 9	..	24,352 15 3
October	36,713 3 6	43 12 0	73 2 0	551 5 0	..	37,381 6 6
November	27,489 1 6	260 10 6	193 2 0	62 14 0	502 15 0	28,508 11 0
December	33,835 10 0	151 1 0	164 0 0	1,549 11 0	113 15 7	35,814 5 7
Total	2,45,655 8 6	1,504 15 0	3,051 1 0	4,282 11 9	616 14 7	2,55,111 2 10

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER,
Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Somali Coast Protectorate.

2

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

STATEMENT of Expenditure from April to December, 1899 (three Quarters).

Month.	No. 1. Administration.	No. 2. Police.	No. 3. Gaol.	No. 4. Customs.	No. 5. Port and Marine.	No. 6. Medical.	No. 7. Educational.	No. 8. Native Civil Administration.	No. 9. Workshop and Water Works.	No. 10. Public Works and Furniture.
	Budget Estimate, Rs. 72,636.	Budget Estimate, Rs. 1,05,468.	Budget Estimate, Rs. 2,550.	Budget Estimate, Rs. 16,263.	Budget Estimate, Rs. 5,908.	Budget Estimate, Rs. 10,042.	Budget Estimate, Rs. 1,740.	Budget Estimate, Rs. 31,884.	Budget Estimate, Rs. 2,936.	Budget Estimate, Rs. 59,499.
1899.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
April	4,341 14 7	3,185 8 5	210 4 6	1,265 8 4	469 0 11	174 9 3	179 6 0	2,399 6 0	266 4 0	4,496 15 3
May	4,270 4 10	3,947 15 9	227 14 6	1,275 8 2	502 3 7	191 5 8	122 14 0	2,967 13 11	266 12 0	3,660 13 7
June	3,634 14 7	4,210 1 5	256 1 3	1,315 9 7	645 10 9	145 10 4	141 14 3	2,100 12 3	356 0 0	5,309 2 9
July	4,010 12 10	4,212 9 4	189 6 6	1,184 9 3	510 11 7	255 12 9	127 13 3	2,448 6 3	205 4 0	7,142 5 7
August	4,880 11 8	4,412 1 5	160 6 6	1,191 15 9	796 1 9	265 6 3	119 13 6	2,465 15 3	207 10 0	4,665 2 6
September	4,015 12 10	10,749 6 3	152 2 6	1,227 13 6	624 2 5	216 1 10	118 15 9	2,289 0 6	276 0 0	2,514 10 6
October	6,116 2 6	16,008 0 11	140 13 3	1,227 3 2	352 5 11	238 2 10	120 8 0	2,337 4 6	253 15 6	2,206 2 1
November	7,028 12 7	16,128 15 6	207 1 3	1,268 4 8	443 3 3	180 8 3	182 7 9	2,351 5 3	251 0 0	2,136 8 6
December	5,225 10 0	5,416 13 4	246 3 6	1,379 15 1	358 14 6	316 12 0	120 1 3	2,846 8 3	251 8 0	745 0 9
Total	43,525 0 5	68,271 8 4	1,770 5 9	11,336 7 6	4,702 6 8	1,984 5 2	1,233 13 9	22,206 8 2	2,334 5 6	32,876 13 6

Month.	No. 11. Audit.	No. 12. Conservancy.	No. 13. Transport.	No. 14. Communications and Telegrams.	No. 15. Refunds.	No. 16. Miscellaneous.	No. 17. Military Charges.	Advances Recoverable.	Total Budget Estimate for 1899–1900.
	Budget Estimate, Rs. 7,250.	Budget Estimate, Rs. 4,024.	Budget Estimate, Rs. 10,614.	Budget Estimate, Rs. 14,165.	Budget Estimate, Rs. 15,000.	Budget Estimate, Rs. 10,250.	Budget Estimate, Rs. 21,000.	Budget Estimate. —	Rs. 3,93,929.
1899.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.		Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
April	504 14 11	250 6 7	1,593 14 0	597 0 0	781 6 3	238 12 8		..	20,955 3 8
May	576 14 11	279 0 3	1,221 6 6	567 4 0	2,050 15 6	951 7 0	..	..	23,080 10 2
June	1,092 14 11	286 0 6	1,166 4 0	97 4 0	889 15 2	204 1 0	..	..	20,852 4 9
July	..	276 12 3	2,420 15 1	3 0 0	1,376 11 2	1,096 7 6	..	..	25,461 9 4
August	1,005 14 0	324 10 3	699 10 9	3,110 12 0	1,404 8 4	891 11 0	..	..	25,602 6 11
September	..	310 11 5	1,303 9 4	386 4 0	1,412 15 1	763 11 5	..	..	26,341 5 4
October	..	328 14 3	437 7 3	3,613 12 0	1,855 3 7	338 14 11	..	5,509 0 0	41,083 14 8
November	..	340 5 6	1,184 12 6	2,004 8 0	1,494 1 3	1,536 12 0	..	392 12 8	37,131 6 11
December	2,250 0 0	321 9 3	722 3 8	750 0 0	1,473 15 4	40 9 1	..	4 12 8	22,470 8 8
Total	5,430 10 9	2,718 6 3	9,750 3 1	11,129 12 0	12,739 11 8	6,062 6 7	..	5,806 9 4	2,43,979 6 5

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER,
Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Somali Coast Protectorate.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 28.)

(No. 87.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 26, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Bordeaux, reporting the return to Dakar of eighty-two Senegalese soldiers, who formed the body-guard of M. Leontieff on his recent expedition in Abyssinia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Consul Hearn to Sir E. Monson.

(No. 2.)

Sir, *Bordeaux, February* 24, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that eighty-two Senegalese soldiers left Bordeaux yesterday in the steam-ship "Brésil" for Dakar. These men appear to have formed the body-guard of M. Leontieff in his recent expedition to Abyssinia, and are now returning to their native country.

They were commanded by Lieutenant Sebillon, an officer of the French cavalry reserve, who, in an interview with a journalist, gave the following information about his expedition. He arrived at Jibuti in January 1898, and trained his men till Leontieff joined them in November of the same year. They were augmented by a contingent of the troops of the Negus, and the object of the expedition was to reach the country lying between the second and fourth degrees of north latitude, which is watered by the River Omo and Lake Rudolph. This country, which is of extraordinary fertility and where coffee, tobacco, millet, &c., are grown in abundance, and which is also rich in coal, is claimed both by England and the Negus, the former claiming to the fourth degree and the latter to the second. This expedition, which lasted fifteen months, has settled the question, and the Abyssinian flag now floats on the banks of the Omo and of Lake Rudolph; twenty Sengalese soldiers remain there to guard it. They did not see a sign of the English, except in one village, where they saw some cases with English marks on them.

They fought several times with the natives, who are absolute savages. Two of their soldiers were killed with arrows, and one died of disease.

However, when the natives saw that Leontieff came as a peacemaker and not as an enemy, they were soon subdued. This accomplished, the expedition returned to Addis Abbaba, the capital of the Negus, where great fêtes were given in their honour.

"I believe I am right in saying," continued M. Sebillon, "that after a month's rest M. Leontieff will reorganize his Mission for a new expedition to the equatorial regions, and that I shall be sent to recruit the Senegalese and Soudanese for the escort. Nearly all my men have already expressed a wish to return to Abyssinia."

I have, &c.

(Signed) WALTER R. HEARN.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 25.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 3, 1900.

THE Marquess of Salisbury has had under his consideration your despatch No. 93 of the 27th November, 1899, regarding the medical staff of the Somaliland Protectorate.

His Lordship approves your proposal to engage the services of one Assistant Surgeon and three Hospital Assistants on the terms proposed by the Government of India, namely, for the Assistant Surgeon, 200 rupees a-month for the first seven years, 300 rupees during the next seven, and 400 rupees after fourteen years' service; and for the Hospital Assistants, 50 rupees, 70 rupees, and 110 rupees a-month each, while in the 3rd, 2nd, and 1st classes respectively.

On hearing that Surgeon Raymond is prepared to accept service in the Protectorate, an application will be made by this Department to the India Office for the transfer of that officer.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 35.)

My Lord, *Cairo, February 20, 1900.*

I HAD hoped to be able to submit to your Lordship a separate Report on the Soudan, prepared by Sir Reginald Wingate, who has succeeded to the post of Governor-General recently vacated by Lord Kitchener. I regret to say that this has been found impossible.

Sir Reginald Wingate's hands are at present so full of other work that I felt I could not reasonably ask him to spare the time requuisite for the preparation of an elaborate Report. I arranged, therefore, on Sir Reginald Wingate's departure from Cairo towards the end of January, that he should leave with me a mass of material which he had collected with a view to framing a Report. By the help of this material, I will endeavour to give some account of the existing state of affairs in the Soudan. It will, however, be remembered that one of the leading features of the new régime is that, although some general supervision over Soudanese affairs is exercised from Cairo, the administration is so far decentralized as to allow the main work of government to be carried on from Khartoum.

Under these circumstances, I must claim your Lordship's indulgence for any omissions or imperfections in this Report. It cannot be characterized by that intimate local knowledge of Soudanese affairs, which would, without doubt, have been its most prominent feature had it been the work of the present Governor-General or his predecessor.

General Situation.

The territorial situation may be briefly described as follows:—

The frontier between the Soudan and the Italian Colony of Erythræa has now been delimitated from Ras Kasar, on the Red Sea, to Sabderat, a few miles east of Kassala.

Negotiations are proceeding which will, without doubt, result before long in the delimitation of the small remaining portion of the Italian frontier from Sabderat up to the point where it strikes Abyssinian territory.

The most friendly relations exist between the British and Abyssinian Governments.

The general basis of a frontier arrangement in respect to the country lying west of the Blue Nile has already been settled with the Emperor Menelek. When the survey party, now being employed, has finished its work, it may confidently be expected that the detailed delimitation will be carried out without much difficulty.

I have already stated in my Egyptian Report that an endeavour is being made to cut through the sudd which obstructs the White Nile, and thus open up communication with Uganda. To a certain extent this communication may be said to be already established for a mixed party, consisting of British, French, and Belgian officers, with their followers, arriving from the South, recently succeeded in getting through and joining the Egyptian party, under Major Peake, which was engaged in cutting the sudd.

Turning to the provinces which lie west of the Nile, it is to be observed that, on the 17th December, El-Obeid was occupied by an Egyptian force under Colonel Mahon. The town was found to be deserted and in ruins, but the supply of water was reported to be abundant. Further, a large quantity of building materials exist in the town. The reoccupation of Kordofan is said to have given great satisfaction to the natives.

The Province of Darfour is at present governed by Sheikh Ali Dinar, grandson of the late Sultan Hussein, whose relations with the Government of the Soudan are of the most friendly character.

I proceed to describe briefly the present condition of the inhabitants of Kordofan, and of the desert tribes of the Soudan.

From the moment of the Khalifa's crushing defeat at Omdurman, the desert and Kordofan tribes, with the exception of a certain number of Baggaras who still adhered to the cause of their Chief, threw in their lot with the Government. Most of these tribes, however, rendered but little active assistance to the Government in the subsequent operations against the Khalifa.

Omdurman and the Ghezireh* were found to be full of Arabs belonging to the Kordofan and far western tribes, who had been brought from their homes by the Khalifa. They were without any regular means of subsistence, but, in the existing state of insecurity, it was for the time being impossible for them to return to their own districts.

The number of these waifs and strays was constantly increased by the arrival of deserters, mostly Baggaras, from the Khalifa's army. Although the Arabs, whose grazing-grounds lay sufficiently far to the north to be safe, gradually returned to their homes, the inhabitants of the districts which were raided by the Dervishes were obliged to take refuge in the Ghezireh, with the result that the situation remained practically unchanged until the Khalifa's overthrow and death. Since then the main objects of the Government have been to send back to their homes the inhabitants of the gum producing region, and to get rid of the useless mouths from the Ghezireh. In respect to the first point, some success has attended their efforts, but many thousands of Arabs belonging to tribes whose homes are in Kordofan and Darfour, still remain in the Ghezireh; neither is it likely that this situation will undergo any material change until the road to Bara and El-Obeid is thoroughly opened up and the water supply improved.

The attitude of the Nubas and of other tribes in Central and Southern Kordofan has, since the battle of Omdurman, been perfectly satisfactory. Beyond annoying the Dervishes with petty raids, they were, however, unable to do anything to help the Government during the Khalifa's lifetime. Since his death, they have sent deputations to the Government, and expressed their willingness to obey its commands.

One of the most serious difficulties which the Government has had to encounter is due to the fact that a large number of fire-arms were, and to a certain extent still are, in the possession of the Arabs. Some of these arms were issued by the Government to be used as a means of defence against the Dervishes. Others were procured from the Dervishes themselves. Since the overthrow of the Khalifa, they have been used for purposes of inter-tribal raiding. The first step taken was to call in all the fire-arms. A large number were recovered from the Bayuda tribes and the riverain population south of Berber. In these districts, and, in fact, in all those parts of the country which have as yet in any degree fallen under the direct administration of the Government, raiding may be said to have practically ceased; but the more remote districts, the population of which still retain their arms, are still in a more or less unsettled condition.

Some long time must certainly elapse before prosperity returns to the tribes in the Soudan. The population has wasted away under Dervish rule. A recent Report says: "The important Kabbabish and Shukurieh tribes, who have suffered most, are now mere shadows of what they once were. . . . The Baggaras have suffered almost as much. Instead of being possessors of large herds of cattle, many of them, including several of their chief men, are now picking up a precarious existence in the Ghezireh or in Gedaref, working for hire or trying their hands at unfamiliar occupations. Some few, it is true, have accepted the situation, and made some progress with their cultivation, but the bulk of them are both lazy and unskilful, and prefer living on roots and berries to settling down to regular agriculture."

Financial Control.

The main lines of the administration under which the Soudan is now governed were laid down in the Agreement signed on the 19th January, 1899, between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of His Highness the Khedive. The purely administrative portion of that Agreement was based on a recognition of the evils which are likely to ensue from a system of over-centralization. Large powers were conferred on the Governor-General of the Soudan. In practice, it was intended that those

* Literally, the island. In this case the name is given to the tract of country lying south of Khartoum, between the White and Blue Niles.

powers should be exercised after consultation with the proper authorities, whether British or Egyptian, in London and Cairo, as circumstances might demand.

The important question of financial control was treated outside the Agreement. As it is probable that, for many years to come, the Soudan will constitute a charge on the Egyptian Treasury, it is manifest that some degree of control must be exercised by the Egyptian Financial Department over the conduct of Soudanese finance. The main object which it has been sought to attain is to institute a system calculated to afford an adequate guarantee to the Financial Department against the creation of a state of affairs which might cause serious embarrassment to the Egyptian Treasury, whilst it would, at the same time, admit of such a degree of latitude being left to the Governor-General of the Soudan as to obviate any risk that the financial control exercised from Cairo should involve unnecessary interference in matters of local detail.

This matter formed the subject of discussion between Lord Kitchener, Mr. Gorst, and myself at Omdurman in January 1899, with the result that some simple Regulations were framed, and were subsequently approved by the Egyptian Council of Ministers. The main features of these Regulations are that the Soudan Budget shall be annually submitted to and approved by the Council of Ministers; that the Governor-General of the Soudan and his Financial Secretary are made responsible that the total amount granted from Egyptian revenues for the Soudan is not exceeded in any one year; that any special or unforeseen expenditure must be defrayed by special grants, which must be sanctioned by the Egyptian Council of Ministers; that the Ministry of Finance has at all times the right of supervision, audit, or inspection of the whole of the financial arrangements of the Soudan; but that—and this is a very important provision—the Governor-General of the Soudan can, on his own authority, and without reference to Cairo, transfer credits from one head of account to another, provided that his total expenditure does not exceed the aggregate sum made up by the addition of the Soudan revenues to the Egyptian grant, as fixed by the Budget.

It is as yet too early to form an opinion of the practical working of this system.

Finance.

The revenue Estimates for the year 1899 were as follows:—

	£ E.
From the Moudiriehs*	38,500
Post Office	5,000
Telegraphs	3,000
Railways	5,000
Total	51,500

The Estimates of expenditure were as follows:—

	£ E.
Administration	123,000
Public buildings	5,000
Post Office	3,000
Telegraphs	4,500
Railways	50,000
Total	185,500

It will be seen, therefore, that the estimated expenditure (£ E. 185,500) was less than the estimated revenue (£ E. 51,500) by £ E. 134,000. Provision to meet this deficit was made in the Egyptian Budget.

These Estimates only include ordinary Civil expenditure. In addition to this, the Egyptian Treasury had to meet a military charge on account of the Soudan amounting to £ E. 281,000, thus bringing the estimate of the total Soudan charge up to £ E. 415,000. Further, a certain amount of extraordinary expenditure was incurred. To this I will presently allude. In the first instance, however, I propose to compare the actuals and estimates of the ordinary account.

In view of the fact that, when the Estimates for 1899 were framed, but little trustworty information was available to guide the authorities of the Soudan, it can be no matter for surprise that their anticipations were not in all cases realized. It is, however, satisfactory to note that they erred on the pessimist rather than on the optimist side.

* Under this head is included taxation of every kind, the principal item being the land tax.

The revenue for 1899 was approximately as follows :—

	£ E.
From the Moudiriehs	78,000
Post Office	6,500
Telegraphs	3,500
Railways	31,000
Registration of trade at Wady Halfa	5,500
Total	124,500

It will be seen, therefore, that the receipts "from the Moudiriehs," *i.e.*, from taxation of various kinds, were £E. 39,500 in excess of the estimate. The Post Office, Telegraphs, and Railways yielded collectively £E. 28,000 more than the estimate.

A trade-registration fee was levied during the past year at Wady Halfa. It yielded a revenue of £E. 5,500, of which, however, I understand that £E. 1,500 was collected in 1898. On the other hand, it hampered trade. I am glad to learn that it has now been abolished.

The civil expenditure in 1899 was approximately as follows :—

	£ E.
Administration	97,000
Public buildings	5,000
Purchase of grain for relief of destitute people, and supplies	8,000
Post Office	8,500
Telegraphs	10,000
Railways	100,000
Total	228,500

It will be seen that the expenditure on administration was £E. 26,000 less than the estimate. The charge of £E. 8,000 for the purchase of grain was exceptional. It was due to the high price of grain, and to the presence of a large number of destitute people in Omdurman and the neighbourhood. The Post Office and Telegraph expenditure was £E. 11,000 in excess of the estimate. There is no reason to regret this expenditure. "The government of the country," as Mr. Harman, the Financial Secretary of the Government of the Soudan, says in a recent Report, "is practically conducted by the telegraph wire." The estimate of £E. 50,000 for railway expenditure was a mere conjecture. The actual expenditure on maintenance, &c., came to £E. 100,000.

Taking revenue and expenditure together, the deficit was £E. 104,000, instead of £E. 134,000, a difference of £E. 30,000.

This result is satisfactory. Unfortunately, these figures do not state the whole case. I give the estimates and actuals of the extraordinary expenditure, for which, at the commencement of the year, special grants were made outside the Budget :—

Heading.	Estimate.	Actuals.
	£ E.	£ E.
Reconstruction of Khartoum	20,000	27,500
Equipment of police, &c.	8,000	8,000
Telegraph construction	9,000	13,500
Completion of Soudan Railway, including Atbara Bridge	300,000	340,000
Total	337,000	389,000

The actuals, therefore, were £E. 52,000 in excess of the estimates, chiefly by reason of the extra sums which had to be spent on railway construction.

Taking the ordinary and extraordinary account together, the net result is £E. 22,000 worse than the estimate. This sum will, for the time being, be considered a debt due by the Government of the Soudan to the Egyptian Government.

Turning to the Estimates for 1900, it is perhaps unnecessary that I should give the detail. The following statement will suffice :—

	£ E.
Revenue	158,000
Expenditure	292,000
Deficit to be charged to the Egyptian Government	134,400

In addition to this, an extraordinary grant of £ E. 15,000 has been made for the construction of bridges south of the Atbara.

The total charge on the Egyptian Treasury during the current year will be :—

	£ E.
Civil deficit	134,000
Special grant (charged to the special reserve fund)	15,000
Military charge	281,000
Total	430,000

Mr. Harman concludes his Report for the past year in the following words :—

"The conclusion at which I venture to arrive is that, while certain further capital outlay on the Soudan may be desirable, or indeed necessary, the expenses of government, apart from the Railway, will, at no distant date, be covered by the revenue.* The deficit is not so large as it appears, as the Customs receipts taken at Port Saïd and Alexandria on foreign goods going into and from the Soudan are at present retained by the Egyptian Government. This item will grow as population and trade increases."

Land and Date Taxes.

The fiscal legislation of the Soudan has been based on the unquestionably sound principle that, in the assessment and collection of the taxes, no innovation, based on Western ideas, should be introduced unless its introduction were altogether unavoidable. The main fault of Oriental fiscal administration has generally been, not so much that the principles on which the taxation is based are unsound, as that the method of applying them has been very defective. On going through the list of the taxes which were collected under the Khalifa's rule, it was found that, although the manner in which they had been levied was cruel and extortionate to the last degree, they were based on principles which are generally recognized in all Moslem countries. No radical change of system was, therefore, necessary. Broadly speaking, all that was required was that the rates of taxation should in each case be fixed by law; that the taxes should be moderate in amount, and that every care should be taken that no demands were made on the taxpayers save those which the law allowed.

I proceed to explain in what manner effect has been given to these principles.

An Ordinance published in the "Soudan Gazette" of the 27th May, 1899, lays down the rates at which the land and date taxes are to be assessed. Land is divided into four different categories, namely, island land, irrigated by means of Sakias or Shadoofs; land on the mainland, similarly irrigated; fore-shore land, irrigated by the flood; and land irrigated from wells. The rates vary from a maximum of P. T. 60 (12*s.*) to a minimum of P. T. 20 (4*s.*) per acre. The date tax is fixed at a maximum of P. T. 2 (5*d.*) per tree. As a matter of fact the Ordinance has, up to the present time, only been applied fully in the Province of Dongola. In a portion of the Berber Province half-tax has been collected. In the other districts the Ordinance has not yet been brought into operation. As regards the date tax, no rate higher than P. T. $1\frac{1}{2}$ has been collected.

With every desire to avoid the premature introduction of Western methods of administration into the Soudan, it is practically impossible to devise any proper system for the recovery of taxes without having recourse to the principles on which European procedure in such matters is based. The Dervish system consisted in practice in taking as much as the taxpayers could pay. On the other hand, if the land yielded no crop, the tax collector recognized the futility of making any demands on the cultivator.† The experience of other countries has shown that the elasticity thus obtained goes a long way to mitigate the rigour even of the worst fiscal systems.

The European administrator, who has to look to financial equilibrium, naturally desires to introduce a system which will enable him to know, with tolerable accuracy, the amount of revenue on which he can count, not only for a single year, but for a series of years. It is comparatively easy for him to rectify the main defect of the Oriental

* Mr. Harman is, of course, here only speaking of the Civil expenses.

† The execution of a system under which the tax is in reality made proportionate to the crop of the year is, of course, in some degree facilitated by the practice, common in all Moslem countries, of taking payment in kind. It has been found necessary to continue this practice in some parts of the Soudan. But it is one which leads to numerous abuses, and it will be desirable to abolish it as soon as possible. It was abolished in Egypt some twenty years ago.

system. He can substitute a fixed and moderate demand for one which was capricious and generally exorbitant. It is far less easy to obviate the rigidity which is, in some degree, an almost unavoidable accompaniment of the change of system. Notably, it is impossible to dispense altogether with the system of legal expropriation in cases of default, albeit this practice is wholly foreign to the ideas of a backward Oriental population. Something, however, may be done to temper the comparative rigidity of the European modes of procedure. Thus, in Egypt, although for many years past expropriation has been legalized, the best part of the Oriental fiscal system has been preserved. It has never been the practice to impose a fixed rate on land, and to exact the amount of the taxes in good and bad years alike. In my Egyptian Report I have dwelt on the concessions made, especially during the current year, to the holders of Sharaki or unirrigated land. In the Soudan an attempt has been made to carry this principle somewhat further. It is laid down that, when a summons is taken out against any man for non-payment of the land tax, the Magistrate, if "he is satisfied that the crop upon the land has failed through no fault of the owner or cultivator, and that the tax cannot be paid without depriving the owner of the means of earning his living as an agriculturist," may adjourn the summons and report the case to the Governor-General. The latter can then, if he thinks fit, remit the tax.

The clothing of the owner and that of his wife and children, the tools of an artisan, or the implements of a cultivator, and cattle ordinarily employed in agriculture, are exempted from seizure. Further, the process for the recovery of taxes, though it may perhaps be criticised on the ground of being too elaborate, is manifestly devised with the express object of obviating a resort to expropriation, save in cases of absolute necessity.

Of course, a great deal depends on how a system of this sort is worked in practice. Amongst a population such as the Soudanese, who live under different economic conditions to the fellaheen, and who are far less industrious than these latter, too much indulgence is apt to do almost as much harm as too much rigour. So far as I have been able to form an opinion, the system has so far been worked with judgment. Nevertheless, it must still be considered as on its trial.

Ownership of Land.

One of the most important and also the most difficult questions with which the Government of the Soudan has to deal is that of deciding to whom the land belongs. Mr. Brunyate, one of the Law Officers of the Egyptian Government, went to the Soudan early last year with a view to assisting Lord Kitchener in the settlement of this question. Subsequently, two Ordinances were published in the "Soudan Gazette."

The first of these deals with urban property in the towns of Khartoum, Berber, and Dongola. Under this Ordinance Commissions were appointed to settle claims to lands situated in these towns. Further, Khartoum especially being at the time of the reoccupation a mere heap of ruins, provision was made for rebuilding under suitable conditions. I am informed that the hearing of the claims has now been well-nigh completed.

Relatively speaking, the treatment of urban property presented few difficulties. The question of the ownership of rural property was found to be far more intricate and difficult of solution. On this subject Mr. Brunyate writes as follows:—

"The political changes which the country had undergone had produced a very general displacement of the owners of rural property. In, perhaps, the majority of cases, transfers had occurred within the family or tribe to which the land originally belonged, in return for support given to the Mahdist Government; where strangers had been introduced, they had for the most part disappeared on the downfall of the Government which had introduced them. Of the actual occupants of land, many based their title on the gift of the Mahdi or the Khalifa alone; others were able to produce decisions, for what they were worth, of the *de facto* Cadi's Court. After the reoccupation of the country again, there was undoubtedly a considerable influx of persons who quietly returned and took possession of the land, as the representatives of the former owners. Finally, claims were made by persons not in possession (nor, in many cases, in the country), in virtue of title-deeds, the vagueness and comprehensiveness of which disclosed a very unsatisfactory condition of the land registers in the years immediately preceding the rebellion. It was recognized that, if the title to any plot of land was to be left to be fought out in the Law Courts, when established,

according to the ordinary legal rules, the settlement of land questions would be indefinitely postponed. At the same time, the unravelling of the transactions which had occurred during the fifteen years of the rebellion, most of the parties to which were dead, was a task obviously beyond the power of ordinary legal procedure.

"The Title Lands Ordinance accordingly provides for the appointment of Commissions, district by district, which shall determine all questions as to the ownership of land.

"The Ordinance provides, as a fundamental principle, that five years' continuous possession at the date of claim shall confer an absolute title as against all persons. As the Government's only desire is to have as many persons as possible settled on the land with an undisputed title; the Ordinance further provides that possession since the re-establishment of the Civil authority shall, in default of any claimant with a superior title creates a *primâ facie* title; the title of persons so in possession would only be resisted by the Government where the land was required for public purposes or in similar cases.

"At the same time, power is reserved to any person to prove his title in the ordinary way before the Commission. As it may consequently happen that an absolute possessory title may be shown by the present occupant, whilst the representative of the former owner succeeds in proving his title in the ordinary way, it is provided that the latter shall, in such cases, be given an equivalent piece of land elsewhere. Such a course will prevent any general disturbance of the present occupants, and recognizes the fact that at present the value of land is principally due to those who have, during the last few years, kept it from going out of cultivation.

"The Ordinance comprises further provisions for the protection of minors and of absent owners.

"Up to the present, the many calls upon the small number of officers in Civil employment have prevented the appointment of the Commissions, but it is intended very shortly to make a commencement.

"The information collected by the Commissions ought to form a good basis for a system of land transfer, and accordingly the Ordinance makes provision for the establishment of such a system."

In some respects, the unavoidable delay which must occur in dealing with this matter is to be regretted. There are large tracks of land in the Soudan which are probably capable of cultivation if a considerable capital were expended on their improvement. It is obvious that the acquisition of a valid title is an essential preliminary, without which no capital outlay can, or would, be incurred. The other side of the question is that mere land speculation—by which I mean the purchase of large tracts at an almost nominal price now, with a view to subsequent sale at some remote time when the value of the land has increased—will do no real good to the country, and is, therefore, to be discouraged. A *sine quâ non* condition of any sale to capitalists would have to be that, within a reasonable time, certain improvements should be made with a view to bringing the land under cultivation. Even if the difficulty as regards ownership were removed, it is somewhat doubtful whether, considering the want of population, which will probably for a long while stand in the way of Soudanese progress, it would be possible to comply with conditions of this nature. Under these circumstances, the delay in settling questions of ownership on a large scale will perhaps be found to produce inconvenience of a less serious nature than might at first sight be supposed.

I may mention that, in order to prevent land speculation, the Ordinance renders all cultivable land, whether cultivated or not, liable to taxation. If the Government avails itself of this provision, it is not probable that any speculation on a large scale will take place.

Gum, Ostrich Feathers, &c.

An Ordinance promulgated in May 1899 provides that a royalty of 20 per cent., according to a scale of prices fixed from time to time, shall be paid, in cash or in kind, on gum, ostrich feathers, and ivory, coming from the provinces south of Khartoum. Further experience is required before any opinion can be formed as to the practical working of this measure.

In the meanwhile I may remark that the gum trade would appear to be capable of considerable development. Indeed, as I have already mentioned in my Egyptian Report, the exports of gum have already increasedl argely, the figures being over £ E. 30,000 for

1899, as compared to about £ E. 7,000 in 1898. I have been collecting some information on this subject, which I propose shortly to communicate to the Governor-General of the Soudan for his consideration. I understand that, since the Soudan was closed to trade some fifteen years ago, most of the gum used in Europe has been brought from India, and that since the reoccupation of the Soudan there has been a fall of about 40 per cent. in the price of Indian gum. The point which manifestly requires consideration is to regulate the royalty and railway tariff in such a manner as to enable gum to be laid down in London and Liverpool at a price which will command a market.

Herd Tax.

A herd tax ("Zakat") is a feature common to the fiscal systems of most Moslem countries. Until a few years ago it was levied in Egypt and yielded a considerable revenue. It gave rise to numerous abuses, which it was difficult to check, inasmuch as the duty of counting the flocks, with a view to the assessment of the tax, necessarily devolved on a number of subordinate agents. Here, as elsewhere, a marked contrast existed between the elaborate provisions made by the law giver with a view to preventing abuse, and the arbitrary and often illicit practices of the tax gatherer. When the era of reform set in, it was one of the first taxes to be abolished. I trust that it will not be found necessary to incorporate this tax permanently into the fiscal system of the Soudan. Otherwise, in spite of every care, a considerable risk will be run that the abuses which prevailed in Egypt will be reproduced in the Soudan. Nevertheless, as the tax was levied by the Dervishes, and has probably existed for a sufficiently long time for the people of the Soudan to become accustomed to it, I concur in the view that its immediate abolition would be premature. An Ordinance has, therefore, been issued, legalizing the levy of the tax at rates which are in conformity with Moslem practice.

Provision is made for necessary exemptions, as, for instance, in the case of oxen ordinarily employed in agriculture. These, and some others, will not be liable to the payment of the tax.

Sale of Alcoholic Liquors.

The important question of the sale of alcoholic liquors has been treated in an Ordinance which was promulgated in May 1899. The main provisions of this Ordinance are as follows :

No one may import, trade in, or sell wine, spirits, or other alcholic liquors without a licence, the cost of which, for one year, is £ E. 50. "The holders of licences," it is laid down, "shall conform to Regulations to be issued as to the conduct of their business, under penalty of revocation of the licence, and of any other penalties which may be specified in the Regulations. The number of licences allowed in each town or district has been fixed by Regualtion."

Merissa (native palm wine) is exempted from the operation of the Ordinance.

The practical working of the system thus inaugurated will manifestly require to be carefully watched.

Minor Fiscal Legislation.

Under an Ordinance published in the "Soudan Gazette" of the 31st July, 1899, power was conferred on the Governor-General to levy a house tax, at the rate of one-twelfth of the annual rental value, in such towns as he might from time to time indicate by public notification. Houses, the rental value of which does not exceed £ E. 5, are exempted from taxation. It will be advisable to exercise great caution in bringing this Ordinance into operation. It has so far only been applied to two towns, viz., Suakin and Tewfikieh, which is situated close to Wady Halfa.

Two other Ordinances, also issued last July, provide that public ferries shall be let by auction, that an annual boat tax, at the rate of P. T. 2 of the boat's carrying capacity, shall be levied; and that auctioneers and pedlars shall take out annual licences, the former on payment of from £ E. 1 to £ E. 2, the latter on payment of P. T. 75. I am informed that the tax on pedlars cannot be regarded wholly as a fiscal measure, inasmuch as these individuals are very frequently mischievous characters, over whose actions and movements it is desirable to exercise some control. Experience

will, without doubt, show what modifications, if any, it will be advisable to introduce into these Ordinances.

As regards fiscal legislation generally, I think it may be said with confidence that the principles on which the assessment and mode of recovery of the land tax have been regulated are sound, and, moreover, that they are adapted to the special conditions of Soudanese society. This is the main point to be borne in mind, for not only is the land tax the principal resource of the country, but it is also to be observed that mistakes in its assessment are more likely to be productive of harm, and are more difficult of rectification, than is the case in dealing with other branches of the fiscal system.

The other measures, to which I have alluded in this Report, can only be regarded as tentative and experimental. Their operation will have to be carefully watched, partly—as in the case of the royalty on gum, &c.—with a view to ascertaining their effect on trade, and partly—as in the case of the herd tax and some others—in order to check the abuses to which they are liable, and to enable an accurate opinion to be formed as to whether they yield a sufficient revenue to be worth the cost and trouble of collection.

Currency.

There has been a great scarcity of small change in the Soudan. Until quite recently, 8 millièmes were given in exchange for a piastre at Omdurman.* A hundred pounds' worth of bronze, quarter and half-millièmes, was sent to the Soudan a short time ago. More will be sent if necessary.

Maria Theresa and Medjidieh dollars are still in use in some of the more remote districts, but they are gradually coming into the Government Treasury, and will not be reissued.

Mining Concessions.

An Ordinance of the Governor-General, laying down the conditions under which prospecting for metals, minerals, and precious stones will be permitted in the Soudan, was published in the "Soudan Gazette" of the 2nd January, 1900. It is based on the Mining Regulations in force in India. A Memorandum explanatory of the Ordinance has recently been issued. As the matter is of some public interest, I give below a summary of the main provisions of this Ordinance Those specially interested in the matter should, of course, refer to the full text of the Ordinance itself.

There are to be two descriptions of licences, viz., general licences and exclusive licences.

Articles 4 and 5 of the Ordinance lay down in detail the modes of application in each case. The most important of these is that the locality, in respect to which the application is made, should be clearly specified.

Licences of both descriptions will be granted for one year. They are not transferable.

The main difference between the two classes of licence is sufficiently indicated by their nomenclature. The one does, and the other does not, confer any exclusive rights. The exclusive licence will, of course, only be granted over a relatively small tract of country. If, upon the expiration of the first year, the licensee holding an exclusive licence shall prove to the satisfaction of the Governor-General that he has completed a reasonable amount of prospecting, and has in all respects complied with the Ordinance and the conditions of his licence, he will be entitled, upon payment of the prescribed fees, to receive a new licence in respect of any such part of the land comprised in his former licence as he may select, provided that the land so selected does not exceed one-half of the land comprised in the former licence, and lies in one block.

The Ordinance contemplates that the holder of an exclusive prospecting licence shall, by agreement with the Governor-General, be given the right, upon the expiration of his licence, to apply for and obtain the grant of a mining lease. The conditions under which mining leases will be granted are laid down in the Memorandum to which allusion has been already made.

Every prospecting licence, whether general or exclusive, confers and imposes on the licensee the following rights, privileges, conditions, and liabilities.

* A millième is the tenth part of a piastre: 1 piastre = $2\frac{1}{2}d$.

The licensee may remove and dispose of all metals, &c., subject to the payment of the prescribed royalty.

He must give notice to the Governor-General of any find which he may have made.

He must permit the Governor-General, or any public officer authorized by the Governor-General, at all reasonable times to inspect any work which may have been executed, or is in progress, under the licence.

Every prospecting licence will be liable to be summarily revoked upon breach by the licensee, his agents, servants, workmen, or labourers, of any of its conditions or of any of the provisions of the Ordinance.

The Courts of Justice established in the Soudan are the only Courts which have jurisdiction to determine any question or dispute between the Government and the licensee with reference to a prospecting licence.

Railways.

It had been hoped that the railway would have reached Halfaya, which lies at the junction of the Blue and White Niles, opposite Khartoum, in the course of last September. Some delay, however, ensued, partly owing to the fact that the Atbara bridge took rather longer to erect than had been anticipated, and partly by reason of the damage done to some parts of the line by heavy rains. The result was that the line was not open till the 30th December. Arrangements have been made for the construction of bridges and culverts which will henceforth prevent any interruption of the traffic being caused by rain.

In my last annual Report I mentioned the possibility and desirability of extending the line to Abu Haraz. This is probably the direction which railway extension will eventually take, but after full consideration it was thought desirable to postpone action for the present, and to devote whatever money is available to improving that portion of the line which has been already constructed. I fully concur in this decision.

Telegraphs.

Good progress has been made in the construction of telegraphs. About 1,000 miles of line were laid in the course of last year. Gedaref is now in telegraphic communica- with Kassala. The line has also been extended from Abu Haraz, on the Blue Nile, to Sennaar and Karkoj. On the White Nile, the southernmost station is at Goz Abu Goma. The line to El-Obeid is in course of construction.

Preservation of Game.

An Ordinance for the preservation of wild animals and birds in the Soudan has been prepared and promulgated. I do not attempt to summarize it, as it is of a somewhat elaborate nature. I must, therefore, refer those specially interested in the matter to the text of the Ordinance itself, merely observing that it has been framed on the general lines adopted in the Game Regulations now in force in Uganda and the East African Protectorate.

I venture to express a hope that great care will be taken to enforce the provisions of this Ordinance. Otherwise, it may safely be predicted that the continued existence of the numerous species of animals and birds with which the Soudan now abounds, will be seriously threatened.

In connection with this subject, I may also remark that the reoccupation of the Soudan would appear to open up a wide and almost virgin field for the researches of the naturalist. It is to be hoped that when other and more pressing matters are decided, the Government of the Soudan will be able to consider, possibly in conjunction with European scientific authorities, whether any steps can be taken to encourage research of this nature.

Arms Ordinance.

An Ordinance was promulgated last May, prohibiting the carrying of arms in the Soudan without a licence. The licence is issued for one year, and costs for a revolver, P. T. 25, and for every fire-arm other than a revolver, P. T. 50.

Justice.

Mr. Bonham-Carter, the Judicial Adviser to the Government of the Soudan, writes as follows :—

"Legally, the most important work of the past year has been the enactment and application of the Soudan Penal Code and the Soudan Code of Criminal Procedure. The former has provided the country with a system of criminal law at once simple, just, and well suited to the habits of the people.

"The latter established Criminal Courts, nnd regulates the procedure before them. Both were drafted by Mr. W. E. Brunyate, of the Contentieux de l'Etat.

"The Soudan Penal Code is an adaptation in a somewhat simplified form, of the Indian Penal Code, which had already been employed with success in the Zanzibar and East African Protectorates.

"The Soudan Code of Criminal Procedure is partially based on the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, but, having regard to the fact that the Magistrates are all military officers, the forms and methods of Egyptian military law, with which they are familiar, and which is itself an adaptation of English military law, have been, so far as is possible, retained. The system established is as follows :—

"All offences are ordinarily tried in the province in which they have been committed, the smaller offences before a single Magistrate, the graver crimes, after a preliminary inquiry by a single Magistrate, before a Court of three Magistrares, called a Moudir's Court or Minor District Court, presided over by the Moudir (Provincial Governor) or other high official, Except in unimportant cases, there is a right of appeal from the Judgment of a single Magistrate to the Moudir. Judgments of Minor District Courts and of Moudir's Courts require conffrmation, the former by the Moudir, and the latter by the Governor-General. The Governor-General possesses a general power of revision.

"A Civil Procedure Ordinance has also been prepared and will shortly be promulgated. It preserves the rights of individuals under local custom or religious law as regards all questions relating to personal status or religious foundations. All questions on these subjects, arising in actions between Mahommedans, will be tried by the local religious Courts according to Mahommedan law. An appointment of two Sheikhs with legal training to fill the important posts of Chief Cadis at Khartoum is about to be made."

Slavery.

In my last annual Report, I expressed the hope and belief that anti-slavery operations would, in the future, be greatly facilitated by the reconquest of the Soudan. I see no reason to alter this opinion. At the same time, it must be confessed that, in so far the traffic in slaves is concerned, the results obtained up to the present have been disappointing.

Captain McMurdo, the head of the Slavery Department in Cairo, wrote to me a short time ago : "Very recently, I have received private reports which assure me of the fact that the Slave Traffic has greatly increased in the Soudan, especially in the Kassala and Dongola Provinces."

Unquestionably, the difficulty of guarding all the routes and outlets over a tract so vast as the Soudan, is very great. At the same time, it has to be remembered that, although the battle of Omdurman took place early in September 1898, it was not until late in November 1899 that the Khalifa was finally overthrown. Now that the country is practically tranquillized, and military operations in the field have ceased, I am hopeful that the Governor-General will be able to take this matter vigorously in hand, and check the traffic to which Captain McMurdo has drawn attention. In the meantime, I observe from a Return commmunicated by Colonel Maxwell, recently Governor of Omdurman, that no less than forty-seven individuals were brought to justice in the course of last year for kidnapping, buying, and selling slaves, &c., and were condemned to various terms of penal servitude or imprisonment.

If my forecast of last year was somewhat too optimist as regards the check which would be given to the Slave Trade, I think I may say that I erred to some extent on the side of pessimism in dealing with the very difficult and important question of the suppression of domestic slavery.

The Order which Lord Kitchener issued on this subject will be found in paragraph 8 of his "Memorandum to Mudirs" (Inclosure No. 1). They are, I venture to think,

eminently judicious. Without doubt some while must elapse before slavery entirely disappears from the Soudan, but passages occur in the reports of the British Mudirs (Inclosure No. 2), which clearly indicate that a distinct impression has already been made.

The progress in the direction of gradually getting rid of the institution of slavery is certainly greater than, having regard to the very great difficulties which beset this question, I anticipated when I wrote my Report for 1898.

Education.

Two primary schools, of the type commonly established by the Egyptian Government, exist at Wady Halfa and Suakin. With these exceptions, the only education at present obtainable in the Soudan in supplied by the Kuttabs (village schools), which in all Moslem countries are usually attached to the mosques. I have on former occasions frequently dwelt on the defects of these schools in Egypt. In the Soudan, those defects are, so far as I am able to judge, present in a very marked degree. The masters are ignorant; the teaching is almost exclusively confined to reading and reciting the Koran, without explanation or comment of any kind. The schools appear to be often in a very insanitary condition; measures are about to be taken with a view to their improvement.

In the first place, it is intended to start one or two Government Kuttabs in each of the large towns. In the second place, the best method for providing a proper system of inspection is under consideration. In the third place, it will, it is hoped, be possible to introduce a system of grants-in-aid to such schools as may be found to satisfy the requirements of the Inspectors.

For the rest, steps are being taken to establish a primary school at Omdurman. At a later period, similar schools will be opened in other towns; these schools will resemble the primary schools of the Egyptian Government. The normal age of the pupils will be from 10 to 15 years. The teaching will be in Arabic, and will consist chiefly of reading, writing, arithmetic, and the Arabic language. English will be taught in the higher classes.

The treatment of all the questions connected with the Gordon College was left entirely in Lord Kitchener's hands. Although I have at times had some general conversation with him on the subject, I am not acquainted with the details of the organization he proposed. For the purposes of any remarks contained in this Report, I am, of course, unable to consult him.

I may mention, however, that I am confirmed in the view, which I expressed last year, to the effect that the use of the word "college" somewhat conveys the idea that a more ambitious programme will be adopted than is for the present either possible or desirable.

For some while to come there will be no youths in the Soudan who will be capable of receiving what is generally termed a higher education. My personal opinion is that, for the present at all events, the funds of the college had better be devoted, in some form or another, to primary education. Higher education can come somewhat later.

Sir Reginald Wingate is at present considering the question, and will eventually lay his proposals before the Committee appointed to administer the Gordon College Fund.

The delay which has arisen in dealing with this question has been caused by the great amount of other work on the hands of the various authorities concerned, both in the Soudan and in Egypt. In the meanwhile, I am informed that the work of building the College is progressing.

Health of the Troops.

Major Penton, the Principal Medical Officer of the Egyptian army, has written a full Report, dated the 30th January, 1900, on the health of the army. The following passages deal with the main points of interest:—

"Vast improvements in sanitation have been effected in the town of Omdurman since its occupation by the Egyptian army. Its condition was at first such as to render it quite unfit for human habitation. The numerous cess-pits, stagnant pools of water, and other nuisances have been abolished, with the result that diseases directly attributable to filth have been greatly diminished, including dysentery and cerebro-

spinal fever, which has been entirely absent during the present winter, while in 1898 it spread as an epidemic, causing great mortality.

"There is a mild outbreak of small-pox now in Omdurman, introduced by Dervish refugees; but the epidemic is not very serious, and is kept under control.

"Sennaar is the only station on the Blue Nile where troops are quartered. Malarial fever, the curse of the Blue Nile, has not prevailed to the same extent as the previous year, nor have its effects been so lasting and severe. The dryness of the srason probably accounts in some measure for this. Egyptians are far more liable to attacks than Soudanese, who enjoy comparative immunity. This fever may be said to prevail, and is very virulent, south of latitude 14°. Sennaar is healthy only for a few months in the year.

"The health of the whole army is most satisfactory. The sick rate is 4·4 per cent., against 4·5 per cent. last year, and will probably be still less when the troops in the Soudan have been properly housed and suitable barracks are built. During and after the rainy season the Blue Nile district should be evacuated as far as possible, as Egyptians, and even Soudanese, cannot stand the climate.

"The total number of invalids from the service in 1899 was 570, against 1,435 in the previous year. The chief causes of invaliding were malarial fever, wounds, and eye diseases, especially ophthalmia."

A detachment of about 250 men of the Royal Irish Fusiliers arrived in Khartoum on the 28th January, 1899, and left on the 18th May. Colonel Fawcett, the Principal Medical Officer at Cairo, writes that "the health of the detachment was very good."

Another detachment, consisting of about 250 men of the Seaforth Highlanders, was sent to Khartoum early in December 1899. Of these, Colonel Fawcett wrote on the 10th February :—

"During December and January they had practically no sickness. In the past week two cases of enteric fever have occurred, and one has proved fatal.

"The drinking water has been obtained from the Blue Nile, and has been most carefully filtered."

General Administration.

I annex to this Report extracts* from a Memorandum which was issued early in 1899 by Lord Kitchener to the provincial authorities of the Soudan, and which contains instructions for their guidance. These instructions appear to be generally well adapted to the special circumstances under which the task of administering the Soudan has to be undertaken. They indicate with sufficient clearness the spirit in which it is intended that the work shall be conducted.

I need hardly say that much depends on the manner in which these instructions are carried out. I have before me a series of Reports addressed by the Mudirs of the various provinces to the Governor-General. They are too lengthy to reproduce textually. I omit a quantity of multifarious but important detail connected with the administration of schools, hospitals, prisons, &c. I have, however, thought that the best method of giving some accurate idea both of the general condition of the country and of the spirit in which its administration is being conducted, would be to give some extracts from the Reports, in order that the officers concerned may tell their own tale in their own language. These extracts are, therefore, annexed to this despatch (Inclosure No. 2).

I may say that the Reports leave the most favourable impression on my mind. It will be remembered that they are written by officers of the army who until quite recently have had but little or no experience in the work of Civil administration. It is, however, clear that they take the most lively interest in their Civil duties. Their Reports are straightforward, business-like documents, and seem to me characterized throughout by excellent common sense and by a keen appreciation of the facts with which they have to deal. I have no doubt whatever that, with encouragement and a very little guidance on some few matters of principle, these officers constitute the best possible agents for the administration of a country in the present condition of the Soudan. I deprecate any excessive amount of interference with their actions. I have already alluded to the undesirability of attempting to govern the Soudan from Cairo. The policy of decentralization admits, I venture to think, of being carried still further.

* The remainder of the Memorandum deals at some length with matters of administrative detail. It is important, but I have thought it unnecessary to reproduce it in this place.

Harm will be done if any attempt is made to regulate all the details of the administration from Khartoum. Within reasonable limits, a certain amount of latitude should be left to the Mudirs, notably as regards the extent to which it is just and expedient to press the collection of taxes.

Conclusion.

The main problem which had to be solved in the Soudan during the course of last year was how to start the machine of Government without making any serious mistakes, which it might be difficult to rectify hereafter. It is highly probable that some of the measures which have so far been adopted, and of which a brief description is given above, will require modification by the light of the increased experience which will now be gained of the conditions and requirements of the country, but I hope and believe that the administrative system which has been established is, in so far as its main lines are concerned, adapted to the special circumstances with which the British and Egyptian Governments have to deal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Memorandum to Mudirs.

THE absolute uprootal by the Dervishes of the old system of Government has afforded an opportunity for initiating a new Administration more in harmony with the requirements of the Soudan.

2. The necessary Laws and Regulations will be carefully considered and issued as required, but it is not mainly to the framing and publishing of laws that we must look for the improvement and the good government of the country.

3. The task before us all, and especially the Mudirs and Inspectors, is to acquire the confidence of the people, to develop their resources, and to raise them to a higher level. This can only be effected by the District Officers being thoroughly in touch with the better class of native, through whom we may hope gradually to influence the whole population. Mudirs and Inspectors should learn to know personally all the principal men of their district, and show them, by friendly dealings and the interest taken in their individual concerns, that our object is to increase their prosperity. Once it is thoroughly realized that our officers have at heart, not only the progress of the country generally, but also the prosperity of each individual with whom they come into contact, their exhortations to industry and improvement will gain redoubled force. Such exhortations, when issued in the shape of Proclamations or Circulars, effect little; it is to the individual action of British officers, working independently, but with a common purpose, on the individual natives whose confidence they have gained that we must look for the moral and industrial regeneration of the Soudan.

4 The people should be taught that the truth is always expected, and will be equally well received whether pleasant or the reverse. By listening to outspoken opinions, when respectfully expressed, and checking liars and flatterers, we may hope in time to effect some improvement in this respect in the country.

5. In the administration of justice in your province you should be very careful to see that legal forms, as laid down, are strictly adhered to, so that the appointed Courts may be thoroughly respected; and you should endeavour, by the careful inquiry given by your Courts to the cases brought before them, to inspire the people in the absolute confidence that real justice is being meted out to them. It is very important that the Government should do nothing which could be interpreted as a sign of weakness, and all insubordination must be promptly and severely suppressed. At the same time, a paternal spirit of correction for offences should be your aim in your relation with the people, and clemency should be shown in dealing with first offences, especially when such may be the result of ignorance, or are openly acknowledged. In the latter case, they should be more than half pardoned in order to induce truthfulness.

6. Be careful to see that religious feelings are not in any way interfered with, and that the Mahommedan religion is respected.

7. Mosques in the principal towns will be rebuilt, but private mosques, takias, zawiyas, sheikhs' tombs, &c., cannot be allowed to be re-established, as they generally formed centres of unorthodox fanaticism. Any request for permission on such subjects must be referred to the Central authority.

8. Slavery is not recognized in the Soudan, but as long as service is willingly rendered by servants to masters it is unnecessary to interfere in the conditions existing between them. Where, however, any individual is subjected to cruel treatment, and his or her liberty interfered with, the accused can be tried on such charges, which are offences against the law, and in serious cases of cruelty the severest sentences should be imposed. I leave it to your discretion to adopt the best methods of gradually eradicating the habit of depending upon the slave labour which has so long been part of the religious creed and customs of this country, and which it is impossible to remove at once without doing great violence to the feelings, and injuring the prosperity of the inhabitants. Without proclaiming any intention of abruptly doing away with all slave-holding, much can be done in the way of discouraging it, and teaching the people to get on without it. I have noticed good results in this respect in Dongola Province, where the inhabitants have to a certain extent realized they must depend on their own industry.

Inspectors.

You should divide your province into two approximately equal districts, and hold each Inspector responsible for the exact execution of all Orders and Regulations in the district allotted to them.

Duties of Inspectors.

The Inspector is the Mudir's Staff Officer in charge of the district to which he is appointed by the Mudir. He will be responsible for the execution and enforcement in his district of all Orders and Regulations that are issued for the administration of the province, and for the smartness and discipline of the police.

He will be careful to strictly carry out the law as laid down, and make the Court over which he presides respected, and to see that the Mamurs in his district give proper punishments according to their powers.

It will be one of his most important duties to supervise the operations of the police and to see that they thoroughly investigate all criminal cases, and are employed in such a manner as to insure the maintenance of public security.

He will not be a channel of communication between Mamurs and the Mudirieh, that is, Mamurs will forward direct to the Mudirieh all Reports and Returns called for. He will, therefore, have no office staff, but will make himself acquainted with the work of the Mamurs of his district either in the central office or while inspecting the Mamuriehs.

He will be most careful to see that there is no oppression nor illegal taxation in his district.

He will report to the Mudir any official who fails to set a good example in the district by leading a moral and respectable life, or who shows negligence or incapacity in the performance of his duties.

Mamurs.

Instructions for Mamurs are as under. In addition to the duties specified it should be noted that they are responsible for the proper measurement of the land in their Mamuriehs and its correct registration.

Instructions to Mamurs.

The new position you are about to take up is an important and responsible one.

You should always bear in mind that you are the recognized agent in your district of a just and merciful Government, and as such you should do all in your power to gain the confidence and respect of the inhabitants, who should, in their turn, be made to look to and respect the Government of which you are the Representative.

In order to acquire and hold this position, you should bear in mind the following points, which are essential to the good government of your district.

You should recollect that this country has just been relieved from most oppressive and tyrannical rulers, who have plundered and enslaved the population, and engendered in them feelings of moral and physical fear, which it may take long to eradicate; your object should, therefore, be to make the government of your district as great a contrast as possible to that of the Dervishes. Every effort should be made to induce the inhabitants to feel that an era of justice and kindly treatment has come, with, at the same time, a vigorous repression of crime, and a determination to put down with a strong hand any attempt of evil-doers to carry on the practices which, it is hoped, have disappeared with the flight of the Dervishes.

No doubt the local people will offer bribes, in order to try and secure the goodwill of their new rulers; these offers must be resolutely and absolutely refused, and the people made to understand that they can acquire no benefits by such means, but are more likely to be severely punished. In all their dealings with the Government they should be convinced of its unity of purpose and justice; nothing, therefore, should be taken from them without payment, in accordance with the fixed tariff, and every inducement should be given to them to bring their saleable articles and products to fixed market places, where it is most important the regulation price should be adhered to. You should also endeavour, by all means in your power, to encourage the inhabitants to increase the amount of cultivation in the district. It is especially necessary that the women should be in no way molested, and that the Mamur of the district should be not only an example of fairness and justice, but also of morality, by doing all in his power to improve the moral tone of the inhabitants in his charge, and by instilling into their minds that it is to him thry shonld turn for a redress of grievances, being fully convinced that he will act as is best for their interest and advantage consistently with justice.

Every effort should be made to repress crime, and Mamurs have the power of sending offenders to prison for one day; but when, in their opinion, offences are committed which deserve more severe punishment, they should refer the case to the nearest Commandant, who will either deal with it in accordance with the military powers delegated to him, or will refer it to higher authority. Should it be discovered that you or any of your employés have been the recipients of bakshish of any kind from the local people, you will be liable to be tried by court-martial, and dismissed the service.

In any case of difficulty or doubt, you should at onco refer to the nearest Military Commandant, under whose general direction and guidance you will act.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Extracts from Reports of the Mudirs in charge of Districts in the Soudan.

COLONEL MAXWELL, who was during last year in charge of the Khartoum Mudirieh, writes:

"The whole population suffer, without doubt, at present from want of money and of cattle, and from past oppression.

"The supply of slaves has become very limited; as the Arab population return to their lands they find difficulty in cultivating, and without doubt do their utmost to secure slaves. Little by little, however, these people are beginning to realize that if they do not work themselves, they will starve, and I have no doubt that, in the majority of cases, they are settling down to work; but the besetting sin of the Soudan is laziness.

"The people who live in the towns are those who engage most in the traffic of slaves, but they are now very frequently detected and brought to justice under the provisions of the Penal Code.

"There is no doubt that the riverain population suffered very much at the hands of the Khalifa and his Emirs; their cattle were seized, and such crops as they were allowed to raise were taken from them; but, on the whole, there is a great improvement

noticeable during the past twelve months; more Sakias are being built, more Shadoufs working. It is extremely unfortunate that the Nile succeeding our occupation should have proved the worst on record, and also that in places the crops have suffered severely from want of rain and from the depredations of locusts; it is, therefore, all the more satisfactory to notice any improvement under such circumstances.

"As regards the nomad Arabs, we have not been in a position to exercise very much influence over them, but their condition seems fairly satisfactory, and they themselves well disposed towards the Government. There has been, and will be, considerable difficulty in settling the vexed question of Sheikhships. Under the Dervish rule, the old system of hereditary Sheikhs was, for the most part, upset, and Taaishi Emirs were put over the various tribes; consequently there is considerable intrigue among the more influential tribesmen to become Sheikhs, and our difficulty is to get hold of the best man.

"In the latter part of 1898 and the early part of 1899, a certain amount of grain, and in some cases money, was given out on loan, principally to the Jaalin and riverain people; though some have failed to repay, I believe the majority will pay up when they can, but the low Nile has upset all their hopes.

"Whether they pay or not, I do not doubt that this effected a considerable amount of good.

"In some cases payment has been made by the Government to persons who have erected Sakias, in order that they might purchase cattle to work them.

"It will be some little time before thorough confidence is restored, and people will come forward and claim what they believe to be theirs; as a case in point, an Egyptian woman, the wife of a former employé, who had resided for the last fifteen years in Omdurman, only came forward last month and asked permission to dig up some treasure at Khartoum; she was given this permission, and came back with over £ E. 500 in sovereigns and gold ornaments.

"There are a few small native schools, started by the people themselves, where the children learn to read and write, and a smattering of the Koran.

"It is extremely desirable to start a respectable school as soon as possible. but I consider it better to start on a proper basis

"In my opinion, we want good primary schuols, which will prepare Soudanese boys to reap the benefits of a technical education at the Gordon College.

"I hope that, when the Mosque at Khartoum is built and ready for occupation, some broad-minded Mahommedan Notable may be produced to direct the religion of the Soudan; at present there are many aspirants to religious celebrity, but most of these are contaminated with associations of Mahdism, which, I apprehend, are not readily shaken off.

"As regards the Khartoum Moudirieh, with which I have been more or less intimately concerned, it has always been a matter of regret with me that I have not been able to move more about the Moudirieh; the exigencies of the service have, moreover, deprived me of my Inspectors. I have had, therefore, to rely on the reports of my Mamours, and I must say they have, with very limited resources, been indefatigable.

"As far as my judgment goes, there is no hurry; the country badly needs rest; it has to recuperate, increase its population and its cattle; change somewhat the ideas of the people; and, with patience and good government, I see no reason why the Soudan should not be extremely prosperous.

"It will take some time before the various Ordinances are thoroughly understood and appreciated; it will be some time before there is a proper land registry; it will be some time before the Penal Code and Criminal Procedure are understood by those who have to administer them; but I think on the whole that there is every reason to be satisfied with the progress made.

"I am sure that the people are beginning to appreciate the situation, and learning to understand that the officials no longer prey upon them, but try to do what is just and right, and to disentangle the truth from the skein of lies that generally is put before you.

"South of Gebel Ain, our policy has been to leave the negroid races alone; but a gun-boat with a British officer on board. who is in charge of the district, has always

been there. He was instructed to keep an eye on the doings of the people, and to inspect the police posts at Fashoda, Sobat, and Nasser. There have been no complaints, but I hear that the grain crop has been a partial failure.

"In spite of the adverse circumstances it is satisfactory to note that grain in the Omdurman market is lower than it has ever been since our occupation. It is now between £ T. 80 and £ T. 90 the ardeb, whereas last year it ranged up to £ T. 400.

"The people who have established their claims to the boats that were captured by us in 1898, have now had them returned; consequently, there is no lack of water transport for the needs of the natives. More boats are constantly being built, and every encouragement is given them to build more.

"Our efforts should now be directed towards improving inter-communication with the more distant provinces, for instance, the road from Gedaref to Abu Haraz, the roads into the Ghezireh, and the roads into Kordofan and Darfour. In my opinion it would be politic to make certain high roads, so convenient that all traffic would be by these roads, where, with a minimum of expense, we could watch what was being carried, and what traffic there is into these places.

"The land tax has not yet been enforced in the Khartoum Moudirieh, nor is it yet ready for it; the district of Halfaya is the only one in which the land has been measured. The other districts are now being taken in hand, with the exception of those on the White Nile.

"The more British officials move about the country, the better it will be; the Soudan is not very difficult to rule, provided that inter-communication is facilitated.

"Before closing this report, I would like to add a few remarks: I do not think that it is necessary just yet to embark in any expendiiure on account of irrigation. There is more cultivable land in the Soudan than there are people to cultivate. Every encouragement should be given and is given, to people to make Sakias and Shadoufs. If cattle suitable for Sakias could be imported fairly cheap into the Soudan, this would be a great benefit to the inhabitants; I think they would readily buy good cattle, if under 10*l.* each."

Colonel Lewis, the Mudir of Sennaar, writes:—

"As is well known, the Kenana, in the Ghezireh, had been a privileged and dominant race. The establishment of Anglo-Egyptian rule put an end to this. I do not think there was any definite discontent with the present régime, but there was unrest, and while the Khalifa lived Mahdism still existed. My reception, passing from the White Nile to Sennaar last month, was very enthusiastic. I think that the entire population have received the news of the 24th November last with a feeling of relief, and that the prospect of settled government is as welcome to the Kenana as to others.

"There is every chance of a settled and contented spirit prevailing among the people of this province, although there has been a simmering of treason up to the end of last year.

"The Kenana crops south of Sennaar and the southern part of Karkoj, are partly failures owing to a want of rain in September.

"The Wad-el-Abbas cultivation has wonderfully developed; 2,500 ardebs are estimated as the ushur* this year, against 250 last year. The rainfall has been good, and there was no failure in the later rains. The people have been very industrious. Agriculture is developing everywhere. Ground is being cleared, and fresh villages are springing up, fourteen between the Blue Nile and Dinder alone. I do not think that it is too sanguine a view to estimate the ushur of maize and sesame for the coming harvest as respectively 12,000 and 4,000 ardebs. I do not expect much development

* This is the tithe which, under Mahommedan custom, is paid in kind.

of cotton; I think it is quite possible that cheap cotton imports (manufactured) may tend to reduce its cultivation.

"Other cereals than maize could be produced in considerable quantities, but they depend on the construction of Sakias, as they are winter crops.

"Near Sennaar a good many new Sakias have been made, but money and oxen are wanting, and it will be some time before any large number of Sakias will be in use.

"The amount of traffic on the roads is the best sign that a feeling of public security exists. Very few highway offences have been committed, and they have all been tried.

"On the top of the disturbance caused by the two Khalifas, has come rinderpest. It is traced almost certainly to cattle brought to Khartoum at the beginning of October, the cordon, of which Colonel Drage had charge during September, having been taken off. I hope it is over in this district, but there is some anxiety as to the result of a cow from an infected herd breaking out of her inclosure and going south. Many Sheikhs have been punished in connection with the disease; I think they now appreciate the importance of the preventive measures that are being taken."

Colonel Jackson, the Mudir of Berber, writes:—

"For the year 1899 half taxes only have been collected on land and date trees in the Robatab and Berber Mamouriehs. In Zeidab and Metemmeh no taxes have been taken, and no ushur or herd tax has been collected from Arab tribes throughout the Moudirieh.

"The population of late, especially since the death of the Khalifa, has greatly increased, many persons who were banished having returned and settled down in their villages. At the commencement of the year people and cattle were wanting, and Sakias were only seen here and there, the cultivation being chiefly confined to the foreshore of the river and the islands. There are now numerous Sakias at work throughout the Moudirieh, and the amount of land under cultivation has increased tenfold, especially in the Berber and Zeidab Mamouriehs. Metemmeh is the most backward, the inhabitants of that district having suffered severely during the Dervish rule. The soil, however, is excellent, but covered with dense growth of mimosa and halfa grass; the people are slowly, but by degrees, cleaning and getting the land under cultivation, and also cleaning and pruning the date trees.

"The yield of crops throughout the Moudirieh has been satisfactory, although during the latter part of the year the low Nile has affected the winter crop of maize, and a small green grub appeared attacking the "lubia" and "fassoulia." Few locusts only appeared during the year.

"Taking into consideration that, until recently, the country was in an unsettled state, there has been very little crime in the Moudirieh during the year. I especially wish to bring to notice the Monasir and Robatab tribes; their behaviour has been excellent; they are most obedient and give no trouble, not one case of crime having been recorded against them.

"During the early part of the year some cases of cattle raiding and of trading in slaves occurred, the persons implicated being chiefly wandering Arabs from the Eastern Soudan, who attempted to bring slaves from the south and pass them to the Red Sea coast. The strictest measures were adopted and most severe punishments inflicted; a general meeting of Arab Sheikhs in the Moudirieh was ordered, resulting in the desert roads being placed under supervision, and the Sheikhs being held personally responsible for their respective districts. Since the adoption of these measures there has been no raiding, no cases of Slave Traffic have been reported, and it is hoped that the attempts of evil-doers to carry on these practices have disappeared. The inhabitants now thoroughly understand that slavery is not recognized in the Soudan, but that as long as service is willingly rendered by servant to master, the conditions existing between them will not be interfered with. The habit of depending on slave labour, which has so long been part of the custom of the country, is gradually being eradicated, and people realize that they must depend upon their own industry."

Colonel Hickman, the Mudir of Dongola, writes :—

"Owing to the bad Nile, the increase of cultivation in the province is not nearly so great as might have been expected. The increase, however, in the number of Sakias working and bringing fresh land under cultivation will more than balance the land left uncultivated from want of water.

"On account of the poorness of many of the people and their lack of cattle, it is impossible to take tax from all the land registered, but only in some cases from the land actually cultivated. Therefore, the rule observed is that, if the man is poor, the tax is according to cultivation; but if the man is idle, the tax is according to register.

"I have employed my Inspectors in carefully going into the case of every reduction in the tax according to register, on the actual spot.

"So long as the Government continues to buy the produce, I anticipate a continued increase in cultivation, prosperity, and consequent revenue; but if the Government ceases to buy, the cultivation will decrease, the people being naturally rather idle and only inclined to sow enough for their present needs.

"The present registered number of date trees, viz., 471,370, shows a considerable increase since 1897 (see the report of Mr. Dawkins, who gives 376,512); but the Return he gives for 1885 (600,000*l.*) is a long way from being reached yet. However, I think the above increase of nearly 100,000 in two years may be considered as very satisfactory. At the same time, I am aware that the figure given in 1897 may not have been at all accurate, and I do not think we can count on such a large increase in the future.

"The people here do not seem keen on fishing; consequently, the monopoly for fishing only fetches £ E. 23 for five contractors in four Mamouriehs. I am inclined to think this is not worth collecting, and to stop this tax.

"With the exception of the export of a little grain to Omdurman, and a considerable amount of dates to Omdurman and Wady Halfa, and a certain amount of imports in cotton goods, &c., from Wady Halfa, there is very little trading going on.

"Trade with Kordofan and Darfur has hardly commenced yet, but I am informed that the Khandak merchants expect that it will be considerable later on.

"A Government loan of £ E. 500 was sanctioned for the purpose of encouraging the erection of Sakias, purchase of cattle, and general development of land.

"The following is the result :—

"35 Sakias have been erected, or helped to be erected.

"32 head of cattle have been bought, and are at work.

"248 feddans have been brought under cultivation, from which an estimated additional revenue of £ E. 87 is expected.

"Half the money will be repaid this year (1900), and the remaining half will be repaid next year.

"I have asked for an additional £ E. 1,000 to be granted for similar development in 1900.

"The above figures show that the transaction is remunerative to the Government. I hope that the £ E. 1,000 may be granted, and also that I may be allowed to lend out again the repayment coming in in 1900.

"As an experiment, £ E. 500 was borrowed by me from the National Bank of Egypt at 5 per cent. per annum, and lent out to the people for development of land, at the same rate of interest.

"The results are as follows :—

"17 Sakias have been erected or assisted to be erected.

"25 head of cattle have been bought or assisted to be bought.

"183 feddans have been brought under cultivation, from which an estimated additional revenue of £ E. 78 is expected.

"Half the money, with the interest, will be repaid by July 1900, and the remaining half, and interest, by July 1901.

"I hope that eventually, when the bank sees that the investment is safe, they may make arrangements to lend out further sums of money to assist in the development

of the land, to the benefit of the people and consequent increase in revenue to the Government.

"Most of the crime in the province comes from the free blacks not having masters. There is a tendency amongst the black slaves to get free from their masters.

"There is a certain amount of kidnapping going on by the Kabbabish Arabs, who pick up boys and women in Omdurman and bring them to sell, mostly at Old Dongola and Khandak. It is very hard to catch any boy out, the blacks being so stupid, and not able to put us on to the kidnappers, but I hope to put a stop to this in course of time.

"On the whole, there has been considerable progress in the province in the year 1899.

"The increase of 355 Sakias and 41 wells is a great improvement.

"Had there been anything like an average high Nile, the revenue would have been considerably increased in the Estimate for 1900.

"There is very little serious crime; idle and vicious blacks, having no masters, are responsible for most of it.

"I hope I may now be permitted to allow people with capital from Lower Egypt to settle in the province on Government land, with steam-pumps to irrigate the land.

"The population is slowly increasing.*

"There is no land tax unpaid, and only a question of about £ E. 39 under judication of the land tax; all other taxes have been paid."

There are other reports, but the extracts given above will probably suffice for the purposes of this despatch.

(Signed) CROMER.

---

o

* The increase during the past year has been 701 men, 939 women, and 1927 children.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 26.)

Foreign Office, March 7, 1900.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 7 of the 2nd instant, reporting the steps which you have taken with regard to a request made by M. Jean Babitcheff for permission to import through Zeyla a supply of arms procured by Count Leontieff in the name of the Emperor Menelek.

Your action in this matter is approved.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

[1860 *g*—1]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 12.)

(No. 19. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, February* 24, 1900.

WRITING from Harrar on the 12th instant, Mr. Gerolimato tells me that he does not think that the Abyssians have more than 500 men in the Ogaden, but that he has been informed that Dejatch Wold Gabriel, Governor of Bari, is moving troops into the Ogaden against the Mullah.

This would account for the latter showing no further signs of retreating south, as reported in my telegram of yesterday.

I have no further news of the Abyssinian force said to be moving to protect the Jibuti–Harrar railway in Abyssinian territory.

Whilst writing this despatch, a man of the Jama Siad has come in, who escaped from the Mullah's clutches ten days ago. He bears signs of beating, and says he was imprisoned for a fortnight. He reports that he left the Mullah at Harradiggit; that his immediate following consists of about 1,000 men belonging to the Ogaden, Aligheri, and Dolbahanta, with 200 Midgans, but that all the Ogaden have submitted to him, not because they want him, but because they are afraid of him; and that he keeps his hold over the tribes by boasting that he is going to rule the whole country. He further reports that attempts are being made to join the Ogaden against the Ishak tribes, especially against the Habr Yunis, and that the Mullah has promised the Ogaden the loot of the Habr Yunis camels. The Mullah lately killed Matten Nur, a leading man of the Aligheri, for what reason is not known.

This sums up the position as it has been understood here.

Rer Ali and Rer Haroun caravans are still coming into Bulhar. Rer Abdillah caravans have ceased coming for some weeks, and no Ibrahim Kafilas have appeared since the commencement of the disturbances.

It is reported that the Ibrahim have large accumulations of gum and skins, which they will be forced sooner or later to bring into our ports. For the present they are paying heavily to other tribes for their supplies.

In the eastern districts matters are fairly quiet, but the late disturbances have left a sequel of accentuated inter-tribal ill-feeling.

Last week the Rer Yusuf raided the Adan Madoba and carried off some 1,300 camels and a quantity of sheep and goats in the Maritime Plain below Miriya, alleging as their reason for so doing that the Adan Madoba were responsible for the losses inflicted on them by the Mullah last autumn. Both the Adan Madoba and the Rer Yusuf took a leading part in the earlier stages of the disturbances, and in the present matter I have little sympathy with either side. For the peace of the country, however, it is necessary to stop this looting, and I accordingly sent out a party of the Camel Corps, who effected the restoration of all the property raided, with the exception of the animals that had been killed and eaten. Representatives of both sides are now in here, and they will be required to adjust their differences.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

N.B.—A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Captain Harrington, and the Intelligence Branch, Simla.

J. H. S.

No. 2.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 20. Confidential.)

My Lord. *Berbera, February 24, 1900.*

I QUOTE an extract from a demi-official note of the 16th instant from the Acting Consul, Zeyla, to my address, embodying the views of Mr. Crosby regarding the progress of the Jibuti railway, and the situation as likely to be created thereby.

Mr. Crosby is an American gentleman, late an officer in the United States' Engineers, to whom facilities have been accorded to travel in Abyssinia. I met him previous to his visit to Jibuti and was struck with the soundness of his observations on all matters on which he conversed. As he has personally inspected the railway, and had opportunities of conversing with the French officials and others of Jibuti, his remarks will not be without interest.

Lieutenant Harold writes:—

"Crosby was at Jibuti from the 8th instant to the 13th instant, on the evening of which day he returned to Zeyla. He was two days at kilom. No. 52 on the railway. His opinion—the opinion of an American engineer officer will interest you. He states that the large bridge near kilom. No. 52, a splendid ironwork, will be finished in a month, and then the line will be completed up to kilom. No. 108; that workmen in abundance are being employed, and that work is being pushed on with energy; that quantities of material are stored at the various camps on the line, and that everything points to the railway being pushed through to Harrar (or rather in a line with that place to the Errar Valley) at an early date.

Politically, he thinks the railway will pave the way for French intervention in Abyssinia, and that England—the Power most interested in retaining Abyssinia in Abyssinian hands—is certain to be involved. He thinks that within the next two or three years there will be an uproar in the country. He hears, but, of course, does not know, that the Danakil, a very powerful tribe, are all armed, and the black Aysa are armed to a considerable extent. He sums up that all the seeds of a 'soulèvement' are in that Jibuti railway."

In another note of the same date Lieutenant Harold reports that reliable information has been received that on the 13th instant three Arab workmen, returning from one of the posts on the railway (probably that at kilom. No. 52) with their rifles and one or two camels, were suddenly set upon by the Aysa and killed. The Harlah and Rer Malin tribes are suspected, and several of their number have been imprisoned in Jibuti.

Annexed is a cutting from the Jibuti weekly journal of the 17th instant, giving an account of an interview accorded by M. Ilg to the editor of that paper.*

I have no information as to the present financial position of the French railway, but viewed from here two facts seem to be obvious: that substantial progress is being made with the construction of the line, which is being pushed forward in a manner which implies its early completion, at least, as far as the neighbourhood of Harrar; and that calculations based on the failure of the line to reach completion up to that point are day by day losing their significance.

I venture to suggest that if we are to move in the matter of a line from Berbera to Harrar, or some point in its proximity, we have no time to lose in setting the necessary preliminaries on foot.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer and to Captain Harrington.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

---

* Not printed.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Captain Harrington.

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 17, 1900.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 69 of the 28th December, 1899, reporting the interview which you had with the Emperor Menelek on your return to Abyssinia.

The language held by you to His Majesty on that occasion has the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

[1786 *r*—2]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 5.)

(No. 33. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Cairo, February* 19, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 27, Confidential, of the 10th instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the text of the address read by the Sirdar to the Members of the Court of Inquiry assembled to inquire into the recent acts of insubordination in the Egyptian army.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Address read by Major-General Sir F. Wingate in English, and by Miralai Fathi Bey in Arabic, to the Members of the Court of Enquiry and assembled Officers.

To the Officers composing the Court:

I HAVE convened this Court of Inquiry in order to sift to the bottom the causes of the recent insubordination in the Egyptian army, and to fix the blame on the shoulders of those who are undoubtedly guilty, in order that just punishment may be meted out and thus the imperilled honour of the army may be vindicated.

Before leaving Cairo to come to Omdurman, I informed His Highness the Khedive of the recent acts of insubordination, which had been telegraphed to me by Maxwell Pasha.

His Highness was deeply annoyed, and caused me to be furnished with the following letter, which I received the day before I left Cairo:—

"To his Excellency the Sirdar of our Egyptian Army and Governor-General of the Soudan.

"It has been brought to our notice that some of the officers and men of our army have lately acted in a manner contrary to military regulation and discipline, at which we have been greatly displeased.

"This rumour, if not altogether untrue, must, we think, be greatly exaggerated, but as your Excellency has asked our permission to yourself proceed to the Soudan, and as we are aware of your sincere devotion to us and of your abilility to maintain discipline and enforce compliance with military regulations, we trust that if on reaching your destination, you find upon investigation that the rumour is founded on fact, you will do all in your power to restore perfect order and discipline.

"It is our special desire that all ranks shall be made to strictly conform to regulations, and that nothing shall occur to blemish the honour of our army; you should, therefore, insist that all officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and men uphold the honour and perfect discipline of our army, and we have issued you these orders, and direct that you shall act in accordance therewith.

"Dated the 29th January, 1900 (28th Ramadan, 1317)."

(Signed) "ABBAS HILMI."

On arrival in Omdurman, I did not at once communicate the contents of His Highness the Khedive's letter, as I had informed His Highness I hoped such a course would be unnecessary.

Unfortunately, the preliminary investigations which have been made with a view to ascertaining the causes of the recent disorders and inducing a ready compliance with

orders, although partially successful, have not yet resulted in a complete disclosure, nor have the orders been yet fully and entirely obeyed.

On reporting telegraphically the result of my efforts to elicit the truth, I received on the 8th instant the following telegram from His Highness the Khedive:—

"I much regret to learn that the cases of insubordination and indiscipline in our army, as reported by you to me before your departure from Cairo have not yet entirely ceased. Should you, therefore consider it desirable and necessary to enforce the measures sanctioned in my letter to you of the 29th January, I hereby give you full power to do so, feeling sure that you will exercise such authority in the manner most conducive to the maintenance of the good discipline and well being of our troops, remembering that strict conformity with the military regulations is essential, and that any contravention of the same must be without fail repressed and the offenders forthwith brought to justice."

This was followed on the 10th instant by the following telegram from his Excellency the Minister of War on behalf of the Council of Ministers:—

"I much regret to learn of the indiscipline and insubordination in the army. This unsatisfactory conduct is receiving the attention of the Government of His Highness the Khedive, and I am directed to inform you that they wish a most thorough and searching investigation to be made in order that instigators may be at once brought to justice. The Government is aware of your report that officers and men have submitted certain grievances and complaints with special reference to pay and pension, but I am to inform you that the Government, whilst ready to consider any such complaints as you may think it desirable to bring to their notice, wish it to be distinctly understood that they must refuse to deal with any of the alleged grievances until you have succeeded in ascertaining the causes of the late insubordination, and are satisfied that the steps you have taken to punish the offenders will prevent any recurrence of the disorders. You should instruct the officers you detail to investigate this matter that they should impress upon those accused of having instigated insubordination that it is only by a frank and open avowal of the causes which induced them to act as they have, that they can hope to have any mitigation of the punishment which so serious a misdemeanour invariably carries with it. They should also be warned that the consideration of complaints by Government will entirely depend on the nature of your report, and until Government is fully satisfied the discipline of the army is intact, the question of the redress of grievances cannot be entertained."

With such definite and clear instructions to guide them, I now leave the matter entirely in the hands of the Court of Inquiry, feeling sure that they will leave no stone unturned to fasten the blame on those who have been guilty of a gross act of military insubordination.

I would specially call the attention of the Court to the terms of the instructions received from his Excellency the Minister of War, viz., that it is only by the frank and open avowal of the causes which led to this insubordination that the guilty can hope to have any mitigation of the punishment which so serious a misdemeanour invariably carries with it.

I would also point out to the Court that the Government, having been apprised by me that certain complaints and grievances had been brought to my notice, have in their telegram held out a hope that they are ready to consider such complaints, but they expressly state that the consideration of such complaints will entirely depend on the nature of my report and that until the Government is fully satisfied the discipline of the army is intact, the question of the redress of grievances cannot be entertained.

In conclusion I would urge the Court to appreciate to the full the importance of their deliberations, and that it is my earnest desire that the punishments which may eventually have to be inflicted will be neither excessive nor vindictive, but that in view of the gravity of the offence, it is of imperative and immediate necessity that the evil doers be brought to instant justice in order that the honour of the army may be vindicated, and that due respect for the military orders and regulations may be inforced.

(Signed) F. R. WINGATE, *Sirdar*,
Governor-General of the Soudan.

Omdurman, February 12, 1900.

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March 5.*)

(No. 40.)

My Lord,

Cairo, February 25, 1900.

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the recent insubordination in the Egyptian army at Omdurman, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a Special Army Order, issued at Omdurman yesterday, which contains the decisions of the Court of Inquiry, and the telegrams sent to the Sirdar by the Prime Minister and the Minister of War.

This order is to be read out to the Egyptian army on three successive days.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 2.

SPECIAL ARMY ORDER.

THE following Special Army Order, dated Omdurman, 24th February, 1900, is republished for information :—

The Court of Inquiry of the marginally noted composition* which was convened on the 12th instant to inquire into, report upon, and record its recommendation with regard to the recent cases of insubordination having completed the first portion of its deliberations the decisions which the Court have submitted for consideration and which have received full ratification and confirmation of the Government of His Highness the Khedive are promulgated to the army, and will be read out on three successive parades :—

1. The Court considers that El Yusbashi Mahmud Effendi Mukhtar, 14th Soudanese, is directly responsible for the insubordination in that battalion, and unanimously recommends that this officer be dismissed from the service of His Highness the Khedive.

2. The Court unanimously recommends that El Mulazim Awal Mustafa Effendi Lutfi, 14th Soudanese, be dismissed from the service of His Highness the Khedive, as well as El Mulazim Tani Ahmed Effendi Shaker, 14th Soudanese, but owing to the youth and inexperience of this officer, the Court recommends his case for favourable consideration, and that he be placed *en disponibilité*.

3. As regards the insubordination in the 11th Soudanese, the Court is of opinion that El Yusbashi Hassan Effendi Lebib was the chief offender, and unanimously recommends this officer be dismissed from the service of His Highness the Khedive.

4. The Court recommends the reduction to the ranks of No. 1012 Onbashi Belal En Nur, 14th Soudanese, his transfer to the Discipline Company, during the pleasure of His Highness the Khedive, and his subsequent discharge with ignominy.

5. The Court further unanimously recommends that El Mulazim Awal Saleh Effendi Zeki, 8th Battalion, be dismissed from the service of His Highness the Khedive, and that El Mulazim Tani Mustafa Effendi Mohammed Es Shami, 8th Battalion, be severely reprimanded and placed at the bottom of the roll of Mulazimin Tawani of the army.

All these above decisions have received full ratification and confirmation of the Government of His Highness the Khedive, and the telegrams were yesterday received from his Excellency the President of the Council of Ministers and his Excellency the War Minister, of which the following are extracts :—

"(*a.*) *Wingate Pasha, Sirdar, Omdurman.*

"In accordance with your Excellency's telegram in which you have given me the details of the decision of the Court of Inquiry concerning the insubordination

* President : El Miralai Jackson Bey. Members : El Miralai Ibrahim Bey Fathy, D.S.O., Commanding 7th Battalion ; El Kaimakam Fergusson Bey, D.S.O., Commanding 15th Soudanese ; El Kaimakam McKerrell Bey, Commanding 12th Soudanese ; El Kaimakam Abd El Gauwad Bey Borhan, Commanding 5th Battalion ; El Kaimakam Mahmud Bey Husni, Commanding 8th Battalion ; El Bimbashi Mohammed Effendi Mahmud, Artillery.

which has lately occurred in the army, I approve and confirm all that the said Court has decided. I have informed his Excellency the War Minister to telegraph instructions concerning the necessary action which is to be taken in dealing with the prisoners.

"By command of His Highness the Khedive,
(Signed) "MUSTAFA FEHMY,
"*President of the Council of Ministers.*

"(*b.*) *His Excellency the Sirdar, Omdurman.*

"His Excellency the President of the Council of Ministers has informed me of his approval on the part of His Highness the Khedive of the decision of the Court of Inquiry. In addition to the directions telegraphed to you by his Excellency I now forward you the following instructions, viz., The guilty officers should be sent as prisoners under close arrest to Cairo; the Court should continue the investigations into minor cases connected with the recent in discipline.

(Signed) "Minister of War."

The above officers have accordingly been placed in close arrest and have been sent this day to Cairo.

By order,
(For Deputy Adjutant-General),
(Signed) L. F. O. STACK, *Bimbashi.*

By Order,
(For Adjutant-General),
(Signed) W. S. SPARKES,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

War Office, Cairo, February 24, 1900.

Rec'd with Letter No 12 D. 16th March 1900, from the Secy. Cab. the Depatt

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN. [March 5.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 3.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 6. Africa.)

My Lord, *Cairo, February* 25, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from the Sirdar, containing the latest reports which have been received from the sudd-cutting expedition in the Bahr-el-Jebel, and explaining the circumstances under which the French and Congo Free State expeditions were met and sent on to Khartoum.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

War Office, Egyptian Army, Cairo,
My Lord, *February* 10, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the most recent reports from the sudd-cutting party at present operating in the Bahr-el-Jebel.

I trust your Lordship will concur with me in considering that Major Peake showed much tact and discretion in the manner in which he dealt with the French and Belgian parties whom he met whilst cutting his way through the sudd, and whose lives were in all probability saved by the timely arrival of the Anglo-Egyptian expedition.

The inclosed reports speak for themselves, and I consider much credit is due to Major Peake, and to the officers and men composing the expedition, for the thorough and successful manner in which their instructions are being carried out.

I have received no official instructions regarding the disposal of the French, Belgian, and Uganda parties who have now arrived in Omdurman.

Lieutenant de Tonquedec has requested permission to proceed to Cairo with his men, and, unless I hear to the contrary, he will leave to-morrow.

Commandant Henry has also intimated to me that he intends to proceed to Cairo to-morrow, but that his men will remain here in charge of Lieutenant Bertrand, and when free communication with the south is established, they will return to Reggaf.

Will your Lordship be good enough to furnish me with instructions in regard to the disposal of this party?

Captain Gage and Dr. Milne, of the Uganda Protectorate, also proceed to Cairo to-morrow, and I shall temporarily detain their men here pending instructions.

The men have had no pay for six months, and I should be obliged if your Lordship will furnish me with details as to their maintenance and ultimate disposal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. R. WINGATE, *Sirdar,*
Governor-General of the Soudan.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Report by Major Peake on the Anglo-Franco-Belgic Reconnaissance encountered at the Third Sudd Block on the Bahr-el-Jebel.

THE party consisted of the following:—

1. Captain Gage and Dr. Milne and eight men of the Uganda Rifles from Fort Berkeley.

2. Lieutenant Tanquedec and Sous-Officier Salpin with thirty-nine Senegalese from Shambeh.

3. Commandant Henry and Lieutenant Bertrand and forty-two Congolese of the Congo Free State troops from Kirro. They had twenty days' food with them, and were on the up-stream side of the third block, and had not the slightest chance of working through the three blocks in twenty days. They were provided with three iron boats and some canoes, which they have left at the block, and which I propose sending to Fort Sobat as soon as the block is opened, there to await instructions as to their disposal.

I have sent the whole party to Omdurman with their arms and stores complete; I have informed Captain Gage that I place him in charge of the party going down north.

I informed Commandant Henry, in the presence of Captain Gage, that Her Majesty's Government did not recognize that the King of the Belgians has any right of permanent possession to any part of the Nile Valley. Commandant Henry informed me that in making this reconnaissance he had no intention of hoisting his flag in any place other than where it was already hoisted.

Lieutenant Tanquedec wished to remain at the third block until he got his canoes through, and then to proceed to Khartoum in them by himself. I had to inform him that I could not allow this. He demurred a little, and said that his Government might object to his being conveyed down by Anglo-Egyptian gun-boats. I informed him that if I was wrong I would take the responsibility, and the matter was amicably settled.

He most courteously gave Captain Hayes Sadler and myself information about the route between Fort Dessaix and Shambeh, which we made a note of. He informed me that Fort Dessaix, Meshra-er-Rek, and Shambeh were all now evacuated by the French.

Hearing from Captain Gage and Dr. Milne that the discipline and bearing of the Congo Free State troops were far from making them desirable neighbours, I decided that it would be better to send them all to Omdurman, where there is less chance of their doing harm than there would be if they were left, even temporarily, among the Shilluk and Dinka villages of their district, especially as our police force is not very large.

As I had no orders what to do with their people in their practically destitute condition, I trust that what I have done may meet with the approval of his Excellency the Sirdar.

(Signed) M. PEAKE, *Kaïmakam, E. A.*

Camp Gabat-el-Magahid, January 22, 1900.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Major Peake to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

Sir, *January* 21, 1900.

IN continuation of my report to you forwarded from Camp Sabt-el-Mesahid on the 29th December, 1898, I left camp on the 30th December and arrived at the first block on the Bahr-el-Jebel latitude 9° 29′ the evening of the same day; getting to work on the 31st December, I had cleared out the entire block of 1,100 yards by the evening of the 4th January, 1900; I give details of this and other blocks a separate report. Proceeding south on the 5th January we encountered the next block at latitude 9° 24′,

after about 8 miles of steaming. I had cleared a channel through this block by the evening of the 18th January, and on the morning of the 19th January proceeded south encountering the third block in latitude 9° 20′, after about 6 miles steaming. I arrived at this block about 8 A.M. on that day, and am still working at it. At about 10 A.M. I saw several men coming towards us through the thick papyrus of the block, armed with rifles, and on going towards them found them with a French flag, and had a note from Captain Gage of the 7th Dragoon Guards, employed in the Uganda Protectorate, informing me that they were men of the Uganda Protectorate, of the French from Shambe, and of the Belgian Congo Free State; shortly after the officers of the party came through with all their men, leaving their three boats and canoes on the other side of the block. I am sending all their people down to Khartoum, and attach a separate report on them.

On the 11th January, in company with Lieutenant Drury, R.N., I made a reconnaissance up the Bahr-el-Ghazal; I got about 100 miles up, and there was still open water in front of me, but unfortunately relying on what I had been told, namely, that the river was still blocked, I had neither wood, nor men to cut wood, with me, nor had I more time to spare the steamer from the work in hand; in consequence I could not proceed so far as I could wish. I will, however, next month make a further and more detailed reconnaissance of the Bahr-el-Ghazal, and endeavour to the best of my ability to reach the true Meshra-er-Rek.

I anticipate being able to clear the river of sudd by the end of April. The more I see of the Bahr-el-Jebel the more I am convinced that this is the river to clear and not the Bahr-el-Zeraf.

All officers who have come through from south thoroughly agree with me. I venture to suggest that one of the experts from Cairo who wish to open the Bahr-el-Zeraf be sent up now to see these rivers, and I will undertake to show him all of them. Sir William Garstin when up here last year never saw the Bahr-el-Jebel; once the Bahr-el-Jebel is open, I cannot foresee much difficulty in keeping it open.

I attach a list of the men and tools that I require, and trust that they will be forwarded to me quickly as possible.

(Signed) M. PEAKE, *Kaïmakam, E. A.*

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

Report by Major Peake on the Blocks in the Bahr-el-Jebel and General Progress made.

First Block.—Commencing at latitude 9° 29′, and reaching for 1,100 yards up stream; breadth of river at beginning of block 62 yards, and volume of water discharged per second 4,000 cublic feet; this was not very thick, the average depth of sudd being about 4 feet, the average depth of the river about 18 feet.

Second Block.—Commencing at latitude 9° 24′, and reaching for 1,258 yards up stream, average breadth of river about 75 yards. On first sighting this block it had the appearance of a sea of papyrus, and one could not distinguish river from dry land; the sudd was of the most stiff and obstinate nature, in most parts it was from 10 feet to 15 feet thick, and required an enormous amount of labour to get it away; the depth of the river varied from 12 feet to 28 feet.

Third Block.—At which we are still working, and hope to finish about the 1st February, commencing at latitude 9° 20′, is of the same nature as the second block, but I do not think so stiff. The river averages about 70 yards broad at its commencement. Length not yet measured. The following is the general system I have adopted for clearing these blocks:—

1. A party of men armed with old swords, knives, small axes, and means of lighting, is sent forward in line over the sudd, and cuts down and lights everything that there is that can be burnt or cut. The actual earth itself on the sudd being of a peaty nature will go on smouldering for days; this both clears one's view and weakens the sudd, causing in some cases large blocks in the centre to turn completely over on to their side.

2. A party armed with fasses and saws digs and cuts the sudd into squares of about 4 square yards on an average by means of trenches; they dig down as deep as

they possibly can, but the infiltration of the water causes it to be very hard to get lower than 5 feet. It is most important that all roots should be cut: in many instances these roots are as thick as a man's arm.

3. The leading steamer charges the blocks, which have been trenched, at full speed, taking care to work where the current is bubbling up from under the sudd. A steel wire hawser is then laid all round the block, which is to be hauled out and driven well into the trench. Holdfasts and telegraph-poles are then driven in to assist the wire in drawing out the block of sudd. The steamer then goes astern, and continues going astern and ahead until the block comes out, and so works on.

The second and third steamers work at clearing the sides of the river when the leading steamer has sufficiently advanced to avoid collision.

I attach a list of further requirements, and would remark that I consider that gun-cotton or dynamite would be most useful.

Whenever I find that the sudd is thin and moves very easily I employ an anchor or a simple wooden holdfast in place of the wire hawser.

The work proceeds from sunrise to sunset.

The Bahr-el-Jebel is now running between dry banks.

When we had just removed some especially stiff sudd on the 13th January there was a rise of about 2 feet in the river, which I can only account for by the fact that the sudd was almost completely damming up the river. In the third block there is an open patch of water, through which there is a regular cataract running at the rate of 10 miles per hour, as estimated by Lieutenant Fell, R.N., and myself. All measurements given are taken by the naval officers, who, I may state, are invaluable to me.

I may add that I am doing my best to free the river in every case from bank to bank, and so make a good job of it.

(Signed) M. PEAKE, *Kaïmakam.*

Camp Sabt-el-Megahid,
January 22, 1900.

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

Requirements of the Expedition to open the Bahr el-Jebel.

150 pick-axes.
150 fasses.
200 telegraph-poles.
50 1½-inch planks, about 15 feet long.
50 steamer shoving-off poles.
Either gun-cotton or dynamite.
50 artillerymen, if possible men who can swim.
All Marine Artillery sergeants who can be spared.
50 iron prongs, as per sketch.

(Signed) M. PEAKE, *Kaïmakam.*

January 22, 1900.

Inclosure 6 in No. 1.

Readings of Nilometer at Camp Sabt-el-Megahid.

	Reckoned in decimetres.		Reckoned in decimetres.
December 29, 1899	8·2	January 11, 1900	6·95
„ 30, „	8·15	„ 12, „	6·95
„ 31, „	8·1	„ 13, „	6·9
January 1, 1900	8·0	„ 14, „	7·5
„ 2, „	7·9	„ 15, „	7·4
„ 3, „	7·8	„ 16, „	7·5
„ 4, „	7·6	„ 17, „	7·6
„ 5, „	7·5	„ 18, „	8·1
„ 6, „	7·3	„ 19, „	8·2
„ 7, „	7·2	„ 20, „	8·4
„ 8, „	7·1	„ 21, „	8·0
„ 9, „	7·1	„ 22, „	8·0
„ 10, „	7·0		

(Signed) M. PEAKE, *Kaïmakam.*

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 19.)

(No. 2. Africa.)

My Lord, *Cairo, February* 9, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1, Africa, of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a paraphrase of a further telegram which I have received from the Sirdar on the subject of the Belgian and French expeditions, under the command of Commandant Henri and Lieutenant Tonguedec respectively, which have just arrived at Khartoum.

I have telegraphed to the Sirdar my approval of the judicious action of Major Peake, who commands the sudd-cutting column, in dealing with these foreign expeditions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 27.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Omdurman, February* 8, 1900.

I UNDERSTAND that Lieutenant Tonguedec came to reinforce Marchand, but found him already on the way to Fashoda when he arrived at Fort Desaix, and he consequently went on to Shambeh. This step verifies our belief that Fashoda was not the only objective the French had in the Valley of the Nile.

An order to abandon Shambeh reached Lieutenant Tonguedec in October last, but I understand, from what he says, that he took upon himself the responsibilty of taking the Nile route, the difficulty of retiring by land being very great owing to the misrepresented state of the country, the scarcity of local supplies, the withdrawal of the French from both Fort Desaix and Meshra-er-Rek, &c.

I am informed by Peake that when our gun-boats met the Belgian and French parties they had only provisions left sufficient for twenty days, which would have been quite inadequate to last them until they had cut through the three blocks of sudd removed by our men.

Peake informed Henri in the presence of Gage that Her Majesty's Government did not recognize that the King of the Belgians had any right of permanent possession to any part of the Nile Valley. Henri replied that his expedition had no intention of hoisting the flag in places where it was not already flying. I hear from Gage that there are, roughly, 1,000 Congolese troops at Kero, 200 at Lado, and the same number at Rejaf.

Tonguedec was anxious to proceed to Khartoum in his canoes after having dragged them through the third block, but Peake very rightly refused permission. Tonguedec demurred slightly, and said that his Government object to his party being transported in complimentary Egyptian gun-boats. Peake replied that he was ready to take the responsibility, if he was wrong; and an amicable settlement was thus arrived at.

Tonguedec and Henri are both very friendly and communicative, and are ready to impart any information about the country they have traversed, and the routes taken.

Their men are being well looked after, but I am anxious to know approximately how long we shall have to entertain them. Peake found Henri's men very undisciplined, and his principal object in bringing them down was the harm they would probably do in the Shilluk and Dinka villages, where sudd-cutting operations are now being carried on.

Peake trusts that his action may be approved; he had no orders as to how to deal with these people, whom he found in a condition of practical destitution. In my opinion, he showed great discretion.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 5, 1900.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you, to be laid before Lord George Hamilton, the accompanying copies of despatches from Consul-General Hayes Sadler,* respecting the question of leave allowances and pensions in the Somaliland Protectorate, which formed the subject of your letter of the 21st November, 1899.

In that letter you stated that, "so far as regards those whose service is entirely rendered in the Protectorate, the view of the Government of India appears to be in accordance with your letter to the Treasury of the 4th August, 1898, and Sir. F. Mowatt's reply dated the 16th of that month, accepting such a liability estimated as equal to a present payment of 9,000 rupees a-year."

I am to point out that the sum of 9,000 rupees set down in the Somaliland Estimates was intended to provide for any demands that might be made on the Protectorate by the Government of India in connection with the loan of the services of officers by that Government. This was explained by Colonel Sadler in his despatch No. 43 of the 23rd May, 1899, a copy of which was sent to you on the 24th June of that year, and is more explicitly stated in his despatch No. 100 of the 16th December, 1899, a copy of which accompanies this letter.†

It will be seen that Colonel Sadler considers that the Government of India should bear the charge of the whole proportion of pensions earned by service in the Protectorate up to the 1st October, 1898. He points out that this principle has already been admitted in two cases, and that, while the Protectorate was under the Government of India, deductions were regularly made from the pay of the police to cover pension charges and credited to the revenues of the Somali Coast, which then went to the Government of India.

In these circumstances, Lord Salisbury fully concurs in the opinion expressed by Colonel Sadler, and he trusts that the Secretary of State for India will accept this view.

With regard to contributions for leave allowances and pensions of officers temporarily lent to the Protectorate by the Government of India, Colonel Sadler urges (in his despatch No. 93), that the same ruling might be adopted in the case of officers transferred for service under the Egyptian Government, viz., that the contribution should be one-sixth instead of one-quarter of the assumed salary, service in Somaliland not counting towards Indian furlough. Lord Salisbury hopes that Lord George Hamilton will give this proposal his favourable consideration.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

---

* Consul-General Hayes Sadler, No. 93. † Consul-General Hayes Sadler, No. 100.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

North East-Africa
/ Soudan

~~EGYPT.~~

[March 5.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION X 5

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 5.)

(No. 5. Africa.)

My Lord, *Cairo, February* 25, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a Report by Captain Gage, of the Uganda Rifles, detailing his experiences on his journey from Fort Berkeley to Omdurman.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

My Lord, [*Undated.*]

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of your Lordship, a Report and map handed to me by Captain Gage, of the Uganda Rifles, detailing his experiences from the date he quitted Fort Berkeley down to his arrival in Omdurman. Captain Gage has procured much information of value and interest relating to the countries and districts through which he passed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. R. WINGATE,
Sirdar and Governor-General of the Soudan.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Captain Gage to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

Your Excellency, *February* 9, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to forward a Report of a reconnaissance carried out by me, together with Commandant Henry, Congo State, of the Bahr-el-Jebel, from 7° 23′ to 9° 22′ north latitude.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MORETON F. GAGE, *Captain*,
7th Dragoon Guards.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Report by Captain Gage of a Reconnaissance of the Bahr-el-Jebel. September 9, 1899, *to January* 19, 1900.

Saturday September 9.—Left Fort Berkeley at 9 A.M. on reconnaissance of Bahr-el-Jebel, accompanied by Dr. A. D. Milne, P.M.O., Nile district.

Fadlmoulah Effendi
Onbashi Baballah Rehan
Nafar Allajabu Ali
Nafar Allajabu Mohammed
Nafar Murghan Abderrahman
Nafar Deen Bakheit
Nafar Abdulam Mustafa
Nafar Marhan Mohammed
} No. 2 Company, Uganda Rifles.

Nafar Omar Juma, No. 13 Company, Uganda Rifles, orderly to Dr. Milne.
Nafar Ibrahim Idris, No. 2 Company, Uganda Rifles.
Nafar Murghan Ali, launch stoker.

Took three months' provisions; eighty rounds ammunition per man. All on board steam-ship "Kenia" and steel boat kindly lent by Commandant Henry, commanding Congo State troops on the Nile.

I left Sergeant Osborne in charge of the fort pending Captain Dugmore's arrival.

Having no engineer, was obliged to row launch down to Regaf, arriving at 4 P.M., having been several hours towing launch off a rock on way down.

Sunday, 10.—Left Regaf at 6·30 A.M. Met Congo steamer "Vankerchkoven" half-way to Gondokoro, with Engineer Mulders on board. Commandant Henry very kindly placed Mr. Mulders' services at my disposal, if required, during the journey; also those of James Grover, Sierra Leone native assistant, to work the launch, together with Murghan Ali, who does not yet quite understand the engines. Accepted them. Continued voyage for a couple of miles, when "Vankerchkoven" ran on sand-bank, and the remainder of day was spent endeavouring to haul her off with ropes, but without success. Anchored "Kenia" in the river for the night. "Vankerchoven" not practical for these parts.

She is a double-paddled, keeled steamer, and draws too much water, and apparently burns a great amount of wood for her size.

Monday, 11.—After five hours' work, the men succeeded in hauling "Vankerchkoven" off sand-bank. Arrived at Gondokoro 1·30 P.M., after grounding on two more banks. Baker's old station here all overgrown with grass. No vestige of former buildings. Parapet and ditch only remain to mark site; also some lime trees. Few villages near. Sand-bank stretches across nearly whole breadth of river here, but Chief of Gondokoro knows channel fairly accurately.

Arrived at Lado in one hour and a-half from here. River shallow in places, but no difficulty in finding channels. No more rocks. Emin's zariba still remains. Very unhealthy here. Whole camp a marsh in rainy season.

Tuesday, 12.—Heavy rain for five hours. Left Lado at 10 A.M. Arrived Kero ($5\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ north latitude), Belgian post, at 4 P.M. "Vankerchkoven" touched sand-banks once or twice during the voyage. Belgians busy building brick houses here, and finishing off stockade. About 1,000 men here at present, but I understand reduction of garrison is contemplated. Current in river runs nearly 4 miles per hour here.

Wednesday, 13.—At Kero; Commandant Henry making his preparations, &c.

Thursday, 14.—"Vankerchoven," "Kenia," and three steel boats left Kero at 8·30 A.M.

Following comprises the Congo State force:—

Europeans—
Commandant C. Henry.
Baron Charles de Rennette de Villiers Perioin, Capitaine.
Lieutenant A. Bertrand.
Sous-Officier Nagels.
Mr. G. Mulders, engineer to "Vankerchkoven"
Fifty rank and file.

Steamed about 50 miles, and anchored in mid-stream for the night.

Friday, 15.—Arrived at late Dervish position of Bohr at 1 P.M. Strong position from land side, consisting of loop-holed mud walls and formidable ditch, the latter flanked by a species of bastion in centre of eastern face. Undefended on the river side. Position could easily have been taken by boats last November. Searched all the afternoon for game while men were cutting wood.

Nothing to be seen, except a few elephant tracts, natives very friendly between here and Kéro.

Saturday, 16.—Steamed ten hours to wooding station. River full of hippopotami, killed two, which "Kenia" towed into camp.

Sunday, 17.—Steamed two hours to another wooding place, in order to lay in a good supply. First-class wood here all dry. Spent the whole day here, filling up with fuel.

Monday, 18.—Arrived at Gaba Shambe at 4 P.M., as I expected from what Henry told me, found a small French post here, with an enormous tricolour on the top of a long twig, which groaned with the weight it had to bear. Lieutenant de Tonquedec (Infanterie de Marine) in command here, with Sous-Officier Salpin, and some twenty-nine men. He has also posts at Abu Kuka and Ayak, and his total force is thirty-nine all told.

He left France on the 10th January, 1898, forming part of an expedition apart

from Marchand's, to occupy these posts and various others in the interior. He arrived here on the 20th March, 1899. He informs me that he distinctly heard a steamer whistle in the direction of the Bahr-el-Zeraf on the 7th instant. Abu Kuku, he informs me, is the proper wooding place here where there is plenty. The wood here at Shambe is a long way off, and much time would have been wasted if De Tonquedec had not already had a supply ready cut.

Tuesday, 19.—Suggested to De Tonquedec that he should accompany us and try and get through the sudd, but he said he could not do this until his orders for evacuation arrived from his Government.

He considers this place uninhabitable for Europeans on account of mosquitoes which are more numerous than he has known anywhere. I can quite bear him out if this evening is a sample. He says there is plenty of game round here, and especially near Abu Kuka. Elephants, giraffe, lions, buffaloes, and various species of antelope. Remained here all day, cutting up the wood which the Senegalese had collected.

Wednesday, 20.—Left Shambe at 7·30 A.M. The river course soon after leaving is blocked, but the water has forced a new passage where the current is swift.

Unfortunately there was not much depth of water. This passage continues for some 10 miles, when it cuts into the true course of the river once more. "Vankerchkoven," as usual, stuck several times.

"Kenia's" steering geer broke and caused some delay in repairing it. Constantly met floating islands of papyrus or sudd. Anchored in mid-stream.

"Vankerchkoven" carried down stream in the middle of the night by a floating mass of sudd,was obliged to have a couple of men up all night, pushing away the islands from the bows of the "Kenia," as so small a boat might become seriously entangled. One should anchor into the bank at this time of the year. Mosquitoes very troublesome. Absolutely necessary for men to have nets. Shall issue cloth to them to-morrow for this purpose.

Thursday, 21.—Started at 6 A.M., steamed until midday, and then stopped to cut wood for the remainder of the day. Magnificent river and plenty of water. Plenty of sudd moving down with the stream.

Friday, 22.—Steamed about 50 miles, at the end of which true course of river again blocked, but passage formed into an immense lake, which leads by another passage into another still larger. Water varying from 3½ to 6 feet in these lagoons. "Vankerchkoven" struck twice and had to be hauled a long way by men with ropes. True river continues on our right. The passage which leads into these lagoons might easily be blocked at any moment. It cannot be more than 10 yards in width. Anchored in the lagoon, where we found plenty of good dry wood. A village to the south-west from here in the marshes.

Saturday, 23.—Steamed about 13 miles. Stopped at several places for wood *en route*. Found no great abundance of it. Henry tells me we shall reach Lake No (?) and the stoppage to-morrow. I have my doubts, to my mind, we have not travelled far enough northwards.

Sunday, 24.—Started at 4 A.M., arrived at a large lagoon at midday, the entrance into which was free. This is what Commandant Henry took for Lake No on his first trip. The Nile seems to be entirely lost here; it arrives a magnificent river, pours itself into this lagoon by a swift current, and there it ends. There are three large lagoons here altogether. Nothing but papyrus to the north as far as the eye can reach. A clump of trees in foliage in the midst of high water grass to the east. A line of papyrus running west from the general mass to the north, and another line which seems from this distance to run east. It is impossible to say where we really are, but reconnaissances may show us.

First Reconnaissance.

Monday, 25.—We made a reconnaissance this afternoon in a steel boat across the sudd, bordering the east side of the lake, having sighted a small lagoon in that direction. After hauling the boat for two hours, entered a stretch of water 400 yards in length by 70 yards in breadth, unable to touch the bottom with sail gaff which measures 15 feet, therefore this must be a portion of the true course which is blocked to north and south, anyhow we know where the river is now. It evidently runs amongst the mass of sudd to the north.

Second Reconnaissance.

Tuesday, 26.—Commandant Henry, Lieutenant Bertrand, Captain Gage, and thirty men in all, British and Belgians, left the steamers in a steel boat, on a reconnaissance north, across the sudd leaving the remainder of the party at anchor in the lagoon. We made for a fairly large stretch of water, visible from the observatory, bearing north 10° east, from which the line running east appears to issue. After a severe day's work for the men, from 6 A.M. until 5 P.M., hauling the whole day, with only half an-hour's rest, arrived in a lagoon, which extended north for some 3 miles, water averages 7 feet in depth. Four different currents arrive here in different places from the south from underneath the sudd we have crossed. Current farther on in the lagoon almost imperceptible. Papyrus on east bank of this lagoon in a thin line, beyond that long water grass.

Wednesday, 27.—Reconnoitred every lagoon, inlet, &c., issuing from and connected with this large stretch of water, but without any result. Extremely hot, mosquitoes in thousands, men slept very little.

Thursday, 28.—Decided to return to steamers, bring all men back here, and cut a passage in order to pass the Vankerchkoven through into this lagoon. By this means we shall have a more extended view of the country to the north, and, perhaps, find out where we are. Started cutting to-day in order to gain a little experience.

Friday, 29.—Arrived back at the steamers at midday. Going much easier, the road across the sudd being much broken by first journey.

Saturday, 30.—Captain Gage, one corporal, six men, Lieutenant Bertrand, forty rank and file, returned across the sudd with two steel boats to cut passage between the two lagoons, commencing from north end. Belgians have only fifteen days' food left. Commandant Henry, Dr. Milne, Captain de Rennette, left in the launch "Kenia" in order to shoot hippopotami further south.

Sunday, October 1.—Commenced cutting the channel work; going on very well and a fine current established which carries away the masses of papyrus as they are cut. This papyrus has enormous roots up to 10 feet in length, and it is sometimes necessary to send men right to the bottom with saws in order to cut them free. Ten men always remain behind to clean up and cut away all roots, which catch on their way down. Remainder cut ahead. Made nearly 200 yards of channel 15 to 20 yards in breadth, current, 4 miles per hour. There is a lagoon 200 yards in length a-head. Bad camp.

Monday, 2.—Men continued cutting sudd, exceedingly difficult to-day, this portion of the sudd is evidently very ancient and very tough to cut. All solid papyrus. Heat intense. Mosquitoes at night in thousands. Men found a fairly dry camp.

Tuesday, 3.—A discouraging day for the men. During last night a large floating mass of papyrus arrived from a small lagoon and completely choked yesterday's cutting, being forced into it with great force by the current. Whole day spent in chopping up this island and consequently not a yard of progress made.

Wednesday, 4.—After having finished chopping up the island, which yesterday blocked the passage, men continued to cut a-head again. At midday another island of sudd, which was observed to be in movement a-head, was again forced into the passage by the current and temporarily blocked it; it evidently was forced right through by the current into the small lagoon, separating the first passage cut, and the present one, considerably widening the latter in its course. Having determined that the rear passage was not thereby blocked work was again continued a-head. In a short time, however, the whole mass of sudd a-head began to move and a procession of islands was forced through the passage, completely blocking the rear passage, and the lagoon connecting the two. Consequently four days' work was undone in as many minutes. The work has been excessive and trying for the men during the period. We are obliged to return to the steamers now. Bertrand has no more food for his men here. The fault in this first attempt is that the passages have not been cut broad enough to allow the passage of the sudd, when brought down by the current. It should be from 40 to 80 yards broad at least.

Thursday, 5.—Sudd-cutting party returned across the sudd to the steamers. Nothing can be done until Belgians are provided with food. Found "Kenia" not yet returned, and "Vankerchkoven" somewhat seriously inclosed in the sudd. She was blown from her anchorage by a squall into the sudd the day we left, and it appears that fresh masses of papyrus and grass have been arriving daily from the south end of the lagoon and been blown by the wind on to the ship, still further embedding her in the

sudd. Suggested to Lieutenant Bertrand that all our men should set to work at once to endeavour to cut her out; her position under present conditions, when their men are short of food is somewhat serious. He preferred to give his men a day's rest.

Friday, 6.—Nothing done. Ship hourly becoming more seriously imprisoned by continual arrival of fresh sudd.

"Kenia" must be cut off from this lagoon by a block or she would have returned by now. Every hour precious under the circumstances. My men managed to cut a short passage this morning, but it was blocked again before they could finish it.

Saturday, 7.—Position of "Vankerckhoven" worse this morning, owing to one of these now prevalent southerly gales having blown further masses of sudd on to her and firmly imprisoned her.

Gale continues this morning from south-east, and sudd constantly arriving from that direction. Must expend remaining stock of wood, I fear, to enable ship to force her way out. It is too late to cut her out now. Lieutenant Bertrand made an attempt to pull the islands away this morning with his men in the boat, but unsuccessfully. Anxiety on account of "Kenia." I have suggested steam being got up to-morrow morning and an endeavour made to force a way out. I think this will be done.

Sunday, 8.—More than ever imprisoned this morning. Consequently steam was got up, and after four hours going astern and ahead, the powerful engines succeeded in breaking apart the sudd and forcing a passage into the lagoon. On arriving at the southern end it was observed that the passage leading into the river was closed by newly-formed barrage which was evidently a mass of papyrus and grass which had been brought down the river, and being too large to pass this false passage had struck and blocked it. It was some 200 yards in length; on the other side, however, I saw to my great relief the "Kenia" which had thus been cut off from communication with us for eight days. They had killed two hippopotami, which had gone bad.

All day was occupied by the "Vankerckhoven" in unblocking the passage. Once the first few islands were released by means of the anchor and full speed astern, the whole mass was brought away with the current and the passage was free.

Monday, 9.—A day's rest for men. Decided to dispatch "Kenia" to buy food at Hellet Nuehr before commencing further work. Can do nothing until passage is cut. Sick with severe boils, result of bad water.

Tuesday, 10.—Steam-ship "Kenia" left towing steel boat to carry food with following party:—

Belgian—
Lieutenant Bertrand, Engineer Mulders, 40 rank and file.

British—
Fadlmoulah Effendi. Onbashi Baballa Rehan and five men with trade goods. "Vankerckhoven" remains anchored here until return.

Wednesday, 11.—Captain de Rennette down with rheumatism and fever.

12th to 19th.—Nil.

Friday, 20.—Violent storms; masses of sudd being brought down stream with the current. Reconnoitred to northern lagoon in steel boat. Caught in storm on return, shipped a great deal of water.

Saturday, 21.—Steam-ship "Kenia" returned with two months' supply of food for all hands, and twenty goats. Lieutenant Bertrand reports natives unfriendly at Hellet Nuehr. He was obliged to leave trade goods on the houses.

Sunday, 22.—Following left the steamers in two steel boats to commence sudd-cutting operations again:—

British—
Captain Gage and 9 rank and file, Uganda Rifles.

Belgian—
Commandant Henry, Captain de Rennette, 40 rank and file.

Arrived at north end of the sudd at 4 P.M., found former cutting considerably closed in by pressure of current which evidently arrives from south-west here, just room for passage of boat. Set fire to all surrounding papyrus.

Monday, 23.—Commenced cutting operations in the same place as before but this time the road is being enlarged to 40 yards. Provided the current is strong enough to

prevent roots of papyrus catching in mud bottom all sudd should pass all right. Usual difficulty—want of water, and since a strong current is not yet sufficiently established, a large mass of old papyrus came down this afternoon and stuck. The remainder of the day spent in cutting it, root by root. Average depth, 7 feet.

Tuesday, 24.—No advance made. The whole day cutting the roots of the island which arrived yesterday.

Wednesday, 25.—An encouraging day. Several islands of sudd arrived with the current and considerably aided in opening the mouth of the passage by tearing away portions of the old papyrus forming the bank, at the same time establishing a formidable current. We have now a fine passage leading to the one where work ceased the first time. All the intervening sudd which then blocked the passage having come away with the current. Part of the first island still blocking the mouth, but when the men have finished cutting up this, progress should be rapid. Passage already 800 yards long and 30 yards broad. My men working splendidly.

Thursday, 26.—At 9 A.M. the current became so strong that it carried everything before it thereby forming a magnificent passage. Some more sudd came down with the current from the south during the night which should have cleaned the passage in that direction.

Friday, 27.—Widening the passage.

Saturday, 28.—First portion of the passage being sufficiently wide, we proceeded up stream to the point where we left off before, and tapped the sudd behind, which began to come away in great masses the moment the first few islands were removed. Obliged to retire in the boats to the lagoon to prevent being squashed. The whole mass passed most successfully through the artificial passage into the lagoon, the current being strong enough to prevent papyrus roots catching.

Sunday, 29.—Obliged to change the men's camp which was becoming wet and unhealthy. Continued tapping the sudd to the south, but did not succeed in finding the resisting point. Consequently little progress made.

Monday, 30.—After cutting all day until 5 P.M., the resisting point in the mass of sudd ahead was finally reached and the whole lot began to move with the current into the passage. Just time to run the boats' bows into the papyrus forming the bank. In five hours huge masses continued to pass by, carried on by the violent current. Half the men's camp carried away by the force of current and sudd, not an island stopped in the passage.

Tuesday, 31.—This morning we found that the sudd which came away last night was that which blocked the actual river. Thus we had cut a false passage into the river from the lagoon, and the latter acted as a drain for the sudd, blocking the former, which all carried into the lagoon; 500 yards of river was thus freed from sudd. The former, as usual, immediately recognizable by its great depth. Continued cutting.

November, 1 *and* 2.—Occupied in cutting a passage of 200 yards through the river bank into the large lagoon where steamers were originally anchored. This was done in preference to following out the course of the river up to the steamers to save time.

Friday, 3.—Steam-ship "Kenia" towed "Vankerchkoven" through the passage into the northern lagoon. Arrived too late to make any satisfactory observations.

Saturday, 4.—A day's rest for the men.

Sunday, 5.—Men cutting wood in the adjoining marshes for the steamers. Observations so far have led to nothing. Mass of papyrus still continues to the north, with here and there small stretches of water. To east and west long water grass as far as the eye can reach. There are marshes with three or four feet of water, evidently inundations formed by the barrage. Sous-Officier Nagells made a reconnaissance into them on foot to endeavour to find *terra firma*.

Further Reconnaissance by Commandant Henry to the North.

Monday, 6.—Following Belgian detachment left on reconnaissance northwards in a steel boat across the sudd:—

Commandant Henry, Lieutenant Bertrand, thirty rank and file. Taking with them seven days' food.

I could not agree with their plan of reconnaissance which apparently had no definite object in view. Personally I should wish to start with thirty days' food, when there would be more chance of finding something definite to denote our position. Seven days can do no good, for I am convinced that we are yet 20 to 30 miles from the junction of the Bahr-el-Jebel and Bahr-el-Abyad.

Tuesday, 7.—Observed Henry's fires to the north. Observed the boat travelling in free water, arriving to within half a-mile of the steamers and then returning. Seems as if they may have found a free part of the river.

Wednesday, 8.—"Vankerchkoven" nearly imprisoned in the sudd again, north wind blowing masses of it from the northern end of lagoon. "Kenia" was obliged to tow her out. Reconnoitred the route southwards to guard against its being blocked. Found all clear.

Thursday, 9.—Sudd in movement everywhere on account of wind fortunately not current.

Friday, 10.—"Kenia" again obliged to free "Vankerchkoven" from sudd in which she was entangled.

Saturday, 11.—Twenty men arrived on foot across the sudd from Commandant Henry for food, of which they had run short. He suggests my joining him with my men and another boat, and to make a reconnaissance north, to endeavour to find the White Nile by way of the marshes, where he thinks the going will be easier than by the barrages in the river. He has found a portion of the latter free for 1,000 yards. I have agreed to his plan and shall join him to-morrow.

Further combined Reconnaissance.

Sunday, 12.—Following left steamers to join Commandant Henry on further reconnaissance north :—

British: Captain Gage, one corporal, seven men, twenty-four days' food.

Belgian: Captain de Rennette, eight rank and file. All in steel boats. Joined Commandant Henry at midday in a part of the Nile free from sudd. Severe work pulling boat across sudd this morning. Continued work until 4 P.M. Camp formed on continuation of barrage.

Monday, 13.—Made a way of some 1,600 yards through the water grass on the right bank of the Nile in a north-easterly direction. Line of river clearly indicated running north by papyrus. This evening we arrived in a stretch of water which extends to the north as far as the eye can reach. Breadth 80 yards. No current. Evidently one of the numerous lagoons.

Reconnaissance in Boats.

Tuesday, 14.—Followed the free water to the north for a mile, which led into a large lake 3½ miles long by 1 mile broad. Depth as usual averaging 7 feet. Every one believed we had reached Lake No at last. But after spending the whole day in a careful reconnaissance, we found a free portion of the true river at the northern end of the lake, on its western shore, with a pronounced current flowing northwards underneath the papyrus, which formed the northern (?) shore, which is positive proof that the river still continues to the north, and that this immense stretch of water adjoining it is either an overflow or lagoon, formed probably by inundation.

Wednesday, 15.—Continued voyage northwards through marsh bordering right bank of the river. Exceedingly trying work for the men, as they must be in the water all day from 7 A.M. until sunset, beating down the grass ahead and towing the boats with cords in the channel thus formed. Men had to be packed into the boat to-night for a camp, as there was no papyrus near. Made 800 yards. General directions: morning, north 20′ west; evening, north 65′ west. The line to the west of our direction denoting the river is evidently turning north-west.

Thursday, 16.—Direction north, 20′ west, through marshes. Espied a free portion of the Nile early from mast-head. Cut into it at midday, and found that it continued for 1,200 yards, when it was again blocked ahead. A large lagoon on the west bank. Nothing but a sea of papyrus observable from the mast-head to the north. Don't believe we are near Lake No. Bivouacked on the papyrus, and men slept well.

Friday, 17.—Journey continued through marshes on right bank; direction north. Endeavoured to burn grass with contrary wind, as work was so severe for men. Another stretch of water espied from mast-head about midday to north-west. Arrived within 300 yards of it this evening. I camped for the night on papyrus. Made nearly 1,000 yards.

Saturday, 18.—Arrived in a fairly large lagoon at 8 A.M. this morning. Masses of floating sudd everywhere being blown about by the wind. Evidently we are still near the right bank of the river, as there is a well-defined line of high papyrus on our western

side, presumably denoting the banks, running north. This lagoon being nearly a mile in length, running north is a great help. Continued on across the marshes from its northern end, and bivouacked on the papyrus bank of a small lagoon running out from general line of papyrus in an easterly direction. Slight current here in same direction. Made about 2 miles to-day, but calculations are difficult here.

Sunday, 19.—Started at 7 A.M.; direction generally north. Very easy going through; burnt grass. Passed another small lagoon running out east. A good day's work; must have made nearly 3 miles.

Monday, 20.—Made nearly a mile in a northerly direction. Another small lagoon at midday. Nothing visible to the north this evening except the same dreary expanse of marsh, and the inevitable line of papyrus, always running north. A hard day's work, and a bad bivouac at the end of it.

Tuesday, 21.—Started at 7 A.M.; direction north. Easy road found by following hippo. tracks through marsh. Obliged to fire grass later. Bivouacked in boats in a small lagoon; no papyrus available; distance, 1 mile and a-half all day. This evening's observations from mast-head: A line of trees to the north, extending apparently due east from the general line of papyrus running north. This may give us some indication, if we can arrive there before the food gives out. Belgians again running short.

Wednesday, 22.—Very bad going. Did not make more than 1 mile to-day; general direction north 20′ east. Zig-zagged a great deal in order to avoid marshes filled with green grass.

Heat intense amidst this high grass. We decided this evening to continue for two more days, which will bring us to the end of our tether in the way of food, and leave us just sufficient to return. Belgians will have to be on half rations for two days. I am giving them 40 lbs. dhurra from my stock, which will help them. Reckon half time to return by the route we have made.

Thursday, 23.—Going very bad in places; made a mile. Direction north 10′ west. Bivouacked near a small lagoon, with hippopotami in it. Too wild to get near enough for a shot however. From mast-head—a tree in foliage—about 3 miles distant to the north, which appears to form part of the line extending east. Whole party Europeans and men now reduced to 1 lb. dhurra per day. All European provisions exhausted.

Friday, 24.—General direction north; made 1 mile and a-half. This evening line of trees extending east very distinct. These probably indicate *terra firma*, since they appear to be in foliage. Baker describes the south bank of the Bahr-el-Abyad as *terra firma*, and covered with mimosas.

If this is the neighbourhood of the river, which is now seen, we shall probably either have to pass the boats across *terra firma*, or cut into the Bahr-el-Jebel, and again engage sudd. This may mean another month's work. We have six days' food left. If we go on and chance it, we certainly cannot return, and must trust to finding food ahead. On the other hand, we have sufficient food to return with.

We can then buy a further supply from the Nuehr (two months ahead), and return here again, and make a certainty of finding the White Nile, and consequently the extent of sudd blocking Bahr-el-Jebel. Henry is agreeable to both plans, and since he has left me the choice, I have chosen the latter, as being more certain. I do not consider that I should be justified in sacrificing men's health, and possibly lives, through hunger for the object in view. It is discouraging for them to turn back after all their hard work, but to my mind it is the only thing to be done.

Saturday, 25.—Started on return journey.

26 to 28.—Return journey. Men becoming done. Two of our men sick, one with fever, another with abscesses; eight Congo men down with fever, &c.

Wednesday, 29.—A Congo State soldier found dead in the boat this morning. Evidently result of severe work and short rations. I am very thankful that we decided to return.

Thursday, 30.—Arrived across the sudd to within 300 yards of the steamers. Sick were sent across on foot, and the launch then ferried them.

Another Congo State man fell down dead within 20 yards of the "Kenia." We have just arrived in time. The men will have plenty of food to-morrow.

Friday, December 1.—Reached steamers at 9 A.M. Dr. Milne had made a reconnaissance south in the "Kenia" on the 29th November, and found another barrage formed behind us in the same place where it was unblocked before. Men have been fishing this afternoon to the south end of lagoon. Report that masses of sudd are coming through the passage we cut into the lagoon. This probably means that the remainder of the barrage in the river at that point is coming away. Provided it does

not block the passage, it will do no harm. We have twenty days' food all round; result of consultation with Commandant Henry this afternoon. Two steamers will proceed to Hellet Nuehr and purchase two months' supplies.

After which we will depart on further reconnaissance north, with three boats, "Vankerckhoven" to remain up the river with four months' food on board and a small guard. "Kenia" to return to Kero in charge of Engineer Mulders and Sous-Officier Nagels to open up communication with rear, and inform of our movements, and then return to "Vankerckhoven." Since we have been absent nearly three months already, this will relieve any anxiety there may be. At the same time, "Kenia" can take back any sick.

Another Congo man died to-day of fever and dysentery.

Saturday, 2.—Found the passage south much changed owing to movement of sudd yesterday. River now free here for a mile and a half in length, sudd all having passed into the lagoon. Temporary passage into southern lagoon which we formerly cut, blocked, but not seriously. Was opened in two hours.

We found barrage formed further on, in same place as before, some 400 yards in length, and completely blocking entrance from river into lagoon. After ten hours' work with steamers it came away with a rush.

Continued journey up-stream until midnight when we ran out of wood and were obliged to anchor. "Vankerckhoven," however, has still sufficient to enable "Kenia" to go in search of wood to-morrow, four hours up-stream.

Sunday, 3.—Following proceeded in "Kenia" four hours up-stream to obtain wood supply for "Vankerckhoven:—

Commandant Henry, Sous-Officier Nagels, thirty rank and file, Belgians; Captain Gage, Dr. Milne, one native officer, nine rank and file, two boats British.

At 2 P.M., on rounding a turn in the river, met Lieutenant de Tonquedec, Sous-Officier Salpin, and the whole of his detachment coming down-stream in dug-out canoes. De Tonquedoc hoped to find the river open, as we had been absent so long. He informs me that having received his orders, he has evacuated Shambe and the other forts, and wishes to reach France as soon as possible. Reports river open behind and met with no floating masses of sudd. We have not met a single island since we have been back in the river. The dry season has evidently commenced and the sudd is stationary.

De Tonquedec goes on to join "Vankerckhoven," and await our return with wood. He has not yet decided whether he will go on immediately in his canoes and try to get across the sudd, or whether he will join us.

Monday, 4.—Returned to "Vankerckhoven" with a boat load of wood. De Tonquedec reports following from native sources received at Shambe, 22nd November, "natives report three steamers, ten boats, working at sudd in Bahr-el-Zeraf." Found De Tonquedec undecided as to whether he should go on or wait for us. I therefore took him down to the barrage in the launch to show him what it was like. This finally decided him and he returns with us for food supply, and then will contiuue with us across the marshes.

Tuesday, 5.—Continued voyage south. Water in lagoons much shallower than down at the barrages.

Wednesday, 6.—Arrived at the derivation leading to Hellet Nuehr. "Vankerckhoven" tried to descend it and got stuck on a sandbank. The remainder of the day spent in trying to shift her. She will have to remain here while "Kenia" takes steel boat down for food.

Thursday, 7.—Following started in "Kenia" and three steel boats for Hellet Nuehr:—

British: Captain Gage, Dr. Milne, 1 native officer, 9 rank and file, 1 stoker.

French: Lieutenant de Tonquedec, Sous-Officier Salpin, 37 rank and file.

Belgian: Commandant Henry, Captain de Rennette, Lieutenant Bertrand, Sous-Officier Nagels, 50 rank and file.

After covering some 20 miles came to two deserted villages, these were the ones visited before by Lieutenant Bertrand.

Found several more further on about 3 P.M., which were very rich in dhurra (white) sheep and goats.

Natives fled on our approach with large herds of cattle. I called to them in vain. Camped in village. Natives twice endeavoured to attack during night. First attempt, they arrived within spear-throwing distance at the Belgian side, and threw several spears, severely wounding one man. Second attempt on French side, but their sentries

were too wide awake, and drove them off with a couple of shots. Natives also fired village at northern end.

Friday, 8.—Collecting food. Natives assembled in some numbers this morning, armed only with spears and knives, some 500 yards away from the camp. Half the troops were carrying food to the boats. Assembly sounded and natives dispersed. Wounded Congo man died this morning. Another attempt made by natives during the night to surprise the camp. A crowd of them crawling up to within 30 yards on their hands and knees. Three shots dispersed them without casualties on either side. Lieutenant Bertrand took two boat-loads of food back with "Kenia" to "Vankerckhoven." He let off his rifle into one of his corporal's legs, causing a severe wound. Fortunately Dr. Milne was here.

Saturday, 9.—Two more boatloads of food sent off to "Vankerckhoven."

Sunday, 10.—Troops evacuated camp in the village, and formed a new one on the river, in order to dry hippopotamus meat. Two hippopotami shot.

Reconnaissance of Derivation.

Monday, 11.—Commandant Henry and myself left in "Kenia" to reconnoitre derivation to the north. Found it continued with a fine current for 20 miles further to the north-west, when it was blocked with grass and papyrus. Depth averaging about 7 feet but very shallow in places, breadth at this spot varies from 100 to 400 yards. Villages on left bank. Killed three hippopotami and towed them all back to camp.

Tuesday and Wednesday, 12, 13.—Collecting and dispatching wood to "Vankerckhoven" by "Kenia."

Thursday, 14.—A Congo State corporal wounded by a spear this morning while collecting food in the village. Some dozen natives surprised half-a-dozen men without guns and threw spears at them and then ran away.

Friday, 15.—"Kenia" taking wood to "Vankerckhoven."

Saturday, 16.—Twenty men dispatched to "Vankerckhoven," this will lighten boats when whole party return to-morrow.

Sunday, 17.—Whole force returned to "Vankerckhoven." Commandant Henry wishes to remain here until the 20th instant to give Captain de Rennette a chance of accompanying further reconnaissances. He has been laid up with rheumatism and sciatica for ten days.

Monday, 18.—Rest.

Tuesday, 19.—Ditto. Lieutenant de Tonquedec left for the north with his detachment in a steel boat, he will await us at the barrages. He has to recover his canoes which he sunk in a lagoon near there before returning up-stream.

Leave for North on further Reconnaissances.

Wednesday, 20.—Following left in two steel boats towed by steam-ship "Kenia" for further reconnaissance north across marshes :—

Captain Gage, Dr. A. R. Milne, 1 native officer, 7 rank and file, British.

Commandant Henry, Lieutenant Bertrand, 42 rank and file, Belgian.

Following return in "Kenia" on the 22nd instant to Kero :—

British, stokers, No. 2 Company, Uganda Rifles, Murghan Abderrahman, Been Bakheit, Murghan Ali.

Belgian, Mr. G. Mulders, engineer, Captain de Rennette (invalided), Sous-Officier Nagels, sick and wounded Congo soldiers.

"Kenia," after remaining at Kero for slight repairs, and Fort Berkeley having been communicated with, will return down-stream to "Vankerckhoven," and remain there until the 3rd March, 1900, when she will return to Fort Berkeley. I have issued written instructions to Mulders. "Kenia" towed boats until midday. then cast off and returned up-stream. Camped on the barrage at 8·30 P.M., without having met De Tonquedec.

Thursday, 21.—Met the French party at 7 A.M., continued north of the Northern Lagoon, and once more entered the marshes. Made very little progress.

Friday, 22.—The morning spent in drying the Belgians' food, which had been soused on journey down river. Made 800 yards in the afternoon ; very bad camp, men obliged to sleep in the water.

Saturday, 23.—Travelled from 7·30 A.M. until midday, obliged to halt here, as there

are no camps ahead for some distance, and men did not sleep last night. Found a good camp here on sudd.

Sunday, 24–*Saturday*, 30.—Continued along our former reconnaissance route. Men pulling boats with cords. Water in these marshes has sunk 3 inches since we were last here.

Sunday, 31.—Continued making the road ahead, through the grass, which is beginning to spring up again, after our fire of the 24th November, which we lit here; general directions, 1,000 yards north 40′ east; 500 yards north 20′ east; total, 1,500 yards.

Bad going this afternoon, as the grass in these parts is mixed with innumerable islands of papyrus, which are difficult to avoid. This evening, line of trees to the east, very distinct from masthead. Another uncomfortable bivouac for the men, on a floating island of papyrus.

Monday, *January* 1, 1900.—A discouraging day. The line of trees, which promised so much, on close inspection appears to be merely a forest of ambatch, which, from the distance, gave the impression of mimosas in foliage. There is no sign of free water in any direction. Going very bad; three hours hauling the boats across a piece of papyrus 100 yards in length. Made about 1,400 yards altogether. Men obliged to bivouac in the boats.

Tuesday, 2.—Terribly bad going; water diminishing; men all dog tired owing to sleepless night. Only made 900 yards to the north all day. A small lagoon sighted from the masthead this evening to the east, apparently running north and south.

Wednesday, 3.—Only made 600 yards to-day in a northerly direction. Struck two small lagoons, current running north-west. From masthead to north-east and west a mass of papyrus as far as the eye can reach. Ceased work at 1 P.M., and sent reconnaissances on foot across the sudd to north and north 15 degrees east. No result; report papyrus everywhere. Indications certainly tend to show that we are in the neighbourhood of a river; all this sudd proves it; but whether it is the Bahr-el-Jebel taking a turn to the east or the White Nile it is difficult to guess.

The former is the more probable, for our direction has been generally north without allowing for variation of compass (10′ west); consequently, since the line denoting the Bahr-el-Jebel has always been visible to the west extending north, we should cut into any such sudden turn.

Thursday, 4.—Boats all day making 300 yards across burnt sudd. I made a reconnaissance north on foot this morning, and found a stretch of free water amongst the ambatch trees, which the boats reached in the evening; we are now in the midst of the sudd again, extending as far as the eye can reach, from the masthead to the north, east, and west; no current perceptible in the lagoon.

Friday, 5.—Followed along the free water for 300 yards; observations from masthead here as follows:—

"A line of depression in the papyrus about 300 yards away to the north, running east." Consequently, since this undoubtedly indicated free water, the whole morning was spent in hauling the boats across the sudd in that direction. We here found ourselves in the river once more, which ran nearly east. On following down stream, we found it blocked after 1,000 yards of free water. River here turns to the north, so it is evidently the Bahr-el-Jebel. First 300 yards of this new barrage not compressed, and we were able to pole the boats through between the sudd and the right bank. There is another 300 yards of compressed sudd to be cut through, and then open river once more.

Saturday, 6.—There being a slight inundation on the right bank and the sudd being too solid to cut, an attempt was made to haul the boats by the bank. After making 150 yards they stuck, the papyrus becoming too solid to proceed. Way must now be cut ahead to the river at north end.

Sunday, 7.—Men at work all the morning cutting a canal through the bank to the river. This was finished by 1 P.M., and the last boat hauled through into the river by 3 P.M. We rode on for 2½ miles, when further progress was arrested by a further barrage of much the same character as the last one.

Monday, 8.—Pushed our way by means of pools of water for 300 yards through between the sudd and the right bank. Current in these pools extremely violent, the water oozing up from underneath the sudd. De Tonquedec down with fever; Milne seedy; length of this barrage about 800 yards; latter 500 compressed and solid, like the last one.

Tuesday, 9.—Commandant Henry and self made a reconnaissance on foot to the far end of the barrage. We crossed on to the left bank, which was *terra firma*. Current

here somewhat stronger than usual. Men cutting a canal between barrage and right bank, they made about 300 yards in the course of the day, and the boats were then moved up.

Wednesday, 10.—Continued cutting channel from 7 A.M. until sunset; made 250 yards. Belgians working half their men at a time.

Thursday, 11.—Cutting from 7 A.M. until 6 P.M., which completed the channel, and the boats were once more hauled through into free water; camped on left bank. Lieutenant de Tonquedec reconnoitred down-stream in a canoe. He returned at midnight without having found any further barrage.

Friday, 12.—Found the river open for six hours' steady rowing; must have made nearly 14 miles in a north-north-easterly direction. Fine river, and broad. Came on another barrage here, and camped for the night.

Saturday, 13.—Made 250 yards across the barrage with the aid of small stretches of water as before. This barrage is moving, though almost imperceptibly so. Free river ahead seen from the masthead this evening, which turns eastward. To the north-west, among the marshes away from the river, is a long stretch of water running north; don't know what this can be. This barrage must be 900 yards long.

Sunday, 14.—Made another 200 yards by means of cutting through the sudd—a hard day's work, as it is very much compressed and solid. The canal began to close in this evening solely because the cutting was not kept near enough to the bank, where there is shallow water. By the bank there is not sufficient depth for the sudd to float, so it cannot compress and close the canal, as it does when cutting above deep water. Just managed to pull the boats through in time before the passage closed.

Monday, 15.—Made a 200 yards cutting through the sudd. Work not being finished until late, it was unfortunately decided to postpone pulling the boats through until to-morrow. They were in a very bad position, not being right in to the bank. At midnight the sudd began to move most perceptibly, and firmly jammed two of the boats before it stopped. This will necessitate some hours' work to cut them out to-morrow.

Tuesday, 16.—The whole morning occupied in cutting out the boats and pulling them through yesterday's passage. The remainder of the day spent in cutting 50 yards of passage and passing two canoes across the barrage for Henry and De Tonquedec to reconnoitre the river ahead west. They started off at 2·30 P.M.

Wednesday, 17.—Passage into the river finished at 9·30 A.M., and the boats were then pulled through. After rowing for nearly six hours, we met Henry and De Tonquedec, who informed us of the existence of yet another barrage ahead of us about 1 mile distant. This is not encouraging for the men.

Thursday, 18.—Rowed down to the new barrage this morning; sent off a foot reconnaissance to find the river ahead. It returned at 4 P.M. with the news that the block is twice as long as the last one, and very much more solid and compressed than any we have met. There is a torrent of water plunging underneath the sudd 80 yards from here, with a roar like a waterfall. The current at that point is most violent, and no boat could live in it. The men commenced work at 10·30 A.M., and cut a passage into and along the bank for 150 yards.

Friday, 19.—Last night some 200 yards of the barrage in rear went away with the current, and was carried underneath the sudd ahead.

Fortunately, all the boats were safe in the bank. De Tonquedec, however, lost one canoe which was not properly secured, together with a rifle and ammunition. This morning there is a constant procession of sudd arriving from the south with the current, all of which passes underneath the damm. Evidently the barrage behind is coming away; there is no other way of accounting for it otherwise at this time of the year. At 9 A.M. the "Tamai" was sighted by men at the north end of the block to the great satisfaction of all concerned. The men have worked splendidly throughout, and never for a moment lost heart. This barrage is 1,200 yards long.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

Captain Gage to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

Sir, [*Undated.*]

I HAVE the honour to forward a Report and diary of a reconnaissance of the vegetable obstructions, or sudd, of the Bahr-el-Jebel which was carried out by me in conjunction with Commandant Henry, commanding the Congo State troops on the

Upper Nile, from the 9th September, 1889, to the 19th January, 1900, my authority being inclosed instructions from Lieutenant-Colonel Martyr, D.S.O., to Major Tickell, D.S.O., and which were handed to me by the latter officer prior to his departure home on sick leave from Fort Berkeley in June 1899.

I left Fort Berkeley on the 9th September, 1899, in the Uganda Protectorate launch "Kenia," accompanied by Dr. A. D. Milne, of the Protectorate, one native officer, one corporal, eight privates, and one stoker, all of the Uganda Rifles; also three months' provisions and eighty rounds per man, and finally left the Congo State post at Kero on the 14th September, together with following force of Congo State: Commandant C. Henry, Captain Baron Ch. de Rennette de Villers-Perioin, Lieutenant A. Bertrand, Sous-Officier Nagels, Chief Engineer Mulders, and fifty rank and file, all of whom were embarked on the Congo State steamer "Vankerckhoven" and two steel boats.

Arriving at Gaba Shambe on the 18th September, I found a French post of twenty-nine Senegalese, Sous-Officier Salpin, under the command of Lieutenant A. de Tonquedec, Infanterie de Marine. The latter informed me that he had established small posts at Abu Kooka and Ayak, and that his total force consisted of thirty-eight rank and file, the whole forming part of an expedition which had left France on the 10th July, 1898, having for its object the occupation of above-named places and various others in the Bahr-el-Gazal country. I understood that it was in no way connected with that of Major Marchand. On my suggesting that he should accompany our reconnaissance and endeavour to return by the Bahr-el-Jebel, he informed me that his orders for evacuation not having arrived, he would be obliged to wait for them, but would endeavour to follow on after us in canoes. He eventually joined us with his entire force on the 3rd December, and accompanied us north. He arrived at Shambe on the 20th March, 1899.

On the 28th September the journey northwards was continued, the "Vankerckhoven" touching several sand-banks shortly after leaving Shambe, over which she had to be hauled with ropes.

The river having forced a new passage through the sudd at this point, the old course being blocked, the depth of water rarely exceeded 5 feet; this passage continued for 8 to 10 miles, and then led into the true course, where a depth of 20 to 25 feet was found. There having been no rainy season, the river at this time was exceedingly low.

According to observations at Fort Berkeley by means of a nilometer, the water at that place was 4 inches lower than it had been during the whole of the dry season.

From the point where this new passage rejoins the old course of the river, as far as the commencement of the sudd at roughly 8° 34′ north latitude, the Nile, with the exceptions of one more short false passage, where the water shallows, is a magnificent river, with great depth of water, averaging, as far as I could judge by the means at my disposal, from 20 to 25 feet, and breadth varying from 70 to 90 yards. The true course of the river was always immediately recognized by this uniformity of depth in the new passages which have been formed in places; the water is invariably shallow (4 to 6 feet), which renders them liable to be blocked by the sudd during the rainy season.

On the 24th September the first barrage was encountered (8° 34′ north latitude). At this point, as far as could be seen from the observatory of the "Vankerckhoven," the course of the Nile was blocked for a great distance with masses of papyrus and green grass, and as far as the eye could reach not a vestige of the river was to be seen continuing north. On both banks were large lagoons with an average depth of 7 feet of water, and to the north was another one some 2 miles in length, into which the water, being arrested by the barrage, poured with great force through a small passage varying in breadth from 30 to 40 yards.

The sudd at this point is very plentiful, and extends for a great distance to the north and north-west.

Some 5 miles before arriving at the barrage I noticed the extraordinary diminution in the rate of the current, which is almost imperceptible, in this last stretch of free water.

The surrounding country here is entirely inundated on both banks, evidently for a great distance into the interior, since there is no rising ground observable, the country presenting the appearance of one vast flat to the horizon.

The marshes thus formed consist of water-grass 15 feet high, with an average depth of $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet of water; since there are no undulations, this is probably uniform throughout.

Having spent seventeen days cutting the sudd here in order to pass the steamers into a large lagoon to the north, for further observations, and on completion of this

work finding that the river was still blocked, apparently for a considerable distance further north, it was decided to make a reconnaissance in the steel boats by way of the marshes on the right bank, and to endeavour to discover the true course of the river to the north, and whether or not we were in the vicinity of the Bahr-el-Abyad.

No instruments being available during this reconnaissance, my calculations throughout were made solely with the aid of a small pocket compass and by means of taking the approximate rate of steamer and current, the former varying considerably according to the wood employed, and the latter by no means uniform. Consequently, it was not possible to accurately determine our position.

We left in two steel boats on the 12th November, the steamers remaining anchored in the lagoon. The general direction taken was northerly. To the west of our course the line of the river was clearly denoted by a line of papyrus, with intervals of free water, running in a north-north-westerly direction through the apparently endless expanse of water-grass.

Progress through the latter in the boats was extremely slow. The road ahead was made by some fifteen men beating down the grass, when the boats were able to follow, being towed by ropes and propelled with long poles at the rate of nearly 500 yards an hour.

This reconnaissance across the marshes, during which we twice struck free portions of the river—which, however, only extended for some 1,500 yards in each case—was continued until the 25th November, during which I calculated we had made 20 miles in a northerly direction, but as yet there was no indication of the White Nile. Food, however, began to run out, and we were obliged to retrace our route to the steamers, in order to return 60 miles south and purchase a fresh supply from the village of Hellet Nuehr.

As the inundations apparently continued without diminution of depth to the north, Commandant Henry and myself decided that it would be best to return south for food, and then to make a more complete reconnaissance to the north, in order to approximately determine the extent to which the river was actually unnavigable, owing to the sudd.

The steamers were reached on the 1st December, with the loss of two Congolese, who died from the effects of the severe work in hauling the boats, which necessitated the men being in the water from sunrise to sunset each day, wet bivouacs on papyrus, and the necessarily small rations to which they were subjected during the last six days of the return journey.

One of my detachment down with fever, and another from abscesses caused by the cuts inflicted by poisonous grass.

On the 3rd December, during journey south towards Hellet Nuehr, we met the whole of the French detachment of Shambe and outlying stations recently occupied by them coming down stream in canoes.

Lieutenant de Tonquedec informed me that all the forts in the Bahr-el-Gazel country and on the Bahr-el-Jebel had been evacuated, and that nearly two months having elapsed since our departure from Shambe, he had concluded that the steamers had successfully negotiated the sudd, and he had, consequently, decided to return to France viâ the Nile as the shortest and easiest route.

On learning the state of affairs, however, he decided to continue with us, after having purchased sufficient food for the purpose.

On the 20th December the combined British, French, and Congo detachments started on a further reconnaissance north, following the same route as was taken by the first.

Captain de Rennette, after suffering for some weeks from sciatica and rheumatism, the result of exposure in the marshes, was invalided to Kero, for which purpose I placed the launch "Kenia" at his disposal, which was to return to that post in charge of Mr. Mulders, Engineer to Congo State, together with two of my detachment as wood-cutters, and some sick and wounded Congolese, also invalided.

In the meantime the "Vankerckhoven" was anchored 20 miles north of Hellet Nuehr, in the Nile, where she will remain with a six months' supply of food as a base.

The "Kenia" having communicated with Fort Berkeley, will eventually return to the "Vankerckhoven," and both steamers will remain in this part of the river till the 30th March, 1900, when they will return to their respective stations in charge of Mr. Mulders, should no news be received of the boat reconnaissance in the meanwhile.

This arrangement will enable them to return before the commencement of the

rainy season, and thus insure them against any risk of their retreat south being cut by sudd, since during the dry season the latter is never met with in movement.

To return to the boat reconnaissance. Two months' food supply was taken. The men were now in splendid health and vigour, having had twelve days' complete rest at Hellet Nuehr, where eight hippopotami and one elephant had been shot as food, the meat of which was dried and put in the boat with the dhurra.

In the first eight days the route, which had already been made by the first reconnaissance, was comparatively easy, but for the eight ensuing days the work for the men was severe, the water in the marshes having sunk 3 inches, and the water-grass being intermixed with almost impassable papyrus roots, over which the boats had to be hauled one at a time.

Finally, on the 5th January, the Bahr-el-Jebel was struck at point 4 on the map, where a free waterway was found for a distance of 1,000 yards, when the course was again blocked by a barrage 500 to 600 yards in length, half of which was considerably compressed forming a solid mass, like *terra firma*, under which the current flowed sluggishly.

On the afternoon of the 7th January, free water was again reached after two days' work, in cutting a passage through the right bank, where the inundation gave sufficient depth of water to float the boats.

This further stretch of water, which was the true course of the river, as was the last, continued for a distance of 2½ miles, when another barrage was encountered of much the same character as the last one, and 800 yards in length.

Four days were occupied here in cutting a passage between the bank and the sudd and free water was found the other side. This continued for 13 miles. As usual, wherever the river is free of sudd a magnificent channel, 70 yards to 100 yards broad and the uniform depth. A further barrage was here encountered, which proved to be 900 yards in length.

During the second night here the barrage was observed to be in movement, and the boats became badly jammed between the barrage and the papyrus, which formed the right bank; this necessitated an extra day's work in cutting them out.

Four days' work at this block again brought us to open water, which continued as before for nearly 14 miles, when it was again blocked.

This was most discouraging to the men, as it was impossible to guess how many more of these barrages we should find ahead, but, with their customary cheerfulness, they commenced cutting again, the following morning. (18th January.)

According to information brought in by a reconnaissance on foot, this barrage was some 1,200 yards in length and exceedingly solid.

Half way across the current plunged underneath with considerable violence carrying islands of sudd with it.

This was quite the most formidable block encountered; the banks were *terra firma* instead of the usual marshes; and the river was evidently completely dammed through its depth and breadth, with the exception of this one portion, under which the water poured like a cataract, and in which no boat could live.

During the night of the 18th, 100 yards of the rear portion of the barrage was carried under this passage by the force of the current.

Fortunately, owing to former experience our cutting of the previous day had been made close in to the bank, or the consequences as regards the boats might have been serious.

On the morning of the 19th a procession of sudd continued to arrive from the south and pass underneath the barrage, and from this I concluded that the last barrage which we had met and which was already on the move when we passed through it, had burst and was coming away in pieces.

At 9 A.M. on the 10th, a steamer was reported at the north end, which proved to be the "Tamai," to the great relief of all concerned. We had still twenty days' food left for the men, but the maps in our possession (Major Marchand's and Junkir's), both small scales, having proved absolutely unreliable and not according in anyway with our several calculations as to our position, it had become impossible to even approximately determine our whereabouts, and the continual encountering of fresh barrages was most discouraging for the men after the severe work they had already undergone.

Eventually I compared my own rough sketch with that of Colonel Gordon in possession of Lieutenant Fell, Royal Navy, and was immediately able to recognize our whereabouts, the turns of the river shown, with one exception, being almost identical with those on my sketch, which proves that the old course of the river remains the same.

General Observations on the Sudd.

During the four months that I was in the sudd I was able to observe on several occasions how a barrage is formed, and in practice how easily one is removed, within a short time of its formation.

During the months of September, October, and November, when severe storms of wind and rain were still prevalent, large masses of sudd were continually passing down the river. These latter are apparently blown into the current during a storm, either from the numerous lagoons which are so constantly found on either bank of the river between Shambe and 9° north latitude, or from the actual banks of papyrus, between which the river flows.

This sudd consists of islands of papyrus, which attach themselves to each other on their voyage down the river, which becoming entangled, form formidable masses, often blocking up the whole breadth of the river, and vary from 50 to as much as 400 yards in length.

A mass of sudd thus formed generally continues to move on where the current is uniform and the river broad; but immediately a narrow portion or shallow water such as is found in the newly-formed passages is reached it forms a block. In the former case the mass is then much compressed by the current flowing up with great force behind, and which is occasionally sufficiently strong to force it on with the larger masses however the current jams them with great force between the banks, and the sudd being unable to compress sufficiently a barrage is formed.

In the meanwhile, the water being unable to continue on the surface, forces itself underneath, often carrying with it fresh islands of papyrus.

These latter, catching in the long roots of the papyrus, forming the first part of the block, and their natural buoyancy likewise forcing them upwards, increase the depth of the barrage and solidify it. In the course of months it is probable that through a continuous arrival of fresh papyrus a solid dam is formed, such as the last one encountered by the reconnaissance, and which requires considerable time and labour to disengage.

In the case of a mass of sudd encountering shallow water or even a single island of papyrus, its course is immediately arrested in spite of the current by the roots varying from 3 feet to 10 feet in length, and as much as 10 inches in diameter) catching in the muddy soil of the river bed.

These form the most serious barrages of all, and it is undoubtedly preferable, when cutting, to leave these alone and find the true river recognizable, by its depth, before commencing operations. On the occasion of our cutting a passage (*vide* diary pages 12 to 14) and the chief difficulty was the want of water, since we were not working in the true bed, and consequently three times the work, which would otherwise have been necessary, was required to cut away the papyrus root by root from the bottom, which was carried out by men diving with saws for the purpose.

Twice during the reconnaissance the retreat south for the steamers was temporarily cut by the formation of new barrages, which with the food and wood difficulties, was of always somewhat serious import.

On both occasions, however, they had not sufficient time to solidify and were opened in nine or ten hours by means of dragging the islands which formed the point of resistance (generally in the corners) into the current by an anchor, the steamer going full speed astern. This accomplished, the whole mass came away with the current with great force; nearly 2 miles of river was freed in this manner, on one occasion, from the middle of November until the 20th December, when the reconnaissance finally left this portion of the river and took to the marshes, not a single island of sudd was seen floating down stream, which was a great contrast to the state of the river in September and October, when day and night it was constantly floating down in large masses.

From this I should imagine that the only period when the formation of barrages is to be apprehended would be during the rainy season, May until November. During the rest of the year, there not being sufficient depth of water in the lagoons to float the papyrus, it remains anchored, and the river is like any ordinary one and absolutely secure from barrages. The sudd remains stationary until the rise of the Nile and the severe wind storms of the rainy season force it in large quantities into the river.

I am quite convinced that with a fortnightly, or even three-weekly steamer service, during the rainy season on the Bahr-el-Jebel, between Lake No and Shambe, this fine

river need never again be seriously blocked, when once opened up, throughout its true course.

From the somewhat rough calculations I was able to make, I would conclude that the Bahr-el-Jebel is at present unnavigable, owing to the various barrages for a distance of 55 miles, at the most, of which there is in all probability some 10 miles of actual sudd to be cut or removed, the remaining distance being open portions of the river. I conclude this from my own experience of the parts of the river between the two points where it is unnavigable, III and IV on map, 34 miles out of which I have personally reconnoitred.

The remaining portion we were obliged to avoid by means of the marshes, or we should not have had sufficient food to arrive at the northern end of the block. Of these 34 miles, roughly 4 miles was actual sudd, distributed at intervals, of sometimes a mile and at others as much as 13 miles, the intervening spaces being free waterway.

During the journey we cut into eight separate free portions of the river. On these grounds I base the presumption that the unexplored portion is blocked in a similar manner, and that it does not consist of one uninterrupted mass of sudd, which I have not yet met with to so great an extent during the reconnaissance.

There is a pronounced contrast between the sudd where it commences, and that forming the last four barrages. At the former place the solid compressed appearance, so conspicuous in the latter is not so apparent, which would denote that the former has only been formed lightly. Eight times the steel boats were hauled across the sudd at the southern end in reconnaissance, &c. Across the four latter portions this was found to be impossible and a passage had to be cut each time. Hauling across was only feasible when the weight of the boats and men were able to partly submerge the sudd, and thus partly float the boats.

Consequently I should imagine that the four barrages above mentioned, some 2,500 yards in length in all, once overcome, the remainder of the block should not present any serious difficulties as work would be greatly aided by the current bringing away the sudd in large portions, when the resisting portion of each barrage has been removed.

The present extraordinary depth of inundation (3 feet to 4 feet) in the surrounding marshes at the commencement of the sudd, is undoubtedly due to the abnormal state of the river at this point. The huge volume of water continuously arriving from the south, being unable owing to the sudd to pass in sufficient quantities along its true course, forces its way into the water pass on either side. This was evident by the numerous, slight, but perceptible currents, observed in the marshes and invariably running north. I was unable to even approximate the lateral extent of these inundations, but by the uniform appearance of the country they evidently extend to a great distance.

The water here sank 3 inches during the time that elapsed between the first and second reconnaissances in the boat (December 25th) but as a similar fall was recorded at Hellet Nuehr on the 18th December, it is probable that this was a uniform decrease, throughout both river and marshes.

It must be remembered that during 1899 practically no rain fell in the southern equatorial provinces, and from my personal observations at Fort Berkeley, the river in September of that year was lower than it had been even at the end of the dry season of the same year; consequently during the reconnaissance the Bahr-el-Jebel was probably at its lowest.

It is difficult, therefore, to account for these inundations if they are not caused by the barrage. Again, 60 miles south of the sudd the country which is of precisely the same character, was very slightly inundated on our first arrival in September and latterly it was quite dry.

It would appear therefore that an immense volume of water is being lost in inundations on both banks of the river in the neighbourhood of the sudd. These extend for an unknown distance into the interior, on both banks, the water gradually shallowing as the end of the barrages is reached.

An indication that these inundations are abnormal is that all mimosa trees encountered in these marshes were dead, while others on *terra firma* were generally living at this season. Those trees must originally have been on *terra firma*, but have died from a permanent inundation of several years. It seems probable therefore that, on the removal of the sudd, a large volume of water will be released from these marshes, and return into the river bed, which should cause a pronounced rise further north.

With the exception of a few shallow passages between Gondo Koru and Shambe

the difficulties of steamer navigation are nil; from Gondokoro, south to Fort Berkeley, navigation is dangerous during the dry season owing to rocks, and especially between the latter place and Regafe, where they are numerous.

If buoyed out this portion of the river would be perfectly navigable. Rocks do not exist north of Gondokoro. The river south from Shambe could never be blocked with sudd. The passage is too broad and current too strong, and sudd is not met with on this reach.

Wood.—Scarce between Hellet Nuehr and Lake No, fairly plentiful further south.

Game.—Saw none between Bohr and Lake No, with the exception of elephant at Hellet Nuehr.

Junction with Bahr-el-Jebel blocked near Shambe, and no communication could be found.

Nothing seen of the ship, natives near Bohr report her sunk there, together with a quantity of ivory.

Those further north reported her sunk in Lake Pamelwal, a large expanse of water on the left bank between Bohr and Shambe, I searched everywhere in the Kenia without finding any trace of her. Water very shallow in lake (3 feet), so I should imagine this report cannot be true.

On two occasions these villages were visited for the purpose of purchasing food supplies for men of the reconnaissance.

There is a deviation running from point 2 on the map, with a strong current but shallow water, not navigable for large steamers; general direction north-north-west 20 miles down stream are found several villages scattered on both banks.

Every attempt was made to enter into friendly relations with these people, the Nuehr, but without avail, and several times they endeavoured to attack the camp at night. The Congo State lost one man killed on this occasion and another was wounded. They are exceedingly rich in cattle and sheep and their villages were well stored with dhurra and tobacco. None of them were killed or wounded to my knowledge during our sojourn there; it was necessary to fire a few shots one night to keep them from spear-throwing distance. Trades goods were left as payment of all food taken.

Derivation swarms with hippopotami; it continues for nearly 40 miles from its junction with Nile and is then blocked.

(*Vide* reconnaissance of ditto diary, p. 42.)

On the 19th January, having met Major Peake 15 miles south of Lake No, the reconnaissance came to an end, I gave him all the information I could concerning the sudd. He instructed me to proceed to Omdurman with the French and Congo State detachments.

Attached—

1. Sick Report, Dr. A. D. Milne.
2. Instructions in duplicate issued by me to Mr. Mulders in temporary charge of Uganda Protectorate launch "Kenia."
3. Statement of repairs carried out by Mr. G. Mulders on steam-ship "Kenia" and engineer's certificate.
4. Name and address of assistant employed by me to work launch.
5. Memorandum of services rendered by individuals of detachment of Uganda Protectorate during reconnaissance.
6. Reasons in writing for carrying out reconnaissance.
7. Lieutenant-Colonel Martyr's instructions to Major Tickell.
8. Diary of reconnaissance giving details of work done, &c.
9. Duplicate copy of instructions left with Sergeant Osborne, R.H.A., in temporary command at Fort Berkeley.
10. Rough sketch showing routes of reconnaissance, &c., from 7° 23′ north latitude to 9° 22′ north latitude.

Attached instructions were those sent by Lieutenant-Colonel Martyr to Major Tickell early in 1899.

Major Tickell was soon afterwards taken seriously ill with blackwater fever, and finally invalided to England, leaving me in command of Fort Berkeley. He handed me these as my authority for reconnoitring northwards, if I considered it advisable.

On the 8th September, 1899, Commandant Henry arrived at Fort Berkeley unexpectedly, and informed me that he had just returned from a trial trip in their steamer down the river, and that he believed they had arrived in the neighbourhood of Lake No, at the entrance to which there was a "barrage," which he considered would require ten days' work to open up.

Since he was good enough to place a steel boat at my disposal to carry the necessary

supplies for my detachment, and that he considered that the steam-ship "Kenia" would prove exceedingly useful for reconnaissances and in obtaining wood and food supplies, I considered it my duty to seize so favourable an opportunity of gaining information as to the extent of the sudd and the time required to open up the river. Commandant Henry further urged on me the necessity, in his opinion, of leaving at once on the reconnaissance before the river should sink any lower.

I therefore decided to take the responsibility of endeavouring to carry out Colonel Martyr's instructions without the delay of fourteen days or more, which would have been necessary to obtain the further sanction of the Officer Commanding Nile district, whose whereabouts at that time were very vague.

Further, my term of engagement in Uganda was already completed, and I had received information that Captain Dugmore, Uganda Rifles, was already in the Protectorate on his way up to relieve me.

The company which I then had the honour to command had been paid by me up to date, the monthly store accounts and pay lists had been dispatched to headquarters, and 10,000 lbs. of dhurra stored in the fort, the building of which was just completed.

The country being perfectly quiet and peaceful, I considered that, under the circumstances, I should be justified in leaving Sergeant Osborne, R.H.A., a non-commissioned officer, in whom I had the greatest confidence, in temporary command of Fort Berkeley until Captain Dugmore's arrival.

I handed him attached written instructions.

I did not see my way to taking a stronger force of men with me, since it was not advisable to materially weaken the garrison of the fort, every man of which was required for the constant escort duties inseparable from caravans, food buying, &c.

The Protectorate launch "Kenia," as I have already mentioned, returned to open up communication with Fort Berkeley and the Congo State Post at Kero. She was then to rejoin the "Vankerckhoven," which is anchored 20 miles north of the village of Hellet Nuehr, and to remain there until the 30th March, 1900, when the two steamers will return in company, with Mr. Mulders, a most capable man, in charge. Commandant Henry left a sufficient guard of men.

I should wish to conclude my Report by bringing to your notice the great assistance rendered to me on this reconnaissance by Commandant Henry, of the Congo State. Without his kind offer to place a boat at my disposal it would not have been possible for me to have pushed my part of the reconnaissance further than 8° 34′ north latitude, where the sudd commences, and I should have been obliged to return to Fort Berkeley without any definite information regarding the extent of the block.

It was almost entirely owing to the excellent observatory erected on the "Vankerckhoven" that we were enabled to decide on the necessary routes across the sudd and marshes.

He also, on several occasions, placed at my disposal, the invaluable services of his European engineer, Mr. Mulders; as also those of an assistant native engineer, to work the launch, there being no one at Fort Berkeley competent to do so.

The latter worked the "Kenia" together with the Protectorate stoker throughout the whole voyage, and will continue to do so until the "Kenia" returns to Fort Berkeley. I was forced to accept the services of both Mr. Mulders and the assistant, the former to carry out occasional necessary repairs on the launch.

There was no engineer at Fort Berkeley when I left, and consequently I was obliged to choose between leaving her behind to rust, or take her with me and risk a certain amount of expense in keeping her in working order.

I chose the latter alternative, believing that, as in any case the pay of an engineer must be provided for in the estimates, any reward considered necessary to Mr. Mulders in this case would not entail any additional expense to Her Majesty's Government, inclusive of the wages (30*s*. per month) which I engaged should be paid to the assistant who worked the launch.

The latter I engaged from the 14th September, 1899, until the "Kenia" is handed over to Officer Commanding Fort Berkeley.

Throughout the whole voyage Commandant Henry, and his officers, and non-commissioned officers rendered me every assistance in their power.

It was also in a great measure due to the additional force under Lieutenant de Tonquedec, whose men worked magnificently in the sudd, that we were enabled to get through when we did.

I attach a statement of repairs carried out by Mr. Mulders, engineer to the "Kenia." On several occasions during the voyage there were slight breakdowns in her machinery

such as boiler, tubes leaking, engines thumping, steering gear breaking, &c., further repair of which the services of an experienced engineer were essential.

Mr. Mulders was always most ready and willing on these occasions to render any assistance he could, and he himself carried out the necessary repairs most thoroughly. The work he did was invaluable, and the launch could certainly not have been kept in working order without him.

James Grover is the assistant I have already mentioned who worked the launch. He proved a very capable, willing, and hardworking man, and he gave me every satisfaction in the performance of his duties.

Address: c/o Mr. Martison, King Street, Accra.

Thomas Fulsome, carpenter on "Vankerckhoven," carried out one or two jobs on the "Kenia" with every satisfaction.

Address: c/o T. C. Vaughan, Lagos.

James Graham has requested me to mention that he worked at Bedden for a month in December 1898 at putting the "Kenia" together. This was during Colonel Martyr's expedition.

I can certify to his having worked well on this occasion. He also is in the service of the Congo Free State.

Address: Officers' Mess, c/o Francis Wolfe, Accra.

Of the British detachment I would bring most favourably to notice the services rendered by the following during the reconnaissance:—

Dr. A. D. Milne of the Uganda Protectorate rendered invaluable service, not only to the men of the British detachment, but also to those of the French and Congo State. He has been indefatigable in his care of the sick throughout, and that under the most unfavourable circumstances a man of his profession could be in, medical stores were by no means abundant, and the difficulties in that respect with which he had to contend, and the circumstances under which he had to treat some serious cases were exceedingly trying. It was in a great measure owing to his devotion and care of the men that their morale was so excellent, when at one time a great deal of sickness prevailed, owing to short rations, severe work, and sleepless nights, due to mosquitoes and wet camps.

In the last reconnaissance across the marshes his services were required most urgently on two occasions, one of my detachment being seriously ill with pneumonia, and a Congo soldier dangerously ill and delirious with fever, during which he made a most determined attempt to stab Sous-Officier Salpin with a knife.

Both these men are now quite recovered, owing to Dr. Milne's care and skill; without his aid they would have stood very little chance of recovery.

In circumstances which occasionally arose when the men were inclined momentarily to discouragement and depression, his cheerful influence with them was invaluable.

In fact, from more than his own professional point of view his services have been most valuable and essential; without him the sick list would undoubtedly have been serious.

He accompanied the reconnaissance entirely on his own responsibility, considering that his services would be more urgently required in the marshes of the Bahr-el-Jebel than at Fort Berkeley, where the health of the troops had been most satisfactory.

I feel sure also that M. de Tonquedec and Commandant Henry feel all my sentiments of gratitude and appreciation of his care of their men.

Mulazim Tani Fadlmoulah No. 2 Company Uganda Rifles. This officer has carried out his duties most conscientiously throughout.

He is exceedingly energetic and zealous, and to his good example and strict insistence on discipline throughout a somewhat trying work for soldiers, was in a great measure due to the cheerful demeanour, good morale, and hard-working qualities shown by the men of the detachment throughout the reconnaissance. I always found him a most reliable officer and intelligent and persevering.

Onbashi Baballah Rehan No. 2 Company, Uganda Rifles, an exceedingly zealous non-commissioned officer, and indefatigable in the performance of his duties. It was entirely on him that I had to rely for the superintending of details of work in which part of the detachments were occasionally engaged during my absence on reconnaissances, and he carried out his duties in a most satisfactory manner. He has several

times been down with fever, and once with a somewhat severe attack of dysentery, but he never stayed away from his work an hour longer than was absolutely necessary. He is a thorough soldier and full of enterprise and has shown most sterling qualities throughout the voyage. I cannot too strongly recommend him for promotion.

I feel sure he would make a most competent sergeant.

Nafar Allajahi Ali, No. 2 Company, Uganda Rifles.
Nafar Allajahi Mohammed No. 2 Company, Uganda Rifles.
Nafar Been Bakheit, No. 2 Company, Uganda Rifles.
Nafar Marhum Mahomed, No. 2 Company, Uganda Rifles.
Nafar Oman Juma, No. 13 Company, Uganda Rifles.
Nafar Murghan Abderrahman, No. 13 Company, Uganda Rifles.
Nafar Ibrahim Idies, No. 13 Company, Uganda Rifles.
Nafar Abderham Mustafa, No. 13 Company, Uganda Rifles.

The above men who are mentioned in order of merit have been through a most trying ordeal for soldiers. With the exception of Been Bakheit and Murghan Abderrahman, they were for seventy-four days working in the water usually from 8 A.M. to 4 P.M., and the same number of nights they were bivouacked on the sudd, and occasionally in the marshes, there being no sudd to sleep on, were obliged to be crammed into the boats with the Europeans.

It is needless to detail a bivouac on the sudd, comfort of any sort is out of the question, and the only chance of keeping dry is to cut the reeds and pile them up in order to form a bed.

The discomfort of loading from the boats to form a camp on the papyrus after a hard day's work, the difficulties of cooking, and all the details, which need no description. Suffice it to say that I never heard a murmur from a single man, and they were always cheerful under discouragement.

The food question for them was the hardest; there was only white dhurra obtainable, and since there was only one grinding-stone available for both them and the Belgians, they were constantly condemned to cook it whole with the most disastrous effects.

Being accustomed only to red dhurra, they were consequently suffering from continual diarrhœa, which invariably followed a meal of unground white dhurra.

I wish to express most strongly my appreciation of their services on this reconnaissance, and of the courageous and determined manner in which they have worked under most trying circumstances.

Murghan Ali, stoker to "Kenia":

This man did splendid work on the launch. He was indefatigable in his work, in spite of his age, and took the greatest interest in the working of the launch, so much so he is now quite capable of running her himself without assistance, provided no serious repairs are necessary. He originally arrived in Equatoria with Sir S. Baker, and was consequently able to give useful information at times. His present wages are only 22 r. 8 a. per month, and considering the work he has done and the quick way in which he has picked up knowledge of the machinery, I would strongly recommend him to receive the same pay as a sergeant in the Uganda Rifles, viz., 40 rupees per month.

He has very hard work to keep the ship clean all by himself, and he always carries it out most satisfactorily.

He is quite capable of taking charge of the launch on short journeys, when breakdowns of a serious nature would be improbable.

Trusting that I have not in any way caused unnecessary expense to Her Majesty's Government, I have, &c.

(Signed) MORETON F. GAGE, *Captain,*
7th Dragoon Guards.

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

Instructions to Captain Tickell, D.S.O., Commanding Fort Berkeley.

(Strictly Confidential.)

WITH reference to the instructions I left with you regarding a reconnaissance on the Bahr-el-Jebel, to endeavour to recover the steamer said to have been left by the

Dervishes in their retreat from Bor, in a sub-stream of the Bahr-el-Jebel, near Akwak, and which instructions I am obliged to cancel owing to the probability of the steam-launch being required on this reach of the river, as you now know, the launch is to remain for service at Bedden.

The reconnaissance as already directed can now be carried out by you as you may think fit, with the additional objects of—

1. Ascertaining where the sudd or block in the Bahr-el-Jebel commences.
2. Ascertaining how far the Bahr-el-Zeraf is navigable.

As the Bahr-el-Zeraf is in the Nuehr country, it is possible you may prevail on them to take a letter through to the Anglo-Egyptian force at the mouth of the Sobat. I therefore inclose a letter U.F.S., and you should add any intelligence you may obtain regarding the state of the river, for the information of the Officer Commanding Sobat.

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson commands at Fashoda, and Major Maxse at Sobat.

In giving you these instructions I rely on your discretion as to whether you carry them out in full or in part only, or whether you undertake them at all. Much depends on local circumstances, state of river, launch engineers, weather, &c.

I place confidence in your knowledge of the country and of the troops under you, and rely on your not undertaking any further expedition for which we are not prepared, for which more troops are required, and which might lead to embarrassment.

Kindly furnish report as to your departure, and as to what you consider you will be able to undertake of these instructions.

(Signed) CYRIL MARTYR, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Nile District.*

Afriddo, March 23, 1899.

Inclosure 6 in No. 1.

SICK Report of the Detachment of Uganda Rifles, under Captain Gage, from September 9, 1899, to February 6, 1900.

Name of Disease.	Number of Cases.	Total Number of Days off Duty.
Malarial fever	8	19
Dysentery	5	27
Diarrhœa and colic	11	5
Poisoned wounds	1	14
Catarrhal ophthalmia	1	8
Boils	1	12
Burns and minor accidents	14	2
Pleuro-pneumonia	1	21
Bronchitis	2	2
Muscular rheumatism	2	2
Grand total	46	112

Nearly all the diseases were directly due to the peculiar nature of the country traversed. Bad camps and the impossibility of properly cooking the food were responsible for most of the cases of illness. In the floating islands of papyrus or water grass, which formed the usual halting places, the men were often unable to obtain sufficient brake to form a bed high enough to keep the water out, and in the morning would awake to find all their garments soaking. Added to this, a heavy dew at night would complete the wetting of such garments not already soaked by the water under the grass. Fuel for cooking the grain and dried rations of hippo. meat was the withered papyrus stems; and with no proper means of suspending the pots, and without cooking stones to support them, the men suffered constantly from indigestion. To these facts,

plus the chills from the intense coldness of the nights, the abdominal troubles were traceable.

One precautionary measure adopted of rubbing the men's bodies with hippo, fat seemed to have a twofold value in preserving the skin against the macerating action of being all day long in the water, and also as preventive against the irritating effects of a certain kind of water grass. Cuts from this gave rise to destructive abscesses.

There were two cases of fever with high temperature, but otherwise the attacks were of short duration—one to three days—and were surprisingly few in number.

The health of the white officers of the party was excellent from start to finish.

(Signed) A. D. MILNE, M.B., *Senior Medical Officer, the Nile District, Uganda Protectorate, in Medical charge of the Detachment.*

Gunboat "Kaibar," February 6, 1900.

Inclosure 7 in No. 1.

Instructions issued to Mr. G. Mulders, Engineer, in temporary charge of steam-ship "Kenia."

SINCE you have kindly consented, with the permission of Commandant Henry, to place your services temporarily at my disposal to work Her Majesty's steam-ship "Kenia" to Kero, you will be good enough to carry out the following instructions as far as you are able:—

1. *En route*, with your necessarily small escort, to avoid camping in the neighbourhood of any villages. If it is absolutely necessary to do so for wood, the latter must, if possible, be cut by day, and your camp formed in a good position, with necessary sentinels at a distance from the village.

It is unnecessary to remind you of the treacherous nature of natives, when dealing with small parties of soldiers, however friendly they may appear.

2. On arrival at Kero you will kindly forward immediately, if possible, accompanying despatches. Await arrival of necessaries for steamer, &c., from Fort Berkeley, and carry out any slight repairs you may consider necessary. Making a careful note of any expense caused to the Congo State, in the use of materials, &c., at Kero, which may be sanctioned by the Commandant at that place, for which I will hold myself responsible.

3. As soon as possible after you have carried out these instructions you will be good enough to return to the base north of Rejan (Hellet Nuehr), and await my return from reconnaissance.

4. On arrival at latter place, if the reconnaissance has not returned, I should wish you, if possible, to patrol the river towards the north, avoiding the sudd, in order to tow the steel boats up-stream, if you should meet us. Every ten or fifteen days would be a convenient interval for these patrols.

5. On the 30th March, 1900, the two steamers will return south to Kero, if the reconnaissance has not returned, and I should feel much obliged if you would further conduct the "Kenia" to Fort Berkeley.

6. I leave the "Kenia," and the three stokers I am sending with her, entirely in your charge and under your command, respectively, and the latter will carry out all orders given by you personally.

(Signed) MORETON F. GAGE, *Lieutenant, Uganda Rifles.*

December 21, 1899. *N. Lat.* 8°.

Inclosure 8 in No. 1.

Instructions left with Sergeant G. Osborne, R.H.A., in temporary Command at Fort Berkeley.

I AM leaving Fort Berkeley to-day, on a reconnaissance north, in company with Commandant Henry, to endeavour to open up the route to Omdurman. You will be in temporary command of this station during my absence, and will reply as far as you are able to all correspondence addressed to Officer Commanding Fort Berkeley.

The following, as far as is compatible with circumstances, should be the daily routine of parades and fatigues :—

6 A.M. to 7 A.M. Parade.
8 A.M. to 11 A.M. Fatigue, Government work, clearing ground, improving fort, &c.
2·30 P.M. to 5·30 P.M. Men building their own houses.

Once a month a section thirty strong, all ranks included, twenty rounds, to proceed to buy food. If any difficulties should arise with natives, the arrangement of such should await my arrival, or that of any officer of the Uganda Rifles, if you are unable to settle them. If urgent you must communicate immediately with Officer Commanding Nile District, and await his instructions. A mail to leave twice monthly, or anyhow a small escort to conduct trades goods, &c., from A. Fu so and so, to this station.

You will check and enter in writing the amount of any trades goods or clothing for the men which may arrive at the station. Punishment of soldiers for any offence must await the arrival of an officer. If urgent, you must communicate with Officer Commanding Nile.

You will keep a note of any issue of food or trades goods from Government store. You will make a note of any official correspondence received, and of your replies thereto. It is impossible to say how long I shall be away, but if the reconnaissance is not successful I shall probably be back within a month. If any untoward circumstances should arrive, which these instructions do not cover, you must act entirely according to your judgment.

(Signed) MORETON F. GAGE, *Lieutenant, Uganda Rifles, Commanding Fort Berkeley.*

September 9, 1899.

Report of Work and Repairs done while on Expedition and while as Engineer Inspector in charge of Congo State Steamer "Vankerckhoven."

Injector opened, examined, ground, cleaned and refit.

Opened feed pump on engine and given it more stroke to save fuel. Changed steering gear from left to right handed. Fitted two new steel wire leaders on steering gear quadrant, which were used up, and fixed quadrant on rudder, which had worked loose. Repaired bottom of launch hold. Put seat on steering gear for helmsman. Made and fitted new flagstaff. Repacked four stay tubes in boiler furnace which leaked badly. Put new asbestos packing in all glands. Lifted slide valves $\frac{1}{8}$ in. and $\frac{3}{16}$ in. to stop engines from thumping.

Beached steam-launch, lifted rudder, fitted new bush in rudder post, examined propeller and shaft, taken up after-poop deck, fitted in new cross-beam, and fitted new bolts in steering lead rollers and lined up quadrant of rudder, and fixed it permanently, refitted after-poop deck. Overhauled and adjusted all engine bearings, examined pistons, lined up and refitted all valve link motion pins. Cleaned boiler.

Gave 14 gallons of marine engine oil. Lend one of my apprentice engineers to act as driver.

(Signed) G. W. MULDERS, *Inspector Engineer.*

To the Commander of
Her Majesty's Steam-launch "Kenia."

Gerard Wilhelmus Mulders, born in Rotterdam (Netherlands), the 19th May, 1860. Served as apprentice in Rotterdam "Establishment Feyenoord" for over three years as a journeyman mechanic at Walker Strouck and Van Delden. Served two years on the West Coast of Africa as an engineer for the "Afrikaansche Handels Vereeniging." Served as an engineer three years and some months in the Rotterdam Lloyd. Obtained Second Engineer's certificate in England, No. 23981. Served three years in the Company of Gellatley, Hankey, Sewell. Sailed in steam-ship "Janon" of Whitby, eighteen months.

Petroleum boats from Antwerp to New York, &c., two years.

Obtained my First Class Engineer's certificate in England, No. 23988. Apply to Registrar-General of Seamen, Lower Thames Street, London.

Obtained Highest Engineer's Certificate in America, *i.e.*, Chief Engineer on ocean steamers. Apply to Norfolk (Virginia) Inspector of Steam.

For over three years Free Congo State doing the duty of an Inspector Engineer, Boma, Leopoldville, and the Nile, where I launched engines and fitted paddle-steamer "Vankerckhoven."

Address: 115, Rue Brederode, Antwerp, Belgium; or General Post Office, Antwerp.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Captain Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 10, 1900.)

(No. 70.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, December* 28, 1899.

WITH reference to No. 42, Confidential, of the 26th May last, I have the honour to report that the Emperor Menelek has granted to Mr. Lane, the representative of a British Syndicate, a Mining Concession in Beni Schongul of which I shall have the honour to forward a copy in a subsequent despatch.

I cannot but look on His Majesty's attitude in this affair as a valuable proof of his friendly intention towards Her Majesty's Government.

The only other Concession ever granted by His Majesty is that held by M. Ilg to build a railway from the borders of the French Colony of Jibuti to Harrar. I have been reliably informed that permission to construct this railway was only granted by the Emperor after M. Ilg had discussed the matter with him for fifteen years.

Several attempts have been made of late to obtain Mining Concessions from His Majesty on behalf of foreign capitalists, but they have hitherto been refused.

The rapidity with which the negotiations have been concluded appears to be another indication that His Majesty really is desirous of showing his friendly intentions towards Her Majesty's Government. Mr. Lane had not been here quite a month before he obtained a Concession, which he considers in every way most satisfactory.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 10.)

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, February* 10, 1900.

WITH reference to the recent disturbances at Omdurman, I hear from Sirdar that troops are giving in ammunition by degrees, and he considers that the men really find it difficult to discover the exact spots where they buried it.

(Confidential)

No. 961 E.A.

× A copy of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department for information.

By order, &c
(sd) J.B. Wood
Under Secretary to the
Government of India
Foreign Department
Simla
the 5th May 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential prints: Section 1, dated the 16th February and 19th March, 1900.
Section 2, dated the 26th February 12th March 1900.

× With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 3474 of 1900.
Political Department
Bombay Castle, 14th May 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Hudson
Acting Secretary to Govt

MLC

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Intelligence Division to Foreign Office.—(*Received February* 16.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to draw attention to the inclosed extract from the "Times" of the 12th February, tending to show that M. Leontieff has already established an "effective occupation" in Lake Rudolf under the auspices of Menelek.

Sir John Ardagh is of opinion that this news, if true, is of great importance at this moment, which might well appear to Menelek as particularly opportune for pressing a settlement of the question of Abyssinian boundaries.

Although Lord Cromer's telegram Na. 3 of the 14th January tends to show that M. Leontieff has now been recalled by Menelek and is in disfavour, it appears to Sir John Ardagh very improbable that this fact will affect the question of the "effective occupation" of the northern districts round Lake Rudolf, since it is clearly to Menelek's interest to uphold it, as Sir John Ardagh pointed out in his note of the 21st December last.

Intelligence Division, War Office,
February 13, 1900.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Times" of February 12, 1900.

A MARSEILLES correspondent telegraphs :—

"M. Leontieff and his Senegalese arrived here to-day in the 'Ernest Simons.' He has given me some new details of his expeditions in behalf of Menelek. He states that posts and forts have been erected at the principal strategic points of the Equatorial Provinces and on Lake Rudolf. Senegalese have drilled the natives, who enlist with enthusiasm, and under the control of Europeans the country is being regularly governed.

"M. Leontieff showed me a catalogue of his wonderful ethnological collections, which will figure in the Jibuti pavilion of the International Exhibition. His maps show his survey of the River Oma, which rises in Besuma and receives the waters from the highest Ethiopian mountains before falling into Lake Rudolf. The river is already navigable at six days' march from Ain Abada, and its exploration opens up a new horizon for Jibuti. M. Leontieff is delighted with the results of his expedition. Questioned as to Menelek's impression of the Transvaal war, he states that the Negus means to abstain from any diversion. He is anxious by new undertakings to insure the welfare of his subjects and the independence of his territories. The Ethiopian Chiefs who accompany him extol his achievements. M. Leontieff will land to-night and start to-morrow for Paris."

Paris, February 11, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 22.)

My Lord, *Berbera, March* 1, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that the 2nd Battalion Central Africa Rifles, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel H. E. Brake, arrived at Berbera on the 27th ultimo, and disembarked the same day.

I attach the marching in state of the battalion.

There are several sick, and as I have but one hospital assistant here, and it is imperative that the battalion should not be left without medical relief, I advised the Officer Commanding to temporarily detain Lieutenant F. C. Heffernan, the medical officer who was detailed for duty with the regiment on its voyage from the Mauritius to Berbera.

Anticipating that possibly the regiment might have no camp equipage, I asked the Resident at Aden if he would kindly meet their requirements in this respect by lending tents from the Aden arsenal, as the regiment put in at that port. Unfortunately, plague broke out in the meanwhile at Aden, and the "Clive" was unable to hold any communication with the shore.

I have to-day telegraphed to your Lordship, asking if the War Office will supply the regiment with tents, &c. Their requirements are given me as fifty Indian Sepoys' pals, and twenty tents for officers. The latter are indispensable, and I have recommended African green canvas tents, similar to those advertised by the Army and Navy Co-operative Society as their No. 2.

As regards the men it would seem desirable that they should also be furnished with pals, as they cannot hut themselves, their movements will depend on circumstances, and the rainy season in the uplands will commence about the middle of April, if not earlier, with the uncertain weather we are having here. I recommend Sepoys' pals as the best suited for a large number of men in this country.

Owing to the plague in Aden the "Clive" could not coal, and consequently had to leave Berbera the day of her arrival. It rained heavily during the disembarkation, and as a bivouac in the open was out of the question, such temporary shelter as could be found was afforded the battalion in our police lines, which were cleared for the purpose, in Masjids, and in such houses and huts as were available. The Sikhs were quartered with the detachment of native infantry in the Zariba.

The battalion will move to Syk as soon as arrangements for its march, and the purchase of certain necessaries, are completed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

MARCHING in State of the 2nd Battalion Central Africa Rifles, Berbera, Somaliland.

		Europeans.			Indians.		Africans.				Women.	Children.	Creoles.	Africans.	Animals.		Remarks.
		Officers.	Officer attached R.A.M.C.	Warrant Officer.	Sikh Instructors.	Public Followers.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Buglers.	Privates.			Private Followers.	Private Followers.	Horses.	Dogs.	
Present.	On parade	14	1	1	30	5	20	33	31	737	196	82	3	3	3	4	
	In hospital	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	15	6	1	..	..	..	..	
	Attending hospital	1	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	19	4	2	..	..	.	..	
Absent.	Leave (sick)	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
	Mauritius	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	
	Total effective	16	1	1	30	5	20	34	31	777	206	85	3	3	3	4	

Berbera, February 27, 1900.

(Signed) H. E. BRAKE, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Commanding 2nd Battalion Central Africa Rifles.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 26.)

(No. 7.)

My Lord, *Berbera, February* 2, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to submit copy of a letter with inclosures, which I have received from the Acting Consul at Zeyla on the subject of a request made by a Russian, M. Jean Babitcheff, to import through Zeyla a supply of arms, which, apparently, Count Leontieff is procuring in the name of the Emperor Menelek.

I do not propose to allow these arms to be imported through our ports unless I hear from Her Majesty's Agent at Addis Abbaba, to whom I am sending a copy of the correspondence, that the Emperor has made a formal application to him in the matter.

It would seem probable that this consignment is required by Count Leontieff himself for the new Equatorial provinces. We can hardly view without concern the wholesale importation of arms into that portion of Africa, and though we cannot prevent arms reaching those districts, we need not facilitate their transit beyond what is required of us by our Treaty obligations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Acting Consul Harold to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 44.)

Sir, *Zeyla, January* 28, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that to-day a card, bearing the following name and particulars, was sent up to me with a message asking to name an hour at which the person mentioned thereon could call upon me: "Jean Babitcheff Mission," "Dedjaz, Count de Leontieff." I said that I would be glad to see M. Babitcheff in half-an-hour.

An hour before this it had been reported to me that a Russian had come to Zeyla from Djibouti, and that it was probable he had come to see me.

M. Babitcheff accordingly made his appearance, and presented me with a letter which he said was from Count Leontieff. I opened and read the letter, and herewith attach true copies of it and the inclosure it contained.

I asked M. Babitcheff if Count Leontieff was in Djibouti. He replied in the negative, and said he had left for Europe some time previously. I then asked M. Babitcheff if he knew the contents of the letter. He replied that he did, and that it was a request to be allowed permission to pass some rifles through Zeyla. I then informed him that I would refer the matter to you. He then asked within what period he was likely to receive a reply. I in return asked whether the reply was to be sent addressed Count Leontieff or to him at Djibouti. He said Count Leontieff had left the matter in his hands, and that the reply might be sent to him at Djibouti. I said he would probably get some rep'y in a fortnight or so, but it was impossible for me to say exactly.

M. Babitcheff then asked me to recommend him an aban for hiring camels, if permission to pass the rifles through Zeyla were granted. I stated that I would be glad to do so. He also mentioned that the Djibouti road was closed. After this M. Babitcheff, who is, I presume, a Russian, took his departure.

2. It will be seen that the document M. Leontieff calls a copy of a letter from His Majesty Menelek II is addressed to M. Martineau, the Governor of Djibouti. It is dated "16 Juin, 1891," *i.e.*, over seven months and eight years ago, and it is possible the "huit mille fusils" it refers to may have already been dispatched from Djibouti, but "1891" is probably a mistake for 1899. It will also be remarked in M. Leontieff's letter that in one place he says "8,000" rifles and in another "5,000." The figures are quite plain.

3. I have to ask your orders on the subject. To save time I am sending a copy of this letter, with copies of inclosures, to Captain J. L. Harrington, Her Britannic Majesty's Diplomatic Agent in Ethiopia, for information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. F. HAROLD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Count Leontieff to Acting Consul Harold.

Dear Sir, *Djibouti, January* 24, 1900.

AS you shall see, after the copy I send you from His Majesty Menelek II, that I have the order to send 8,000 rifles for Addis Abbaba. I come to beg you in His Majesty's name to allow me to send them through Zeyla, as the road here is not secured. I am sure that you will do all you can to assist for the Emperor, and that I shall have camels for the 5,000 rifles ready to be sent off.

I thank you ever so much in advance for all what you shall do, and please receive my best salutations and regards.

(Signed) Dedjaz, Count DE LEONTIEFF.

True copy:
(Signed) C. F. HAROLD,
Her Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul, Zeyla.

Zeyla, January 28, 1900.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

King Menelek to the Governor of Jibuti.

(Traduction.) *Addis Abbaba, le* 16 *Juin*, 1891.

LION de la tribu de Juda, Menelek II, élu du Seigneur Roi des Rois d'Éthiopie.

A mon cher ami M. Martineau, Gouverneur de Djibouti.

Je vous adresse mes salutations.

Les 8,000 fusils qu'apportera le Dedjazmatch, Comte de Leontieff, seront pour moi; je vous prie de ne pas lui faire payer de droits de douane et vous lui donnerez toutes facilitations possibles.

(Signé) Le Dedjazmatch, Comte DE LEONTIEFF.

True copy:
(Signed) C. F. HAROLD,
Her Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul, Zeyla.

Zeyla, January 28, 1900.

No. 2.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 26.)

(No. 8. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, February* 3, 1900.

INSIDE the Protectorate affairs continue to progress satisfactorily. Deputations from all the tribes who were concerned in the late disturbances have now come in. It does not, however, follow that all the tribes in the south of the Protectorate have severed their connection with the Mullah's movement. The Aligheri and several other sections of the Girad Farih are known to have men with him now in the Ogaden, and the Habr Yunis are suspicious of the attitude that may be taken by their kinsmen of the Musa Ismail should disturbances break out anew.

In the Ogaden the aspect of affairs has changed for the worse. The looting of Ishak traders continues, and now the Ba Awadleh and Rer Haroun are implicated. They appear to have yielded to the pressure brought to bear on them, and the majority of both sections are now said to be with the Mullah. It is also reported that he has succeeded in getting possession of some 140 rifles which were amongst the Ba Awadleh.

A few complaints of looting our traders have been brought against the Rer Ali Ogaden, but it is believed that this tribe has now moved west to avoid the Mullah and take refuge with the Abyssinians.

For some time past reports have been daily brought in by Somalis returning from the Ogaden of a projected move by the Mullah against the Ishak tribes of our Protectorate, and reports are not wanting that he meditates another attempt on our ports. He is now said to be at Digwein, in the neighbourhood of Harradiggit, where it is reported that he has collected large supplies of grain and live-stock.

Musa Farih, the Ressaldar of the Camel Corps, who has lately returned from a tour with a party of sowars through the Habr Yunis country and about Burao, reports that the Habr Yunis are all collected in the Toyo Plain ready to fall back on the Maritime Plain if they are attacked, and that the country between the Toyo Plain, Burao, and Dubbur is deserted, except by the Musa Ismail.

There is considerable uneasiness amongst our tribes, and they have been coming to me to ask for assistance, saying they are ready to collect to oppose any hostile move against the Protectorate if they are helped with arms. It is the fact that the Mullah's followers have rifles and that our people have none, which is responsible for a good deal of the fear which this fanatic has inspired among our tribes.

I do not at present attach importance to the reports which are current as to a move against our ports, but there are, I consider, sufficient grounds for apprehending a raid on the southern portion of our Protectorate, probably in the Habr Yunis country, if the Mullah can get sufficient of the Ogaden to follow him. As I have previously reported, the fight between the Habr Yunis and Aidagalleh on the one side, and the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun on the other, over the Daror water has tended to considerably complicate matters.

If an advance is made against the Habr Yunis country there will be considerable water difficulties in the way, and the Mullah's left flank will be exposed to the Habr Awal tribes to the west of Hargaisa, who will be ready to fall on him.

In view of these conditions, I have deferred the location of a post at Sheikh for the present, and am sending out Ressaldar Musa Farih, with a party of fifteen camel sowars and twenty-five foot police, to establish a post at Syk on the high ground commanding the water supply, with instructions to aid the tribes in that vicinity should occasion arise, but on no account to move further south without definite orders. This post, which will also cover the Jerato Pass, can, if necessary, be reinforced with a further party of sixty police.

This post will form a rallying point for the tribes on the Golis should there be reason to anticipate a repetition of the events of last autumn, and it should inspire confidence as showing our tribes that we are not leaving them entirely to themselves, although with the small force at our disposal we are not now prepared to operate in the remoter portions of the Protectorate.

Should the Abyssinians, against whom this movement is said to be as much directed as against us, decide to operate against the Mullah in the Ogaden, I think they might now be usefully encouraged to do so, provided their operations are confined to the Ogaden, and they do not cross our border. The altered condition of affairs in the Ogaden has removed the objections I previously entertained to the advance of an Abyssinian expedition in that direction.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer and Captain Harrington.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 3.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received February* 26.)

(No. 31.) *Cairo, February* 18, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received a telegraphic communication from Mr. Harrington, informing me that M. Leontieff has not established a permanent post at the mouth of the Omo.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. F. R. St. John to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 12)

(No. 37. Africa.)

My Lord, *Berne, March* 9, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith an extract from an article in a Swiss newspaper, reporting a conversation of the editor with M. Ilg, a Swiss holding high office in Abyssinia, whence he lately returned, on the subject of the position of the British Representative at that Court.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. ST. JOHN.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Neue Zuricher Zeitung" of March 6, 1900.

(Translation.)

THE negotiations with England which reopened out the Soudan were complicated and difficult, for there were delicate frontier questions to settle in the south and west of Ethiopia. The present envoy (Harrington) appears to be a very able man, greatly respected at Court, and much appreciated by the Emperor. The Russian influence has been immensely exaggerated; besides, Russia is far too occupied in Eastern Asia to arrive at any important position. The much-vaunted Leontieff is in no intimate relation with the Government of St. Petersburgh, but is just such a type as was in the last century exemplified in the person of Count Bengawsky. He is in the service of a European commercial firm, with its head-quarters at Brussels, which desires to secure the districts on Lake Rudolf south of Kaffa for agricultural purposes.

Menelek II, with a view to providing him with a means of existence, has intrusted to his care the so-called Equatorial province. It will depend on his tact whether he will make anything of it.

With Italy the relations are undisturbed, and likely to remain so.

---

1 S.C. for Pol. Resd. at Aden.

(Confidential)

No. 1059 E A

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forward-ed confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, etc.,
pd/ J. B. Wood
Under Secretary to the
Government of India

Foreign Department
Simla,
The 19th May 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Con-fidential Prints Section 1, dated the 9th 13th 15th 24th and 31st March, 1900,
Section 2, dated the 19th March 1900,
Section 3, dated the 12th March 1900
Section 6, dated the 5th March 1900.

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident Aden.

Confidential

No. 3815 of 1900.

Political Department.
Bombay Castle, 26 May 1900

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Hudson

Acting Secretary to Govt

ADE

Rec'd with Letter No. 15, J. the 6th April 1900, from the Secy. Foll. Sec. Dept.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) P

Cairo, March 9, 1900.

SIR R. WINGATE is of opinion that the British troops now at Omdurman should stop there during the summer; but before the hot weather commences, he thinks it most necessary to improve the barrack accommodation and the hospital. I have no doubt that he is right. I should be glad to know, consequently, in as short a time as possible, whether the War Office will sanction the expense, which is estimated at 600*l.*

It is not necessary to take into consideration at present the question of increasing the number of British troops quartered in the Soudan, but it is probable that the permanent garrison will ultimately have to be increased to a whole battalion.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul Alvarez to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 2.)

My Lord, *Bengazi, February* 24, 1900.

I HAVE just heard in the course of conversation with M. Bertrand, the French Vice-Consul here, that the Bengazi Administrative Council on the 14th instant decided to establish the authority of the Imperial Government at Kufra by naming a Kaïmakam there, and supporting him with zaptiehs and, if necessary, with troops. Thus Taher Pasha, the Governor, has at last apparently made up his mind to carry out a plan which for the last six years has been more or less in embryo. This decision may be taken as a conclusive proof that Es Sennsy has definitely abandoned those oases, with no intention of ever returning thither, and also that there is some tacit understanding between him and the Porte, as otherwise any attempt to annex Kufra to the Empire without a considerable display of force would be foredoomed to failure. The occupation of Kufra, should it really take place, will be a fit pendant to that of Kawar, in both cases an extension into the Turkish Hinterland.

Mukhtar Efendy Abdul Hady, till lately Acting Kaïmakam of Ojela and Jalo, concerning whom I had occasion to report to the Ambassador on the 12th June last, has either been named by the Pasha Kaïmakam of Kufra, or has been proposed by the Governor to the Porte for that office. Should he proceed thither, I greatly fear that his exploits at Ojela and Jalo in the slave-dealing line will be renewed on a vaster scale, and the more so as at Kufra, a noted emporium for traffic in slaves he will be practically beyond any control.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JUSTIN ALVAREZ.

P.S.—2nd March, 1900. I learn to-day that Mukhtar Efendy Abdul Hady objects to go to Kufra as Kaïmakam in spite of the Pasha's insisting on his acceptance of the appointment, if it should be confirmed at Constantinople, on the ground that he anticipates armed resistance on the part of the Sennsys. In support of his assertion he refers to an order said to have been sent by the Grand Sheikh to each of the following tribes: Abeydat, Awagher, Bragheta, Brassa, Dorsa, and Hassa, to send him forty picked men, well armed and mounted, who are to proceed to Kufra and await orders there. The Governor knows of this, and is reported to be very embarrassed as to the action he should take in the matter.

J. A.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 28.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 15, 1900.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 12 of the 15th ultimo, reporting the attitude of the various tribes in connection with the movements of the Mullah, and the steps which you have taken in regard to tribes of the Ogaden.

His Lordship approves your action in this matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

[1860 *p*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 9.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, February* 9, 1900.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram, received on the 31st December, respecting the reported establishment of a permanent post on Lake Rudolf by M. Leontieff, I have the honour to report that I have learnt that one of his European officers stated that M. Leontieff did camp at the north end of the lake, but that he cannot be said to have established a post there.

It appears that on his appointment as Dejasmatch, which I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my despatch No. 58 of the 14th June, 1899, M. Leontieff collected and armed some 500 Abyssinians here, intending to take them to the countries given to him by the Emperor, which are also enumerated in my despatch referred to above. Of these 500 men he lost about 300 immediately after their enrolment; some deserted as soon as they had received their arms and ammunition (which they carried off), and others were claimed by other Abyssinian Generals as deserters from their forces. With the remaining 200, reinforced by some 150 Senegalese, he started last July for the provinces allotted to him. He was accompanied by two Frenchmen—M. Chefdœuvre and M. Leymairie—two strolling Austrian musicians, named Seljan, two Cossacks, and a doctor, named Kahn, said to be an American subject.

The subsequent proceedings of the expedition appear to have been marked by the greatest brutality; large numbers of natives were killed; villages looted and destroyed; a force crossed the Omo into Ras Walda Giorgis' country; and another, under Dr. Kahn, was sent down the east bank of Lake Rudolf; but these parties were recalled by the Emperor as soon as he heard of their whereabouts, and M. Leontieff was summoned to Addis Abbaba.

Ras Walda Giorgis personally informed me that M. Leontieff did not content himself with looting in his country, but burnt every village he visited and murdered many of the inhabitants, not sparing even women and children.

M. Ilg stated that His Majesty, who was greatly incensed at M. Leontieff's encroachment on the Ras territory, wished at first not only to take his province from him, but to degrade him from the rank of Dejasmatch as well.

His Majesty was dissuaded from taking this step by M. Ilg, who held that such action would assuredly be misrepresented in Europe, where it would be said that the only European who ever attempted to open up a part of the country to trade and civilization, suffered injustice at the hands of the King, and that European capitalists would hesitate to undertake further enterprises in Abyssinia.

Regarding M. Leontieff's telegram to his Company, contained in M. de Courcy Perry's despatch No. 4, Africa, Confidential, of the 8th December last, it is impossible to reconcile some of the facts therein reported with information which I have obtained from the most reliable sources available here.

M. Leontieff says:—

"Tres satisfait résultat . . . . pays tranquille; administration organisée; ivoire . . . . abondant."

The result so far is nil; the greater part of the country is in anarchy, and only in one small portion of it has any sort of government been established. Although the province undoubtedly contains elephants, the ivory which M. Leontieff sent home was bought from the King in Addis Abbaba at a higher price than local merchants were willing to pay.

The recall of the expedition sent down the east side of Lake Rudolf prevented the projected "repatriation of half the Senegalese by the Belgian Congo." (I met these troops travelling to the coast in a dilapidated condition on my way here from Harrar.)

No post has been established at the mouth of the Omo. Of the Europeans who have visited the country, M. Leontieff alone has described it as "ravissant."

The sketch map which I have the honour to inclose has been furnished to me through the courtesy of my Italian colleague, who has compiled it from information which he has

extracted during the past fortnight from M. Seljan, one of the Austrian musicians who accompanied M. Leontieff, now entrusted with the government of the northern provinces of Uba, Bao, Zuza, the only part of the whole country in which any sort of fixed government exists.

Your Lordship will observe that three districts are included in M. Leontieff's province, Murle. Caro, Basciada, which are not mentioned in the list given to me by M. Ilg, which I had the honour of communicating to your Lordship in my despatch referred to above, No. 58 of the 14th June last. M. Ilg distinctly told me that M. Leontieff's province was bounded to the south by Fitaurari Imani's country, and the Emperor himself had previously assured me that M. Leontieff would be surrounded by Abyssinian Chiefs, as reported in my despatch No. 55 of the 3rd June last.

In my despatch No. 69 of the 28th December, I had the honour to report to your Lordship that the Emperor showed great annoyance at the mention of M. Leontieff's name, and when I asked about the removal of British flags and the dispatch of an expedition into British territory, His Majesty remarked to M. Ilg: "What! has he been down there to?" It is possible, therefore, that M. Leontieff has acted contrary to the Emperor's orders in this matter. At the same time, M. Seljan has told Captain Ciccodicola, the Italian Representative here, that the Emperor imposed no limits on M. Leontieff's expansion to the south. But for the Emperor's statement to the contrary, I should be inclined to credit this theory, for my information leads me to believe that all the southern Abyssinian Chiefs have permission to push as far south as they like; and this they will continue to do until they come in contact with posts of the British East Africa Protectorate.

M. Seljan states that M. Leontieff has concluded Treaties with the natives in the neighbourhood of the north-east of Lake Rudolf, as an Abyssinian officer on behalf of the Emperor, and that he has brought these Treaties to Addis Abbaba. Even if this is true, I do not think that much harm has been done; if his Majesty bases his claims to these countries on Treaties, it is to be expected that the Uganda authorities will be able to produce Treaties of prior date.

In view of the state of affairs in the Transvaal and of the general situation here, I venture to think that no good purpose would be served by further discussing this matter with the King at present. His Majesty would in all probability seize the opportunity to open the whole question of southern frontiers, which, in accordance with your Lordship's instructions, I have not mentioned since my return. I therefore await your Lordship's instructions on this point.

Whatever M. Leontieff may have done when he was in the south, there is no doubt that, except in the three northern districts mentioned above, where some sort of government is carried on by the Brothers Seljan, the only traces of M. Leontieff's visit consist in the ruined villages which mark his route. He has left the country in disgrace, and the Emperor told me that it was by no means certain that he would return.

The profits which he has prophecied are purely theoretical: the country's sole wealth consists in ivory—a source of revenue which must necessarily be exhausted in a few years. Moreover, a considerable time must elapse under the most favourable circumstances before the province can be pacified and placed under a fixed Government, after which, before commercial undertakings of any magnitude can be successfully entered into, confidence must be established among the natives and wants created, which appear at present to be entirely lacking. The population seems to consist chiefly of brave savages, who neither wear nor want clothes, and live on bread manufactured from herbs which grow wild.

My feeling with regard to the whole of the Leontieff affair is that the information supplied to me by M. Ilg and the Emperor has been inaccurate and misleading, and that the conduct both of His Majesty and of his Adviser has been unsatisfactory. At the same time, allowance should be made for the fact that they have been dealing with a man who is very much cleverer than either of them, and who is not overburdened with scruples

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain.*

Inclosure in No. 1.

Sketch Map.

[Not printed.]

Res with letter No 16 of the 12th April 1900, from the Secy, Foreign Office Depth

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 31.)

(No. 10. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, February* 17, 1900.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 36 of the 10th November, 1899, forwarding Memoranda by Sir Arthur Hardinge and Mr. Jenner regarding the frontier to be eventually settled between Abyssinia and the British East Africa Protectorate, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a Memorandum which I have drawn up on the same subject.

In accordance with your Lordship's instructions, I have not mentioned the question of the southern frontier to the Emperor Menelek since my return here. In view, however, of its ultimate settlement and of M. Ilg's possible visit to England, I have thought it right to lay before your Lordship certain considerations which appear to be of some importance.

I do not anticipate that the Emperor will open a discussion on this subject during M. Ilg's absence, but I venture to think that, in spite of His Majesty's assurances to the contrary, the Abyssinian Chiefs in the south will continue to push forward their posts as long as the frontier remains undetermined.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain.*

Inclosure in No. 1.

Memorandum by Mr. Harrington.

(Confidential.)

I THINK Sir Arthur Hardinge's description of Menelek's proposals as "rather audacious" a little drastic. His Majesty might with equal justice apply the same terms to our claims. If we refer him to our Agreement with Germany of 1890, he brings forward his Circular to the Powers of 1891, of which we took no notice till 1897, when the Emperor also first learnt from Mr. Rodd of the existence of our Agreement mentioned above.

But the Emperor's last proposals, reported in my despatch No. 53 A, Confidential, of the 3rd June, 1899, entail a considerable modification of his 1891 line, which was drawn round the west and south sides of Lake Rudolph, touching latitude 2° north, slightly to the west of longitude 40° east, and running thence to the Le Hele Cataract: this line is shown on the map published by the Intelligence Division of the War Office to illustrate the Report of the Mission to Abyssinia in 1887.

If we use the argument of effective occupation, Menelek replies that his occupation of the countries which he claims is as effective as ours in some territories which are recognized as indisputably British in consequence. It will be seen that the country claimed by Menelek in his last proposal excludes a great deal of what even in 1897 appeared to be occupied by Abyssinians (*vide* Colonel Wingate's Memorandum in Mr. Rodd's despatch No. 18, Confidential, of the 9th May, 1897).

M. Ilg told me last June that there was an Abyssinian force in Aflata's capital, and that the Borana country was divided between Fitaurari Habta Giorgis and Dejasmatch Asfau. The Emperor informed me that Chiefs of the Gere and Gabra tribes had come here to pay tribute (reported in my despatch No. 56, Confidential, of the 3rd June, 1899), and that all the Chiefs in the territory he claimed had made their submission and had been reinstated by him.

In my despatch No. 28 of the 7th November, 1898, I reported that a large deputation of Borana came here in that year and tendered their submission to Menelek. It is difficult to say how far the statements as to occupation are reliable; they are obtained from the best sources available here, but definite information can only be got by

sending some European to report on the country. I do not pretend to believe that all the territory referred to can be said to be under what we call settled government, but it is at least under the control of the Abyssinians, and at their mercy.

As regards Lugh, the Italian Representative here is constantly receiving complaints from the Italian garrison there respecting interference with caravans on the part of the Abyssinian authorities in the neighbourhood.

Concerning Sir Arthur Hardinge's allusion to Menelek's connivance at the slave-dealing operations of the Abyssinians in the south, I can only say that I have been unable to discover any proof in support of his allegations; although domestic slavery undoubtedly exists here, I am not aware of any case within recent years of Menelek shipping slaves in French dhows to Arabia.

I fear that the argument suggested by Mr. Jenner would have little weight with the Emperor. In reply to a suggestion that we should suffer material damage by the cession of the Borana, His Majesty would probably say that he, too, would lose by yielding it. The only arguments which he understands are those which he knows will be followed up by armed force if not listened to.

The present situation south of latitude 6° seems to be roughly this: Commencing from the Omo on the west Leontieff has a post at Uba, and has raided country extending from there to two days' journey down the east side of Lake Rudolph. Captain Wellby reported Abyssinian posts at Kerre, about four days' journey north of Lake Rudoph; and at Amerkoke, a day's march north of Lake Stephanie. Fitaurari Habta Giorgis' territory extends far enough south to include Karayu, his head-quarters being at Dandi, which I have been unable to locate; to the east of Fitaurari Habta Giorgis lies the Province of Dejasmatch Asfau Darghie, which includes the Gere country.

It will be difficult to negotiate a frontier with Menelek in such a way as to include in our territory a large tract which is not actually occupied by us: the expansion of his Empire to the south will continue, I venture to think, until country is reached where there are visible signs of our authority.

The Emperor can probably be induced to modify in our favour the line which he has proposed, but I greatly doubt his accepting Mr. Jenner's or Sir Arthur Hardinge's proposals as a whole. The Abyssinian Chiefs who rule the southern districts are so powerful that I doubt his daring to curtail their provinces beyond a certain point. If we push our claims to excess we shall incur a serious risk of war. In this country a war with us would be popular. The general idea among all classes is that Great Britain wishes to absorb this Empire. Filled with recollections of Adoua, the army is confident in its power to beat us, and, since they think the conflict inevitable, many of the Chiefs are in favour of fighting at once. The fighting strength of the nation amounts to not less than 300,000 riflemen, besides seventy or eighty guns, and a large body of cavalry and spearmen.

Although Menelek himself is anxious for peace, and probably does not share theviews of his army as to the result of a war with us, still I think it possible he may be forced by his Chiefs to fight if we press him too much. TheEmperor is very vain, and his ambition is to be known in the history of his country as the Monarch who extended the frontiers of Ethiopia beyond all the former limits of the Empire. His Majesty is much influenced in his dealings with foreign nations by M. Ilg, a circumstance which produces a combination of cunning and shrewdness with a very fair insight into European methods, which is by no means easy to deal with, and is further complicated by the profound mistrust entertained both by His Majesty and his Adviser of all our doings. M. Ilg told me himself that it was he who forced the Emperor to declare war against Italy.

At the present moment our position seems to be fairly strong here; it would, however, take little to throw Menelek into the arms of our French and Russian opponents, who are not likely to be sparing in promises of support and incitements to act against us. On the other hand, I venture to think that a settlement of the frontier on somewhat liberal lines will go far to allay the suspicions which the Emperor shares with his people regarding the designs of Great Britain. British merchants and capitalists would then, I think, have every chance of obtaining the largest share in any profits which may result from the commercial development of the country.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain*

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN, [March 19.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

No. 1.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received March* 19.)

Sir, *War Office, March* 19, 1900.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 9th and 15th instant, and to acquaint you, for the information of the Marquess of Salisbury, that he approves of the expenditure of 600*l.* on improving the barracks and hospital accommodation for the British detachment at Khartoum, as proposed by Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Cairo, and I am to request that you will cause Lord Cromer to be informed accordingly by telegraph.

I am, &c.

(Signed) R. H. KNOX.

No. 2.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 19.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 19, 1900.

THE War Office sanction the expenditure of 600*l.* for the purpose of improving the barracks and hospital accommodation for the British detachment at Khartoum, as recommended in your telegram No. 54 of the 9th instant.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 12.)

(No. 13.) *Berbera, February* 16, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Foreign Office despatch No. 8 of the 31st ultimo, transmitting copies of "The Somaliland Order in Council, 1899," and "The Somali and Brunei (Repeal) Order in Council, 1900."

A copy of "The Somaliland Order in Council, 1899," has this day been affixed and exhibited conspicuously in the public office of the Consul-General in Berbera; notice of this exhibition is being duly published in Berbera, Zeyla, and Bulhar; and the Order in Council will consequently come into effect in the Protectorate on the 16th March, 1900.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 2.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 12.)

(No. 29.) *Rome, March* 7, 1900.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 13 of the 5th ultimo, I have the honour to inclose copies of the official Gazettes of the 23rd ultimo and 1st instant, publishing two Royal Decrees in regard to the Colony of Erythræa.

The first Decree states that, in view of the reduction of the number of civil and military officials either already effected or in contemplation, and of the consequent redistribution of the duties respectively assigned to them, it has been decided to issue an Organic Decree defining and regulating the constitution and the functions of the various civil and military officials.

At the same time all Ordinances not in harmony with the present Decree are abrogated.

The second Decree, consisting of 145 Articles, ordains:—

That the Government of the Colony shall be intrusted to a Civil Governor, nominated by the King at the suggestion of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who shall have first consulted the Council of Ministers. The Governor is the representative in the Colony of Civil Government; he is invested with all such powers as Ministers can delegate to him, including, in the interests of public order and safety, that of proclaiming the state of siege.

The seat of Government is to be at Asmara.

The defence of the Colony is intrusted to a body of colonial troops composed of Italians and natives, under the orders of a Commandant appointed by the King on the suggestion of the Ministers for War and for Foreign Affairs, who will previously have consulted the Governor.

The authority of the Commandant of the forces in regard to discipline is similar to that of a Commander of a division, though dependent on the Governor in the matter of the employment of military forces for political purposes.

The naval forces in the waters of the Colony also belong to the defence of the Colony.

To the Governor are intrusted the Intelligence Department, the public safety, and political correspondence with the Central Government, and with foreign or Italian Representatives abroad. The different districts into which the Colony is divided will be under Royal Commissioners or Residents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CURRIE.

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 5.)

(No. 3.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, January* 24, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that His Majesty King Menelek left yesterday for Bulga, escorted by about 10,000 troops.

Bulga is about three days' journey from here, on the road to Ankober.

The object of his journey is to build an arsenal and magazine there. His Majesty will stay there probably two months.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Consul-General, Somali Coast.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 2.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 5.)

(No. 4.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, January* 25, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that, in consequence of renewed attacks on the French railway from Jibuti. Dejasmatch Birrato left here yesterday for Harrar to take charge of the Abyssinian troops, whom, it is reported, have been detailed to guard the railway works in Abyssinian territory.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Consul-General, Somali Coast.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 3.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 5.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord, *Berbera, February* 10, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to submit copy of a letter I have received from the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, on the subject of the arms and ordnance stores belonging to the Government of India and in the possession of this Protectorate on the date the transfer took place, together with a copy of my reply.

I also attach copy of the list of arms and ordnance stores, and copy of my letter of the 29th October, 1899, to the Examiner of Ordnance Accounts, Madras and Bombay Commands.

I refer to the matter, as I see from Mr. Edgerley's letter that it appears to be understood that these arms and ordnance stores were transferred to Her Majesty's Government with the Protectorate on the 1st October, 1898.

Unless Her Majesty's Government has already agreed to take over these arms and stores, I cannot recommend that this should be done. The arms would certainly be condemned by any Board as unserviceable, and the accoutrements are old and worn out.

Since the transfer the police forces have been supplied with new arms and accoutrements, and the only use the old Snider rifles would now serve would be to

form a reserve in case the position of affairs in the Ogaden necessitated the arming of a portion of our tribes pending the completion of other arrangements.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

Government of Bombay to Consul-General Sadler.

Sir, *Bombay Castle, January* 4, 1900.

I AM directed to refer to your letter dated the 29th October, 1899, to the address of the Examiner of Ordnance Accounts, Madras and Bombay Commands, regarding the valuation of the arms and ordnance stores transferred to the Foreign Office of the Home Government with the Somali Coast, and to state that this Government will be very much obliged if you would enable the accounts of the Indian Government as to the items in question to be closed at an early date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) S. W. EDGERLEY,
Secretary to Government.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Consul-General Sadler to Government of Bombay.

Sir, *Berbera, February* 9, 1900.

IN acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 4th ultimo, received on the 6th instant, I have the honour to inform you that a statement of the arms and ordnance stores belonging to the Government of India in the possession of this Protectorate on the 1st October, 1898, was sent to the Political Resident, Aden, on the 5th November, 1899.

I am now sending a copy of this statement direct to the Examiner of Ordnance Accounts, Madras and Bombay Accounts, in case it has not already been sent from Aden.

As I have previously intimated to the Examiner of Ordnance Accounts, I did not propose to take over any of these arms and stores, as they are mostly old and obsolete.

I should, however, be glad if it could be arranged without inconvenience to the Government of India that the Protectorate be allowed to retain for a short time longer the old Snider rifles now in the possession of the Protectorate. They would certainly be condemned as time-worn, but if they are not immediately required by the Government of India, they would be useful in the present disturbed state of the Ogaden.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 3.

LIST showing the particulars of Arms and Ordnance Stores belonging to Government of India and in hand on October 1, 1898.

Names of Articles.	Balance in hand on the 1st October, 1898.			
	Serviceable.	Repairable.	Un-serviceable.	Total.
Handcuff's, common (with keys)	17	..	9	26
Cartridges, S.A. balled, rifle Snider	14,107	..	900	15,007
" " blank	3,444	..	..	3,444
" " buck shot	3,755	..	280	4,035
" Remington, ball	30	..	..	30
" " revolver	170	..	..	170
" S.A. pistol revolver	240	..	..	240
" Enfield "	240	..	..	240
Boxes, wooden, ammunition	103	..	..	103
Carbine, army, S.B., Mark III	146	5	1	152
" " Artillery	57	1	..	58
Snider rifles, long (Sowars)	20	6	..	26
Pouches	254	..	203	457
Frogs	106	..	71	177
Revolver, Enfield	2	..	..	2
" Adams	6	..	..	6
" Remington	1	..	..	1
Arms, chest	10	..	..	10
Snider, carbine, cavalry	1	..	..	1
Remington	1	..	..	1
Ram-rod carbines	5	..	1	6
" short rifles	46	..	..	46
Slings	126	..	20	146
Bayonet swords, with scabbards	95	..	..	95
Swords, with scabbards, leather	29	..	..	29
Belts	35	..	18	53
Bandoliers	26	..	..	26
Swords	28	..	..	28
Rifle buckets	29	..	..	29
Fetters	11	..	..	11
Nipple wrenches, T-headed	2	..	..	2
Upper band, rifle pattern 1/13	1	..	..	1
Norton tube well pump	1	..	..	1

Inclosure 4 in No. 3.

Consul-General Sadler to the Examiner of Ordnance Accounts, Madras and Bombay Commands, Madras.

Aden, October 29, 1899.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of the 13th instant, I have the honour to say that the list of arms and ordnance stores in use in the Protectorate and belonging to the Government of India will be sent as soon as possible.

They consist mostly of obsolete Snider rifles, a small quantity of Snider ammunition, and old and worn-out accoutrements of the foot and mounted police.

As the list appears to be required for the adjustment of accounts between the Government of India and the Protectorate, I lose no time in informing you that the police have been supplied with new arms and accoutrements, and that I do not propose to take over the old arms and ordnance stores to which your letter refers. These will shortly be returned to the Aden Arsenal.

It will probably be found that the only articles worth being taken back into the Aden Arsenal are the old Snider rifles and ammunition.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

I.S.C. for Pall. Book. at Hew.

No. 4.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 5.)

(No. 12. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, February* 15, 1900.

SINCE my despatch No. 8 of the 3rd instant was written, further reports came in from all sides of an intended advance by the Mullah on the southern portion of our Protectorate, and the excitement amongst our tribes increased. Both here and at Bulhar massed meetings of the Habr Awal, Habr Gerhajis, and Habr Toljaala were held at which the three tribes agreed to sink all their differences for the time being and take concerted action to repel, with our assistance, an attack on whichever tribe it may be made. The opinion then was general throughout the country that the Mullah was preparing to advance at a very early date.

Further reports, too, were received as to looting by the Rer Ali, who are now so fully implicated as the Rer Haroun and the Rer Abdillah.

Having no longer any doubts as to the attitude of the Ogaden, generally, in respect to this movement, I have imposed a punitive tax of 4 rupees per camel on all caravans of the Rer Abdillah, Rer Haroun, and Rer Ali entering our ports.

I have not yet prohibited their caravans coming to our coast towns, because I do not wish to interfere with trade more than is absolutely necessary, and because I believe that the majority of these Ogaden tribes will cease to give trouble as soon as they are relieved of the presence amongst them of the Mullah and his immediate following. I will try the effect of this measure for some time, and then, if it becomes necessary, altogether prohibit Ogaden caravans entering our ports until the position in the Ogaden has returned to its normal state.

In the meanwhile, this tax will serve to recoup our Ishak traders in some measure for the losses they have suffered at the hands of the Ogaden, and bring pressure to bear on the latter to relieve themselves of the incubus of this fanatical priest.

It says a good deal for the temper of our tribes and their amenity to control that, despite the general looting of Ishak traders in the Ogaden, they have so far, with trifling exceptions, abstained from interfering with Ogaden caravans passing through their country belonging to the very tribes who have plundered their people. Very strict injunctions were issued in this respect, and these have been loyally observed in the face of extreme provocation.

The excitement has now in a measure subsided. For the last week there have been rumours that the Abyssinians are moving towards the Ogaden, and for four days past the reports from the southern portion of the Protectorate have been that the Mullah is retreating towards the Webbe Schebele. I was at a loss to assign any intelligible reason for these reports, as travellers returning to the coast from Abyssinia last week could give no information of any activity in Harrar. But this week I have received a despatch from Captain Harrington, in which he mentions that an Abyssinian force is moving to protect the works of the French railway in Abyssinian territory.

This would now account for a probable retrograde move by the Mullah, who has also probably been furnished with exaggerated accounts of the Protectorate force moved out to the Syk post.

I do not know the strength of the force the Abyssinians are detailing for the protection of the railway works, but the move has evidently been construed by the Mullah as a move against himself, and for the present, at least, it would seem that he has abandoned his designs of a demonstration against our tribes.

So long, however, as this Mullah has the free run of the Ogaden, we never know when the border may not be raided and our tribes kept in a continual state of excitement and anxiety.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Captain Harrington, and the Intelligence branch of the Government of India.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

(Confidential)

No. 1058 E A

A copy of the foregoing letter is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information, with reference to the letter from that Government, No. 2296, dated the 26 March 1900

By order, etc.,

(sd) J. B. Wood.
Under Secretary to the
Government of India

Foreign Department
Simla
The 19th May 1900

Enclosure in a letter from the Secretary Political and Secret Department, India office, No. 16, dated the 13th April, 1900, viz.
From India office to Foreign office
dated the 11th April 1900.

Confidential

No. 3916 of 1900
Political Department.
Bombay Castle 29th May 1900

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident Aden, for information, with reference to his letter No. 65 dated the 2nd March 1900.

W. Hudson

Acting Secretary to Govt

Received with letter from Secretary, Political and Secret Department, No. 16 dated the 21st April 1900.

India Office
11th April 1900.

Sir,

I am desired by Lord George Hamilton to forward herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the Political Resident at Aden, No. 66, dated the 6th March enclosing a statement made by one Ouladi Barut, a Sarang living at Shaikh Othman, Aden, regarding the action of the French Government towards foreigners in French employ.

I am to enquire whether the Marquis of Salisbury considers it advisable to obtain any information from the British Consul at Marseilles which would throw any light upon the proceedings which form the subject of this complaint

I have, etc,
[sd] Horace Walpole

The Under Secretary of State
Foreign Office.

True copy
W. L. Conway
Superintendent

(Confidential)

No 962 E.A

A copy of the foregoing letter is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information

By order, etc,
(sd) J. B. Wood
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department.
Simla
The 5th May 1900

Enclosure in a letter from the Secretary, Political and Secret Department India Office, No 14 dated the 30th March 1900 viz:-

From Foreign Office to India Office dated the 13th March, 1900 with enclosure

---

Confidential

No. 3475 of 1900.

Political Department.

Bombay Castle, 14th May 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Hudson

Acting Secretary to Govt

(Copy)

Received with letter from Secretary Political and Secret Department No. 14, dated the 30th March 1900.

Foreign Office to India office
13th March 1900.

Sir,

I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State for India the accompanying decypher of a telegram from H.M. Consul General on the Somali Coast suggesting that the detachments of Bombay Native Infantry employed in the Protectorate may now be dispensed with, and that he should arrange for their withdrawal.

Colonel Sadler's suggestion has been approved.

I am &c.
(sd) T.H. Sanderson.

Colonel Sadler to the Foreign Office
Telegraphic. Aden 10th March 1900.

We might now dispense with detachments of Bombay Native Infantry. May I arrange with Aden? Zeyla detachment already gone.

(Confidential)

No. 977 E. A.

A copy of the foregoing correspondence is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information in continuation of the endorsement from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 3 E/A dated the 28th March 1900.

By order etc,
(sd) J. B. Wood.
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department,
Simla,
The 4th May 1900

Enclosures in a letter from the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, No. 14, dated the 30th March, 1900 viz:—
Memorandum by Consul Gurney No. 2 dated Marseilles the 27th December, 1899;
Extract from Secret-Memorandum, No. 12, dated Marseilles, the 1st March, 1900;
Secret-Memorandum, No. 13, dated Marseilles, the 13th March 1900.

Confidential

No. 3570 of 1900.

Political Department.
Bombay Castle, 15th May 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident Aden, for information in continuation of this Department Memorandum No. 2575 dated the 4th April 1900.

W. Hudson
Acting Secretary to Government.

WHL 17

Received with letter from Secretary Political and Secret Department No 14 dated the 30th March 1900.

Enclosures in F.O. covering letter of 24th March 1900.

Memo by Consul Gurney, No. 2.

Shipments of war material from Marseilles to Jibuti for private consignees.

"Pei-ho" French Messageries Maritimes Co., October 25th 10 cases of rifles, 11, cases of cartridges, 1 case of arms (?)

"Yangtze" French, November 10th 100 cases of ammunition.

"Caledonien" French, November 19th, 7 cases of arms.

"Djemnah" French, November 25th 5th cases rifles, 40 cases of cartridges

"Cholon" French, November 30th 7 cases of rifles, 1 case of caps, 9 cases of cartridges.

"Kurdistan"

"Kurdistan" British, December 24th. 11 cases of cartridges. (Machinery, steam launch and railway material). (Also for Muscat, 23 cases of cartridges and 12 cases of rifles)

Marseilles, December 27th. 1899.

Extract from Secret Memorandum No. 12, dated Marseilles March 1st. 1900.

..... I venture to give on a separate memo. a list, not even complete, of the importations of arms and ammunition to Abyssinia, taken from the published manifests of French and British steamers that have since the month of December last touched at Jibouti on their outward voyage from Marseilles.

From another private and altogether reliable source, I have ascertained that the following rifles and cartridges were sent to King Menelek since the beginning of this year.

One firm alone from St Etienne (Loire) shipped from this port 3,50,000 carbines (of which 1,50,000 within the last fortnight) for the Abyssinian army. They were all of one pattern, the "Gras Mousqueton" until recently used by the French Artillery and Army Service Corps, which has a range of 800 metres only, but which was selected by King Menelek as being the most suitable for his mounted men. The price paid for these "Gras Mousqueton" was 12 francs a piece. The supply is now exhausted and offers have been made by one firm for any number at 22 francs a piece.

The same firm has also sent to Abyssinia hundreds of thousands of the Remington cartridges with the Lebel ball at 32 francs per thousand.

Several firms have been exporting any amount of cartridges from Marseilles for the same consignees at Jibuti and

every

every steamer of the British line of Strick and Company take cartridges from Manchester and Marseilles to Jibuti. From Alencon 300 cases marked as follows M. K. and Company were sent on 25th January by the S.S. "Yungtse" to Jibuti for Menelek. These facts will suffice to show that Menelek has been arming his cavalry with a serviceable weapon, and Frenchmen tell me that the cause has been the political situation and they hope Menelek will have occasion to make use of them against us.

These French hopes have curiously enough been voiced last week at a public meeting of the Marseilles Geographical Society, a Society of considerable influence and energy, by Prince Henri of Orleans, the hot-headed exponent of French Colonial ambition.

The

The subject of the lecture was announced to be "The Transvaal and Abyssinia". Amid enthusiastic applause from a "large and distinguished audience" the lecturer attacked England with the greatest bitterness and most offensive misrepresentation; passed in review all the many "crimes" of England, instances of her greed, cruelty, ill faith, overweening vanity, offensive self sufficiency and disregard of all her neighbours' rights and natural desire of expansion.

The hopeless absence of sound argument in the lecture did not strike his hearers; nothing was bad enough, no motives too vile to attribute to England. "The rightful ambitions of France had been brutally checked by England at Fashoda as well as on the Niger." The occupation of Harrar had given to France a preponderating

influence

influence in Abyssinia, there French influence was supreme. With the help of Menelek, England's ambitious cape to Cairo project would be checked in the North, as it would be checked in the South, by those ardent patriots the Boers! Menelek had carried out his part of the programme agreed to by him and France with the assent of Carnot and on the initiative of a minister (Delcassé) who later, through sentiments of fear, betrayed his country's interests! The hopes of patriotic Frenchmen were still centred notwithstanding official weakness and internal strife in that great King and example to other heads of States, Menelek, the friend of France! He had welcomed French and Russian help. He had with the assistance of a great Russian, Comte de Leontieff extended his Empire in territories

that

that were his by right but which England coveted! The recent expedition of Leontieff to Lake Rudolph had, thanks to the assistance of several French officers and a handfull of Senegalais soldiers, brothers at arms of our brave companions of that hero Marchand, made good his claim by occupation to those rich and valuable territories around, north and south, east and west of Lake Rudolph.

Menelek, said the lecturer, was prepared to hold what he claimed as his own. His army was no longer the army of King Theodore, the handful of unarmed soldiers vanquished by England. Menelek now had, at his disposal 250,000 horsemen, all armed with quick firing rifles, of recent importation! 500,000 rifles in his arsenals and all the ammunition he could possibly need

---

Secret Memorandum No 13.

Marseilles 13th. March 1900.

Arms and Ammunition, for Abyssinia.

In my Secret Memo. No. 12, of the 1st. instant, I gave a description of the arms and ammunition that have been pouring into Abyssinia within the last few months.

In my Secret Memo No 2, of December 26th., I gave a list of some of the shipments of rifles and cartridges from Marseilles to Jibuti during October, November and December. I have collected the following particulars concerning the further shipments to Jibuti by British and French liners.

S.S. "Koordistan" (Frank Strick & Co.) loaded at Marseilles 11 cases of cartridges, consigned to order at Jibuti.

The

The Steamer "Goolistan" on 8th February sailed with 24 cases of arms and 648 cases of cartridges.

The vessels of this firm sail once a month or thereabouts; and have as a rule a considerable quantity of English ammunition from Manchester for Jibuti as well as for the Persian Gulf. The consignments are all to order, at Jibuti The cases are marked M.B. in a lozenge; or an "S" in a lozenge, between the letters M and B; or three crosses in a lozenge.

I find from perusal of the Company's manifests that the cases of cartridges and rifles shipped during November were as follows: SS "Yangtse" 10th November for Jibuti, 100 cases marked partly "M.K.C." consigned to Leborde and marked "J.C.C." consigned to Calvet.

The 40 cases of cartridges and 5 cases of carbines shipped to Jibuti

per

per M. M. Co's SS "Djemnah" on 25th Nov-
ember were marked respectively A B M / C H K
in a lozenge, consigned to Fesquet
and marked A. B. C. consigned to
Kervorkoff.

I have also collected the fol-
lowing particulars concerning the
shipments per M. M. Co's steamers
during January. S.S. "Saghalien" 10th
January shipped 2 cases of carbines
to the order of Papa constante, Jibuti
weighing in all 110 Kilos, marked C P
and the following to the order of Garri-
que, at Jibuti, marked "D. I. G.," 1 case
of miscellaneous arms 12 cases of car-
bines, total weight, 1345 Kilos. SS "Yangtse"
on 25th January, 200 cases of cart-
ridges weighing in all 12,120 Kilos
marked M. K. C. to the order of Laborde
Jibuti; 1 case marked Kh. consigned
to the Company's Agent at Jibuti and
1 case marked as follows, M K. C.

weighing

weighing 94 Kilos. containing arms, consigned to Reverkoff & Co., Jibuti.

Whitaker's Almanac for 1900 estimates the number of modern rifles in the hands of the Abyssinians as 100,000. In my memo. No 12 of 1st March, I stated on the authority of the Agent of the firm that sold them that 350000 Gras Carbines had been sent to Abyssinia recently. Prince Henri of Orleans estimates the number at 500,000.

True Copy.

W. Conway.
ast- Superintendent

(Confidential)

No. 1102 E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order &c.,
sd/ J. B. Wood
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department.
Simla
The 23rd May 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints Section 1, dated the 29th and 30th March and 7th April 1900.

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident Aden.

Confidential

No. 3918 of 1900
Political Department.
Bombay Castle, 29th May 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

Acting Secretary to Govt

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Harrington.

(No. 19.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 29, 1900.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 7 of the 9th ultimo reporting the arrangements made, with the consent of the Emperor Menelek, for causing the British flag to be rehoisted in the places from which it had been removed by M. Leontieff.

I approve your action in this matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 7.)

(No. 65. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Cairo, March* 29, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a telegram which I have received from Sir Reginald Wingate, and in which, as your Lordship will observe, he suggests that Sheikh Ali Dinar, who at present rules in Darfur, should be requested to hoist the British and Egyptian flags in that province. I also inclose a copy of my reply, in which I have intimated that it would be desirable to postpone any action of this nature until I have had an opportunity of discussing the matter verbally with Sir Reginald Wingate, and until Slatin Pasha, who is, I understand, at present travelling in Darfur, has let us know something about the present condition of that province.

In submitting to your Lordship a few observations on this subject, I should wish to add that the views to which I now incline are subject to modification by the light of such further information as Sir Reginald Wingate and Slatin Pasha may possibly supply at some later period.

The frontier arrangement which was negotiated with the French Government subsequent to the Fashoda affair, would appear to afford a sufficient guarantee against the interference of any European Power in the affairs of Darfour. The question may, therefore, be considered almost exclusively from the point of view of local politics.

Your Lordship may remember that when General Gordon went to the Soudan in 1884, a fundamental portion of his original programme was to reinstate the rule of the "local Sultans." Subsequent events showed that the only part of the country where there was any chance of giving effect to this policy was in Darfour. In that province the reigning family, which had been dispossessed by the Egyptian Government at a period not long anterior to the outbreak of the Mahdist revolt, still had some real hold on the public opinion of the country. In Darfour, however, the policy initiated by General Gordon failed. This failure was due partly to the fact that the individual member of the Darfour family, through whose agency it was proposed to act, did not possess the personal qualities necessary to insure the accomplishment of his task, and partly to the predominance of Mahdist power, which at that time could not have been overthrown without the employment of military force.

Nevertheless, there is much to be said in support of the policy advocated by General Gordon, and it is well worthy of consideration whether, under the more favourable auspices which now exist, recourse should not again be had to it. Indeed, it is on these lines that the late and present Sirdar have been acting since the reoccupation of the Soudan. Sheikh Ali Dinar is a member of the family which formerly ruled Darfour. After a good deal of tribal dissension, and after, I believe, some vacillation as to whether he would or would not throw in his lot with the Khalifa, he seems to have established his authority, and has been practically recognized by the Soudan Government as the *de facto* ruler of the country. I am inclined to think that it would be advisable to govern through him rather than to attempt to administer the country directly through Anglo-Egyptian agency. The Province of Darfour is remote and difficult of access. In the event of any serious trouble occurring there, it would probably be difficult, and would certainly be costly, to assert Anglo-Egyptian authority.

I cannot believe that the province would, under any circumstances, yield any considerable revenue. It would more probably prove an additional financial burthen. In fact, it seems to me that all Soudan requirements will be met if the province is kept fairly quiet and trade permitted. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps questionable whether it is necessary or desirable to insist too strongly on any outward and visible signs of allegiance on the part of Sheikh Ali Dinar. He is at present friendly, but from what little I know on the subject, I conceive that his friendship might easily be converted into hostility.

Your Lordship will observe that Sir Reginald Wingate thinks that the Sheikh would hoist the British and Egyptian flags if requested to do so. I have no reason whatever for supposing that this view is erroneous. At the same time, if, as is possible, the Sheikh resented the proposal, it might throw him into an attitude of hostility. Inasmuch, therefore, as there does not appear to be any pressing reason for asserting Anglo-Egyptian authority at this moment, I think it would perhaps be wiser not to incur any risk, at all events until more is known of the conditions of the province and the disposition of its ruler.

Another consideration rather points to the desirability of exercising caution in the treatment of this question just at present.

For some while past rumours have been current that great activity prevails amongst the Senoussiyeh sect. It has been stated, both in the British and continental press, that a general anti-European movement is contemplated, that Sheikh Senoussi is likely to declare himself to be the Mahdi, &c.

There can be no doubt that Sheikh Senoussi exercises a very predominant influence over a large portion of Northern Africa, and that his followers are very fanatical and often very warlike.

I believe the rumours on this subject to be greatly exaggerated.

In the first place, for reasons which were stated at length in my despatch No. 179, Secret, of the 9th April, 1889, I doubt the Sheikh—who when last heard of was moving towards Bornu—declaring himself to be the Mahdi. Should he do so, it is certain that a schism would occur in the Moslem world, and that the Sultan, in his quality of Khalif, would be thrown into strong opposition.

In the second place, I do not believe that any revival of the offensive power of Islamism in general, or of Senoussism in particular, is at all probable. It was at one time very generally held that the aggressive power of Mahdism constituted a real danger. These fears turned out to be groundless. The same, I believe, will be the case with Senoussism.

The Senoussiyeh may cause some trouble to the French, but I have no apprehension that they will take any serious offensive action against Egypt or the Soudan. Their defensive power is, however, without doubt, formidable.

If this view is correct, it is important to leave the Senoussiyeh alone, and to avoid, as far as is possible, being brought in contact with them. Officers who have recently returned from Kordofan confirm the impression which I had previously entertained that Senoussi exercises little or no influence in that province. In Darfour the case is different. It is not at all improbable that there may be a good many followers of Senoussi in those regions. I trust that Slatin Pasha may be able to afford information on this point. If my surmise is correct, it would afford an additional plea for not taking any very active steps to assert Anglo-Egyptian authority in Darfour.

Such are the considerations which led me to send to Sir Reginald Wingate the telegram inclosed in this despatch. I trust that my answer will meet with your Lordship's approval.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 184.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Khartoum, March* 27, 1900.

I AM answering the different requests of Ali Dinar, and sending presents. His messengers who arrived lately will shortly return. Do you think it desirable to give them the British and Egyptian flags to fly at El Fasher? Judging from our relations with Ali Dinar, he will fly them if instructed to do so.

I will lay details before you on my return to Cairo.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

(No. 135.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, March* 27, 1900.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 184, I think it advisable for the present not to hoist the British and Egyptian flags in Darfour. As Slatin has gone there, we had better wait and hear his views; and I shall be glad to discuss the subject with you when you return to Cairo.

1 S.C. for Pall. Rasdt. at Ad

(Confidential)

No. 1064. E.A.

A copy of the foregoing letter is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order etc.,
/sd/ J. B. Wood.
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department
Simla
The 19th May 1900

Enclosure in a letter from the Secretary Political and Secret Department India office No. 15. dated the 6th April 1900 viz:—

From the Admiralty to the Foreign office dated the 19th March, 1900 with enclosure.

Confidential

No 3915 of 1900

Political Department
Bombay Castle, 29th May 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Hudson

Acting Secretary to Government

Revived with letter from Secretary Political and Secret Department No. 15, dated the 6th April 1900.

From

The Admiralty to the
Foreign Office
19 March 1900.

Sir,

I am commanded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State, esctracts from a letter dated at Aden 11th ultimo from the Captain of H M S "Marathon" relative to stores of ammunition at Djibouti.

With reference to his remarks concerning the S.S. "Caravane" I am to observe that as she left Colombo for Singapore on 12 February it would appear that the Captain was mistaken in her supposed destination.

I am &c,
[d/] Evan MacGregor

Encls. in above.

Letter of Proceedings

H. M. S. "Marathon"

No. 18 at Aden 11th Feb, 1900

Sir

× × × × ×

With reference to the stores of ammunition which I mentioned as existing at Djibouti and Obokh, I have had careful enquiries made by a secret agent at the latter place, and have found out that a certain quantity of ammunition has been landed at Djibouti by French ships (some of them being transports and mailboats)

A great part of this ammunition is still awaiting the collection of transport by camel to be sent into the interior for the use of King Menelek, while some is sent across in dhows to the Arabian Coast.

I have ascertained that ammunition for Delagoa Bay was shipped in S.S. "Caravane" leaving Djibouti on 31st ultimo Comm^r.-in-Chief Cape has been informed.

The

The ammunition in store at Obokh is said to be for the most part old stuff and is probably intended for King Menelek.

The Russian gunboat "Zelyat" left this place on 7th instant her Captain informed me and the Resident that his destination was China, but his secret telegrams shewed that he left this place for Bunder Abbas in the Persian Gulf.

There is something suspicious about Masaha and Mashins Islands off Djibouti, 4 or 5 Frenchmen are now living on Moslina Is: and no one is permitted to land - it is in the track of ships.

There are two rooms in Djibouti Gaol, and an underground cell in the same place which are used for storing ammunition.

This information is reliable but I hope to learn more about it later, as one of the interpreters attached to the ship is a Berbera Somali and has relations

in

in Djibouti. I find that a few rupees in that direction are not thrown away.

x x x x x x x

I have, etc,

/sd/ Geo: M. Field

Captain and Senior officer

Aden Division.

True copy

W. Conway

Asst Superintendent

[Confidential]

No. 1199-E. A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, etc.,
Adl J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department
Simla;
the 7th June, 1900

North-East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints.
Section 1, dated the 14th, 16th and 28th March and 13th and 16th April 1900.
Section 2, dated the 21st February, 24th, 27th and 31st March and 16th and 21st April 1900.
Section 3, dated the 19th and 24th March 1900.

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden

Confidential

No 4395
Political Department
Bombay Castle, 13th June 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

Acting Secretary to Government

NE 13

Read with Letter No. 13 J. Dr. 27 April 1900 from the Secy. Foreign Dept.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 14.)

(No. 58. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, March* 14, 1900.

THE officers who have been dismissed the service in consequence of the recent events at Omdurman will be brought before the Khedive to-morrow. The Khedive will order their decorations to be removed, will express strong disapproval, and will state his determination to afford his fullest support to the Sirdar in whatever he may consider necessary for the maintenance of discipline.

The Minister of War and other English and Egyptian officers will be present when these remarks, which will afterwards be published, are uttered.

I let the Minister for Foreign Affairs know something of the contents of your Lordship's telegram No. 12, but did not find it necessary to use it in speaking to the Khedive. For the time being, at all events, I think the whole episode may be regarded as closed.

Rec'd with Letter No 19 of the 4th May 1900, from the Foreign Office & Slave Trade Dept.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 16.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Berbera, March* 16, 1900.

AN Abyssinian force of 1,200 men, mostly mounted, is moving in the direction of Milmil against the Mullah Muhammed-bin-Abdullah, and another force of the same strength is moving from Harrar to join it.

No news has been received of the Mullah for same days.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Intelligence Division to Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 16.)

(Confidential.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards the following Tables, throwing a certain amount of light on the vast amount of warlike stores recently imported into Abyssinia:—

1. *Table* (*A*).—List of warlike stores which have passed through the port of Zeyla from October 1898 to May 1899.

2. *Table* (*B*).—The contents of Consul Gurney's Secret Memoranda Nos. 2 and 13, dated the 27th December, 1899, and 13th March, 1900, respectively, in tabular form.

3. *Table* (*C*).—List of warlike stores embarked at Marseilles for Abyssinia in November 1899 and February 1900, and at Manchester in November 1899 and March 1900, taken from a Report derived from a reliable source, copy inclosed and marked (E).

4. A summary of Tables (A), (B), and (C).

5. *Table* (*D*).—A summary of cartridges taken from Tables (A), (B), and (C).

Sir John Ardagh desires to point out that Table (A) represents the warlike stores that have passed through the port of Zeyla only, and that Tables (B) and (C) show the importations from Marseilles and Manchester only and during a very limited period, and that none of them can be taken as an accurate list of all the warlike stores imported into Abyssinia during the periods they embrace.

Sir John Ardagh forwards also in a Memorandum, marked (F), certain further miscellaneous information on the subject as tending to show the present vast resources of the Negus in warlike material, and he would suggest the advisability of transmitting the inclosed papers to the Consul-General of the Somaliland Protectorate and to Her Majesty's Agent at the Court of the Emperor Menelek for their observations.

18, *Queen Anne's Gate, London,*
April 12, 1900.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Table (A).—KING MENELEK'S Munitions passed through Zeyla, 1898–99.

Date.	Cases War Material, Projectiles, Implements, Caps, &c.	Bundles, Rifles, (Gras) each containing 14.	Bundles, Swords, each containing 60.	Gunpowder Cases, each weighing 1½ cwt.	Ammunition, Ball (Russian make), Cases each containing 1,000 rounds.	Ammunition, Ball (French make), Cases each containing 1,000 rounds.	Ammunition, Ball (Winchester), Cases containing 1,000 rounds.	Remarks.
1898.					384	200	169	All these cases of munitions were passed through Zeyla by Ato Joseph, King Menelek's Agent, and all were brought to Zeyla from Jibuti by bugalow.
October	183	..	..	..	1,281	..	..	
November ..	12	..	50	..	1,502	..	..	
December ..	253	..	10	..				
1899.						16	..	
January	..	16	43	..	..	..	..	
February	..	43	..	58	..	..	..	
March	..	..	..	33	1,000	..	..	
April	..	41	..	..	83	..	..	
May	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	
Total .	448	100	103	91	4,252	216	169	

Consul-General J. Hayes Sadler's despatch.

Berbera, May 26, 1899.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Table (B).—Arms and Ammunition for Abyssinia.

Date.	From what Port.	Nationality of Company.	Cases of Rifles.	Cases of Cartridges (1,000 each).	Cases of Carbines.	Cases of Caps.	Cases of Miscellaneous Arms.	Remarks.
1899.								
October	Pei-Ho	French	10	11	..	..	1	The stores carried on the "Djemnah" are shown in Table (C); they were reported both by Consul Gurney and by the reliable informant mentioned in Table (C).
November	Yang-tsze	,, ...	..	100	..	..	..	
November	Caledonien	,, ...	7	..	..	..	..	
November	Cholon	,, ...	7	9	..	1	..	
December	Kurdistan	British	..	11	..	..	..	
1900.								
January	Saghalien	French	..	..	14	..	1	
January	Yang-tsze	,, ...	..	200	..	..	2	
		Total ,, ..	24	331	14	1	4	

Consul Gurney's Secret Memorandum No. 2, of December 27, 1899, and Secret Memorandum No. 13, of March 12, 1900.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Table (C).—Arms and Ammunition for Abyssinia.

Information from a reliable source.

Date.	Ship.	From what Port.	Rifles, Lee-Metford, ·303	Cases of Cartridges, Lee-Metford (1,000 each).	Army Revolvers.	Revolver Cartridges (Number).	Miscellaneous Arms.	Remarks.
1899.								
November ..	Arabistan ..	Manchester ..	44	..	..	..	..	Samples.
November ..	Djemnah ..	Marseilles ..	..	40	..	..	..	This vessel also took 1,400,000 Lee-Metford and 100,000 Gras cartridges. Further particulars unknown. Consul Gurney reports in his Secret Memorandum No. 13 of April 13, 1900, that the "Djemnah" had besides five cases of carbines.
1900.								
February	Goolistan ..	Marseilles ..	6,000	635	250	80,000	..	
March	Afghanistan ..	Manchester ..	..	542*	..	..	1 Mauser rifle ..	Samples.
							1 Mauser carbine	
							1 repeating rifle	
							1 short bayonet	
Total ..			6,044	1,217	250	80,000		

* Includes nine cases of expanding bullets.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

Total of Tables (A), (B), and (C).—Arms and Ammunition for Abyssinia.

By whom reported.	Cases War Materials, Projectiles, Implements, Caps, &c.	Bundles Rifles, Gras, each containing 14.	Rifles, Lee-Metford, ·303-inch.	Rifles, Miscellaneous, Cases of.	Ammunition, Ball, Cases of, 1,000 in each.	Army Revolvers, 6 chambers.	Ammunition, Ball, for Revolvers.	Bundles Swords, each containing 60.	Gunpowder, Cases, each weighing 1½ cwt.	Carbines, Cases of.	Miscellaneous Arms, Cases of.	Remarks.
			Number.				Number of Rounds.					
Consul-General Hayes Sadler (Table A)	448	100	..	..	4,637	..	..	103	91	..	..	
Consul Gurney (Table B) ..	1	..	..	24	331	..	..	..	..	14	4	
Reliable information (Table C)	..	..	6,044	..	1,217	250	80,000	..	..	..	..	1,500,000 cartridges also reported as embarked, destination unknown.
Total	449	100	6,044	24	5,185	250	80,000	103	91	14	4	

See also paragraph 9 of Memorandum marked F.

C

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

Table (D).—CARTRIDGES shipped to Abyssinia.

Compiled from Tables (A), (B), and (C).

Ammunition, Lee-Metford, ·303.	Ammunition, French make.	Ammunition, Russian make.	Ammunition, Winchester.	Ammunition, Revolver.	Ammunition, description not stated.	Remarks.
Number of rounds.	Number of rounds.	Number of rounds.	Number of rounds.	Number of rounds.	Number of rounds.	
1,217,000	216,000	4,252,000	169,000	80,000	331,000	1,400,000 Lee-Metford and 100,000 Gras cartridges also shipped, destination unknown.

See also paragraph 9 of Memorandum marked F.

Inclosure 6 in No. 1.

Table (E).—Information from a reliable source of Arms and Ammunition for Abyssinia.

A B M (in a diamond) Djibouti.	Steam-ship "Arabistan" to Djibouti from Manchester, November 1899— (A. B. Meusulman, now at Harrar, for Carling and Co.). 4 cases Lee-Metford rifles (10-shot magazine, calibre ·303), 44 rifles in all (samples).
A B M A H K 9155 2 (in a diamond) Djibouti.	Steam-ship "Djemnah" to Djibouti from Marseilles, no date— 40 cases containing 40,000 Lee-Metford cartridges ·303. This vessel also took 1,400,000 Lee-Metford cartridges and 100,000 Gras cartridges shipped by a French firm, further particulars unobtainable.
A B M 160/72 (in a diamond) Djibouti.	Steam-ship "Goolistan" to Djibouti from Marseilles, February 1900— 13 cases revolver cartridges. 80,000 C. F. ·450.
A B M R (in a diamond) Djibouti.	4 cases army revolvers, 250. C. F. ·450 bore, 6 shot. This vessel also carried 50/60* tons Lee-Metford cartridges ·303, and 6,000 rifles rifles, Lee-Metford ·303. The cartridges were supplied by the Société Française des Munitions, Paris. The Messageries Maritimes de France Company inform that "they have all the room booked full for arms and ammunition for Djibouti for the next six months."
P T O 50/67 (in a diamond) Djibouti.	Steam-ship "Afghanistan" to Djibouti from Manchester, March 1900— 18 cases Lee-Metford cartridges, nickel covered, cordite powder, smokeless— 9,000 expanding bullets ·303. 9,000 ordinary bullets ·303.
A A (in a diamond) Djibouti.	1 Mauser rifle, military pattern, calibre 7 millim. 1 Mauser carbine, calibre 7 millim. 1 repeating rifle, calibre 11 millim. 1 short magazine bayonet. The above are samples on which a large quantity with cartridges are pending. This vessel also took 50 tons of cartridges, among them being 510 cases, each of 1,000, Lee-Metford ·303, all being supplied by the Société Française des Munitions, Paris.
A B M (in a diamond).	14 cases cartridges, 14,000 Lee-Metford ·303. Mr. E. W. Carling just arriving at Harrar (2nd April). Inquiry has been placed with Carling and Co. for 7,000 Mauser rifles, 4,000 Mauser carbines, and 1,500 Mauser repeating rifles, and 400 rounds per rifle if order is placed.

Inclosure 7 in No. 1.

Miscellaneous information regarding Resources of Abyssinia in Arms and Ammunition.

1. PRÉCIS of information obtained by the British Mission to Abyssinia 1897 :—

p. 31. "Nearly every system of single loader is represented. The larger proportion of rifles are Remingtons, then come Gras, Vetterli-Vitali magazine rifles, and Berdans; amongst other systems noted were Chassepots, Mausers (single loaders), a Styrian rifle with falling block and lever (name unknown), occasional Winchesters and Peabody-Martinis, Martini-Henrys being rare and much prized. . . .

"Besides the rifles in the hands of the troops, there are sufficient in reserve to bring the whole number of rifles in the country up to considerably over 200,000." . . . .

* This statement is slightly vague. Consul Gurney reports that this vessel carried 648 cases of cartridges, of which 13 were revolver, leaving 635 for Lee-Metford.

p. 32. "The cargo of the 'Doelwyck' (reported at 120,000 rifles and 2,500,000 cartridges) is now being sold throughout the country, but only half these rifles have reached Shoa; the remainder are at Jibuti awaiting transport.

"The artillery consists of 33 Italian 75-millim. mountain-guns (mule) and 2 machine-guns, taken in the last campaign; 2 old French mitrailleuses; 31 old-fashioned small brass guns, mostly taken from the Egyptians; and 15 to 20 of modern make (reported as Hotchkiss). All these are mountain-guns of small calibre (6 centim. to 8 centim.)."

2. Sir F. Plunkett, in his No. 7, Confidential, dated Brussels, the 15th January, 1898, mentions a Report by the Managing Engineer of the "Fabrique Nationale d'Armes" at Hersthal that the Emperor Menelek was known to be in possession of 300,000 military rifles, principally old French Gras rifles and some Spanish Remingtons.

3. M. de Courcy Perry's No. 15, dated Antwerp, the 14th April, 1898, inclosed in Sir F. Plunkett's No. 81, mentions steam-ship "Irena" as transporting 2,404 cases of safety cartridges, weighing 149½ tons, and 521 cases of arms, weighing 72¼ tons, consigned to M. Garriques, Jibuti, for Count Leontieff.

4. Quarterly Returns of warlike stores shipped from England shows:—

April to June, 1898.

300,000 safety cartridges.
2,500 iron shells (empty).
2,500 shrapnel shells (empty).
52 packages of renewal parts of cannon fittings.
66 cases of renewal parts of rifles.
450 lb. gunpowder.
2 cases of friction tubes.
64 cases of fuzes.
Parts of Nordenfelt 48 millim. mark E 1 guns.
Parts of carriages for same.
31,240 rifles.
30 gun-carriage wheels and 27 cases of cleaning materials.

The above on steam-ship "Irena" consigned to Leontieff at Jibuti, which ship was temporarily detained in the Thames. Also 6 rifles and 6 bayonets for Leontieff on steam-ship "Rosendaal."

January to March, 1899.

2 automatic guns.
2 Maxim guns
60,000 S.A. cartridges.

Consigned to Leontieff.

October to December, 1899.

100 rifles to Jibuti.

5. D.A.A.G., Aden, writing to I.B., Simla, the 1st March, 1897, reported the Abyssinian artillery as consisting of 2 field batteries of Krupp guns, 96 Hotchkiss Q.F. guns, and a battery of siege guns drawn by elephants, and the supply of small-arm ammunition as ample, 3,000,000 rounds having been brought back from the battle of Adowa.

6. Von Lobell's annual Report on changes and progress in military matters during 1896 gives the following details of Abyssinian artillery:—

For employment in the field—

14 Hotchkiss guns (arranged for pack transport).
2 Maxim guns.
Several mitrailleuses (American).

Also not for field use—

18 8-cemtim. muzzle loaders.
2 8-centim. breech loaders.
2 guns of position, taken from the Egyptians.
Several obsolete guns.

Also—

60 7-centim. mountain guns, captured from the Italians.

7. From a reliable source there is information that Count Leontieff is now placing an order for 8 Maxims complete and 250,000 Lee-Metford cartridges for the same.

8. Colonel Hayes Sadler's No. 7, dated the 2nd February, 1900, shows Leontieff's agent to be trying to pass 8,000 rifles through Zeyla.

9. Consul Gurney's No. 12, Secret, dated the 1st March, 1900, states from a reliable source that one firm alone at St. Étienne has supplied 350,000 carbines for Abyssinia (of which 150,000 within the last fortnight). These were "Gras Mousqueton" carbines, used till lately in the French artillery.

The same firm had also sent to Abyssinia hundreds of thousands of Remington cartridges, with the Lebel ball.

Several firms have been exporting any amount of cartridges from Marseilles to Jibuti.

Recd with letter No 198 the 4th May 1900 from the Secy Pol: & Sec Dept

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN. [February 21.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Consul-General Sadler.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February* 21, 1900.

A RUMOUR is reported by the Sub-Commissioner in Jubaland to the effect that a force of 200 men, including Nubians and Arabs, and in charge of two Europeans of unknown nationality, crossed the Juba at Bardera about October 1899.

The expedition is said to have proceeded by the Lugh road to Yak, the capital of Boran, where it was reported to be in January last.

Are you able to identify the expedition? Do you think it likely to be either Harrison's party or the one under Donaldson Smith?

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 8.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, February* 9, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that one Daoud-bin-Abdurrahman, a cavass in the Egyptian service, came to Harrar in December last to obtain a certificate from the Cazi of Harrar that he was the sole heir of the wife of Hassan Effendi, an Egyptian subject.

Having obtained the necessary certificate from the Cazi, he requested the British Consular Agent at Harrar to certify the correctness of the Cazi's seal. This was done by Mr. Gerolimato.

The man Daoud then left Harrar in company with an Egyptian. Meanwhile, one Haji Yussuf, native Governor of Harrar, and one Saïd Ebrahim, a Harrar merchant, informed Geramach Bante, Abyssinian Governor of Harrar, that the Consular Agent had signed the Cazi's papers as Governor of Harrar, was intriguing against the Abyssinian Government, and that these men were British spies from Cairo, and were in possession of some important papers from the Consular Agent. The Gerazmach sent soldiers after Daoud and his companion, arrested them at Arto, some 50 miles from Harrar, and brought them back prisoners to Harrar.

When the papers of Daoud and his companion were examined it was found that, beyond the attestation of the Cadi's seal by the British Consular Agent at Harrar, they were in possession of no other document.

Mr. Gerolimato insisted on the punishment of the men who had been the cause of the arrest of the two Egyptians, and claimed 170 dollars—70 dollars as expenses, and 100 dollars as indemnity for the arrest of the two men. The matter was referred to an Abyssinian Court, who condemned Haji Yussuf and Saïd Ebrahim to pay the sum of 170 dollars for making false accusations.

Mr. Gerolimato then paid the money as compensation to Daoud and his companion, who then left Harrar. Some delay having occurred in the payment of the money, the matter was referred by me to His Majesty King Menelek, who immediately sent orders that the money was to be paid.

Taking all the circumstances of the case, and the present delicate situation, into consideration, I venture to think that Mr. Gerolimate acted with great judgment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain.*

No. 2.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 23. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, March* 9, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Britannic Majesty's Consular Agent at Harrar, together with copy of connected correspondence.

We first heard of this expedition as about to be dispatched for the protection of the French railway in Abyssinian territory. Garazmach Bante alludes to an expedition against the Aysa, and it now appears from Mr. Gerolimato's letter to Lieutenant Harold that it is to operate against the Mullah.

Assuming that there is only one expedition on foot, it would seem that either the original destination of the force was purposely concealed in order to act with better advantage against the Mullah, or that the force has been deflected to the Ogaden, in consequence of the reported approach of the Mullah to the Abyssinian frontier.

In either case, the number of men stated—between 1,000 and 1,500—is small for any extended operations in the Ogaden, in view of the numbers the Abyssinians have collected for former expeditions in that country.

If an expedition is contemplated against the Aysa, it would, I presume, be directed against the black Aysa living in French territory, who raided a Danakil caravan conveying goods for the Emperor Menelek in the summer of 1898, and on whom the punitive tax referred to in my despatch No. 88 of the 11th November last was subsequently imposed.

I have heard of no complications lately between the Abyssinians and the Dankalis which would call for repressive measures being taken against the latter, nor, so far as I am aware, have the Dankalis yet actively joined the Aysa in their opposition to the French railway, though it is probable they will eventually do so.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer and to Captain Harrington.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Consul-General Sadler to Mr. Gerolimato.

(No. 171. Confidential.)

Berbera, March 9, 1900.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter No. 7 of the 27th ultimo to the address of the Acting Consul at Zeyla, and to the inclosed copy of a letter dated the 11th Amgheer (18th February) from Garazmach Bante to Lieutenant Harold, I have the honour to request that you will convey my compliments to the Acting Governor of Harrar, and say that, in any expedition which may be undertaken, I trust that such arrangements will be made as will insure the safety of the caravan route from our border to Harrar, so that no interference be caused to the usual run of trade.

I would also ask you to draw his Excellency's attention to his letter to Lieutenant Harold which I have quoted above, in which he alludes to an expedition against the Aysa. As this term is somewhat vague, I think it would be well to say that it is, of course, understood that no expedition is intended against Aysa tribes who are subject to this Protectorate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Acting Governor of Harrar to Acting Consul Harold.

(Translation.)

Harrar, 11th Amgheer, 1892 (*February* 18, 1900).

TO reach our friends.

Thanks to God that we are in good health.

Sent from Garazmach Bante with respectful consideration and sincere salutation.

First, I beg to inform you that (Issa) this year, while they were loading their camels from Djibouti, as soon as they had arrived at Diskarmoon [?] they stole what was stolen from the merchants and left what was left on the way. This has been heard by all the people, and we are intending to come down, therefore, if our coming down be heard of, it happen just the same as before.

Please, as soon as this reaches you, take the necessary steps for not letting any one go up from your way till this question is settled, and God will save you.

(Seal of Garazmach Bante).

Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

Acting Consul Harold to Acting Governor of Harrar.

(After compliments.) *Zeyla, March* 2, 1900.

BE it known to your Excellency that I have received your letter dated the 18th February, 1900, and am forwarding it to Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Somali Coast Protectorate, at Berbera, who will himself write to your Excellency on this subject.

2. In the meantime, be it known to your Excellency that it is quite impossible to stop all the Zeyla–Harrar trade at a moment's notice. I have therefore issued no orders on the subject, and our trade is being prosecuted as heretofore, *i.e.*, people and caravans are continually going to and fro between your town of Harrar, and our town of Zeyla, Hensa, Somadan, Biyo Kaboba, Gildessa–Harrar route.

I close with an expression of my high regard, and trust that God may long preserve you in the enjoyment of good health.

Signed at Zeyla, this 2nd day of March, 1900.

(Signed) C. F. HAROLD.

Inclosure 4 in No. 2.

Mr. Gerolimato to Acting Governor of Harrar.

Excellence, *Harrar, le* 22 *Février*, 1900.

JE viens d'apprendre que votre Excellence avant-hier a informé les négociants de cette ville qu'ils ne devaient pas envoyer des marchandises à Zeila, parçe que le Gouvernement Abyssin envoie une expédition pour punir les Dankalis et Somalis Issa.

Votre Excellence sait très bien qu'il y a toujours des marchandises dans la route de Zeyla–Harrar, c'est pourquoi les négociants auraient dû être informé vingt jours avant l'expédition, temps nécessaire aux marchandises en route d'arriver à destination.

Actuellement il y a en route plus de 1,500 charges diverses merchandises, comme café, ivoire, descendant à Zeila, et cotonnades montant à Harrar, et le Gouvernement Abyssin n'ayant pas informé les négociants, comme il était son devoir, vingt jours avant, il est tenu responsable de toute perte ou dommage de ces marchandises causée directement ou indirectement par cette expédition.

J'ai l'honneur aussi de prier votre Excellence, pour éviter toute complication, de donner des instructions sévères aux troupes Abyssines de ne pas passer la frontière et entrer dans le territoire Anglais.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) J. GEROLIMATO.

Inclosure 5 in No. 2.

Mr. Gerolimato to Acting Consul Harold.

(No. 7.)

Sir, *Harrar, February* 27, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that last Tuesday, the 20th February, the local authorities informed all the merchants that it is prohibited to send down to the coast goods, owing to a punitive expedition against the Somalis and Dankalis. I have then addressed a note to the Acting Governor of Harrar, asking him to postpone this expedition for twenty days. Copy of this note is herewith annexed.

The Acting Governor accepted my proposition, and postpohed the expedition for twenty days; he explained that this expedition is not against the Somalis but only against the Dankalis, and as they fear that when the Somalis will hear that an Abyssinian expedition is going down to Dankalis country, they will be frightened and will throw down all the goods and fly, for that the Abyssinian Government prohibited to send down goods, and all the merchants informed their agents in Zeyla and Djibouti to postpone any loading of goods for the present. The Abyssinian Government declared

that it is irresponsible should any goods be looted in the road, by Somalis or Dankalis after twenty days; but I think that this expedition is postponed for long time as the Mullah Mohamed-bin-Abdullah from Dolbahanta arrived near Jiggigga in the Dubbur Hill and Jah Warabili, and last Sunday Gurasmach Bante, Acting Governor, left Harrar with 1,000 to 1,500 men, going against this Mullah, for that I think that the other expedition for Dankalis is postponed for long time.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. GEROLIMATO.

No. 3.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Cairo, March 24, 1900.

MAJOR PEAKE reports March [? 12 or 16] latitude 8° 49′ satisfactory progress. He thinks all obstruction will be cleared away by end of April. Belgian party would not get back the way they came. They have gone up Bahr-el-Zeraf. Peake did all he could to help them.

Recd with letter No 18927 Dated April 2nd 1900 from the Secy, Pol: Sec Dept

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 27.)

(No. 38.)

My Lord, *Rome, March* 23, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 34 of the 16th instant, in regard to the proposed Italian commercial station at Allula in Somaliland, I have the honour to inclose a précis of an article which appeared in the "Corriere di Napoli" on the 19th instant, giving an account of the district and of its inhabitants, its customs, and resources.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CURRIE.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Précis of an Article by Signor Francesco Sylos-Sersale in the "Corriere di Napoli," of March 19, 1900.

Allula.

ALLULA, the capital of the Sultanate of the Megertines, is a large and well-built village situated on the coast near Cape Guardafui within the zone of Italian influence in East Africa.

The Megertines, of whom the bulk of the population is composed, are a superior race of negroes, distinguished from the surrounding tribes by a higher grade of civilization, a great consideration for foreigners, much personal bravery, and considerable intelligence.

They are Mahommedans by religion, and there is some admixture of Arab blood among them. Their slaves, who are mostly Gallas and Saneli, are well treated. The industries of this population are still in a very backward condition, but they manufacture small articles of iron, wood, and leather, while the inhabitants of the coast engage in the shark fishery, which brings in considerable profits, and also fish for mother-of-pearl, pearls, and sponges.

The inhabitants of the interior rear cattle, which they bring down to the coast and export to Aden and other ports of Arabia. Agriculture is almost unknown, although the country is eminently suited to cultivation, and "durra," which is the staple article of food, is imported from distant countries.

The chief articles of export are, gum arabic, incense, myrrh, dried hides, ostrich feathers, a small quantity of ivory, mother-of-pearl, pearls, sponges, and a few wild beasts' skins.

These products are exchanged for cotton and silk stuffs, "durra," rice, dates, sugar, and tea. Aden is the central market for this trade, and some hundred steamers bound for Zanzibar, Madagascar, and East Africa, touch yearly at that port.

Now, if Allula could be made the central depôt for all the trade of Italian Somaliland, and could be brought into direct communication with European ports, not only would the trade of the district be diverted from Aden as a centre of exchange, but that trade would find scope for enormous development.

Moreover, if it be true, as many natives agree in asserting, that coal is to be found a few days' journey up country, then the Allula would become the natural coaling station for all steamers bound for India, China, and Australia, and the 1,500 vessels which at present coal at Aden would desert that place for Allula, where they might buy their coal for 25 fr. or 30 fr. a-ton instead of 75 fr. to 80 fr., the price of coal carried from England; Aden would thus be reduced to a simple base of operations for the English fleet.

The African Society of Italy has already taken a step in the right direction in sending thither a Resident to push Italian manufactures, especially cotton and silk goods, which

are at present supplied by America, England, Germany, and India, to the value of 12,000,000 fr.

The Allula Commercial Station Committee is composed of highly respected persons, presided over by M. Francesco Spirito, the President of the African Society.

The Italian Chambers of Commerce, and especially those of South Italy (for this is a Southern enterprise), should put themselves into communication with the Committee, and the Naples Chamber of Commerce ought to set the example and give hearty support to the scheme.

I appeal then to Cav. Carrelli, who is so important a member of that body.

While in Aden I had the honour of expressing to Colonel Wissman, who was then Governor-General of the German Colonies in South Africa, and to Signor Secchi, my opinion as to the great future which lies before Italian Somaliland, and of laying before them my schemes and hopes for that country, and I am happy to state that these two distinguished African personalities entirely agreed with my ideas.

(Signed) FRANCESCO SYLOS-SERSALE.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SUDAN INTELLIGENCE REPORT,

No. 71.

9th June to 8th July 1900.

COVERING LETTER.

Head-quarters, Egyptian Army,
War Office, Cairo,
14th August 1900.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward, for your information, No. 71, Sudan Intelligence Report, from the 9th June to the 8th July 1900, inclusive.

I have, &c.,

E. E. BERNARD, *Major*,
for the Sirdar (on leave).

The Under Secretary of State for War,
War Office, London, S.W.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT, No. 71.

SUMMARY of Intelligence received from the 9th June to the 8th July 1900, inclusive.

No intelligence news. — Dongola.

No intelligence news. — Berber.

No intelligence news. — Khartoum.

See Abyssinia. — Sennar.

See Abyssinia and Eritrea. — Kassala.

King Menelik is desirous that the Sudan Government should collect export and import duties between the two countries. He proposes that the Sudan Government should do all the work on the Sudan side of the territory, and hand over half of the takings to him. This is now being carried out as an experiment. — Abyssinia.

The Abyssinian Officer and six men sent by Ras Mangasha to Gallabat to prevent Abyssinian merchants entering the town, and also to demand custom dues, have left that place

9 | 1900—(B319)—630wo

Survey. On the 7th July, Brevet-Major Austin, R.E., and Brevet-Major Bright, Rifle Brigade, arrived at Omdurman from Nasser, on completion of survey work.

Travellers. Mr. Lane and party from Beni Shangul arrived on the 29th June, and left for Cairo on the 30th June; Mr. Lane reports that all seems quiet in the Beni Shangul district. His staff seemed under the impression that Jebel Dul was within the Beni Shangul or Abyssinian limits.

Rains. The rains, though not so severe, have set in, making camel transport of great difficulty throughout Kordofan.

F. NEWALL, *Bimbashi*,
Intelligence Officer, Sudan.

OMDURMAN,
8th July 1900.

APPENDIX A.

Abyssinian Frontier Sheikhs, June 1900.

District.	Name.
Jebel Abu Ramleh ..	Ahmed Abu Zik and Adam.
Assosa	Khojali Wad Hassan.
Bambashi	Sheikh Mohamed Hassan of Robatab.
Beni Shangul	Abderahman Tur el Guri (resident in Abyssinia).
Jebel Dul-Gomasha ..	Mohamed Ahmed Wad Hemeid.
Famaka	Melik Ragab Hussein (under Sudan Government).
Fazoghli	Hassan (under Sudan Government).
Garat	Ibrahim Mahmud Hamdi (Abyssinian post).
Jebel Gubba	Hamdan Abu Shok (hostage in Abyssinia).
Gedaref Fung	Sheikh Geileh (under Sudan Government).
Jebel Keili	Hamdan Beshir.
Kwara	Sheikh Falaghe.

Abyssinian Frontier Commanders, north to south.

District.	Name.
Gandawa	Ras Mangasha Betwaddid Atekim, outpost 5 days east of Gallabat.
	Kidana Mariam Rabel to Mangasha, 1½ days east of Gallabat.
Gojam	King Tekla Haimanot.
Dunkur..	Fitarari El Mare, under Dejaj Dasta.
	Dejazmach Damassi.
Mandi	Dejazmach Tesamande.
	Ras Waldo Giorgis.
Sellali (between Muggar and Nile).	Shum of Tasre, civil ruler of district of Dejazmach Lajahim (Ras Darghé's successor).
Gore, 2 or 3 days east of La, R. Baro.	Ras Dejaz Tasama.

Abyssinian Outposts, Blue Nile Basin.

District.	Name.
Afodi	Commandant Kanashi Mashi Shiti. Force—7 Cavalry, 22 Infantry, 9 transport.
El Amam	Basha Zodi. Force—9 Cavalry, 36 Infantry, 10 transport.
Koha (east of Surkum)	Fellah Geh. Force—13 Cavalry, 22 Infantry, 9 transport.

N. M. SMYTH, *Bimbashi.*

SENNAR,
June 1900.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 31.)

(No. 11. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, February* 24, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Vlassow, the Russian Minister here, started yesterday for Russia.

He informed me that for the next eight months the Agency here would be in charge of M. Orloff, a young Dragoman, who has acted as M. Vlassow's Secretary since the Mission arrived here in January 1898.

Lieutenants Davidoff and Dragomiroff, who, with two doctors and two assistant-surgeons, compose the new Russian Special Mission, have arrived, and were received last week by the Emperor at Bulga. They seem to have come chiefly for sporting purposes. They tell me that they intend shortly to start for a long shooting expedition in the Walamo country, and to return to Russia as soon as it is over.

M. Vlassow told me that he would probably not return here as Minister, but that he expected to come back as a private individual, in order to take back to Russia the body of his wife, who has recently died here. He thought another Minister would be appointed, unless, he said, he could persuade the Russian Government to abolish the post. As the only Russian subjects in this country, besides the above-mentioned Dragoman, are the four doctors who look after the Russian hospital, and as no trade is carried on between the two countries, M. Vlassow's suggestion would seem to be sensible. The Mission and hospital are said to cost the Russian Government between 8,000*l.* and 10,000*l.* a-year.

I have been unable to discover any results of the Mission's two years' labour here. Last year a determined attempt was made to obtain from the Emperor Menelek the reversion of Raheita, but that failed.

I have learnt that M. Vlassow, some time ago, persuaded the Emperor Menelek to write to the Czar, asking that he might be allowed to remain as His Imperial Majesty's Representative in this country, and in view of the fact that four fresh Russian doctors have arrived with Lieutenant Davidoff to relieve those who have worked in the hospital for the last two years, I have some hesitation in placing implicit reliance in M. Vlassow's expressed intentions of urging the abolition of his post.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain.*

P.S.—Captain Bulatovich, who was attached to M. Vlassow's Mission, is leaving to-day for Jibuti and Russia.

J. L. H.

No. 2.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 31.)

(No. 26.)

My Lord, *Berbera, March* 16, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that the detachment of Bombay Native Infantry was finally withdrawn from Zeyla on the 5th instant.

The Acting Consul has reported that the number of military and civil police are not sufficient for guard and town duties, and has asked for an increase of at least six men for the military police and four for the civil police. As a temporary arrangement, I am sending to Zeyla ten Soudanese from the Berbera establishment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 3.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 31.)

(No. 27. Confidential.)

Berbera, March 16, 1900.

My Lord,

MR. GEROLIMATO, writing from Harrar on the 6th instant, reports as follow:—

Garazmach Bante, the Acting Governor of Harrar, left Harrar nine days ago on an expedition against the Mullah Muhammad-bib-Abdullah, who is at Daghabur, two days' march from Milmil. He has with him about 1,200 men.

Yesterday, Dejach Beroo arrived from Addis Abbaba with about 1,200 men, and is going to join Garazmach Bante.

It is also reported that the Governor of Bali, in the Arussa country, is moving on the Ogaden.

Some of the Arussa have revolted, and the news is confirmed that they have killed twenty-six Abyssinians, all small Chiefs.

Azaz Wold Jadik, Governor of the Dankali Province, has arrived at Errer; he is to punish the Aussa Dankalis on account of the loot of some caravans, in which it seems some Somalis were also concerned.

The Daghabur referred to by Mr. Gerolimato is about 30 miles east of Milmil. I heard of the Mullah lately at Bulaleh, about the same distance south of Milmil.

Reports have been brought in that the Abyssinians have punished the Rer Ali, seizing all the animals of twenty-five of their karias.

The whereabouts of the Mullah have not been accurately known for some days past, nor is it yet known how he is meeting the advance of the Abyssinian expedition. Information on both these points will be shortly forthcoming, and will be communicated by telegram.

The Ogaden tribes are tired of the Mullah's exactions; they have but few rifles, and are deficient in ammunition, and they fear retribution at the hands of the Abyssinians; native opinion, accordingly, inclines to the view that they will not coalesce to support the Mullah, and that the latter will try and escape.

If there is truth in the latest reports which have come in that the Abyssinians are in close pursuit of the Mullah, there would seem to be a fair chance of his being caught, as the Abyssinians are mostly mounted; they have taken supplies of water on ponies, and they have been joined by horsemen from the Habr Awal tribes living outside our territory, notably the Rer Ahmed Abdillah.

The most unfortunate position would be for the Mullah to flee eastwards and rejoin his old allies the Aligheri south of Bohotele, where he would be difficult to get at, either by the Abyssinians or ourselves. The country about Bohotele is now very dry.

Owing to the rumours of expeditions against the Dankalis and Aysa, all trade between Zeyla and Harrar is at a standstill.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

P.S.—A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Captain Harrington, and the Quartermaster-General in India, Intelligence Branch, Simla.

J. H. S.

No. 4.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Harrington.

(No. 22.)

Foreign Office, March 31, 1900.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 8 of the 9th ultimo, reporting the action of the British Consular Agent at Harrar in connection with the arrest of Daoud-bin-Abdurrahman, a Cavass in the Egyptian Service, and another Egyptian subject on false accusations made by the native Governor of Harrar and a Harrar merchant.

I request that you will convey to Mr. Gerolimato my approval of his proceedings on this occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 5.

Foreign Office to Mr. A. Gray.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 31, 1900.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul-General on the Somali Coast,* submitting for approval drafts of two sets of Orders, which he proposes should be issued by the Protectorate Court, in its civil and criminal capacity, establishing the Courts to be subordinate to it in the Somaliland Protectorate.

A copy of "The Somaliland Order in Council, 1899," is also inclosed for convenience of reference.†

I am to request that you will take these draft Orders into your consideration, and return them with an expression of your views as to whether they should be approved in their present form, or, if not, what alterations should be made in them.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

No. 6.

Foreign Office to Mr. A. Gray.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 31, 1900.

WITH reference to your letter of the 17th November, 1899, I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you correspondence, as marked in the margin,‡ with Her Majesty's Consul-General on the Somali Coast on the subject of the Regulations for the importation and sale of alcoholic liquors in the Somaliland Protectorate.

It will be seen that, acting on the suggestion in your letter above referred to, the Regulations, while making mention of licences, contained no provision with respect to their issue or conditions, Consul-General Sadler has now, in his despatch No. 21 of the 25th ultimo, submitted for approval the draft of two Regulations on that subject, which he proposes to add to the Regulations as already settled, a copy of which is inclosed.§

I am to request that you will take these draft Regulations into your consideration, and inform Lord Salisbury whether you consider that they may be approved.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

---

* Consul-General Sadler, No. 15, February 20, 1900.

† Somali Order in Council, 1899.

‡ Consul-General Sadler, No. 11, January 21; to ditto, No. 113, November 24, 1899; Consul-General Sadler, No. 21, February 26, 1900.

§ Regulations as already settled.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 16.)

(No. 31. Confidential.)

Berbera, March 31, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to submit copy of an Intelligence Report by Captain Johnston Stewart of the 2nd British Central Africa Rifles, reporting on the movements of the Mullah Muhammad-bin-Abdullah; and extract from a note to my address from Her Britannic Majesty's Consular Agent at Harrar, dated the 20th instant; and translation of a letter I received this morning from Garazmach Bante, the Acting Governor of Harrar, intimating the result of an engagement which took place at Jig-Jaga, on the 21st instant, between the Abyssinians and the Mullah's forces.

It seems that after raiding the Rer Ali the Abyssinians did not, as was at first supposed, advance on Daghabur, but remained at Jig-Jiga, where they were attacked by a large force of the Mullah's followers on the 21st instant, with the result described in Garazmach Bante's letter.

The Mullah seems to have taken care to keep in the background; no certain information as to his whereabouts is available. It is said that, previous to the fight at Jig-Jiga, the Ogaden had risen *en masse* to oppose the Abyssinians, which would account for the large force of Dervishes reported by Garazmach Bante. It is also said that the Mullah's influence now extends to the Webbe Schebele, where the tribes, including the Negro Adone, have joined his cause and sent him assistance in men and supplies.

The messenger who brought in Garazmach Bante's letter, reports that after the defeat of the Mullah's force the survivors were set upon by the Rer Ali and Rer Haroum, who said that they and the Mullah had led them to destruction by falsely representing that the arms of the Abyssinians were powerless against them.

It is further reported that the Mullah left all his followers from the Dolbahanta, and his rifles, said to number 500, at Harradiggit, and sent on the Ogaden tribes with spears to attack the Abyssinans at Jig-Jiga. This is confirmed by news which has just been brought in, that a raiding party of the Habr Yunis who were out in the Ogaden after the Rer Ali stumbled on the Mullah's force near Harradiggit, and lost from 100 to 150 men, all killed by rifle fire.

The defeat at Jig-Jiga has doubtless dealt a heavy blow to the Mullah's movement in the Ogaden, but if he gets away with the number of rifles he is supposed to have, his power for evil will have been by no means checked.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

N.B.—A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Captain Harrington, and the Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Department, Simla.

J. H. S.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Lieutenant Stewart to Consul-General Sadler.

(Confidential.)

Adadleh, March 23, 1990.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that I have gathered the following information regarding the movements of Mullah Muhammad-bin-Abdullah :—

A Habr Yunis and Habr Awal trading caravan, after suffering loss in lives and property at the hands of the Mullah, left Digwein, in Ogaden, on the 15th March, and arrived at Adadleh on the 21st instant.

They report that the first force of Abyssinians (probably from 1,500 to 2,000 men) arrived in Dagabhur on the 10th instant.

The Mullah with his main body moved out from Harradiggit, in Digwein, on the 11th instant. He previously informed his men that the rifles of the Abyssinians were harmless against him, and that he would defeat them with spears and bows and arrows only. He therefore left about 1,000 men with his guns and most of his ponies in zareeba at Harradiggit. He said he would delay his attack on the Ishak tribes and Berbera till he had settled with the Ayssinians

He himself appears to have halted at Bulaleh on the 12th instant, but his advanced party continued their march to Dagabhur, where they arrived on the 14th instant. They had instructions not to engage the Abyssinians till the arrival of the Mullah himself. They found the Abyssinians entrenched in a strong double zareeba, built to surround the watering-place at Dagabhur. The Mullah's men did not build a zareeba, but remained round the Abyssinian position.

Reinforcements of Abyssinians are said to be on the way to Dagabhur, and a third party to be forming at Harrar.

No engagement had up to the 15th instant been fought between the Abyssinians and the Mullah's forces, though the former on arrival had successfully raided parties of the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun.

The Mullah has sent word to the Habr Yunis that if they do not give up all the camels recently looted by them from the Rer Ali, he will attack them. Eight of his men with four water camels have arrived at Waba-ado in the Haud to watch the movements of the Habr Yunis.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. JOHNSTON STEWART, *Lieutenant*,
2nd Battalion, C. A. Rifles.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Mr. Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.

Harrar, March 20, 1900.

(Extract.)

THE Abyssinian expedition into the Ogaden has ended. The Acting Governor, Garazmatch Bante, with his troops, after having devastated all the country through which he passed, has returned to Jig-Jiga, and is expected here in three or four days.

Especially he destroyed the tribe of the Girad Abdi, who escaped, and who, it seems, is a follower of the Mullah.

The Garazmatch has been unable to find the Mullah. He has written here to say that he has not seen any of the Mullah's men.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Governor of Harrar to Consul-General Sadler.

22*nd Zitkada*, 1317 (*March* 24, 1900).

(After compliments.)

THIS letter has been sent from Jig-Jiga, and conveys good news of the fight which took place with the Eastern Sheikh on Wednesday, 13th Majabeet, 1892.

At 8 o'clock the [enemy's] force arrived in front of the fort. Their numbers were innumerable. The fight did not last five minutes before they fled, followed by our soldiers, who destroyed them, but he [the Sheikh] hid himself, and it is said that he did not join the force against us. A few of his force escaped, some on horseback, and others running and seeking for the safety of their lives have been made prisoners. We hear, by the favour of God, there are only a few of them left in Harradiggit. We were going after them, but waited to ask the permission of King John Hawa. Then we will go after them, and by all means we will attack them at Harradiggit.

This we send you for your information.

(Seal of Garazmatch Bante.)

Rec'd with letter No. 19 dated 4th May 1900 from the Secy, Pol & Sec Dept

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 34.)

My Lord, *Berbera, April* 3, 1900.

RULES for the grant of leave of absence to British officers on the staff of the Protectorate have already received your Lordship's sanction in the "Regulations for the employment of officers in the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast," which have lately been issued.

Those Regulations do not apply to the subordinate staff of the Protectorate such as the Indian and other officials and clerks in the various Departments, and the members of the police forces, Customs peons, and others. It is desirable that Rules for the grant of leave to these should be laid down, and I have now the honour to submit, for your Lordship's approval, a draft of Regulations for leave, embracing all classes of officials serving in, or likely to serve in, the Protectorate.

In this draft the form followed in the East Africa Regulations has been adopted, but there are reasons why I have not seen my way to follow those Regulations in their entirety.

I will briefly explain these reasons. Prior to the transfer of the coast to Her Majesty's Government, the officials in this Protectorate have been serving for some fourteen years under the Indian Leave Rules. These Rules are laid down in Chapters XII and XIV of the Indian "Civil Service Regulations," and provide for two classes of leave—short or privilege leave on full pay, and long leave on half-pay; the latter of which is again divided into leave on "medical certificate," leave on "private affairs," and "furlo."

Under Chapter XII an official is entitled to leave on full pay for one month per annum, which can be accumulated up to a maximum of three months.

Under Chapter XIV leave on "medical certificate" is admissible for three years in all; leave on "private affairs" is granted for six months after six years' service; and one year's "furlo" is given after ten years' service, and thereafter at intervals of not less than eight years.

Again, under the Indian Rules when an official took leave temporary promotion followed in his Department, carrying with it acting allowances, which were not deducted from the salary of an official proceeding on privilege leave. With the transfer these acting allowances ceased; they were a recognized charge on the Administration, and the saving effected thereby will go far to cover the cost of passages for the few officials to whom I would propose passages should be given, a concession which has never been allowed under the Indian Rules.

I think the principle of one month's leave on full pay per annum should be maintained; and I would follow the East Africa Regulations in allowing this to be accumulated up to four months only, deducting a quarter of the salary of officials to whom passages are accorded, as an allowance for a substitute.

For officials domiciled in the Protectorate, leave on full pay should only accumulate to three months, being what they were entitled to under the Indian Rules.

The Indian Rules as they stand for long leave would be quite inapplicable to the conditions of the Protectorate now it is separated from India, and there is no large service to fall back upon to fill temporary vacancies. My experience of Indian officials is that they but rarely avail themselves of long leave on half-pay, but set very great store on their short leave on full pay. Still, it seems necessary in the case of officials domiciled outside the Protectorate to have some provision by which long leave may be occasionally granted should they have urgent reasons for repairing to their homes, and I think this will be met by the Rules I have drafted for special leave. I would also extend these Rules to officials domiciled in the Protectorate, more especially to meet the cases of those proceeding on pilgrimage.

As I have already said, passages have never been allowed under the Indian Rules. By the East Africa Regulations they are apparently provided for all classes of officials

coming under class 2, section A, but only half-pay is allowed. I think it will be sufficient, in the case of this Protectorate, if passages are allowed to officials not domiciled in the Protectorate, who draw a salary of not less than 100 rupees a-month, with the deduction noted above. The number of officials to whom passages would thus be given would now be eight, and this number would include the principal officials who are domiciled in India and Goa.

Owing to the climate, expense of living, and other conditions of life, service on the coast is not popular, and I think that granting passages to a few of the senior officials will tend to make the service more popular. The junior officials not domiciled in the Protectorate will still be in the same position as they were as regards their leave on full pay, with the additional advantage of being able to accumulate it for another month, and they will benefit by the rules as to passage when they reach the higher posts in their turn.

As regards acting allowances, there will be the deductions from the salary of those officials to whom passages are accorded on proceeding on ordinary leave, and the half-pay available from the salary of all officials taking special leave. Besides, establishments have lately been increased, and the position of several of the appointments has been improved, which has given promotion.

I have thought it desirable only to allow passages to the country of domicile. There is, for instance, no necessity to give an official, domiciled in Aden, a passage to Bombay; and as the cost of passage between the coast and Aden would be a small consideration, he would naturally take his leave on full-pay and forego a passage to Aden.

It will be observed that I have followed the system of the East Africa Regulations in dividing class 2 into two sections, but I have thought it simpler to differentiate the sections merely by domicile outside or inside the Protectorate.

To provide against repeated extensions of leave on sick certificate or otherwise, it seems desirable to lay down the rule that salary cannot be claimed for any absence from duty beyond six months. Special cases might be taken into consideration in serious cases of illness, but any claim to salary after an absence of six months should not be admitted as a matter of right.

The same reservation should be made in the case of officials resigning the service without returning to duty at the expiration of their leave.

Finally, the principle is affirmed, that leave will only be granted in accordance with the exigencies of the public service, and cannot be claimed as a right.

I may add that the price of a second-class return ticket from Aden to Bombay and back is 265 rupees, adding 30 rupees as the cost of the passages to and fro between the coast and Aden, the maximum cost of passage to be allowed to Indian officials proceeding to India would be 295 rupees.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Draft Regulations for Leave of Absence of Officers of the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast.

THE officers of this Administration are for the purposes of these Regulations divided into two classes:—

CLASS I.

All officers who are in receipt of a sterling salary of not less than 250*l.* per annum, exclusive of allowances, and whose appointments have been directly sanctioned by the Secretary of State.

CLASS II.

All other officials are subdivided into two sections.—

Section (A).

All European officers, whose annual salaries do not amount respectively to 250*l.* per annum, and all officials who are domiciled in Asia or Africa, but not in the Somali Coast Protectorate.

Section (B).

All officials domiciled in the Somali Coast Protectorate.

Class I: Officers of the first class come under the "Regulations for the employment of officers" which have received the sanction of the Secretary of State.

Leave is divided into ordinary leave and special leave.

Ordinary Leave.

Class II, section A: Officials of this class will be entitled to one month's leave of absence per annum on full pay, which may be accumulated for four years only.

Officials in receipt of a salary of not less than 100 rupees per mensem (exclusive of allowances) who have accumulated three months' leave, that is to say, after thirty-three months' service, will be allowed a second-class passage to the country of their domicile, provided that, in the case of officials proceeding to India or elsewhere in Asia, the cost of such passage shall not exceed the cost of a second-class passage by sea to Bombay; and in the case of officers proceeding to Europe, America, or any British Colony or Possession outside Asia, shall not exceed the cost of a second-class passage by sea to London.

In cases where passage is provided, a quarter of the salary of the official will be deducted for the purpose of providing an allowance for his substitute.

In the event of an official, who would be entitled to a passage, being compelled, owing to illness, to proceed on leave before he has become entitled to three months accumulated leave, a proportion of the expenses of his journey, not exceeding one-half of the cost of the passage to which he would have been entitled had three months accumulated leave been due to him, and a similar allowance on his return to his post may be granted him by the Secretary of State.

Class II, section B: Members of this section will be allowed one month's leave of absence per annum on full pay, which may be accumulated for three years only.

Special Leave.

Special leave is intended to meet those cases in which officials domiciled outside the Protectorate may, for exceptional reasons, require to visit their homes for a longer period than is obtainable under ordinary leave, and to allow officials domiciled in the Protectorate the opportunity of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. It will be but sparingly given when due.

Members of both sections A and B may be allowed six months special leave on half-pay after six years continuous service.

General.

On the termination of ordinary leave, salary ceases unless the official is granted an extension on sick certificates, in which case he is placed on half-pay.

Special leave cannot be taken in extension of ordinary leave, nor ordinary leave in extension of special leave.

No salary can be claimed for any period of absence from duty extending beyond six months; nor can an official claim as a right salary for the period of his leave if, during or after that period, he resigns the service of the Protectorate without returning to his post.

Leave will be granted in accordance with these Regulations so far as the exigencies of the Public Service may permit. It cannot be claimed as a right.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 3.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 45.)
My Lord, *Cairo, March* 7, 1900.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 40 of the 25th ultimo, and previous correspondence, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further Special Army Order giving the findings of the Court of Inquiry during the second portion of its deliberations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

SPECIAL ARMY ORDER.

War Office, Cairo, March 5, 1900.

THE following Special Army Order, dated Omdurman, the 5th March, 1900, is republished for information:—

With reference to the Special Army Order of the 24th February, 1900, the second portion of the deliberations of the Court of Inquiry therein referred to having been submitted for consideration and received the full ratification and confirmation of the Government of His Highness the Khedive, is hereby promulgated to the army, and will be read out on three successive parades, viz.:—

1. The Court considers that El Yusbashi Mahmud Effendi Hilmi, 8th Battalion, was a party to inciting certain officers of the 11th Soudanese to acts which resulted in the outbreak of insubordination in that battalion, and unanimously recommends that this officer be placed on pension.

2. The Court considers that El Mulazim Awal Mohammed Effendi Tewfik Yusef, El Mulazim Tani Abd El Hamed Effendi Shukri, and El Mulazim Tani Idris Effendi Abdulla, 11th Soudanese, were directly responsible for the acts of insubordination which occurred in that battalion, and unanimously recommends that those officers should be dismissed from His Highness' army.

3. The Court is of opinion that El Mulazim Tani Osman Effendi Aref, 9th Soudanese, committed a grave indiscretion, acknowledged by him at the time, when the officers and men of the 11th Soudanese were in a state of uneasiness and excitement. The Court recommends that El Mulazim Tani Osman Effendi Aref, 9th Soudanese, be severely reprimanded.

The following telegrams were yesterday received from his Excellency the President of the Council of Ministers and his Excellency the Minister of War:—

(*a.*) "*His Excellency the Sirdar, Omdurman. Urgent.*

"We have received your Excellency's telegram in which it is stated that the Court of Inquiry has decided that El Yusbashi Mahmud Effendi Hilmi, 8th Battalion, should be placed on pension, and that El Mulazim Awal Mohammed Effendi Tewfik Yusef, Mulazimin Tawani Abd El Hamed Effendi Shukri, and Idris Effendi Abdulla, 11th Soudanese, should be dismissed from His Highness' army, and that El Mulazim Tani Osman Effendi Aref should be severely reprimanded. On the part of His Highness the Khedive, the decisions of the said Court are approved; and we have told his Excellency the War Minister to send your Excellency a telegram, instructing you as to the measures to be taken in dealing with these guilty officers.

"By command of His Highness the Khedive,
(Signed) "MUSTAFA FÁHMI,
"*President of the Council of Ministers.*"

(*b.*) "*His Excellency the Sirdar, Omdurman.*

"His Excellency the President of the Council of Ministers has informed me of his approval on the part of His Highness the Khedive, of the decisions of the Court of Inquiry regarding placing on pension El Yusbashi Mohammed Effendi Hilmi, 8th Battalion, the dismissal from His Highness' army of El Mulazim Awal Mohammed Effendi Tewfik Yusef, Mulazimin Tawani Abd El Hamed Effendi Shukri, and Idris Effendi Abdulla, 11th Soudanese, and to be severely reprimanded, El Mulazim Tani Osman Effendi Aref, 9th Soudanese. I now, therefore, forward you the following instructions, viz.: That these officers, with the exception of El Mulazim Tani Osman Effendi Aref, should be sent as prisoners, under close arrest, to Cair

(Signed) "War Minister."

The above officers, with the exception of El Mulazim Tani Osman Effendi Aref, 9th Soudanese, have accordingly been placed in close arrest, and have been sent this day to Cairo.

By order,
(Signed) L. O. F. STACK, *Bimbashi, for Deputy Adjutant-General.*

By order,
(Signed) W. S. SPARKES, *Assistant Adjutant-General, for Adjutant-General.*

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 49.)
My Lord, *Cairo, March* 9, 1900.

IN reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 38 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report as follows:—

Mohamed Bey, the police officer who was instrumental in the capture of Osman Digna, received the 3rd class Medjidieh.

Sheikh Mohammed Ali Or received a robe of honour, a sword, and a gratuity of 100*l.*

Two of his relatives received gratnities of 16*l.* each.

A month's extra pay was issued to the two sergeants, two corporals, and sixteen men of the police and slavery departments who were concerned in the capture.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

No. 3.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 50.)
My Lord, *Cairo, March* 9, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a Memorandum from the Sirdar, from which it will be observed that a new religious sect has made its appearance at Omdurman. Sir Reginald Wingate has, very wisely, caused the leaders of the movement to be arrested and sent to Wady Halfa.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Head-quarters, War Office, Khartoum,
February 26, 1900.

(Confidential.)

The inclosed report deals with the appearance of a new religious sect in Omdurman.

As this sect is of a distinctly unorthodox description, and might develop into a danger if allowed to pass unnoticed, I have had some twenty-five of the ringleaders arrested, and they will be sent to Wady Halfa for a time.

(Signed) F. R. WINGATE, *Sirdar, and Governor-General of the Soudan.*

Civil Secretary, Cairo.

Omdurman, February 24, 1900.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit, for your information, the following report on a religious sect which may be aptly termed Millenniumists.

On the night of the 19th February it was reported by the Mudir of Omdurman that nine men, headed by Abdel Kerim, had been arrested on a charge of "preaching Mahdism and inciting the people to revolt."

On the morning of the 20th February last a Court of Inquiry, consisting of Shakoor Bey, Tannus Effendi, and myself, interviewed the nine persons, who all affirmed that they believed the Mahdi had really come and died, and that the late Khalifa had prophesied that, "When he died and the Turks had once more conquered the land, then would be the time of Issa."

These prisoners unanimously believed in this, and are sure that Issa has come, but do not know where he is at present.

They affirm that they had no intention of causing a rising against the Government, as it was God's will whether they were ruled by Turks or Mahdists.

On the 21st February the Court of Inquiry, assisted by Slatin Pasha and Shahin Bey, inquired further into the case, ten more prisoners having been arrested by the Namur.

Abdel Kerim and Mohammed Ez Zeki gave a full account of their sect, which is as follows:—

The belief of Millenniumists is that the Mahdi has already come and died; the late Khalifa prophesied that, on his death, and on the arrival of the Turks, it would be the era of Issa, which now has come to pass. They call themselves the "creatures of God."

The following are their five Articles of Faith:—

1. "The creatures of God": that is, whatever is done by word or deed is right, as it is by the "act of God."
2. "God is watching over one." "He has created me, and will not forsake his followers."
3. "In His wish": if good or evil happens, it is God's will.
4. "Praise to God": if evil or good happens, God must be praised.
5. "Inspiration": all actions are due to divine inspiration.

This is the whole of their belief, and, without exception, they are strongly convinced that this is the true faith, and are desirous of spreading it abroad.

On being questioned, Mohammed Ze Zeki informed the Court that if inspired to make a rising for the overthrow of the present Government, they would have to do so, as it would be divine inspiration.

At the present time these people are satisfied with the Government, but Article 5 shows that at any time they might attempt a rising.

Slatin Pasha, Shakoor Bey, and myself, have, after consideration, come to the following opinion:—

The sect of religious believers known as Millenniumists, although at the present time not dangerous to the State, may at a future time cause difficulties on account of Article 5, "Divine inspiration;" therefore, for the good of the State, it is deemed advisable that a certain number, probably twenty-seven, of the most important leaders should be sent away from Omdurman as soon as possible.

The following is a complete list of the names of persons who are implicated in this sect, and from whom selection will be made.

[List of names.]

I have, &c.
(Signed) NEWALL, *Bimbashi*,
A.M.S., Sec. C.

His Excellency
The Sirdar and Governor-General of the Soudan.

o

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Captain Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 7.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, February* 9, 1900.

WITH regard to the removal of British flags from Murle, and Nakua or Ahite, by M. Leontieff, referred to in my despatch No. 69 of the 28th December, 1899, I have the honour to report that I have arranged with His Majesty King Menelek that Mr. James J. Harrison's party, who are travelling in this country, and will pass the places in question on their way to Nasser, should rehoist our flag in the places they had been removed from.

I inclose a copy of the instructions given to Mr. Harrison.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Captain Harrington to Mr. Harrison.

Sir, *Addis Abbaba, January* 23, 1900.

AS I understand your intentions are to proceed to Lake Rudolf, I have the honour to forward you two British flags with this letter, and to request that you will be good enough to hoist them at Murle on the east bank of the Omo, and at Nakua, or Ahite, which are to the west of the Omo, and north of Lake Rudolf.

If, as I am given to understand, the British flag has been removed by M. Leontieff from Murle and one other place (I am not sure whether the second place is Nakua or Ahite), then you will be good enough to hoist the second flag, after having ascertained from the local inhabitants, if possible, from which of these two named places the flag was removed.

It has been agreed with His Majesty the Emperor Menelek that the flag should be hoisted by you.

If you are able to report to me that you have carried out these instructions, please do so; otherwise report to Viscount Cromer, Cairo.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

---

1 S.C. for Resdt. at Aden

[Confidential]

No. 1255-E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, &c.,
Sd. J. B. Wood.
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department
Simla,
the 18th June 1900

North-East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints:-

Section 1, dated the 2nd, 4th, 21st, 25th and 30th April 1900.

Section 3, dated the 16th and 21st April 1900.

*With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 4658

Political Department
Bombay Castle, 22 June 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident Aden, for information.

W. Lee-Warner

Acting Secretary to Govern

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 2.)

(No. 59.)

My Lord, *Cairo, March* 24, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a telegram received by the Governor-General of the Soudan from Major Peake, who is in command of the sudd-cutting expedition, reporting the progress of his operations.

Major Peake hopes to have completed the work before him by the end of April next.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 174.)

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, March* 23, 1900.

FOLLOWING from Major Peake:—

"*March* 12.—Block Bahr-el-Jebel, latitude 8° 49′, sixth block, latitude 8° 55′, length 400 yards, opened on the 23rd February, but on the opening of this block about half-a-mile of sudd came down from the seventh block, which had to be cleared away.

"Seventh block begun, latitude 8° 53′, length unmeasured. While working on this block it gave way during the night, and carried down with it steamers and barges. However, they finally managed to secure them without damage. This mass of sudd took thirty hours passing one spot, but it is now reported past Sobat, and so no fear of blocking. After this sudd came away the Bahr-el-Jebel rose about 6 feet, and the Nile at base camp on the 9th March was 8 centim. higher than on the 27th December, when we first arrived there. Here the Bahr-el-Jebel has just begun to fall slowly.

"Ninth block is 5 miles from here, length about 800 yards. I have been up to it, but, owing to strong current in the narrow channel of the eighth block, was not able to get through with barge and men. I am, however, joining on to-morrow.

"Belgians came to the conclusion that they could not get back the way they had come, and have now gone up the Bahr-ez-Zeraf to try and force a passage. I did all I could for them.

"I think we shall be through all the obstructions by the end of April.

"Rain has fallen here the last two mornings. Heat has been great for the last week."

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 4.)

Sir, *India Office, April 3, 1900.*

IN reply to your letter, dated the 5th March, regarding the question of leave allowances and pensions in the Somaliland Protectorate, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to observe that the annual charge of 9,000 rupees a-year, to which my letter of the 21st November referred, did not relate to the entry in the estimate framed by Consul-General Sadler, which had not then been seen by Lord George Hamilton, but to that contained in the statements inclosed in the letter from the Government of India, dated the 3rd February, 1898, which was transmitted to you on the 29th of the following month.

I am, however, desired to state that, on further consideration of the question of the incidence of the pensionary liabilities connected with the Protectorate, the Secretary of State in Council suggests the following arrangement for the consideration of the Marquess of Salisbury.

In view of the right, under the Superannuation Act of 1892, of officers who serve under more than one authority, to civil pension in respect of the whole period of their service, it seems best that, on final retirement, such officers should receive the pension to which they would be entitled according to the Rules framed under that Act. This would apply to the case of Mr. Malcolm Jones, to which you drew attention on the 8th September, 1899.

In such cases the Government of India would bear the portion chargeable in respect of the period during which the officer was paid from the Somali revenues, while the administration was under the Government of India, subject to the condition that the Indian Government should not be liable for a greater pension than could under Indian Regulations have been chargeable for the same period, had the officer retired from service in India with the salary that he received at the close of his service. That is to say, the pension for the full period of continuous service being awarded under the Foreign Office Regulations, the portion chargeable to India would be that rateably due in respect of the service paid by the Indian Government, subject to a maximum limit of 2,000 rupees per annum to an officer who has completed a service of ten years, with an addition of 200 rupees a-year for each year of service under the Government of India in excess of that period, up to a maximum of 5,000 rupees a-year.

As regards officers belonging to the Indian services, who have been, or may be, temporarily employed in the Protectorate after the 1st October, 1898, it appears to his Lordship that they should be required to make a contribution under Indian Regulations to the Government of India, who would then bear the whole liability for pensions.

Lord George Hamilton does not, at present, make objection to the proposal that this should be based on the Egyptian precedent, the Protectorate accepting the cost of allowances during leave; but, before giving his assent thereto, he desires to ascertain the views of the Government of India on this point, and has addressed a despatch to them accordingly.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 74.)

My Lord, *Cairo, April 14, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of the "Soudan Gazette," No. 10, of the 1st April, 1900.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Soudan Gazette" of April 1, 1900.

Proclamation.

WHEREAS it has been brought to the notice of his Excellency the Governor-General of the Soudan that certain persons, taking advantage of the want of money in the Soudan, are acquiring lands from the inhabitants at prices below the actual value, notice is hereby given that until such time as it may be found possible to establish a land register, as contemplated by section 2 of "The Title to Lands Ordinance, 1899," all contracts for the purchase of lands should be submitted to the Mudir for approval, and that power will be given to Land Commissions which may be appointed under the provisions of the said Ordinance to revise the terms of any sales which may be proved to have taken place under the circumstances aforesaid, and of which notice shall not have been given to the Mudir.

(Signed) REGINALD WINGATE,
Governor-General.

An Order putting the Soudan Civil Justice Ordinance in Force.

Whereas a Soudan Civil Justice Ordinance has been prepared, and copies thereof have been, or will shortly be, placed at the Mudiriehs and Governorates;

And whereas such Ordinance is expressed to take effect in such parts of the Soudan as the Governor-General may from time to time, by notice published in the "Soudan Gazette," order:

It is hereby enacted as follows:—

1. The said Soudan Civil Justice Ordinance shall take effect in the Provinces of Khartoum, Dongola, Berber, Sennar, and Kassala, and in the districts of Wadi Halfa and Suakim, as from the 1st day of April, 1900, or from the date (if later) at which copies thereof may be placed in the hands of the officers charged with the administration thereof.

2. Until further order, the following provisions shall take effect:—

(1.) The provisions of the Soudan Civil Justice Ordinance relating to any act or proceedings to be done or taken by or before any Magistrate or Court shall be applied, with such modifications not affecting the substance as, in the opinion of the Magistrate or Court, the circumstances may render necessary.

(2.) The duties under this Ordinance of Mamurs acting as Magistrates of the third class shall be performed according to instructions, conformable to the spirit of

the Ordinance to be issued, with due regard to all the circumstances of the case, by the Mudir or administrator of each province or district.

3. Copies of the Code shall be open to inspection at the Mudirieh or Governorate of each of the said provinces and districts.

(Signed) REGINALD WINGATE,
Governor-General.

Finance Circular.

Finance Circular No. 1, as promulgated in "Soudan Gazette" No. 5, is hereby cancelled, and the following substituted for it:—

Governor-General's Order No. 1.

1. *Financial Secretary.*—The Financial Secretary to the Soudan Government is responsible for the general control of the revenue and of the expenditure, and all questions connected therewith will be submitted to him.

2. *Revenue.*—Revenue in the Soudan is in money and in kind. Receipts in money are accounted for in the ordinary course through the monthly abstracts, to which a statement of the treasure in the safe at the close of each month is annexed.

Revenue taken in kind, whether as royalties or as ushr, is, in like manner, a receipt to be accounted for to the public chest. But until value has been received by sales it will not appear in the cash accounts of the revenue, but it will be taken on charge in the store accounts under the Regulations prescribed in paragraph 5 below. No sales or issues of revenue received in kind may take place without authority.

3. *Expenditure.*—No expenditure may be incurred without authority. The fact of the inclusion of any sum or sums in the annual Budget or other form of credit does not convey or imply any authority to spend such sum or sums. The specific authority of the Financial Secretary must be obtained for all increased expenditure over and above that for which sanction has been given, nor may anything be done which will throw a liability, either direct or indirect, on the public chest without authority previously obtained.

4. *Appointments.*—In case of vacancies, Mudirs may appoint Sarrafs from the locality. Appointments to such posts must in all cases be reported to the Governor-General, and his approval must be obtained of the Sarrafs guarantees.

All other appointments will, except where a standing authority has been given, be made by the Central Government, and no salary (or increase of salary in case of promotion) will be payable otherwise than from the date specified in a letter or Gazette as approved by the Governor-General.

5. *Controller of Stores.*—The Controller of Stores will take charge of all revenue taken in kind and arrange for its disposal. He also is the channel for supplying all Government establishments in the Soudan with stationery and furniture, and has charge of the clothing and equipment of the police. He also controls the issue of rations and forage when such are given in kind, and is the authority to deal with the Army Supply Departments for all articles either received from or delivered to them. The Controller will keep the Financial Secretary fully informed upon all matters which affect the sale of revenue in kind, and will obtain his approval before disposing of the same.

A qualified Mulazim Katib in each Mudirieh will enable the Mudir to keep up all Returns, and to carry out all work in the Mudirieh connected with the Controller's Department.

The following Returns will be rendered monthly to the Controller:—

(1.) Return of all receipts in kind from ushr royalties and all other sources.

(2.) When rations or forage are issued in kind, the ordinary ration Return will be sent in.

A ledger will be kept in the Mudirieh of all articles received from the Controller.

6. *Grants of Loans.*—It may occur from time to time that grain taken as revenue will be utilized for grants for relief of distress or for seed loans. For all such matters application will be made direct to the Governor-General, and no grants (except in case of great emergency) or loans may be made under any circumstances without sanction previously conveyed by him. The question of loans must be dealt with with the utmost caution. Grave objections exist to the placing of the public authority in the position of a lender. Should, however, an application for a loan be entertained, it will be the duty of the Mudir to see that the security is adequate, and, if money is advanced, that it is laid out to the best advantage. If grain is issued, care must be taken that the borrower returns a fair equivalent with reference to prevailing prices; otherwise a portion of the loan becomes a dole in disguise.

(Signed) REGINALD WINGATE,
Governor-General.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 45.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 25, 1900.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you Queen's Regulations, which have been allowed by the Secretary of State, dealing with the importation, manufacture and sale of alcoholic liquors in the Somaliland Protectorate.

You are authorized to issue these Regulations in accordance with the instructions contained in Lord Salisbury's despatch No. 9 of the 31st January.

Fifty copies of the Regulations are inclosed for use in the Protectorate.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 30.)

(No. 37.)

My Lord, *Berbera, April* 12, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that the detachments of Bombay Native Infantry were finally withdrawn, and returned to Aden on the 7th instant.

As the Royal Indian mail-steamer "Minto" was in Bombay and therefore not available for transport, I arranged with Messrs. Cowasjee, Dinshaw, and Brothers to convey the detachments to Aden in their local steamer.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 2.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 30, 1900.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul-General for the Somali Coast,* submitting draft Regulations for leave of absence of officers of the Protectorate.

Lord Salisbury considers that Colonel Sadler is justified in his reasons for not following the Regulations for East Africa.

I am to request that you will submit the draft Regulations for the sanction of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

---

* Colonel Sadler, No. 34.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 16.)

(No. 29. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, March* 27, 1900.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 23, Confidential, of the 9th instant, I have the honour to submit copy of a letter from Her Britannic Majesty's Consular Agent, Harrar, reporting that the Abyssinian expedition against the Aysa has been abandoned, and that consequently the Harrar-Zeyla caravan route has been reopened.

The merchants at Zeyla were notified to this effect as soon as intimation was received at that port.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Mr. Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.

Sir, *Harrar, March* 20, 1900.

REFERRING to your letter No. 171, Confidential, dated the 9th March last, I have the honour to inform you that the expedition against the Aysa is abandoned, the Akils having promised to restore the goods looted three months ago by the camelmen, and consequently the caravan route Harrar-Zeyla has been opened.

The expedition under Azaz Vold Tadik has been only into the Dankalis country, and after having killed a good deal of Dankalis and devastated their country, returned back to Addis Abbaba.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. GEROLIMATO.
Consular Agent.

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 16.)

(No. 69.)

My Lord, *Cairo, April* 3, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith paraphrase of a telegram which I have received from Captain Harrington relative to the movements of the survey parties on the Abyssinian frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 2.

Mr. Harrington to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Jibuti, April* 3, 1900.

NEWS has been received from the survey parties Austin's party reported well at Goré on 2nd March. Gwynne left Gadami for Sobat on 9th March, having been delayed by local Chief.

No. 3.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 16, 1900.

WITH reference to your letter of the 16th August, 1898, I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, copies of correspondence which has passed between this Department and the India Office and with Her Majesty's Consul-General on the Somali Coast regarding the question of leave allowances and pensions in that Protectorate.

The arrangement now proposed by the Secretary of State for India is that, in the case of officers who have served both the Government of India and the Protectorate as independent of that Government, the portion of their pension chargeable in respect of the period during which they were paid from the Somali revenues while administered by the Government of India should be borne by India.

To this proposal are attached two conditions: that the Government of India shall not be liable for a greater pension than may actually have been earned by any officer at the close of his service with them, and that in no case shall they be liable for any pension exceeding 5,000 rupees a-year, that being the limit laid down by Indian regulations for ordinary pensions.

I am to inquire whether the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury see any objection to the acceptance of the conditions proposed.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H SANDERSON.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 3.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 72.)
My Lord, *Cairo, April* 9, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a paraphrase of a telegram which I have received from Captain Harrington on the subject of obstruction offered to the survey party on the Abyssinian survey by local Chiefs and the steps which he has taken to overcome it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Jibuti, April* 9, 1900.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 5, I have now to report that Austin, after much obstruction on the part of a petty Chief, has been stopped at Goré. I have made strong representations to Menelek, insisting that the offender be publicly punished here. He made a promise to this effect, but I said I could not believe him until I had seen it fulfilled. Austin is doubtful if survey can be continued; I have begged him to go on if possible. Menelek has issued fresh instructions to Abyssinian Chiefs ordering all persons to assist survey party in every way, and threatening severe punishment in case of disobedience.

This obstruction must be put down to the insubordination and greed of frontier Chiefs; I am sure that Menelek himself is in no way responsible. Good effect will be produced by public punishment of offenders.

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 9. Africa.)
My Lord, *Cairo, April* 14, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a letter recently addressed by M. Maskens, the Belgian Consul-General at Cairo, to Sir Reginald Wingate, together with the reply which, after consultation with myself, the Sirdar has sent to him.

I trust that the terms of this latter communication will meet with your Lordship's approval.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to M. Maskens.

My dear M. Maskens, *Cairo, April* 14, 1900.

I HAVE spoken to Lord Cromer on the question of the transport of supplies viâ the Nile to the Congo Free State, to which you referred when last we met, and he sees no reason why we should not come to some mutual arrangement by which the wishes of the Free State Government may be met. At the same time, in view of the complicated conditions resulting from the various African Agreements, he would prefer that the Free State Government should address the British Foreign Office, with

13.C. fo Coll. Acadt. at Aden.

whose views he is not yet familiar, directly. With regard to the transport of any stores and supplies, exclusive of trade goods, he thinks it might be arranged that provisional facilities should be accorded for their immediate dispatch. without prejudice to the general question. Such goods would of course, I apprehend, be subject to the Egyptian customs duties on landing at an Egyptian or Soudanese port.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) F. R. WINGATE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

M. Maskens to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

Mon cher Sirdar, *Vendredi, le* 13 *Avril*, 1900.

VOUS pouvez me rendre un service personnel en me procurant rapidement une réponse pour la question de transport sur le Nil, dont je vous ai parlé dernièrement.

En effet, ma femme désire beacoup que j'aille la rejoindre très prochainement, et je crains qu'on ne m'accorde pas de congé avant que la question dont il s'agit soit réglée dans un sens ou dans l'autre.

Je vous serais en conséquence très reconnaissant si, malgré le poids des affaires qui vous accablent, vous aviez la bonté de consulter le plus rapidement possible Lord Cromer sur la question que je vous ai posée.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) LÉON MASKENS.

[Confidential]

No. 1357-E.A

A copy of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, &c.,
Alf. J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department,
Simla,
the 29th June 1900

North-East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints;

Section 1, dated the 27th April, 1900.
Section 4, dated the 12th March, 1900

*With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden

Confidential

No. 5047

Political Department
Bombay Castle, 5th July 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information

W. Rudsdale

N.L

Acting Secretary to Government

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 107.)

My Lord, *Brussels, April* 26, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 147 of the 9th July, 1898, and to previous correspondence, I have the honour to report that an extraordinary general meeting of the "Société Anonyme Belge" for the development of commerce in the Equatorial Provinces of Abyssinia, which Count Leontieff came to Brussels to attend, was held here on the 14th instant.

The report of which I inclose copy, and which was read at the meeting, contains the translation of an autograph letter from the Emperor Menelik, in which His Majesty says: "With regard to your understanding, I trust that for the future you will have confidence in my protection. As far as I can, I will not fail to help you to the best of my power, and as your Company is working in the interests of my Government, I pray God to grant you His Holy protection."

The Board of Directors propose that advantage should be taken of Count Leontieff's return to his Government at an early date to despatch a mission with him to place the commercial affairs of this Company on a sound basis, and that the mission should be formed of persons capable of making a geological survey, and of studying the best means of forming ways of communication.

The Board also propose to forward a small sternwheeler to explore the navigable rivers as far as Lake Rodolph.

The Directors state that 18 tons of ivory will arrive at Djibouti within the next four months, and that 320 kilog. have already been dispatched to Antwerp.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received March* 12.)

(No. 15.)

My Lord, *Berbera, February* 20, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for your Lordship's approval, drafts of two sets of "Orders" which it would seem necessary should be issued by the Protectorate Court, in its civil and criminal capacity, establishing the Courts to be subordinate to the Protectorate Court, in the Somaliland Protectorate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Orders made by the Protectorate Court in the Somaliland Protectorate, with the approval of the Secretary of State, under Article 23 (*b*) *of "The Somaliland Order in Council."*

Establishment of Civil Courts.

UNDER the provisions of "The Bombay Courts Act," Act No. XIV of 1869, the following Courts are hereby established as Courts within the meaning of Article III of "The Somaliland Order in Council, 1899:"—

(*a.*) The Courts of Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Zeyla, and Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Berbera, to be District Courts.

(*b.*) The Courts of the District Officer, Bulhar, and the Deputy District Officer, Berbera, to be subordinate Courts.

Jurisdiction.

2. (*a.*) The jurisdiction of the Judge of a District Court will extend to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature.

(*b.*) The subordinate Judge, Bulhar, will exercise jurisdiction in all suits of a value not exceeding 500 rupees.

(*c.*) The subordinate Judge, Berbera, will exercise jurisdiction in suits not exceeding 50 rupees in value.

Appeal.

3. (*a.*) An appeal will lie to the Protectorate Court against the decisions of a District Judge in all suits exceeding 500 rupees in value.

(*b.*) An appeal will lie to the District Judge, Berbera, against the decisions of the subordinate Judge at Bulhar and Berbera, in all suits disposed of by the subordinate Judge.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER,
Judge, Protectorate Court.

Berbera, 1900.

Orders made by the Protectorate Courts in the Somaliland Protectorate, with the approval of the Secretary of State, under Article 10 (? *or* 31) *of "The Somaliland Order in Council,* 1899."

Establishment of Magisterial Courts.

The following Courts are hereby established as "Courts" within the meaning of Article III (IX) of "The Somaliland Order in Council, 1899," and the Magistrate holding "The Court" will exercise the powers conferred on Magistrates of a similar class under section 32 of "The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882."

The Court of Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Zeyla, to be a Court of a Magistrate of the first class.

The Court of Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Berbera, to be a Court of a Magistrate of the first class.

The Court of the District Officer, Bulhar, to be a Court of a Magistrate of the second class.

The Court of the Deputy-District Officer, Bulhar, to be a Court of a Magistrate of the third class.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER,
Session's Judge, Protectorate Court.

Berbera, 1900.

I.B.C. for the Political Resident

[Confidential]

No. 1369-E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, &c.,
A. J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department,
Simla;
the 30th June 1900

North-East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints;

Section 1, dated the 1st, 5th, 14th, 18th, and 19th May 1900;

Section 2, dated the 30th April and 14th May 1900.

*With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident, at Aden.

Confidential

No 5048
Political Department
Bombay Castle, 5th July 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden for information.

W. Hudson
Acting Secretary to Government

M.S.C.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(*Received May* 1.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, April* 30, 1900.

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury your letter of the 16th instant, with its inclosures, on the subject of the apportionment between the revenues of India and of the Somali Coast Protectorate respectively, of the pensions of officers who have served in the Protectorate partly under the Government of India, and partly under the Imperial Government.

In reply, I am to request you to inform the Marquess of Salisbury that their Lordships agree to the proposed method of apportionment, on the understanding that Protectorate funds will only pay the difference between the entire pension (calculated in accordance with the principles of the Superannuation Act of 1892) and the portion paid by the India Office.

I am, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS MOWATT.

[2051 *a*—1]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 5.)

(No. 13.)
My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, March* 24, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report, for your Lordship's information, that King Menelek informed me to-day of the result of an expedition from Harrar against the Somaliland Mullah. The expedition under Gerazmatch Banti entered the Ogaden, but met with no opposition, the Mullah's forces having dispersed. On their return the Abyssinians were attacked near Jig Jiga, and the Mullah's forces were dispersed with a loss of 2,800 killed. The Mullah was not captured. The above is the Abyssinian version of the expedition. A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Consul-General, Somali Coast.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 2.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 5.)

(No. 14.)
My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, March* 24, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 9, of the 9th ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have drawn the King's attention to the statements made to the newspapers by M. Leontieff and his employés, and pointed out to him that were the true history of M. Leontieff's doings to come to light, they would do considerable damage to His Majesty's reputation.

His Majesty's reply was that what M. Leontieff did was contrary to his orders, and that there were several cases pending against him which would be inquired into on his return.

His Majesty seemed anxious to know whether M. Leontieff would succeed in raising money to return to this country. He stated that M. Leontieff's country had been given to another officer.

This may be true, but I am inclined to think that should M. Leontieff return, supplied with the funds necessary to quiet his enemies and conciliate the King, the past will be forgotten, and we shall again have him devastating the country in the neighbourhood of Lake Rudolph, unless Her Majesty's Government take some steps to show that they consider such country as being within their sphere of influence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 3.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 5.)

(No. 15.)
My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, March* 24, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to communicate, for your Lordship's information, that the state of affairs in Tigre still remains in the same unsatisfactory condition.

Ras Makunan is meeting with considerable opposition on the part of the local Chiefs in his attempts to settle the country.

It is impossible here to obtain accurate information as to the truth of the various reports which circulate concerning affairs in Tigre, but there is no doubt that the situation is decidedly unsatisfactory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 4.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 5.)

(No. 39.)
My Lord, *Berbera, April* 18, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that Captain E. J. E. Swayne arrived at Berbera, and received charge of his duties as Commandant of the Somali Coast levies this morning.

A delay of a fortnight occurred in his reaching this, owing to a break down on the Uganda Railway.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 5.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 5.)

(No. 42. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berbera, April* 21, 1900.

I HAVE but little news to report in connection with the progress of events in the Ogaden.

The Mullah is reported to be inactive at Harradiggit, having failed to induce the tribes to make another venture in the direction of Jig Jiga, where the Abyssinian expedition remains intrenched. Native reports are that the Mullah will return towards Bohotele, but nothing certain is known as to his plans or intentions.

It is reported from Harrar that the reinforcements from Addis Abbaba have been countermanded, and that, as the hot weather is approaching, the Abyssinians do not propose to make any further expeditions into the Ogaden.

A few caravans from the Rer Ali have commenced to come into Bulhar.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Captain Harrington, and the Intelligence Branch, Simla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 6.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 5.)

(No. 82.)
My Lord, *Cairo, April* 28, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a telegram which I have received from Sir William Garstin.

It was thought desirable to publish this telegram at once, in order to put a stop to the various incorrect rumours circulated by speculators in cotton.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Supplement to the Egyptian "Journal Officiel" of April 28, 1900.

Sir W. Garstin to Viscount Cromer.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, April 27, 1900.*

I STEAMED up the Bahr-el-Jebel for about 217 miles from Lake No with Major Peake, and arrived within about 20 miles of Shambeh. Our return was necessitated by shallow water and want of fuel. Major Peake's party has removed fourteen blocks of sudd in all in length of 83 miles of river. I think the Jebel would be navigable to Gondokoro in an ordinary year. Free navigation is obstructed by low water this year. Between miles 137 and 162 from the Nile junction the Jebel River has left its true channel for a distance of at least 25 miles, and now flows through a series of open lakes and a network of shallow branches. The true channel is entirely blocked by sudd, and appears to have been thus closed for years. We determined the position of the two ends of this closed portion, and Peake's men are now engaged at the northern extremity. It is, I fear, too late to clear the obstruction away completely this season, as there is no current to assist the operations, and it is evident that the rains on the Upper Nile will commence shortly. I feel sure that a similar stretch of lost channel exists at mile 217, where we turned back. In each case there is a complete similarity in the state of the river. In both these places the water suddenly shoals from 18 or 19 to 5 feet, and the river is divided into a number of channels. It is probable that this block reaches to a spot in the vicinity of Shambeh. It was not possible to prove this fact, but I am convinced that the Nile now follows false channels in this spot. The works can easily be completed next winter. No water is actually lost, except that due to the evaporation of the lakes. I informed Major Peake that, in my opinion, the only operation necessary to be done this season would be to clear away the projecting angles and corners in those reaches of the river where he had cut through the sudd. A surprising amount of excellent work has been carried out by Major Peake and his officers, despite very difficult circumstances. It would not be possible for men to work in this region during the rains. The steamers afford no kind of protection against the rains, and the climate is most unhealthy. By the 8th April, though the real rains had not yet begun, we experienced incessant thunderstorms, accompanied by drenching showers. There were strong winds from the south, and the sky was overcast in all directions. These storms are probably the forerunners of regular rains, which seem likely to begin very early this season. In my opinion, it is absolutely necessary that two, and if possible three, steamers shall patrol the Jebel River constantly during the period of the flood if it is to be kept free of sudd. It is necessary that one steamer should always remain down stream below the sudd, in order to be able to help the others, in case they should be imprisoned. On our return down the Jebel River we found ourselves thus shut up by a mass of sudd, which had completely closed the river to the north of us. Had it not been for a steamer which had remained behind to bring wood, and which was north of this barrier, we might have been imprisoned for an indefinite period. When we passed up no obstruction existed at this spot, and on the 6th April a steamer which was following us found the river clear. On the 9th April the wood steamer could not pass, and when we arrived on the 10th April the block in the river was about 500 yards in length, while the average thickness of the last 100 yards was 15 feet. The block was caused by storms, which had detached several hundred acres of floating sudd from the neighbouring lakes. These were carried into the deep channel, and, being compressed in a narrow space, entirely closed the river to navigation. Accidents of this kind must always be expected, and it would be unsafe for a steamer to go up the river during the period of storm without another being ready to give her assistance if required.

Considerable fluctuations in the levels in the White Nile were caused by the removal of different blocks of sudd; lagoons on either side were drained into the river by the clearance of certain of these blocks, and a temporary rise of water was thus brought about. Since all fourteen blocks have been removed the lagoons between miles 162 and 137 are draining, and these have occasioned the present rise, which I hope may be maintained until the flood comes.

I understand that the most exaggerated reports have been current in Cairo, such, for instance, as that the White Nile had risen 4 feet. This is absurd. The total rise at Base Camp, 54 miles down stream from Lake No, between the lowest level on the

3rd March and that of the 15th April was 72 centim. Between the 29th December and the 15th April the total rise has been 36 centim. This rise has passed down north. On the 17th April the gauge at Fashoda marked 50 centim. above the lowest level. Unfortunately, the old gauge there had been removed, and the new one was only set up on the 8th March. It is difficult to follow the rise between Fashoda and Khartoum, as the gauges are somewhat vague. At Duem a rise of 21 centim. was registered between the 3rd and 21st April, but I was told by the English Commandant that the total rise was 40 centim. The lowest point registered by the Khartoum Palace gauge was reached on the 16th April. Since that date there has been a rise of 13 centim., and to-day the gauge marks 1 centim. lower than it did on the 1st April. The present levels at Lake No will bring about a fresh fall should the flood-water not arrive before the lakes have been drained off. I feel almost certain, however, that the flood will catch up and overlap the lake water. The rains must very shortly cause a rise in the Upper Nile, and as the lakes are of considerable extent, they will act as reservoirs, and drain off slowly. Unless, therefore, there is a failure of rain for this year, which, however, there seems no reason to anticipate, I do not apprehend any further fall in the levels of the White Nile. Whether the levels rise quickly must depend on the flood, more especially on the Sobat. No rise has yet been marked in this river. It is difficult to say what effect will be caused at Khartoum by the drainage of the lagoons. The trough of the Nile is so very large for a long distance south of the junction that I fear the rise may not be as great here as further up stream. However, great good will have been brought about if only the fall is arrested, and it is possible that the clearance of the Jebel River may allow the flood-water to pass down more rapidly. The most important factor in the situation must, as I have always maintained, be the Sobat River. On the 17th April I ascended this branch for 12 miles, in order to measure its discharge, but found it quite stagnant. The gauge at Nasser registers a fall of 14 centim. between the 31st March and the 4th April, but I am informed by Lieutenant Gwynne, who recently crossed it at a spot two days distant from the Sobat fort, that there was hardly a perceptible current in this river.

I measured the discharge of the Jebel, first at the point above the sudd, 180 miles south of Lake No, and found it to be 6,377 cubic feet per second; and a second time at a spot below the sudd, 10 miles from the White Nile junction, thus including all the drainage from the lakes. I found the discharge here to be 8,050 cubic feet per second. The discharges of the Zeraf and Ghazal I found to be respectively 1,145 and 1,197 cubic feet per second. The total discharge which passes Fashoda is, therefore, approximately, 10,400 cubic feet per second.

We steamed up the Ghazal River to within a few miles of Meshra-er-Rek. The river was quite free from sudd, but it was impossible to reach the Meshra, owing to the shallowness of the water. For the same reason, we were prevented from getting more than 50 miles up the Zeraf, and 12 miles up the Bahr-el-Arab. I met Commandant Henry in the Belgian steamer and Uganda launch. He was working his way up the Jebel, about 160 miles from Lake No. He had dragged his boat across the marshes of the Zeraf, and reached the Upper Nile, returning down the Jebel to meet his steamer. He told me that the Zeraf was practically dry, and that for 170 kilom. from the point where it leaves the Jebel it had no defined channel.

The dhurra crop in the Nuer, Shillouk, and Dinka countries has almost completely failed.

The White Nile is now navigable for steamers, excepting a reach of 15 miles south of Abu Zeit.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 83.)

My Lord, *Cairo, May 2, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a case of some importance, in so far as it affects the recognition by the Mixed Courts of the existence of the present political status in the Soudan, has recently been decided by the Court of First Instance of Cairo.

Mr. Guido Levi, about whose nationality your Lordship wrote to me a short time ago (see No. 5, Treaty, of the 24th March), received permission from the Governor of Suakin, in September 1896, to enter the Soudan.

On the 21st of that month the Commandant of the Fort at the Atbara gave Mr. Levi a permit to go to Khartoum at his own risk and cost with 200 bales of merchandize. Mr. Levi accordingly went to Omdurman and then returned to the Atbara. He then wished to make a second journey to Omdurman. On the 27th December, 1898, permission to make this journey was, under instructions received from Lord Kitchener, refused to him, and he was ordered to leave the Soudan.

He subsequently brought an action against the Egyptian Government to recover the losses which he alleged to have incurred by reason of this order, which he declared to be illegal.

The decision of the Court of First Instance is favourable to Mr. Levi. I need not, however, enter into the details of the case, as, for the purposes of my present argument, they are of no great consequence. Moreover, appeal will be made against the Judgment.

What is more important is to note the ground on which the Court claims jurisdiction. On this branch of the subject, I venture to draw your Lordship's attention to the remarks made by M. Bernardi, the Legal Adviser of the Egyptian War Office. It will be observed that the claim to jurisdiction is based on the fact that the acts of which Mr. Guido complains were performed prior to the signature of the Convention of the 19th January, 1899.

It would, perhaps, be going too far to say that, in taking up this ground, the Court has recognized the validity of the Convention, but the Judgment, more especially in view of the fact that it was prepared and delivered by a French Judge who is notorious for his Anglophobe sentiments, would appear to indicate a tendency to abstain from contesting its validity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Remarks on the Judgment in the Case of Guido Levi.

POUR ce qui concerne les exceptions préliminaires opposées par le Gouvernement Égyptien le Jugement dont il s'agit a décidé :—

1. Que le Gouvernement Égyptien ayant son domicile légal au Caire il peut être assigné devant les Tribunaux du Caire (Mixtes ou Indigènes respectivement) pour n'importe quelle action personnelle—même lorsque l'action a sa base et son origine sur des faits accomplis au Soudan ;

2. Que les circonstances que le Sirdar avait sous ses ordres les troupes Britanniques faisant partie du corps expéditionnaire ne changeait pas le véritable caractère

du Sirdar, c'est-à-dire de fonctionnaire Égyptien et partant pouvant engager la responsabilité du Gouvernement Égyptien ;

Que cela prémis, le Jugement a soin d'ajouter :—

" Que ce n'est que par la nomination faite en vertu de la Convention du 19 Janvier, 1899, et partant postérieurement aux faits qui ont donné lieu à l'action actuelle, que cet état de choses a été modifié."

Qu'en effet, en vertu de la Convention Anglo-Égyptienne du 19 Janvier, 1899, le Gouvernement du Soudan a été séparé du Gouvernement Égyptien et constitué en un Gouvernement à part *sui generis*.

Conséquemment on ne pourrait plus actionner le Gouvernement Égyptien pour répondre des agissements des fonctionnaires du Gouvernement Soudanais. Il faudrait actionner ce dernier à son domicile légal, qui est à Omdurman, devant les juridictions et suivant les lois en vigueur au Sondan.

Lorsque la même personne est investie de la double qualité de Sirdar du Gouvernement Égyptien et de Gouverneur-Général du Soudan il n'est pas difficile de distinguer les actes accomplis dans l'une ou dans l'autre des dites qualités. En effet, s'agit-il d'actes ayant trait au Gouvernement du Soudan ? Il est évident qu'ils doivent émaner du Gouverneur-Général du dit pays. S'agit-il au contraire d'actes concernant l'Égypte proprement dit (au nord du 22^{e} parallèle) ? Ils ne peuvent émaner que du Sirdar qui seul a qualité de donner des ordres sur le territoire Égyptien, en engageant la responsabilité du Gouvernement Égyptien.

En application de ces principes si l'expulsion du Sieur Levi du Soudan avait eu lieu après le 19 Janvier, 1899, elle n'aurait pu être ordonné que par le Gouverneur-Général du Soudan, et partant le Sieur Levi n'aurait pu s'adresser qu'aux Tribunaux du Soudan en invoquant l'application des lois en vigueur au Soudan.

Sous le bénéfice de ces considérations et dans ces limites le Jugement dont il s'agit paraît conforme aux principes et ne porterait aucune atteinte à l'état de droit tel qu'il résulte de la Convention Anglo-Égyptienne du 19 Janvier, 1899.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received May* 18.)

Sir, *War Office, May* 16, 1900.

WITH reference to your complimentary note of the 9th ultimo, inclosing a telegram from Lord Cromer, No. 71, dated the 9th April, concerning the provision of barracks for a British garrison of two companies of infantry at Khartoum, I am to inform you that the Secretary of State for War has issued instructions for immediate steps to be taken to provide the necessary buildings.

I am, &c.
(Signed) R. H. KNOX.

[2051 *s*—1]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 17. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, April 7, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a translation of a permit granted by the Emperor Menelek to a British Indian named Jivajee to import arms and ammunition. Jivajee has asked me to place him in communication with arms merchants in England, and I have told him that I will lay the matter before your Lordship.

This permit definitely opens the question whether we shall allow a trade in arms and ammunition through the British port of Zeyla or not, as permission having been granted to one British Indian merchant probably means that permits will be sought by and granted to others.

Under the Rodd Treaty of 1897, we are bound to permit the passage of arms and ammunition destined for the Emperor Menelek, but not such stores destined for private traders. On the other hand, any person is at liberty to import arms and ammunition through the French port of Jibuti. Consequently so long as we refuse permission to merchants to pass arms and ammunition through Zeyla, they will, it being their interest to do so, engage in the trade through Jibuti. This has the result of increasing other trade through Jibuti, because if forced to keep an agency there for their arms business, it is cheaper for them to transact all their business through that port than part there and part through Zeyla.

The chief trade in arms, up to date, has been in arms of war, such as the Gras rifle. This trade, owing to the overstocking of the market, is not now very profitable, and a small trade in better classes of arms, such as sporting large and small-bore rifles, and revolvers, &c., has sprung up.

It is, so I understand from Jivajee, this latter class of trade, and not military rifles, that the Indian merchants wish to share in, as owing to their lesser expenses in living, they see their way to underselling their French rivals, in whose hands, and that of Greeks and Armenians, the trade in arms at present is.

The local rules which govern the trade in arms in Abyssinia require that a Shoan should have a permit to purchase, before a rifle is sold him, and Gallas are prohibited from owning fire-arms. Even semi-independent, feudatory chiefs, such as King Tekla Haimanot of Gojam, cannot purchase weapons without the Emperor's permit.

Menelek may, therefore, be said to exercise a fairly effectual control over the importation and distribution of arms.

As a signatory to the General Act of the Brussels Conference, it appears that the Emperor is within his rights in licensing a trader within his territory to trade in arms, and any action on our part in the sense of prohibiting such a licensed trader from importing arms and ammunition through our ports would be difficult to justify. Undesirable as it is, that the Abyssinians should become possessed of arms which may eventually be used against us or some other European Power, the fact remains that under existing circumstances, there is no means of preventing it.

I venture to think that the matter resolves itself into the question whether it is desirable to countenance the participation of British and Indian merchants in a trade which is openly carried on by our rivals, and which we cannot suppress.

A copy of this despatch has been forwarded to Consul-General Hayes Sadler.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

Inclosure in No. 1.

King Menelek to Mr. Harrington.

THE Lion hath prevailed from the tribe of Judah. Menelek II, the Elect of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia. I give my salutations to all who see this letter. Jivajee, the Indian, says that he will bring rifles, ammunition, and gunpowder from England; therefore I have given him my permission to do so.

Written on the 29th March, 1900, at Addis Abbaba.

No. 2.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 45. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, May* 3, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Foreign Office despatch No. 44, Confidential, transmitting for my observations copy of a letter from the Intelligence Department of the War Office relating to the importation of warlike stores into Abyssinia.

The defeat of the Italians at Adowa placed a large quantity of small arms and ammunition, and some light field guns into the hands of Menelek. For years past the French have been pouring arms and ammunition into Jibuti, where a free sale has been permitted and encouraged; and by our Treaty with Abyssinia we authorized the transit through our ports of fire-arms and ammunition destined for the Emperor's use. The consequence has been that Menelek, availing himself of the facilities afforded him, has succeeded in accumulating a vast supply of military stores, and glutting the country with small arms, which with ammunition are still coming in.

These are no new facts. It is evident that the military position in Abyssinia constitutes a grave danger to us, and an immediate menace to our frontiers, in the event of a rupture in our relations, hitherto friendly, with Menelek. But it is not easy to suggest a solution of the problem. So far as this Protectorate is concerned our action has been limited to affording Menelek the facilities of transit to which he is entitled under the Treaty, and to nothing more as my despatch No. 7 of the 2nd February last shows.

So long as our relations with Menelek continue friendly we cannot go back on Article V of the Treaty, and if we put difficulties in the way of the working of Article V we should merely irritate Menelek and accentuate the suspicions he already entertains as to our intentions, without the main issue being affected in any way, so long as the transit of arms continues through Jibuti.

It was from October 1898 to May 1899 that Menelek imported his munitions of war through Zeyla. Since May 1899 no arms or ammunition for Abyssinia have passed through Zeyla, but importation has continued viâ Jubuti. I cannot help thinking that this is somewhat significant; it looks as if Menelek were not over anxious to attract our attention to his requisitions for warlike material. It is true that one reason why arms were imported through Zeyla was that, during the period mentioned there were troubles on the French caravan route; but, still, the complete cessation of any importations through our ports for the last year is remarkable. The 8,000 rifles Léontieff tried to pass through Zeyla were probably not destined for the Emperor, and, in their case, it will be observed from my despatch No. 7 that Léontieff was furnished by Menelek with a letter to the Governor of Jibuti requesting that facilities for their transit be afforded.

Nor does the matter end with the facts revealed by the Intelligence Department, serious as they are. The connection between the Jibuti Railway and the present question will doubtless not have escaped the attention of Her Majesty's Government.

Hitherto Menelek has been enabled to accumulate large quantities of small-arms and ammunition, but, with the exception of some light field guns, he has no artillery. Once the French railway penetrates Abyssinia, he will be able to obtain field artillery of the most modern description and heavy guns of position, and I should not be surprised if the facilities which will thus be afforded by the railway had been present from the first to his mind, and possibly exerted no small influence in his decision to grant the Concession.

I would particularly invite attention to the naturally strong position of Harrar, which could easily be rendered impregnable by guns of position.

The only means by which the further importation into Abyssinia of supplies of warlike material could be stopped, and what I may call the second stage of military preparations in the country—the accumulation of modern artillery—be averted, would be to revise our Treaty with Menelek and come to an agreement with France on the subject. For neither of these measures would the conditions at present appear to be in the least degree favourable, and the one without the other would be worse than useless.

As the matter stands, it seems that all control over the armaments of Abyssinia has passed out of our hands.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 3.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 46. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berbera, May* 4, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to submit my observations on the question raised in Captain Harrington's despatch to your Lordship, No. 17, Confidential, of the 7th ultimo.

Whether we should accord permission to import arms and ammunition through our ports to Indian traders, who have been licensed by Menelek to import the same into Abyssinia, is a matter which might conveniently be considered in connection with the general question of armaments in that country, on which I submitted my remarks in my despatch No. 45 of yesterday.

If the position be admitted that, situated as we are, we are unable to exercise any control over the importation of arms and ammunition into Abyssinia, then the main question is not affected by allowing their transit through Zeyla, and I agree with the view taken by Captain Harrington that, under existing circumstances, it would be difficult to justify a refusal in the present instance.

Another point has to be considered. If this permission be accorded to Jivajee it will soon be followed by other applications. Very probably Messrs. E. W. Carling and Company will apply to import military stores through Zeyla. Behind all lies the fact that there is nothing to prevent arms and stores being imported in any quantities through Jibuti.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 4.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 47. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berbera, May* 5, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to submit extract from a note to my address from Lieutenant Harold of the 3rd instant, which shows that the construction of the Jibuti Railway is being rapidly pushed forward, and that its effect on the trade of the Protectorate is likely to make itself felt at an early date.

Lieutenant Harold writes:—

"The news I get from Jibuti is disquieting. The work of the railway is being pushed on with renewed vigour, and it is said a settlement has been arrived at with the Aysa tribe, not that this tribe could stop the work, but it could make it more difficult.

"Trains now run some 84 miles, and rails are laid for a good bit beyond that distance. This is what they call the first section of the line, and it has been completed. Arrangements are now being made for the opening of this section to traffic, *i.e.*, camel transport will only be required at the railhead some 84 miles from Jibuti, and half the distance to Gildessa will have thus been covered by the railway.

"Our merchants are watching all this with interest, and those who have not agents in Jibuti have been going over there to see things for themselves. In a month or two we may see this first section of the railway open to traffic, and, of course, all our trade must go there. I hear, too, that the railway are arranging for a steamer to run between Aden and Jibuti, and if this is affected, Cowasji Dinshaw's steamers will have to take the run to Jibuti.

"A large deputation of the black Aysa visited Jibuti the other day. They were entertained right royally, and on their departure were given a present of 1,000 francs. It is rumoured that the Aysa have sold the land required for the railway to the Company, but the price is not yet agreed upon. This may or may not be. I myself do not believe the Aysa are reconciled to this railway, but they can of course never stop it. Menelek threatens them on one side, and the French on the other.

"1900–1 may prove to be a very disastrous year for Zeyla. Things seem to point that way. There can be little doubt from what I hear that the railway work is going on faster than ever.

"The Greek who ran the liquor shop here has closed it and left."

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

N.B.—A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer and to Captain Harrington.

J. H. S.

---

o

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 38. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berbera, April 13, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, extracts from two news-letters from Mr. Gerolimato to my address.

It will be observed that amongst the killed and wounded of the Mullah's followers at Jig Jiga a number of Gallas and Harraris were found, some coming from a distance of two days' march from Harrar on the road to Addis Abbaba, and that there is considerable excitement at Harrar as to the future development of this movement.

This is the first intimation I have received of any of the Gadabursi having joined the Mullah. The Zeyla tribes have hitherto held aloof from him, and if any have now joined him, it can hardly be more than in isolated instances. At the same time, by the mail which brought me Mr. Gerolimato's letters, Lieutenant Harold reports that the Abyssinians killed two Zeyla Mullahs and their sons at Jig Jiga, and that there is probably secret sympathy with this movement in Zeyla.

The little news that has come lately from the Ogaden bears out what Mr. Gerolimato reports as to the attitude of the tribes towards the Mullah. This, however, only refers to the western Ogaden and the tribes from the Scaebele, who suffered at Jig Jiga. They are reported to have gone south again, and to have refused to try conclusions again with the Abyssinians. The Rer Ali are reported to have sought shelter with the Habr Awal tribes—whom they lately looted—not so much against the Abyssinians as against the Mullah.

The eastern Ogaden tribes, according to the reports I have received, were but sparsely represented in the fight at Jig Jiga, and I have previously reported that the Mullah's immediate following from the Dolbahanta tribes was purposely kept in the background, so as to preserve them from defeat in case he has to retreat towards Bohotele. There is no reason to assume that any of the above have left him, and the position of affairs in the Ogaden and the Abyssinian border continues to be serious. The Abyssinians will doubtless be able to repel any attack the Mullah may make on them at Jig Jiga, but unless they receive large reinforcements, they are hardly likely to move against him into the Ogaden.

Mr. Gerolimato's remarks on the trade of Harrar show that the opening up of the Soudan has already begun to tell on the trade of the Harrar Province, and that goods can now be imported to the districts which used to trade with Harrar by cheaper routes than the Zeyla-Harrar caravan road.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

N.B.—A copy of this despatch and accompaniments is being sent to Viscount Cromer.

J. H. S.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Vice-Consul Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.

My dear Sir, *Harrar, March 27, 1900.*

BY last mail I informed you that Garazmach Bante, after having looted all the country of Girad Abdi (Abbasgul) because he is a follower of the Mullah, returned to Jig Jiga where he built a large zariba of thorns; and it seems that the Somalis (?), seeing that the Abyssinians are in very small force (about 1,000 men only), came about 6,000 in number and attacked the zariba, taking all the sheep, cows, &c.,

looted before by the Abyssinians. The Somalis (?) entered the zariba; they had not a rifle between them, and the Abyssinians killed 2,650 of them, but Girad Abdi escaped.

The day before yesterday, Sunday, the Abyssinians fired ten cannon for their victory . . . . Bante has sent for reinforcements, but there are no troops here; yesterday and to-day they sent more than 800 rifles to Jig Jiga on camels.

It is very strange that amongst the Somalis killed or wounded they found a good many Gallas, from the neighbourhood of Harrar, as from Garamoolata (two days' march from here on the road to Addis Abbaba), and Nolis, Goorgouras, and Harraris. The Abyssinians are very much afraid that it is a general conspiracy for revolution, and they are sleeping in the streets here with their rifles.

They found also amongst the killed Somalis a good number of Gadabursis, but the Mullah is unfindable—no one can give me any news of him. An Abyssinian Chief told me that the Mullah was in the fighting alone, without his men, and that he had sent word to Bante to expect him, and that he will return to Jig Jiga to fight.

The Abyssinians pretend that the Mullah has some rifles with him, given to him by the Italian Government at Lugh. I do not believe this, as there are no Italians at Lugh.

M. Ferrandi (ex-Agent at Bienenfield in Harrar) was there, but he left Lugh some months ago, and is now in Italy; but the Abyssinians, it seems, fear the Somalis very much. I have never seen men so afraid as they now are; they have given rifles to children to show the Harraris they have troops here. I think there will be more fighting soon at Jig Jiga, and that the Mullah will collect all his forces, knowing that there are only about 1,000 men, and attack them again at Jig Jiga. I not think the Abyssinians will be able to catch him unless they send more troops, and there are none here at present; it is reported that some 4,000 men are coming from Addis Abbaba to reinforce Bante. I cannot ascertain whether they have left Addis Abbaba yet or not, but it is certain they will send reinforcements, as they cannot let Harrar be threatened by the Somalis of the Mullah or the Ogaden tribes.

About the trade of Harrar, it has nothing to do with these expeditions. The real reason is that Abyssinian merchants are not now coming from the interior to buy goods or sell them in Harrar. Before, there were rich Abyssinian merchants in Addis Abbaba sending goods here and buying from here, and also giving money at interest to small merchants for trading. Now those rich merchants have all left Addis Abbaba and taken with them the smaller merchants, and gone to Gondar and Godjam, and are trading with Metammah and Hassi-es-Cheiba, our Soudanese frontier, as they find more profit.

Formerly all the Galla countries bought their goods here, and if you take into consideration that one corregia (twenty pieces) of American cloth from Aden is charged with 40 to 45 dollars expenses in reaching those provinces, and that the same can be got by the Nile from Alexandria, or viâ Suakin for 20 dollars in carriage, you will see that it is impossible for those provinces to buy their goods again in Harrar, and my opinion is that after one or two years, when good communication is made between Suakin or Alexandria and the Soudanese frontiers, the trade of Harrar will be nothing more than the local trade of the province. After one or two years Harrar will be unable to compete with Metammah, Famaka, &c., and I cannot guess what will be the revenue of the French railway.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) J. GEROLIMATO.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Vice-Consul Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.

My dear Sir, *Harrar, April* 3, 1900.

IT is certain now that the Abyssinians defeated the Ogaden Somalis, and that the Mullah and Girad Abdi and his followers escaped. The Abyssinians pretend that the Mullah was not present in the fight at Jig Jiga; it seems that the Somalis took away only a small number of camels and cattle, as I see the Abyssinians coming every day from Jig Jiga with a good number of camels, sheep, &c.

It is rumoured that the Ogaden tribes are very angry with the Mullah, who is the cause of all this fighting and looting, and that they have killed him; but that is only a rumour amongst the Somalis here, the Abyssinian authorities knowing nothing about it. It is stated that more than 2,650 of the Ogaden were killed at Jig Jiga.

An Abyssinian Chief told me that Ras Dargue, the King's uncle, is dead, and that they keep it a secret, as there is a prediction amongst the prophets of the King's Court that the King will die the same year as Ras Dargue.

It is rumoured also that Ras Mangasha is to be forgiven and return to his estates, and that Ras Makunan is to come here. Another rumour is that after the return of Garazmach Bante from Jig Jiga, an expedition is to go against the black Aysa on the border of the Dankali country, but nothing yet is certain.

Yours, &c.

(Signed) J. GEROLIMATO.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 84.)

My Lord, *Cairo, May 1, 1900.*

ON the 9th ultimo I addressed to your Lordship a telegram (No. 71) on the subject of the construction of barracks, both permanent and temporary, for the British troops at Khartoum.

I am now able to furnish some further information on this subject, which is one of great importance. I would earnestly beg that it be taken into consideration with the least possible delay.

The facts, as they at present stand, are as follows:—

Until a few weeks ago, a British detachment of about 250 men was stationed at Khartoum. After consultation with Sir Reginald Wingate and General Talbot, I arrived, though very reluctantly, at the conclusion that the detachment should be withdrawn for the present. This decision was based wholly on the fact that no barrack accommodation suitable for occupation by British troops during the summer months exists at Khartoum. I cannot conceal from myself the risk which is thus being incurred. It cannot be doubted that it is considerable.

Looking to the condition of affairs in the Soudan, and the composition of the Egyptian army—both points on which I need not perhaps now enlarge at any length—I have no hesitation in expressing a very decided opinion that a garrison of at least one British battalion should be stationed permanently at Khartoum. In this view Sir Reginald Wingate fully concurs. We recommend, therefore, that steps should be taken to construct suitable barrack accommodation for this force.

If, however, for whatsoever reason, the War Office authorities are not prepared to entertain this proposal, we then recommend that steps should be taken to construct permanent barracks for at least two companies. I wish to repeat that the latter recommendation is put forward not because we think a garrison of two companies is sufficient, but because it is preferable to have even a very small British garrison rather than none at all.

In either case, some temporary arrangements will have to be made. A sum of 600*l.* has been already granted. From the inclosed papers,* which have been communicated to me by Sir R. Wingate, your Lordship will observe that the cost of temporary barrack accommodation is now estimated at 1,050*l.*

In view of the importance of this question, I would again earnestly beg that it should be treated with as great expedition as possible. I need hardly say that any expenditure in connection with the British troops at Khartoum will have to be borne by the British Treasury. It is, in my opinion, quite out of the question that any demands should be made on the Egyptian Treasury.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

* Inclosures not printed.

[Confidential]

No. 1430-E. A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, &c.,
Sd. J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department,
Simla;
The 10th July 1900.

North-East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints;

Section 1, dated the 1st, 8th, 9th and 10th April and 17th, 21st and 28th May 1900.

*With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident, Aden.

Confidential

No. 5373

Political Department,
Bombay Castle, 16th July 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

Acting Secretary to Government

gr/l.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received April 1.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Berbera, March 31, 1900.*

I HAVE received a letter from the Governor of Harrar from Jig-Jiga informing me that on the 21st instant he was attacked at Jig-Jiga by a large force of Dervishes whom he routed with great loss.

The whereabouts of the Mullah are not known.

(Repeated to Cairo).

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN.

[April 8.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 8.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, April 8, 1900.

INFORMATION received from Commandant at Kassala that Gallabat was evacuated on the 27th March by Abyssinian post.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 9.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, April* 9, 1900.

WITH regard to the Abyssinian frontier arrangements, Colonel Talbot, who was sent to Asmara to negotiate with Governor of Erythræa, has not been able to come to any agreement.

He reports that the conclusions arrived at in Rome last November are not being acted upon, but that the Governor's views are distinctly opposed both to the spirit and partially also to the letter of those arrangements.

The matter should, I think, be again referred to Rome, and Talbot ordered to return at once. Sir. R. Rodd can discuss the subject further with Lord Currie, proceeding to Rome on his way to England on leave of absence.

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received April* 9.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, April* 9, 1900.

THE question of the British detachment at Khartoum has again been discussed by the Sirdar, General Talbot, and myself.

The medical authorities on the spot are of opinion that even with the expenditure of 600*l.* already granted suitable accommodation for the summer cannot be provided. We therefore reluctantly arrived at the conclusion that the detachment had on the whole better be withdrawn. The General is about to issue orders to this effect. The opinion of the Sirdar, notwithstanding, is that Khartoum should have a permanent British garrison, and I concur in his opinion. Our view is that a whole battalion would be best, but if there are difficulties in agreeing to this on the score of expense, or for other reasons, I would urge that immediate steps be taken by the War Office for the speedy construction of permanent barracks in which two companies may be accommodated.

The 600*l.* can in the meanwhile be spent on improving the existing temporary accommodation for the detachment when it returns in the autumn. In order to stop as far as possible expenditure on temporary buildings it is important to arrive at an early decision regarding permanent accommodation.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 17.)

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, May* 17, 1900.

A TELEGRAM has just been received from Peake, stating that he went as far south as Fort Berkeley.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 141. Africa. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Brussels, May 19, 1900.*

I LEARN from the inclosure in your Lordship's despatch No. 64, Africa, of the 16th instant, that Viscount Cromer sees no objection to an arrangement being come to by which the Congo State may receive by the Nile supplies for its garrisons in the leased territory.

Your Lordship knows from the frequent questions which I have at various times reported as having been addressed to me by those connected with the Congo, that the King attaches the utmost importance to obtaining this concession, and, if it would suit Her Majesty's Government now to make a general arrangement by which His Majesty would abandon his shadowy claim to occupy the Bahr-el-Ghazal against a right of passage for supplies and reinforcements along the Nile, this, it seems to me, might be a good moment for doing so.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 95.)

My Lord, *Cairo, May* 20, 1900.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a Report which has been received from Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable M. G. Talbot on the subject of his recent negotiations with the Governor of Erythræa for the settlement of a frontier between that Colony and the Soudan, together with Memoranda dealing with the cognate matters arising from this question.

I venture to suggest that these papers should be communicated to Sir Rennell Rodd.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Lieutenant-Colonel Talbot to the Civil Secretary, Cairo.

(Strictly Confidential.)

Civil Secretary, *Omdurman, May* 6, 1900.

I FORWARD herewith a Report on my visit to Asmara for the purpose of negotiating with his Excellency the Governor of Erythræa the boundary from Sabderat to Todluk, with separate Memoranda on the following questions which arose during my interviews:—

1. The grazing question.
2. The Karora cultivation.
3. The Kassala Post Office.
4. The assessment of import duties at Kassala.
5. Signor Martini's proposed visit to Kassala next December.

A résumé of all of these was sent direct to his Excellency the Sirdar by registered letter from Asmara on the 12th April, and has, I trust, reached him safely.

A copy of my map of the Gash frontier was sent you by Bimbashi Boulnois, and I am now preparing a larger compilation embracing the results of my visit to the Setit, which will show the whole of the territory under dispute. I hope to submit it in a few days.

I return to you all the papers on the boundary and grazing questions that were brought to Kassala by Bimbashi Boulnois.

I wish to express my deep sense of the extreme kindness that I received from all officers and officials in Erythræa, from his Excellency the Governor and Colonel Trombi, commanding the troops, downwards, and especially from Lieutenant Colle, the Administrator of the Baraka, who personally conducted me from Agordat to Asmara and back. Nothing could have exceeded the courtesy and hospitality I met with everywhere.

(Signed) M. G. TALBOT, *Miralai.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Talbot on his Visit to Asmara in connection with the Negotiations regarding the Frontier between the Soudan and the Italian Colony of Erythræa.

I REACHED Asmara on the evening of the 29th March, 1900, and discussed the boundary question with his Excellency the Governor, Signor Martini, the next day.

He stated that he could not possibly consent to give up the portion of country between the Gash and the Atbara, bounded on the north by the line of the Protocol of

1891, viz., from a point on the Gash, 20 English miles above Kassala, to a point on the Atbara in latitude 14° 52′, and bounded on the south by a line Todluk to Tomat.

I informed him that my orders did not meet this case, and that I must telegraph for further instructions.

At first I thought he was not really serious in his refusal to adopt the line of the Gash, and was only trying to see what he could get in exchange. But after further discussions with Lieutenant Colle, the Administrator of the Baraka, who was his expert adviser, I gathered that nothing but an order from the Italian Government would induce the Governor to consent to the cession of the territory between the Gash and the Atbara.

I think it possible that his adoption of this line may be due to a desire not to stultify his previous political utterances, as he told me he had always opposed the retrocession of Kassala.

On the evening of the 10th April I received orders to return to the Soudan, and on the morning of the 11th April I informed Signor Martini that, as my instructions had been drawn up on the basis of the Agreement arrived at by Sir Rennell Rodd with the Italian Government at Rome in December last, and as he (the Governor) did not feel justified in accepting the interpretation put upon that Agreement by the Egyptian Government, the matter had to pass out of the sphere with which I was empowered to deal.

Though it was obvious that there was no chance of our coming to any agreement, we rediscussed the whole question.

Signor Martini did not claim any of this country on behalf of the Bazas, nor did he lay much stress on the claims of the Beni Amer, Italian subjects, who undoubtedly have some grazing rights south of the Gash, but dwelt on the great concessions Italy had already made, and urged that the adoption of the line of the Gash meant simply a cession of territory, while his instructions mentioned only a rectification of boundary.

He also dwelt to some extent on the loss of prestige that would accrue to Italy amongst the natives by the cession of this territory, though a few minutes after, in an argument on another question, he stated himself the undoubted fact that all the natives at present believe it to belong to the Soudan.

He showed clearly that he greatly regretted the loss by Italy of the triangle bounded by the Tomat–Todluk line on the north, the Setit on the south, and the Abyssinian frontier on the east; and the only rectification of frontier that he would allow as feasible involved the retrocession of this triangle to Italy, as soon as the Anglo-Egyptian Government had concluded its frontier with Menelek.

I pointed out that such action on our part would probably damage our relations with Menelek, would cut the Hamrans in two, and that even if they got this triangle it would be of little use to them.

Of course, if ever they were able to annex Tigre, this portion of country might be of some value to them, but as things are at present it would only be an incubus, and almost impossible to administer for want of communications.

In reply to his arguments, I dwelt little on the disadvantages to us of the Italians retaining the portion between the Gash and the Atbara, but showed the absolutely unworkable nature of such a frontier, the inconvenience it would cause the Italians themselves, and the innumerable questions that would arise between the two Governments, as it would be impossible to demarcate the northern and southern boundaries except by the great expense of cutting and keeping open defined lines of many miles length through the bush and grass. That though the Beni Amer have some grazing rights on the left bank of the Gash, they had little or none on the Atbara (I have since learnt from Colonel Collinson that they have none on the Atbara), and that whatever rights they may have on the left bank of the Gash they had managed very well without them during the Dervish occupation.

That the bulk of the country belonged to the Hamrans, who would thus be cut in two; and that the cession of a territory like this, whose administration expenses would far exceed its revenue, could not be regarded as much of a sacrifice to friendship.

He admitted more or less the force of all these arguments, but would only reply, "Then give us down to the Setit; that will make it all right."

Colonel Collinson has, I understand, pointed out to his Excellency the Sirdar the danger of leaving the course of the Gash below Todluk in the hands of even a friendly Power, for fear lest irrigation works should be undertaken on a sufficient scale to deprive Kassala of an appreciable portion of the Gash flood.

From what I saw of the course of the Gash, I do not think the danger is a very pressing one, but I should be sorry to say that it could be altogether neglected.

An Italian Engineer officer had hurriedly taken a few measurements to determine the position of the 20th mile of the Gash, but under very disadvantageous circumstances. His results differed considerably with mine, but his Excellency the Governor courteously agreed to accept my map, and to measure the 20 miles along the Gash taking the centre between the two belts of Dom palms, which fringe the true banks of the river bed.

I placed my map at the disposal of the Italians and gave permission for it to be copied, but I do not know if this was done or not.

(Signed) M. G. TALBOT, *Miralai.*

Omdurman, May 6, 1900.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

1 *Memorandmm on the Discussion of the Grazing Question with the Italian Authorities of* ***Erythræa.***

IN discussing this question after a certain amount of cross purposes, it came out that Signor Martini had sent to the Italian Consul-General at Cairo, in his letter of the 22nd February, 1900, for transmission to Lord Cromer, a claim for several thousands of dollars under Article 1 of the Parsons-Martini Agreement of the 7th December, 1898.

This was the first I had heard of this claim; consequently, when Signor Martini offered to denounce the Parsons-Martini Agreement if the Anglo-Egyptian Government would undertake to pay this new claim, as well as the previously submitted one, for 5,500 dollars under Article 7, it was impossible for me to do anything but telegraph for instructions.

Thinking, however, that the Parsons-Martini Agreement must eventually be denounced, and knowing that the present Administrator of the Baraka, Lieutenant Colle, was about to return to Italy, I thought it advisable to utilize his experience and undoubted good faith in drawing an outline of our views as to what would best replace the Parsons-Martini Agreement should it ever be denounced.

Though I had had little experience of the subject I was in possession of Colonel Collinson's views, and I think the draft we prepared embodies the framework of an Agreement that will produce a minimum of friction between the Governments and of hardship to the natives, should it ever replace the present Agreement.

A copy in French was shown to the Governor, who found no objection to it.

It is, of course, not in any way binding on any one; but as it resulted from a comparison of views between Lieutenant Colle and myself, and has been approved by the Governor of Erythræa and Colonel Collinson, I trust it may serve usefully as a basis for whatever Agreement eventually supersedes the Martini-Parsons Agreement.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

Draft of proposed Agreement.

1. The Parsons-Martini Agreement of the 7th December, 1898, shall be considered as denounced from the date of the ratificafion of the following Agreement by the two Governments in question.

2. Each of the two Governments reserves to itself the right of permitting or of forbidding any of its subjects to cross the frontier with their animals in search of pasturage; and of permitting or of forbidding any of the subjects of the other Government to enter its territory for the same purpose.

3. If either of the two Governments allows any subjects of the other Government to enter its territory for grazing, it shall have the right to impose a tax on them proportional to the number of animals they bring with them.

4. This tax shall in no case exceed the following limits:—

For each camel 1 dollar Maria Theresa.

For each head of cattle $\frac{1}{2}$ dollar Maria Theresa.

For each twenty sheep or goats $\frac{1}{2}$ dollar Maria Theresa.

In the case of camels or cattle, only those animals that have been weaned shall be liable to the tax.

This tax is not to be levied on transport animals employed in the conveyance of merchandize.

5. This tax is to be levied annually; and the maximum period, for which its payment shall entitle any herd or flock to remain in the country, is eight months. After the expiration of this period the Government, in whose territory the animals are, shall have the right to insist on the proprietors either removing their animals to their own country, or making a declaration of a change of nationality.

Any such declarations will be at once communicated to the Government to which the owners originally belonged.

6. Each Government reserves to itself the right to withdraw from the owners of animals the permission granted to them to graze their animals in its territory, even after they have paid the tax, if it considers that political reasons or the interests of its subjects render such a course necessary.

7. The tax is to be collected by the Government in whose territory the animals are, and responsibility whatever for its collection attaches to the Government to which the owners of the animals belong.

8. As soon as possible, after giving permission for any animals to graze in its territory, each of the two Governments shall inform the other of the number of persons, the tribes to which they belong, the number of animals with them, the amount of the tax levied on them, and any other details that their common interests may suggest.

9. Any persons crossing the frontier in search of grazing for their animals will be subject to the laws of the Government in whose territory they are, and must submit to the local authorities any complaint they may have regarding what has happened to them while in that territory.

10. The two Governments undertake to inform their subjects of the terms of this Agreement as soon as it has been ratified.

11. This Agreement shall come into force from the date of its ratification by the two Governments; but no tax shall be levied on animals that may happen to be across the frontier till forty-five days after such date.

(Signed) M. G. TALBOT, *Miralai.*

Omdurman, May 6, 1900.

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

2. *Memorandum on the Question of the Cultivation on the Karora.*

AT one of our first interviews the Governor showed me a rough sketch, of which a copy by eye is attached, to illustrate a question of boundary under dispute in the neighbourhood of the Karora wells.

He claimed that the cultivation shown was in Italian territory, and complained that the Egyptian authority had levied taxes on it.

When I looked into the question it appeared to me to be clear that the real boundary, as demarcated, ran from M. Alibai (our J. Halibai) to M. Gaber Kelli (the same as our J. Ergeba in some sketches), and that the cultivation was therefore in Egyptian territory.

I pointed this out to the Governor, who still maintained that the right bank of the Karora was the boundary. He sent, however, for Captain Buon-Giovanni, the officer who accompanied Major Walter when the pillars were erected, who at once stated that my view was correct, and that looking from Gaber Kelli to Halibai all cultivation on the left of that line was in Egyptian territory and all to the right was in Italian.

I think there can be little doubt of this, as Major Walter, in his first Report on the boundary, mentions expressly that the line had been so taken as to leave Egypt practically all the cultivation in the Karora.

At the same time, from a remark on a sketch marked (D), attached to Bimbashi Burgess' Report forwarded by the Administrator S. Suakin, with his letter of the 17th January, 1900, to the Governor-General, it appears that Bimbashi Burgess is under the impression that the right bank of the Khor Karora is the boundary.

The note referred to is as follows:—

"Between J. Ergeba (which seems to be identical with M. Gaber Kelli of the Italian map) and J. Halibai right bank of Khor Karora marks the boundary, and left bank and Khor Egyptian territory."

The matter is of considerable urgency, as the natives have either already paid to both Governments, or are likely to do so very soon. Signor Martini accepted my contention, and undertook to have refunded any taxes erroneously collected.

(Signed) M. G. TALBOT, *Miralai.*

Omdurman, May 7, 1900.

Inclosure 6 in No. 1.

3. *Memorandum respecting Question of Kassala Post Office.*

BY an annex to the Act of Retrocession of Kassala, it was agreed that a post office should be established at Kassala for communication with Erythræa.

Signor Martini asked me to call the attention of the Governor-General to the fact that as yet only a post office for letters had been established, and that there was no means of transmitting money through the post to Kassala from Massawa.

He argued that the intention of the Agreement was that a post office in the full sense of the term should be established for the transaction of all business usually conducted by post offices.

I promised to do as desired.

4. He informed me that merchants complained to him that in assessing the 8 per cent. import duty at Kassala no notice was taken of the invoices, and that the duty was levied on values arbitrarily assigned to goods. I mentioned this to Colonel Collinson on my return, who has perhaps communicated with you on the subject.

5. Signor Martini asked me to mention, pending his official communication on the subject, that he proposed, if agreeable to the Governor-General, to visit Kassala next December with several officers to inaugurate the monument to his compatriots buried at Kassala.

(Signed) M. G. TALBOT, *Miralai.*

Omdurman, May 6, 1900.

Inclosure 7 in No. 1.

Copy of Eye Sketch, without Scale or North Point, furnished by his Excellency the Governor of Erythræa.

[Not printed.]

Inclosure 8 in No. 1.

(D.)—*Rough Sketch of Boundary near Karora Post, with Boundary Pillars between Jebel Ergeba and Halibai, right bank of Khor Karora, marks Boundary left bank and Khor, Egyptian territory.*

[Not printed.]

I.S.C. for Coll: Re-Tr at Ashur

[Confidential]

No. 1491-E/S

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, &c.,
Sd/ J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department,
Simla,
The 17th July, 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints,
Section 1, dated the 30th May and 2nd June 1900.
Section 2, dated the 19th and 28th May, and 2nd June 1900
Section 3, dated the 19th and 28th May and 2nd June 1900

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 5377

Political Department
Bombay Castle, 23 July 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Hudson

Acting Secretary to Government.

9/8.

Read with letter from Secy, Pol & Secret Deptt. No. 25, dated the 15th June, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Harrington.

(No. 36.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 30, 1900.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 16 of the 1st ultimo, reporting the circumstances under which Major Austin and his party were detained at Goré by the local Abyssinian officials.

I approve the steps you have taken to bring this matter to the notice of the Emperor Menelek, and the language which you held to His Majesty on the subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 2.

Foreign Office to Intelligence Division.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Director of Military Intelligence, and is directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to him the accompanying copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia and Her Majesty's Consul-General on the Somali Coast on the subject of the importation of arms into Abyssinia,* to which attention was drawn in Sir John Ardagh's communication of the 12th ultimo.

It appears from these despatches that Colonel Sadler and Captain Harrington are agreed that, as arms and warlike stores nre freely imported in large quantities through Jibuti, there is no reason why the importation of such articles through Zeyla should not be allowed.

Sir Thomas Sanderson is to request that Sir John Ardagh will be good enough to furnish Lord Salisbury with his opinion as to whether, since the prohibition against the transit of arms through Zeyla is practically ineffectual, it would not be desirable to permit the trade through the Protectorate and thus gain whatever commercial advantage may result from the removal of the prohibition.

Foreign Office, May 30, 1900.

---

* Mr. Harrington, No. 17, April 7; and Colonel Sadler, Nos. 45, 46, and 47, May 3, 4, and 5, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 98.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 26, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of a correspondence on the subject of certain differences of opinion which have arisen between the Italian Governor-General of Erythræa and the Government of the Soudan. I venture to suggest that this despatch and its inclosures should be sent to Sir Rennell Rodd.

The discussion has been suspended owing to the temporary interruption of telegraphic communication between Omdurman and Kassala.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

M. Tugini to Viscount Cromer.

Cher Lord Cromer,

Le Caire, le 20 Mai, 1900.

J'AI reçu hier au soir les deux télégrammes ci-joints de M. Martini.

Veuillez me mettre a même de lui télégraphier que vous donnerez les ordres nécessaires au Commandant de Kassala pour qu'il n'entrave pas la libre entrée des caravanes de l'Érythrée, et qu'il s'abstienne d'actes qui seraient de nature à provoquer des incidents fâcheux entre les postes Italiens et les postes d'askaris Soudanais.

Je suis sûr que je recevrai de Rome un télégramme me chargeant d'insister auprès de vous dans ce sens.

Bien, &c.

(Signé) TUGINI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

M. Martini to M. Tugini.

(Télégraphique.)

Asmara, le 19 Mai, 1900.

GOUVERNEUR de Kassala défend entrée des caravanes provenant de l'Érythrée, à cause de la peste. Je vous prie de faire cesser cette prohibition non-justifiée, vu que l'Érythrée est indemne et que toutes les mesures ont été prises pour la conserver telle.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

M. Martini to M. Tugini.

(Télégraphique.)

Asmara, le 19 Mai, 1900.

COMMANDANT de Kassala se trouve à Mogato sur l'Atbara en territoire Italien; il a réuni les Chefs des tribus qui y demeurent. Peu loin, il a établi des postes d'askaris qui surveillent le passage des caravanes provenant de Gedarif, en les forçant d'aller à Kassala. Un poste Italien étant à peu de distance, et les troupeaux des tribus appartenant à l'Erythrée se trouvant là aux pâturages, il est fort à craindre

que l'attitude du Commandant de Kassala, contraire à tout droit, ne provoque quelque grave incident dont le Gouvernement Érythréen doit décliner toute responsabilité. J'ai télégraphié dans ce sens à Rome.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

Colonel Jackson to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 403.)
(Telegraphic.)

Omdurman, May 23, 1900.

YOUR telegram *re* Erythræa.

Talbot says Mogato, if what we call Mogatta, is on the left bank of the Atbara, and is, therefore, not in Italian territory.

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

Colonel Jackson to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 404.)
(Telegraphic.)

Omdurman, May 23, 1900.

YOUR Lordship's telegram *re* Erythræa.

Collinson wires:—

"With reference to your second telegram mentioned by you, I entirely deny statements contained in the Governor of Erythræa's telegram. I have been to Mogatta, which is on the left bank of the Atbara, and I have never entered any territory claimed by the Italians. The Heads of tribes I saw at Mogatta were all from Gedarif. There is no post of askaris on the Atbara, except at Sofie,* which is 12 miles south of the junction of the Setit and Atbara. I most strongly protest against the Governor of Erythræa calling any of my acts illegal. With reference to the statement that caravans from Gedarif are forced to Kassala, there is no proper recognized trade road from the Atbara eastwards, except viâ Kassala. Several attempts were made at the commencement of the year by agents of Massowah merchants to convey gum, on which royalty had not been paid, across the Atbara near Mogatta into Italian territory, on which I issued an order that all gum caravans from Gedarif were to travel viâ Kassala, where their roads and way-bills are checked."

Inclosure 6 in No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to Colonel Jackson.

(No. 151.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 24, 1900.

YOUR telegram No. 404.

Article I of the Protocol of 15th April, 1891, provides that the frontier ascends the Atbara from latitude 14° 52′, to the confluence of the Kakamot. From the maps it would appear that Mogatta is an island. I think it must be held that the frontier runs along the most western of the two branches forming the island. Has Collinson been treating the island itself as Soudanese territory? I should like explanation on this point. As regards the other points raised in the second Italian telegram, Collinson seems to me to be quite within his rights. My only doubt is about the frontier at Mogatta. I should also like an answer to the first Italian telegram about stopping communications by reason of plague.

---

* This is apparently the place marked in the maps as "Roumeli-Sofie."

Inclosure 7 in No. 1.

Colonel Jackson to Major Pedley.

(No. 407.)
(Telegraphic.)

Omdurman, , 1900.

KINDLY show following wire received from Collinson to Lord Cromer :—

"Following for Lord Cromer's information :—

"Up to quite lately no Italian soldiers or subjects have ever been into the country between the Gash and the Atbara now claimed by Italians. Within the last month they have sent several Beni Amer tribes with their flocks to graze, thereby establishing grazing rights. The district in question belongs to the Hadendowa and Hamran Arabs. The district has recently been visited by Italian officer and escort, and a post has been established on the Gash, near Gulsa. I also think that the main object of the Italians is to open a more direct route to Gedarif, so as to draw the bulk of the tribes of the Eastern Soudan to Massowah."

Inclosure 8 in No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to Colonel Jackson.

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, May 25, 1900.

YOUR No. 407.

Have you and has Collinson got a copy of the Protocol of 15th April, 1891 ? If not, I will send you each one with a map marking the frontier. The line goes from a point on the Gash 20 miles south of Kassala to the ford on the Atbara situated at 14° 52′. South of that line the Italians can act as they please in the country lying between the Gash and the Atbara. North of it they cannot establish any posts or exercise any interference with the tribes.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN.

[May 19.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 90.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 12, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to forward a copy of a telegram addressed by Colonel Jackson to the Sirdar. The news contained in this telegram is based on a letter from Captain Harrington, dated the 30th March. This letter deals with the same circumstances as are narrated in Captain Harrington's despatch to your Lordship, No. 16, of the 1st April.

It seems clear that, owing partly to sickness and partly to the obstruction of the Abyssinian authorities, Major Austin has been able to do little or nothing towards the accomplishment of his mission.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Colonel Jackson to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

(Telegraphic.)

Khartoum [*received May* 12, 1900].

HARRINGTON, on 30th March, forwards to Talbot letter from Austin of 19th March from Goré, which he places at latitude 8° 9′ and longitude 35° 33′, and 231 miles east of Nasser, which he left on 7th January. He reached Faidherbe, in Gambila district, 150 miles east of Nasser, 28th February, and was met there by Abyssinian messengers inviting him to go to Bure, where everything had been prepared by Menelek's orders.

Scarcity of water made progress south impossible till rains. He accepted, with great difficulty, owing to badness of road, reaching top of plateau on 8th February. There he fell seriously ill but recovered enough to go by easy stages on 25th February. Degaz Samma was away at the capital, but his representative, Gabriel, received them royally, and up to about 2nd March nothing could have exceeded the kindness of the Abyssinians. Since that date Abyssinians have been trying what they can get out of them, and have refused them assistance to move. He wrote a complaint to Harrington, who is seeing about it. Austin fears he will not be able to do more than return straight to Nasser, where he may arrive any date. Peake has been informed of return of Austin's party, and has been asked to render all assistance and to send a steamer, if possible, to Nasser.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 22. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, April* 20, 1900

I HAVE the honour to report that my Italian colleague has told me that, in conversation with him, the Emperor complained that the French refused to avail themselves of the right reserved to them by their Treaty with him to judge all disputes in which French subjects are concerned.

It appears to be certain, therefore, that the French have stipulated for the protection of their subjects by means of Capitulations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON,
Captain.

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 94.)

My Lord, *Cairo, May* 20, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a telegram communicated by the War Office from Major Peake reporting his proceedings on the Upper Nile.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 2.

Major Peake to Viscount Cromer.

(Telegraphic.) [*Undated.*]

HAVE visited Belgian posts of Kiro, Lado, and Regaf, and met Inspector Chaltin, commanding Nile and Werle districts of Congo Free State, also Fort Berkeley, of Uganda Protectorate, under command of Captain Dugmore. Owing to exaggerated reports of bad navigation south of Lado, only took gun-boat "Tamai" as far as Lado, and went on in Uganda launch to Gondokoro, Regaf, and Fort Berkeley; distance, some 25 miles. In my opinion, river is navigable for gun-boats at all seasons up to Bedden. Left for Berkeley on Monday, 7th May, nilometer reading from Fort Berkeley by post. I granted passage from the Upper Nile to Commandant Henry and Engineer Mulders, of Congo Free State, and to Dr. Donaldson Smith, an American, who was at Fort Berkeley. I did this as a friendly act, and hope you will not disapprove.

The sudd is now finished exactly according to Sir W. Garston's wishes.

I await your replies on further questions at Gebelani.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 99.)

My Lord, *Cairo, May 27, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the "Soudan Gazette," No. 11, containing the accounts of the Soudan Government for the year ending the 31st December, 1899, and other notifications of public interest.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Soudan Gazette" of May 1, 1900.

Accounts of the Soudan Government for the year ended December 31, 1899.

BUDGET ACCOUNT.

RECEIPTS.

	£ E.	£ E.
From the Mudiriehs—		
Khartoum	14,098	
Berber	6,083	
Dongola	25,329	
Sennar	1,093	
Kassala	2,221	
Suakin	19,535	
Halfa	4,195	
Fashoda	..	
Central, by sales, &c.	6,479	
		79,033
Posts	6,847	
Telegraphs	3,984	
Soudan Military Railway	31,190	
Registration of trade, Halfa*	5,542	
		47,563
Total receipts	..	126,596
Credit from Egyptian Government for deficiency of Soudan revenues for civil expenditure	..	134,317
Revote from special credit of 1898	..	6,296
		267,209

* A portion of the receipts under this head are in respect of 1898. The registration of trade fee has now been abolished.

Expenditure.

	£ E.	£ E.
Khartoum	15,958	
Berber	7,713	
Dongola	12,405	
Sennar	6,513	
Kassala	6,214	
Suakin	26,382	
Halfa	1,292	
Fashoda	1,029	
Central	17,990	
Secret service	1,274	
Purchase of durra for relief, supplies, &c.	8,398	105,168
	5,000	
Public buildings	9,903	
Posts	10,167	
Telegraph maintenance	100,000	
Soudan Military Railway maintenance		125,070
		6,296
Expenditure of 1898	..	236,534
Total expenditure	..	30,675
Surplus	..	267,209

The following is a statement of the receipts under specific heads:—

	£ E.
Land tax	21,949
Date tax	9,432
House tax	1,267
Boat tax	2,610
Royalties	11,339
Customs	16,038
Miscellaneous	16,398
Posts	6,847
Telegraphs	3,984
Railway	31,190
Registration of trade*	5,542
Total	126,596

Special Credit Account.

	Credit voted.	Expended.
	£ E.	£ E.
Reconstruction of Khartoum	20,000	27,388
Equipment of police	7,829	7,829
Telegraph construction	9,000	15,133
Completion of Soudan Military Railway, including Atbara Bridge	300,000	339,973
	336,829	390,323
Deficit on special credits	..	53,494
Deduct surplus on Budget	..	30,675
Net deficit	..	22,819

* A portion of the receipts under this head are in respect of 1898. The registration of trade fee has now been abolished.

In addition to the sum of £ E. 140,613 shown above as the deficiency of Soudan revenues in respect of civil expenditure, a sum of £ E. 281,455 is charged against the Soudan on account of War Department expenditure, making up the total of £ E. 422,068 shown as "insuffisance des revenues du Soudan" in the General Account of the Egyptian Government, published on the 17th instant. For the year 1900 the "insuffisance" stands at £ E. 134,317 in respect of civil, and at £ E. 282,852 in respect of military expenditure. There is also a special credit of £ E. 15,000 for further capital outlay in connection with the railway.

By order of the Governor-General,
(Signed) E. G. HARMAN,
Financial Secretary, Soudan Government.

Soudan Audit Office, Cairo, February 25, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, April* 1, 1900.

IN my telegram No. 6 of to-day's date to Lord Cromer, I have had the honour to report briefly the detention of Major Austin and his party at Goré. The details of the case are as follows.

Major Austin reached Goré about the 2nd March, and wrote to me on that day, stating that he had been very well treated by all the Abyssinians with whom he had come in contact, and that every assistance had been given him in procuring supplies and transport. So grateful was he for the treatment he had received, that he forwarded to me for transmission to Dejasmatch Tesama Nadoo, the Ruler of the country in which Goré is situated, a letter thanking the Dejasmatch for the assistance he had received from the local officials, and telling him that he would send him a present from England if he would let him know what he would like to have.

In his letter to me, Major Austin said that he was organizing his transport, which had suffered considerably, and that as soon as this was done, and he had recovered from a severe attack of sunstroke and fever, from which he was suffering, he intended to continue his journey to Lake Rudolf.

Last night (the 31st March) I received another letter from him dated Goré, the 19th March, saying that a disagreeable change had taken place in the demeanour of the local Abyssinian officials since he last wrote. The friendliness which they had shown on his arrival had disappeared; promises of assistance had never been fulfilled, and after parting with their watches, revolvers, and other personal effects in the hope of propitiating what Major Austin described as "these sharks" all their endeavours to obtain transport had been frustrated by active opposition of the local officials. Finally, when no further presents were forthcoming, and when the party could not move for lack of transport, Kanyasmatch Walda Gabriel, the local official, had bluntly told Major Austin that he could get away as best he could, and that he would give him no assistance. Major Austin says that he fears that his expedition will consequently be a complete failure, and that owing to the approach of the rainy season he has no choice but to return to the Sobat by the way he has come.

This morning I read Major Austin's letter to the King, who had with him Dejasmatch Tesama Nadoo. They both expressed indignation at what occurred, in defiance to His Majesty's orders, which I had the honour to communicate to your Lordship in my despatch No. 65, Confidential, of the 2nd November, 1899.

I pointed out to His Majesty in what an anomalous position the action of his officials had placed him. Although Major Austin was a British officer, his work was of as much importance to Abyssinia as to the Soudan. The accomplishment of the desire which His Majesty had expressed for the definite settlement of his frontier had been indefinitely retarded solely through the action of his own officials. Relying on His Majesty's promise of assistance the survey parties had been sent out with small escorts, and officers of conciliatory disposition had been put in charge with a view to reducing the chance of friction. Yet both parties had been subjected to obstruction and annoyance, amounting almost to insult, at the hands of petty frontier officials. If our officers had not shown the greatest self-restraint and tact, very serious consequences might have arisen.

I told His Majesty that I was perfectly well aware that these vexatious events had occurred contrary to his orders. At the same time I felt bound to call his attention to the fact that Her Majesty's Government had always dealt with him as the Head of an organized State, and that they had relied on the paramountcy of his authority throughout his Empire. The disregard of his orders by his officials and the consequent annoyance caused to British officers, could not but have a painful effect. Did not His Majesty therefore think that the exemplary punishment of the offending officials was imperative?

The Emperor at once said that he would have the Kanyasmatch brought here to be punished. He expressed great regret for what had occurred, and begged me to ask

Major Austin to continue his work if possible. At the same time he sent a letter to both survey parties ordering all officials to offer them every assistance on pain of severe punishment. Of these letters, which are identical, I have the honour to inclose a copy.

Although the incidents are in themselves regrettable, I venture to think that if the King keeps his promise, of publicly punishing the offenders, the ultimate effect, as regards British prestige, will be good. The matter touches His Majesty's vanity, which is a strong factor with him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON,
Captain.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Letter from King Menelek to his Officers at Goré, &c.

(Translation.) (Seal of Emperor Menelek.)

THE Lion of the Tribe of Judah hath prevailed. Menelek II, Elect of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia. My salutations to all who see this letter, and to my officers.

Captain Gwynne, who is now in Dejasmatch Demisi's country (Major Austin, who is now in Dejasmatch Tesamma Nadoo's country), is an officer of the English Government. Let him go by whatever route he wishes, and do not stop him. If he wants to buy animals to slaughter, or horses, or mules, or donkeys, over and above what you give him in token of friendship, provide him with animals which he can buy; should he want to hire men to carry his baggage, find the necessary men; if he wants to buy grain, find the grain, and bring it to him to buy; in all ways in which he may require help, help him, and see that he gets on all right.

All officers who are in my country under my Chiefs! If you do not act according to this order of mine, mourn for yourselves for I shall punish you severely.

Written April 3rd, 1900, at Addis Abbaba.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 21. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, April* 20, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have learnt on very good authority that M. Leontieff, before leaving for Europe, obtained permission from the Emperor to import boats for the navigation of the Omo. Subsequently M. Leontieff told several Abyssinian officials that he intended to take his boats into Lake Rudolph.

When the Emperor heard this he is reported to have been displeased, anticipating, as he said, that M. Leontieff's proceedings would again create difficulties with Great Britain.

I have. &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain.*

[2051 *ee*—3]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Intelligence Division to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 2.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, in answer to his letter of the 30th instant, inclosing copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia, and Her Majesty's Consul-General on the Somali Coast, is of opinion that we may assume that the interests of France are—

1. To arm and strengthen Abyssinia as a thorn in the side of England and Italy;

2. To arm and strengthen the native population in the British and Italian spheres of influence;

3. To promote French commerce in competition of that with other nations.

These aims are diametrically opposed to the interests of England and Italy. We are, however, under an obligation to permit arms for Menelek to pass; and, if we stop the imports of arms for others through British Somali ports, the result will simply be a diversion of the channel of entry to Jibuti, and the consequent loss to our own trade in arms. The actual diminution in import owing to our prohibition would be insignificant.

Unless we make a rival railway to the Jibuti–Harrar line—the transport facilities of the latter must attract all the inland trade to Jibuti, including the arms trade, and there will be but little left of the latter to prohibit in the Somali ports.

Under these circumstances, unless a railway is made in our territory, there would be very little gained in raising the prohibition against arms, and it does not appear to Sir John Ardagh that it would compensate for the sanction which our opening of our ports to trade in arms would confer on the immoral proceedings of the French in this respect. If British commerce were largely interested in moving the restrictions, the aspect of the question would be different; but it must be anticipated that the trade will flow by the line of least resistance, *i.e.*, the Jibuti Railway, and that the general commerce of the British ports, particularly Zeyla, will materially decline, and with it the revenue of the Protectorate, which with a railway would probably have increased.

18, *Queen Anne's Gate, London,*
June 1, 1900.

1 S.C. for Pilot President at Aden.

[Confidential]

No. 1531-E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, &c.,
Sd/ J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department,
Simla,
The 23rd July, 1900

North-East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints:
Section 1, dated the 11th and 12th June 1900.
Sections 2 and 3, dated the 11th June 1900.

*With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 5716

Political Department,
Bombay Castle, 27 July 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

Acting Secretary to Government.

9/8.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 103.)

My Lord, *Cairo, June 2, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a report addressed by Major Peake to the Sirdar.

With reference to the remarks contained in Sir Francis Plunkett's despatch No. 141, Africa, of the 19th May, inclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 101 of the 25th May, it will be observed that Major Peake says: "Both the Belgians and the English are very anxious for regular communication viâ the Nile." I have written privately to Sir Francis Wingate to consult him on this subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Major Peake to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *May 16, 1900.*

IN continuation of previous reports of the 17th April, I left Hillet Nuer on board the "Tamai" in company with Lieutenant Drury, R.N., on the 19th April, and proceeded south. We did not arrive at Shambe until the 25th April owing to accidents; we got aground several times owing to not knowing the channel, and twice bent our rudders and had to take them off and heat and strengthen them. From the 25th April till the 29th we were filling up the gun-boat with wood at Abu Keeka.

On the 30th April we passed Bor and the remains of the old Dervish dem; about 10 miles south of Bor we came to our first really dry ground on the right bank.

On the 2nd May we arrived at the Congo Free State Station of Kiro. The Belgians have built good red brick bungalows on a high bluff in a bend of the river; from about 5 miles north of Kiro the left bank is high and thickly wooded; this was our first really dry ground on the left bank. The Belgian cantonment is surrounded by a wooden stockade with emplacements for guns and Maxims; though to all appearances it should be a healthy place, it is very much the opposite: ordinary fever is common, and there is also prevalent a most pernicious form of hæmaturic fever, which carries off men in about three hours. During the first week in April last they lost four European officers from this fever. The Belgians report all their stations on the Nile are unhealthy, but from what I saw their sanitary arrangements are very bad; the river bank in front of each house is the refuse pit; and I saw at Reggaaf a latrine built to fall straight into the river.

I was most hospitably and kindly received at Kiro by Inspector Chaltin, who is in command of the Nile and Welle districts. I read to and gave him a true copy of the document concerning the lease of the portion of the Nile Valley sent to me on the 19th December by Director of Military Intelligence.

On the 3rd May I left for Lado, Inspector Chaltin accompanying me on the "Tamai." Of the old town there are only a few foundations left, but the old ditch and parapet are very clear still. A most unhealthy-looking place, almost surrounded by swamp, and much reminding me of Fashoda. Gebel Lado, visible for many miles north, is about four hours' march from the river.

Hearing that the river south was very low and full of rocks, I decided to leave the "Tamai" at Lado and go on in the Uganda launch "Kenia;" the difficulties of the river

were exaggerated, and I think our gun-boats will be able to get to Fort Berkeley at all seasons of the year. On my suggestion Captain Dugmore is going to make a chart of the river from Lado to Fort Berkeley.

We arrived at Gondokoro midday, the 4th May; the only remains of Baker's cantonment is the ditch and parapet on a high bluff. There are also a few lemon trees; healthy-looking situation. I found a small temporary post of the Uganda Rifles here. From Gondokoro we went in Belgian steel boats to Reggaaf, arriving there on the 5th May. The Belgian cantonment is situated under Gebel Reggaaf, close to the water edge.

Having breakfasted with the officers we crossed the river and rode, horses having been sent by Captain Dugmore from Fort Berkeley, some four hours. The fort is about 300 yards from the river, and the Commandant's house about 500 yards. The country is undulating, rising gradually up from the river. I stayed at Fort Berkeley until the 7th May, when I left for the north, bringing with me Dr. Donaldson Smith from Berkeley, and Commandant Henry and Engineer Mulders from Kiro. I arrived at base camp, Gabt el Megahid, at 8 A.M on the 14th May.

Belgians.—The total strength of the Belgian force now in the Nile is about 1,500 men, distributed at Kiro, Lado, Reggaaf, and this last place being about 20 minutes from the river. Opposite Dufile there are six European officers at Kiro—2 at Lado, 2 at Reggaaf, and 2 at Afuddo.

Kiro is at present head-quarters, but I understand they are going to make Lado in the future. The Belgians in every place are busy building and making themselves comfortable, and I could see no sign of any movement of troops to occupy other territory.

Chaltin told us that he himself considered the occupation of the Nile Valley a mistake; the length of their lines of communication may be judged by the fact that it is a three and a-half months' journey from Kiro to Boma, their post on the sea.

Both the Belgians and the English are very anxious for regular communication viâ the Nile.

Inspector Chaltin appears most anxious to encourage the natives to cultivate the land, and generally wishes to improve everything; there is no doubt, however, that the natives dislike the Belgian rule; this is accounted for by the fact, I think, that the Belgians live on the country, as a rule taking food from the natives without paying for it. I had personal experience of their manner of travelling on the night I spent in the boats. Inspector Chaltin is very strict in his orders as regards keeping his officers and men on his own bank; there appears to be a very good feeling indeed between Inspector Chaltin and Captain Dugmore.

The River.—Some 5 miles south of Hillet Nuer the river breaks into various channels and lakes for a distance of some 25 miles; the real bed of the river has practically disappeared; the opening up of this 25 miles would be quite different to clearing the obstructions that we have hitherto met; there is no current, and though the obstruction is very light and easily moved, each piece has to be dragged out into the current; it took Lieutenant Drury ten days to clear 400 yards. Some 15 miles north of Shambe much the same thing has occurred; on our way south we took the wrong channel, but thanks to Commandant Henry we found an excellent channel on our way back; also Commandant Henry showed the entrance of the Bahr-ez-Zeraf, which is completely blocked up. As we went up these two channels where the river was dead low in the lowest year in record, I think it may be safely said that they will always be navigable.

From Shambe to Bor the river is deep and broad, but has the most extraordinary sharp turns; I recommend that our big boats be never sent to this part of the river, as they are bound to knock themselves about.

About 20 miles south of Bor the river divides up into various channels in which there is not much water; from this point up to Reggaaf the river is in several different channels. The sketching of this river will require some considerable time. I should say it will take three months to sketch it from Lake No to Fort Berkeley. It certainly ought to be sketched, as the present maps are useless; in sketching, care should be taken to put in all the channels and lagoons.

The hardest question as regards navigation from Lake No to Berkeley is the wood question. From my present base camp at mile 551 from Khartoum up to Abu Keeka, about 850 miles from Khartoum, there is practically no wood; there is plenty of wood between present base camp and Sobat; the only thing is for steamers to be always provided with a sandal or boats full of wood. The Nile first began to rise at Fort Berkeley in the middle of March, and then, I understand, fell again until the middle of April, from which date I

attach the Nilometer readings. It will be noticed that it is most erratic; perhaps this is attributable to its being at the foot of the rapids.

We had a good deal of rain. In two days we had steady very heavy rains for ten hours; as a rule the storms only last for two or three hours. The Belgians inform me that the regular heavy rain season has not yet commenced.

(Signed) MALCOLM PEAKE, *Kaïmakam.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

TABLE of Computed Distances and Wood Chart between Lake No and Fort Berkeley, Uganda.

	Miles.	From Khartoum.
		Miles.
Lake No	..	612
Hillet Nuer	133	
First false channel	138	
Good water; true Nile	163	
Second false channel	217	
Shambe	230	
North end, Abu Keeka	265	
South end, Abu Keeka	277	
Dervish Dem at Bor	360	
Good wood station, high bank right	366	
This good wood lasts until	373	
Good wood right bank	405	
This good wood lasts until	410	
Good wood left bank	428	
Kiro	435	
Lado	460	
Gondokoro	469	
Reggaaf	479	
Fort Berkeley	489	
Total	..	1,102

This is calculated by steaming time, and on account of the changes in the strength of the current in different places must be inaccurate.

There is a little wood procurable at Shambe, but Abu Keeka is an excellent wooding place.

Good wood is procurable pretty well everywhere after Kiro.

(Signed) MALCOLM PEAKE, *Kaïmakam.*

May 16, 1900.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

NILOMETER Readings, Base Camp: Mile 551 from Khartoum.

Date.	Centimetres.	A total rise since lowest Nile of—
		Centim.
1900—		
April 16	118	72
,, 17	120	74
,, 18	119	73
,, 19	120	74
,, 20	120	74
,, 21	120	74
,, 22	121	75
,, 23	121	75
,, 24	124	78
,, 25	123	77
,, 26	124	78
,, 27	124	78
,, 28	125	79
,, 29	126	80
,, 30	130	84
May 1	133	87
,, 2	133	87
,, 3	135	89
,, 4	136	90
,, 5	137	91
,, 6	139	93
,, 7	140	94
,, 8	140	94
,, 9	142	96
,, 10	143	97
,, 11	143	97
,, 12	145	99
,, 13	149	102
,, 14	149	102

(Signed) MALCOLM PEAKE, *Kaïmakam.*

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

NILOMETER Readings: Fort Berkeley.

Date.			Remarks.
	Ft.	in.	
1900—			
April 13 ..	..		At Abu Keeka there was a rise of 3 inches from April 27 to May 10. Abu Keeka is well in the lagoon and marsh district.
,, 14 ..	1	0	
,, 15 ..	1	0	
,, 16 ..	1	2	
,, 17 ..	2	9	
,, 18 ..	2	7	
,, 19 ..	2	7	
,, 20 ..	2	6½	
,, 21 ..	2	2	
,, 22 ..	2	2	
,, 23 ..	2	2½	
,, 24 ..	2	4	
,, 25 ..	2	0	
,, 26 ..	1	11½	
,, 27 ..	1	10	
,, 28 ..	1	11	
,, 29 ..	0	10	
,, 30 ..	0	8	
May 1 ..	0	4	
,, 2 ..	0	4½	
,, 3 ..	0	6	
,, 4 ..	0	6	
,, 5 ..	0	3	
,, 6 ..	0	7	
,, 7 ..	2	9	And still rising, but on the 8th May at Lado it began to fall.

(Signed) MALCOLM PEAKE, *Kaïmakam.*

J. O.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 12, 1900.

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 9th September, 1899, relative to a proposal for buying up the rights of the French Jibuti–Harrar Railway Company, and substituting for it a line from Berbera in the British Somali Protectorate to Harrar, I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit herewith, for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, copies of further correspondence relative to the progress made by the French line to the detrimental effect which it is likely to have upon the revenues of the neighbouring British Protectorate, and to the political results which may also ensue from its completion.

Some negotiations were carried on last year with the object of ascertaining whether a Syndicate or Company could not be formed for the purchase of the French Concession, or at all events of the line under construction, and of the right of making a branch from the port of Berbera. These, however, proved abortive, and it has become clear that without the assurance of some assistance, either from Imperial or Protectorate funds, the project of a railway from Berbera to Harrar is not likely to find financial support in this country.

Lord Salisbury has always doubted whether the French Government would have allowed the line from Jibuti to be altogether abandoned, and now that the line has been pushed to a considerable distance such a contingency is even less probable. It would seem, however, that the plan of carrying the line on to the highlands of Harrar has been abandoned, and it is now intended to carry it along the country on a lower level towards the interior of Abyssinia. The effect of the railway on the commerce of the British Protectorate will, however, continue to be highly detrimental, and it seems very probable that unless some steps are taken to give the ports of the Protectorate competing advantages the Protectorate may, before long, become dependent on grants-in-aid from Imperial revenue to meet administrative expenses.

Lord Salisbury thinks it therefore worthy of serious consideration whether some effort should not be made, by such means as are suggested in Consul-General Sadler's despatch of the 7th May, to promote the construction of a railway line from Berbera to Harrar.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

[2090 *m*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 11.)

(No. 100.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 29, 1900.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 98 of the 26th instant, I have the honour to inclose copies of (1) a further telegram which I have received from Colonel Jackson, (2) of a note which I have addressed to M. Tugini, the terms of which will, I trust, meet with your Lordship's approval.

As I am in some doubt as to the answer which should be given to Colonel Collinson's question as regards the Tomat-Todluc frontier, I have telegraphed to your Lordship on the subject.*

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Colonel Jackson to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 430.)

(Telegraphic.)

Omdurman, May 28, 1900.

YOUR Lordship's Nos. 147 and 151.

The following from Collinson, for your Lordship's information :—

"On receipt of your telegram No. 417, informing me of plague at Suakin, merchants were informed that all caravans coming from Suakin and Massowah would be stopped outside Kassala and medically examined, and that if plague increased, caravans would probably be prohibited altogether. No order was given prohibiting caravans. On the 19th all restrictions were removed.

"Your No. 420. Map is wrong; there are no islands at Magatta, nor have I located any island in the Atbara as Soudanese territory. I have no copy of Protocol of the 15th April, 1891. Talbot's map of the Settite and Atbara should be taken for showing where 14° 52′ cuts the Atbara; all other maps are hopelessly incorrect as to the position of both Fasher and Mogatta. Will you ask Lord Cromer if I am to consider the Tomat-Todluc line as the southern Italian border, as this question affects the Hamran Arabs, whose head village is on the north bank of the Settite, about 35 miles from its junction with the Atbara."

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Memorandum sent by Viscount Cromer to M. Tugini.

ON the 20th May M. Tugini sent me copies of two telegrams, each dated 19th May, which he had received from M. de Martini.

In the first of these telegrams M. de Martini complains that, by reason of the plague, caravans had been stopped from going to Kassala.

On this subject Colonel Collinson, the Commandant at Kassala, telegraphs to the Acting Governor-General at Omdurman as follows :—

"Upon receipt of your telegram informing me of plague at Suakin, merchants were informed that all caravans coming from Suakin and Massowah would be stopped outside Kassala and medically inspected, and that, if plague increased, caravans

* Answered by Telegram No. 31 of the 31st May, 1900.

would probably be prohibited altogether. No order was given prohibiting caravans. On the 19th all restrictions were removed."

The complaints made in M. de Martini's second telegram are twofold. In the first place, it is stated that caravans from Gedarif are obliged to proceed viâ Kassala.

On this subject Colonel Collinson says :—

"With reference to the statement that caravans from Gedarif are forced to go to Kassala, there is no proper recognized trade road from the Atbara eastward except viâ Kassala. Several attempts were made at the commencement of the year by agents of Massowah merchants to convey gum, on which royalty had not been paid, across the Atbara, near Mogatte, into Italian territory, on which I issued an order that all gum caravans from Gedarif were to travel viâ Kassala, where their road and way-bills are checked."

The second and more important complaint of M. de Martini is to the effect that the Commandant of Kassala "se trouve à Mogato sur l'Atbara sur territoire Italien."

On this point Colonel Collinson says :—

"I have been to Mogatta, which is on the left bank of the Atbara, and I have never entered any territory claimed by the Italians. The heads of tribes I saw at Mogatta were all from Gedarif. There is no post of askaris on the Atbara except at Sofie, which is 12 miles south of the junction of the Settite and Atbara."

Mogatta is shown in the maps as an island formed by two branches of the Atbara. It occurred to me that the discrepancy between M. de Martini's and Colonel Collinson's statements might be due to the fact that the former had taken the western and the latter the eastern branch of the river as the frontier. I asked Colonel Collinson, therefore, whether he had occupied the island, at the same time expressing my opinion that the western branch was the frontier indicated by the Protocol of the 15th April, 1891.

To this Colonel Collinson replies :—

"Map is wrong. There are no islands at Mogatta, nor have I located any islands in the Atbara as Soudanese territory."

Colonel Collinson adds that, with the exception of the map recently made by Colonel Talbot, of which I have not yet seen a copy, "all the maps are hopelessly incorrect as to the position of both Fasher and Mogatta."

I am sending Colonel Collinson a copy of the Protocol of the 15th April, 1891, and requesting him to conform strictly to its terms. As Colonel Collinson appears to have kept to the left bank of the Atbara, M. de Martini must, I think, have been misinformed in respect to the violation of Italian territory.

I have to express my regret at the delay which has ensued in dealing with these questions. It has been caused by a temporary interruption of telegraphic communication with Kassala.

Cairo, May 29, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 11.)

(No. 147.)

My Lord,

Kismayu, May 6, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that an Embassy from Boran arrived here yesterday evening. It consisted of some seven or eight Chiefs, the four principal ones being respectively named Bare Godana, Idokiso, Okataro, and Bule Ido.

Their object in coming to this province was twofold. They desired to conclude a definite peace with the Ogaden Somalis, their neighbours on the immediate south, between whom and themselves a long feud had existed, leading to numerous raids, the last of which, as your Lordship may remember, occurred in 1897, notwithstanding Mr. Jenner's prohibition. They were also instructed by King Afalata to implore the protection of Her Majesty's Government (within whose sphere of influence they had been led many years ago—I imagine as far back as the days of the Imperial British East Africa Company—to believe that their country was situated) against the oppression and cruelties to which their people were being subjected by the Abyssinians.

In the first of these two objects they were entirely successful. They were very well received on their passage through the Ogaden country, the only exception to this good treatment being the detention of some ivory belonging to them by Hersi Degaja, an Ogaden Chief, who happened to be close to the frontier, and who, whilst welcoming them to his camp and killing a bullock in their honour, appropriated several of their tusks.

On hearing of this incident, Sultan Ahmed-bin-Murgan at once started in pursuit of Hersi Degaja, who fled on learning that he was coming. Mr. Farrant, who was at the time on tour in the Ogaden country, also followed, and met both the Sultan and the Boran Envoys at Melkabula, about 40 miles to the west of Affmadu. Assurances were given to them that the ivory taken by Hersi Degaja would be restored, an agreement was entered into that peace and mutual facilities for trade and travel within each other's countries should exist for the future between the Boran Gallas and the Ogadens, and Afalata's Envoys were promised by Mr. Farrant a welcome at Kismayu, whither Sultan Ahmed-bin-Murgan undertook to escort them, and where they were lodged on arrival at the house of the Chief Government Interpreter.

Their official reception by me took place this afternoon at a Durbar, at which the two Somali Sultans and their principal followers were present, the Ogadens being seated on my right and the Hertis, with the Cadi of Kismayu, a Shereef much respected by the Somalis, on my left. The Envoys were, most of them, tall, handsome men of the ordinary Galla type. When they arrived at Melkabula they were scantily clothed in skins, but the Ogadens had provided them with white cloth, which they wore in the toga fashion universal among the Somalis.

I made them a speech, in which I expressed the satisfaction with which I welcomed them to British territory and had heard the news of the termination of the feud between their people and our Somali subjects, and I requested them to inform Afalata on their return of our desire to encourage and develop as far as possible commercial intercourse between his country and the coast. In reply, they immediately plunged into their grievances against the Abyssinians, whereupon I checked them, observing that their present reception was a public formal ceremony, and that the discussion of the political purposes of their visit would be more fittingly conducted at a private interview, which I should be glad to give them the same evening after sunset.

The four principal Envoys accordingly came to the Residency at the appointed hour, and entered upon the object of their mission. They stated that 300 Abyssinian troops were in their country occupying in detachments the following towns: Hego, King Afalata's own residence, Lei, Arer, Dubullu, Egollej, and Wajille (I spell these names as nearly as possible as they pronounced them). The Abyssinian flag flew over all these places, all of which were I gathered from them about 15 miles from one

another, and their inhabitants were not only treated by the invaders as a conquered race, but subjected to every kind of oppression and cruelty. Their cattle, their camels, and every species of property possessed by them were looted, and the elephants on whose ivory their trade with the coast depended ruthlessly shot down, whilst remonstrances were only met with further acts of violence. The senior Envoy, Bare Godana, stated that when after an ivory caravan belonging to himself had been plundered in September last by Abyssinan soldiers at Lei, fifteen days north of our Ogaden frontier, King Afalata had told the Abyssinian Commander that he should complain to the English Government, whereupon the Commander had contemptuously replied that all the English and Somalis were subjects of Abyssinia, and had redoubled the outrages previously complained of in order to teach him to talk of English protection.

"Afalata," continued the Envoy, "wishes me to say to you that the Abyssinians have placed a rope round his neck, and that he begs the English Government to remove it. Our position is most dangerous, and unless something is done, and done quickly, to help us the Boran Gallas as a people will be exterminated."

The speaker and the other Envoys then fell on the ground and seized me by the ankles, telling me that they had been specially instructed by their King to do this as a sign of his appeal to the Queen, whose subjects they considered themselves, for protection against these raids and robberies.

I replied that I should report to the high Government the message they had brought, but that it was not within my province to interfere in the affairs of Boran, over which Her Majesty had given me no authority. I was merely one of many servants of the Queen, administering dependencies scattered all over the world, and the northern limits of the country in which she had instructed me to maintain order and carry on the Government were the Somali frontiers and the Juba Valley as far as Serenli. If she chose to extend my province or to direct me to expel the Abyssinians from Boran, I should be quite willing to do so, but for the present I could not send askaris there without orders. I told them, however, that Her Majesty had an Agent at the Court of King Menelek who was now engaged there in settling many questions as to our frontiers with the Abyssinians on the side both of the Soudan and Harrar, and that I believed that the question of the southern frontier would not be lost sight of. They must remember that in the eyes of the High Government, which had vast territories and millions of subjects in India, South Africa, and elsewhere, Boran and Abyssinia were very small and insignificant countries, and that their affairs had constantly to wait until those of the Queen's more important dominions had been settled. I felt sure, however, that their happiness and welfare were not really a matter of indifference to Her Majesty or her counsellors, but I preferred not to make any promises to them as to immediate or early intervention on their behalf which they might afterwards complain had not been kept.

The Envoys said the matter was a small one—a very few of our askaris would frighten the Abyssinians away. Last year, when Mahomed Akid, one of Mr. Jenner's native officers, entered Boran with a handful of men, the Abyssinians had fled before him, and had left some of their rifles in his hands.

I told them I had no doubt of our power to expel the Abyssinians, if Her Majesty were to give an order to that effect, but that until she was pleased to do so I could undertake no operations in their country, whether on a large or small scale. I should, however, gladly promote trade relations between them and us, and if any of them wished to settle within the limits of the Jubaland province I would afford them every help and facility in doing so. I added that I should be glad to send back by them, as a mark of good-will, a present for Afalata, if they would let me, or, in my absence, Mr. Farrant know, what they thought would be most acceptable to him. They thanked me cordially, and promised fully to explain all I had said to the King on their return.

Should the ultimate settlement of Abyssinia's southern frontier involve the division of the Boran country between King Menelek and ourselves, I think it very likely that a large proportion of the Boran Gallas will, to escape Abyssinian robberies, cruelties, and slave raids, cross the dividing-line into our sphere. In the meantime pending a settlement, or the examination of the proposed frontier by a Joint Commission, it might perhaps, I would venture to submit, be arranged that both we and Menelek should, without prejudice to any rights already claimed by either side, abstain from actual military occupation of any places within the debateable land, and that any Abyssinian soldiers already holding such places should, as a friendly and courteous act, be withdrawn. This would relieve the people of Boran from the

oppression under which they are at present groaning, and prevent a country, a portion of which will probably be incorporated at a future period within our East African dominions, from being converted into a desert. We could perfectly undertake on our side until the frontier had been definitely settled to establish no garrison or posts in Boran which might thus become a sort of neutral zone, until after the termination of the South African war, when Her Majesty's Government will doubtless have more leisure than at present to consider how the country should be dealt with.

Of one thing I feel pretty certain, that should the occupation of Boran, or a portion of it, and its constitution into a province of this Protectorate be eventually decided on, it will prove an easy and fairly cheap undertaking as far as the natives themselves are concerned. Three hundred Abyssinian riflemen already keep them in absolute subjection, and the advent of Europeans, bringing with them a just and merciful administration, would now be hailed throughout the country with delight. In the meantime the result of Adam-bin-Musa's trading expedition, in which he made after paying all expenses about 8,000 rupees, and the cessation of the old quarrel between the Boran Gallas and the Somalis will stimulate the Boran trade with the coast. Already Sheikh Ali Nahar, the principal Chief next to the Sultan of the Herti Somali tribe, is organizing a trading expedition of his own to Boran, and I have, at his request, given him formal permission to proceed there, on the understanding, of course, that we assume no responsibility on his behalf beyond the limits of our administrative authority.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

[Confidential]

No. 1551-E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

Foreign Department,
Simla;
the 26th July 1900

By order, &c.,
(sd) J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

North-East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints;
Section 1, dated the 29th May and 6th, 9th, 18th and 20th June 1900.
Section 2, dated the 25th May and 18th June 1900.
Section 4, dated the 11th June 1900.

*With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 5755

Political Department,
Bombay Castle, 30th July 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Rudsdon

Acting Secretary to Government

9/8.

Rec'd with letter No 278 of the 29th June 1900, from the Secret Service Dept

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 29.)

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, May* 29, 1900.

ERYTHRÆAN frontier.

The Mudir of Kassala asks if he is to regard the Tomat-Todluc line as the southern Italian frontier. Sir R. Rodd's opinion on this point would, I think, be useful. It appears that the chief village of the Hamran tribe is situated on the Settite at a point about 35 miles from its confluence with the Atbara, on the north bank.

I understand that this Tomat-Todluc line had been accepted by the Italians, but the negotiations which took place at Rome leave the question in ambiguity. It would, I think, be advisable to communicate with Rome before sending any instructions to Colonel Collinson if there is really any doubt as to whether the Italians have agreed. It is clear that there exists a good deal of friction between the local Soudanese and Italian authorities. Some correspondence on this point went home by last mail.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 6.)

(No. 86.)

My Lord, *Rome, May* 31, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a précis of an article which appeared in the "Tribuna" of yesterday's date, based upon a conversation said to have been held with M. Ilg, who is reported to have declared that a satisfactory settlement of the frontier between Erythræa and Abyssinia had been arrived at.

M. Ilg is also said to have stated that there was no foundation for the rumour that Italy was to pay compensation to Abyssinia for maintaining the existing frontiers, and to have denied that King Menelek intends to visit the Paris Exhibition.

I have sent a copy of the précis to Lord Cromer for his information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CURRIE.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Tribuna" of May 30, 1900.

THE FRONTIERS OF ERYTHRÆA.—Our Zurich correspondent sends us the following telegram:—

"*Zurich, May* 28, 1900.

"The Engineer Ilg has received a letter from Captain Ciccodicola by the messenger from Addis Abbaba, from the the tenour of which it seems that the difficulty in regard to the boundary delimitations has been smoothed to the satisfaction of both sides. The Captain now only awaits the ratification of the Italian Government for the Treaty with Menelek to become an accomplished fact.

"M. Ilg did not enter into details, but led me to suppose that the Italian frontiers would remain as they are at present (Mareb-Belesa-Muna).

"On my inquiry as to the amount of truth there might be in the rumour of an indemnity to be paid to Abyssinia as compensation for maintaining existing frontiers, he replied that it was purely a newspaper invention.

"You may also deny, he added, that Menelek is preparing to come to Europe in order to visit the French Exhibition."

The importance of this news cannot escape our readers. The recognition of actual frontiers by the Negus, while it closes the saddest period of our colonial policy, shows that it is easier to arrive at a satisfactory result by a dignified, yet firm, policy, than by insisting on irritating proposals which are entirely out of place under the circumstances.

Italy is now established on the Ethiopian Plateau with the approval of the Emperor, and our Government must seriously consider how to deal with a question which has been so fortunately concluded.

It is not easy, yet by no means impossible. The political conditions of Ethiopia render relations with European Powers far easier than they used to be.

Before the increasing power of the Emperor, militarism and feudalism are rapidly giving way.

A railway is built from Jibuti towards Addis Abbaba, and another from Massowah to the plateau; while neither meet with opposition. The telegraph and telephone are working to the capital of the Negus, and are likely to be extended further.

The moment seems, therefore, come to penetrate into Ethiopia commercially, and to create interests of a lasting nature between Erythræa and Ethiopia on which to base the future of our Colony. When once this is accomplished we may rest in quiet.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Intelligence Division to Foreign Office.—(Received June 9.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to forward, for his information, a copy of a telegram, dated the 7th June, from the General Officer Commanding at Aden, referring to ammunition at Jibuti.

18, *Queen Anne's Gate, S.W., June* 8, 1900.

Inclosure in No. 1.

General Officer Commanding at Aden to Secretary of State.

(Telegraphic.) *Aden, June* 7, 1900.

REFERRING to small-arm ammunition at Jibuti: On the 25th May there were 2,226 boxes on the wharfs, 1,500 have since been landed from steam-ship "Arabistan," 400 have been sent to Harrar, and 200 removed to private premises. Rest remains and is believed to be for King Menelek.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 25.)

My Lord,

Addis Abbaba, May 2, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report, for your Lordship's information, that Ras Oliye, brother of Queen Taitou, has been sent to Tigre to replace Ras Makunan who has been recalled by the Emperor Menelek.

Ras Makunan's recall is due to representations made by the Italian Agent. It seems that relations between the Governor of Erythræa and the Ras were not satisfactory.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain.*

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 122.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 20, 1900.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 100 of the 29th May last, transmitting correspondence with Colonel Jackson and M. Tugini on the subject of the complaints of the Governor of Erythræa against the Commandant of Kassala.

I approve the terms of your note to M. Tugini in regard to this matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 101.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 25, 1900.

I RECEIVED in due course your Lordship's despatch No. 9, Africa, of the 14th ultimo, inclosing correspondence between the Sirdar of the Egyptian army and the Belgian Consul-General at Cairo respecting the transport of supplies by the Nile to the Congo Free State, and I approve the terms of the Sirdar's communication to M. Maskeus.

A copy of your despatch was forwarded to Her Majesty's Minister at Brussels, and I now transmit to you, for such observations as your Lordship may wish to offer, a copy of a communication which has been received from Sir F. Plunkett on the subject.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

* Sir F. Plunkett, No. 141, Africa

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 88.)

My Lord,

Rome, June 4, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 10 of the 27th January last, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship an extract from the "Italie" of the 2nd instant in regard to the Society which has been formed to work gold mines in Erythræa.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CURRIE.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from "l'Italie" of June 2, 1900.

LES MINES D'OR DE L'ÉRYTHRÉE.—La Société Érythréenne pour les mines d'or pour l'exploitation du quartz aurifère découvert dernièrement dans la Colonie, s'est constituée avec un capital de 2,000,000 lires divisés en 80,000 actions de 25 lires chacune, souscrites pour la moitié par des capitalistes Italiens, et parmi lesquels figurent pour les sommes les plus importantes, la Société Italienne pour le commerce des Colonies, le Crédit Italien de Gênes, &c.

La Société Érythréenne pour les mines d'or aura son siège à l'Asmara; le service de banque sera fait par le Crédit Italien de Gênes, et le contrat avec le Gouvernement pour le permis d'exploitation aura la durée de trente ans.

Le Gouvernement a mis une taxe de 5 pour cent sur le produit brut des mines.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 11.)

(No. 51. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp, Sheikh, May* 18, 1900.

I LEARN from Mr. Gerolimato, under date the 7th instant, that Garazmach Bante, the Acting Governor of Harrar, was then absent from Harrar escorting, as far as the Hawash River, some 30,000 rifles destined for Addis Abbaba.

These rifles are far in excess of the numbers noted in the Tables which accompanied the Memorandum of the Director of Military Intelligence to the Foreign Office of the 12th April last as under shipment to Jibuti, whence they have been doubtless imported. Whether they are recent importations or not I am unable yet to say.

I have asked Mr. Gerolimato for further information regarding this consignment, and have requested him to be good enough to keep me informed of particulars of all consignments of arms passing through Harrar in any quantities for Addis Abbaba.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Captain Harrington, and the Intelligence Branch, Simla.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

T.S.C. for Pol. Resdt. at Aden

(Confidential)

No. 1652 E.A.

A copy+ of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, etc.,
(sd) J. B. Wood.
Under Secy. to the Govt of India

Foreign Department
Simla,
The 10th August 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints, Section 1, dated the 19th June 1900
Sections 3 and 4, dated the 18th June, 1900

+ With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden

Confidential

No. 6169

Political Department
Bombay Castle, 16th August 1900

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Hudson

Acting Secretary to Government

MK

Rec'd with Cutter No 288 of 6th July 1900, from Secy, Admlty & War Dept

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June* 19, 1900.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 109 of the 10th instant, transmitting two telegrams from Captain Harrington referring to the Emperor Menelek's proposal for a combined attack on the Dolbahanta Mollah.

It would be prudent to abstain from further military entanglements for the present, while Her Majesty's forces are fully engaged in South Africa, China, and Ashanti, and the danger of their being needed in the Soudan is never absent.

(Also sent to Colonel Sadler, No. 1, the 19th June.)

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 109.)
My Lord,

Cairo, June 10, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of two telegrams which I have received from Captain Harrington on the subject of a proposal put forward by the Emperor Menelek for a combined movement by his forces and those of Her Majesty against the Mullah of Dolbahanta.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Captain Harrington to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.)

Jibuti, June 9, 1900.

MENELEK has suggested that Her Majesty's Government combine with him in suppressing the Somaliland Mullah. The Mullah is reported to be threatening a movement on Harrar at present. If it is possible to attempt diversion on Mullah's flank with forces now at disposal of Consul-General, such action is to be recommended, as our political opponents represent us as encouraging Mullah's action.

Copy of this telegram sent to Consul-General for Somali Coast.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Captain Harrington to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.)

Jibuti, June 9, 1900.

SINCE my telegram No. 9 I have seen Menelek. He informs me that he has delayed moving against the Mullah until he receives reply of Her Majesty's Government. I have explained that present season is unfavourable for operations, which would be easy in cold season. If Mullah continues his advance it would be politically advisable to attempt diversion.

Sent to Sadler.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 23. Secret.)

My Lord,

Addis Abbaba, May 2, 1900.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 18, Secret, of the 23rd March last, forwarding details of arms and ammunition dispatched to Jibuti from Abyssinia, although it is impossible to ascertain the exact proportion destined for Abyssinia, my observations force me to the conclusion that the majority of such exports reach this country.

Recently King Menelek has been withdrawing muzzle-loading and worn-out weapons from his troops and those of his officers, and replacing them by Gras rifles.

Negus Tekla Haimanot of Godjam's troops have recently been rearmed with modern rifles, and at present the troops of Dejasmatch Balcha are being rearmed. This officer's country is to the south of Shoa and east of Lake Stephanie, and, I believe, includes portion of the Borana country.

From inquiries made I estimate the number of modern rifles, such as Gras and Remingtons, in the country at the lowest computation at 500,000, and the number of pieces of artillery at about ninety pieces. This number includes the guns captured from the Italians, the Krupp guns left by the Egyptians at Harrar, and about half-a-dozen Maxims and Mitrailleuses.

I do not consider these continued purchases of arms as denoting any hostile intent on the part of King Menelek. They are more with a view to self-defence, and as a precaution against the evil intentions our political enemies credit us with.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain.*

No. 2.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord,

Addis Abbaba, May 2, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that three of Major Marchand's boats have been brought to Addis Abbaba from the upper waters of the Baro. Two of the boats appear to be beyond repair; the third is repairable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain.*

[Confidential]

No. 1705-E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

Foreign Department,
Simla;
the 20th August 1900

By order, &c.,
Lt.-J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

North-East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints,
Section 1, dated the 27th June, 1900.
Section 2, dated the 25th June, 1900.
Sections 5 and 6, dated the 18th June, 1900.

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No 6369

Political Department,
Bombay Castle, 24th August 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

Acting Secretary to Government.

MLE 24

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[June 27.]

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Intelligence Division to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 27.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, while returning Colonel Hayes Sadler's No. 53, Confidential, dated, Camp, Sheikh, the 30th May, 1900, wishes to bring to notice, that in Colonel Hayes Sadler's subsequent telegram to Foreign Office, dated the 15th June, 1900, he gives his opinion that Inger is probably connected with the French party.

Sir John Ardagh incloses a short note on this individual as tending to show that probably any undertaking by him will be of a very doubtful nature.

18, *Queen Anne's Gate, London, June* 26, 1900.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Memorandum on the "Soi-disant" Emir Soliman-ibu-Inger-Abdullah.

THE above individual, who formerly went by the name of Inger or Karlinger (his christian name being Karl) is well known to the Intelligence Department and to the Egyption authorities, who first made his acquaintance in October 1896. His history, stripped of a certain amount of fiction of his own invention, is as follows:—

Inger, the name under which he is generally known to us, was a native of Temisvar, in Hungary, and is now about 32 years of age.

He was a Lieutenant in the Austrian Army, but resigned his commission, voluntarily it is believed, in February 1895, and went to Morocco.

After vainly endeavouring for some months to get employment in that country, he went to Constantinople and Cairo, where he asked for employment of a military nature, principally on the strength of a drill book, which he had translated into Arabic.

In October 1896, he was arrested while attempting to join Osman Digna at Suakin. He was brought before a Court of Inquiry, but being considered more a fool than a knave, he was merely sentenced to be expelled from Egyptian territory.

Early in 1897, he landed at Jibuti, where, after intriguing for a time with some unimportant Somalis, he tried to enter the Soudan by Abyssinia.

He was ejected from Abyssinia by the Governor of Harrar, and next appeared in Constantinople, where, in September 1897, he was posing as the Chief of the Somalis and Danakils, supporting his pretensions upon a forged document bearing the signatures of several Sheikhs, who, he said acknowledged him as their Sheikh.

Next, Inger visited Hungary, raised a considerable amount of money, and formed a commercial Syndicate in Buda Pesth, on the strength of promised trading facilities. Meanwhile he sent two agents to Jibuti to prepare for his arrival, and to intrigue with the Somalis.

He imposed on numbers of Turkish and Hungarian officers by promises of employment in his "kingdom." With these he left Fiume late in June, 1899, and attempted to land in the Somali Protectorate, 25 miles south of Zeyla. Here he was met by Lieutenant Harold, who had heard of his proceedings, and was turned back to Aden.

The authorities there would not permit him or his party to land, and so they proceeded to Jibuti, where he soon came into collision with the French authorities. By this time his dupes had discovered Inger's roguery, and deserted him; he was sold up and returned to Europe.

According to the statement of his followers, he intended to set up a kingdom in the country to the south of the Somali Protectorate, but it is not known exactly where.

Though the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs told Sir H. Rumbold that he

considered Inger a worthless character, and that he did not want him or his friends back in Austria, Inger nevertheless returned to Hungary, and according to report, succeeded last July in raising more funds for another African venture.

On the 29th December last the Military Attaché at Paris, writing to the Intelligence Division, reported an offer made to him by Inger in Paris of 11,000 natives organised as carriers; also of sheep, goats, &c., from Somaliland, for our needs in South Africa. This offer, he stated, was to prove his remorse for the years he fought against England.

The above sketch of this adventurer's career needs no enlargement to show the sort of enterprise he is probably engaged in now.

(Signed) B. R. JAMES, *D.A.A.G.*

June 26, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Captain Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 28.)
My Lord,

Addis Abbeba, May 10, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Dejasmatch Tasamma Nadoo, whose province consists of the country on the upper waters of the Sobat River, has been promoted Ras over his own province and that of Dejasmatch Jote. The latter's country is Walega and the Galla country to the west.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 2.

Captain Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25).

(No. 29.)
My Lord,

Addis Abbaba, May 12, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Lagarde, the French Minister, left to-day. He is accompanied by Dejaz Biratu and Likamakwas Nadoo, who were members of the Abyssinian Mission who visited France in 1898.

Having failed to induce King Menelek to visit the French Exposition, and to obtain the company of a Ras, M. Lagarde has been forced to content himself with these small fry.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 3.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 113.)
My Lord,

Cairo, June 18, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I have to-day received a telegram from the Acting Governor-General of the Soudan, stating that the Commandant at Kassala telegraphs to him to the effect that Ras Mangasha has been removed from the Gondar district, and that a new Governor, named El-Samma Wad Mariam, has been appointed in his place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 52.)

My Lord,

Camp Sheikh, May 23, 1900.

FOR many years the Mahomed Aysa sections of the Habr Awal, who occupy the country immediately round Berbera to the east and south, have been accustomed to levy a road fee on all caravans entering Berbera from those sides of 4 annas per camel, 2 annas per donkey, and 2 annas and 1 anna respectively, on cattle and sheep.

Though never actually sanctioned the levy of these road fees has been tacitly permitted by the Administration from the earliest days of our occupation, as partaking more or less of the nature of vested interests. The amounts collected in each year varied with the trade, but may be set down at about 2,000 rupees. The fees appear to have been originally levied in return for right of way and escort through the Mahomed Aysa country, but gradually the escort ceased to be afforded as our hold over the tribes became stronger, and eventually the collections found their way into the hands of a few Akils and those who were more immediately connected with their collection in Berbera, the Elders in the jungle and the tribes generally ceasing to have much interest therein.

These road fees have ever been a fruitful cause of quarrel between the Mahomed Aysa and their neighbours amongst the Habr Toljaala tribes who have always protested against the levy, and a certain impediment to trade generally. The difficulty which always presented itself in dealing with this question lay in the fact that we were not ready to abolish the levy by force, and a settlement by compensation would have cost money.

Last year when on tour in this direction I had several conversations with the jungli Akils on the subject, which confirmed me in the impression that they benefited but little from the levy, whilst they looked upon it as a nuisance as involving them with the Habr Toljaala. It was not, however, expedient to press the matter at that time both because of the connection of several of the Habr Toljaala tribes with the Mullah's movement, and because it was not advisable to risk the disaffection of any of the Akils with a measure which entailed pecuniary loss to them.

Opportunity was taken of the desire evinced by the Mahomed Aysa and the Habr Toljaala lately to settle up their differences left by last year's disturbances, to again bring the matter forward, with the result that a few days before I left Berbera an influential and representative deputation of the majority of the Mahomed Aysa sections appeared before me, represented that they now recognized that any permanent settlement with the Habr Toljaala would not be possible so long as the road fees continued, and asked that they be now stopped by the Administration. This was at once done, and the fact was proclaimed in the Berbera bazaar that the road fees had now ceased. We are thus rid of a long-standing vexed question at the initiative of the parties concerned. Amongst the deputation were the Akil who benefited chiefly by the levy, and others who shared in the collection.

Similar fees which used to be levied by Sultan Nur on caravans passing through the Habr Yunis country were stopped by the Administration when Nur set himself against us last year, and will not be allowed to be reimposed. There only now remain the road fees levied by the Adan Aysa on the western routes, and I am hopeful that this tribe may soon follow the example set by the Mahomed Aysa.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 2.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, June* 18, 1900.

I HAVE received a telegram from Captain Harrington informing me of his departure from Addis Abbaba on the 8th instant. The Doctor of the Mission remaining behind at the request of King Menelek, in consequence of the illness of the Queen.

Captain Harrington adds that he brings with him more favourable proposals as regards the southern frontier.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Governm

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 18.)

(No. 53. Confidential.)

Camp, Sheikh, May 30, 1900.

My Lord,

THE Acting Consul at Zeyla has forwarded to me a request made to him on the 23rd instant by the Governor of Jibuti for a passage, with the usual facilities, to be accorded through the Protectorate to M. Joubert, who wishes to proceed from Jibuti to the Ogaden with a commercial caravan, accompanied by three companions and twenty followers.

I have to-day written to the Governor, regretting that I am at present unable to meet his wishes, as the state of the Ogaden is quite unsuited for commercial enterprise or the entry of caravans led by Europeans.

I trust that this will meet with your Lordship's approval.

A somewhat serious question is, however, raised by this request. It is most undesirable just now that French travellers, commercial or otherwise, should be hanging about the Ogaden, but the Ogaden is not our territory. The French are presumably as well aware of the state of the country as we are, and should another application of the same nature be received, backed up by permission from Menelek to enter the country, we might have some difficulty in refusing a passage through our territory.

The difficulty might, perhaps, be best got over if a hint were given to Menelek that it would be advisable, in view of the disturbed state of the country, to refuse for a time permission to any European to enter the Ogaden from this side.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Captain Harrington.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

[Confidential]

No. 1735-E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, &c.,
Lt. J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department,
Simla;
The 28th August 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints;
Section 1, dated the 15th June and 2nd and 5th July 1900.
Section 2, dated the 2nd July 1900.
Section 3, dated the 25th June and 2nd July 1900.
Section 4, dated the 2nd July 1900.
Section 7, dated the 18th June 1900.

*With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 6625

Political Department,
Bombay Castle, 4th September 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W Lawrence

Acting Secretary to Government.

MK

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 15.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Camp Sheikh, June* 15, 1900.

A FRENCH commercial expedition armed left Jibuti on the 10th instant to cross the Protectorate for the Ogaden despite my refusal to allow passage through the Protectorate. The Governor of Jibuti disclaims all responsibility.

I am dispatching Camel Corps to intercept.

Inger is either at Jibuti or is shortly expected there. A suspicious vessel has been lying off Jibuti for some days; I have informed Aden, and suggested that a watch be kept on her movements.

No. 2.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 15.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Camp Sheikh, June* 15, 1900.

PLEASE see Harrington's telegrams Nos. 9 and 10. The Governor of Harrar returned to Harrar on the 5th instant, and reported that the rumours were untrue as to the advance of the Mullah.

The latter is at Daghaboor, near Milmil. Two companies of the British Central Africa Rifles are proceeding with a Maxim to Hargaisa at once, and if necessary three more can follow.

I could take all available forces towards Hargaisa should the Mullah advance, but infantry could not be safely pushed into the Haud. Tribal levies could be collected; to be of any use they would require active support.

A strong force of Camelry, such as the Bikanir Camel Corps, would be wanted if we are to co-operate with the Abyssinians in the Ogaden.

Repeated to Harrington.

[2090 *p*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 5.)

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, July* 5, 1900.

ON the subject of the Erythræan frontier, the Commandant at Kassala, Colonel Collinson, has made several complaints to me of the proceedings of Italian officials.

There is one point on which I think representations might be made at Rome, the case being of considerable gravity.

I understand that, on arriving at Mogatta, postmen from Gedaref went down to the west bank of the Atbara, which is without question Egyptian territory, and there watered their camels. Four Italian irregulars, standing on the opposite bank with an Italian flag, immediately began to curse and abuse them, saying that if they came there again they would be shot. It cannot be supposed that the men intended to cross the river, as it was in full flood. They then proceeded to Fasher, where they were conveyed across by the ferry.

I hope the Italian Government will take measures in order that no further cause may be given for such complaints.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 2.)

(No. 36.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, May* 19, 1900.

I HAVE been desired by His Majesty King Menelek to inform your Lordship that Ras Waldi replaces Ras Mangasha Attakem as frontier officer at Gondar.

Ras Waldi, who has recently been appointed Ras, accompanied M. Lagarde, the French Minister, to France last year.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 2.)

(No. 35. Confidential.)

Addis Abbaba, May 18, 1900.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 26, Confidential, of the 20th April, forwarding a copy of a letter from the Intelligence Division of the War Office, relative to the importation of warlike stores into Abyssinia, I have, in my despatch No. 23, Secret, of the 2nd instant, referred to the matter.

The only additional observations that I am able to offer at present are that all the arms and ammunition consigned under the mark A.B.M. (otherwise A. B. Messullam, agent of Messrs. E. W. Carling and Co. at Harrar), have arrived at, or are *en route* for, Harrar.

All shipments made by Count Leontieff are, with small exceptions, purchases on behalf of, or for sale to, King Menelek.

With reference to D.A.A.G.'s Report to I.B., Simla, in March 1897, I have never heard of a battery of siege guns drawn by elephants. There are no trained elephants in the country.

As regards Van Lobell's Annual Report on the Abyssinian artillery, it is somewhat difficult to verify his figures as the Abyssinian guns are not all kept in the capital, but are in different arsenals, and some with different Rases and officers. The only item I am not certain of is the number of Hotchkiss guns. There are at least four Maxims in the country. At present large quantities of rifles and cartridges are *en route* from Harrar to the new arsenal which is being built at Bulga.

I shall endeavour to collect information concerning the Abyssinian artillery and any consignments of war material. It is, however, extremely difficult to do so, as, owing to the impression caused by French and Russian reports that we intend war with Abyssinia when the Transvaal war is concluded, any inquiries on my part have to be conducted with the greatest possible care.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 2.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Harrington.

(No. 37.)

Foreign Office, July 2, 1900.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 26, Confidential, of the 5th May last, reporting inquiries made by the Emperor Menelek on the subject of the Abyssinian frontier questions, and the replies which you made to His Majesty.

I approve the language held by you on this occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 3.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Viscount Cromer.

(No. 129.)

Foreign Office, July 2, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 111 of the 13th ultimo, reporting that you have instructed Captain Harrington, at the request of the Greek Consul-General, to take charge of Greek interests in Abyssinia, should the Emperor Menelek be agreeable thereto.

I approve your Lordship's action in this matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 3.

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 2.)

(No. 30.)
My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, May* 14, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 16 of the 1st April, I have the honour to report that Kanyasmatch Walda Gabriel has been brought here in chains a prisoner.

As punishment for obstructing Major Austin's survey party, the whole of the Kanyasmatch's property has been confiscated, and he has been degraded.

In addition, the Kanyasmatch was publicly flogged in my presence this morning in the market place of Addis Abbaba.

Previous to his public punishment, public proclamation was made to the effect that the punishment was because this officer had disobeyed the King's orders in not receiving British officers with the respect due to them, and not helping them, and thereby had endangered the good relations existing between the King and the British Government.

As an example to others, the Kanyasmatch is to be paraded in chains along the frontier.

It is to be hoped that this public punishment of an Abyssinian officer of rank will have a salutary effect on the behaviour of Abyssinian officials in future towards Englishmen. The Kanyasmatch was Ras Tasamma Nadoo's right-hand man, and Acting Governor of his country during the Ras' absence at the capital.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 2.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 2.)

(No. 31. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, May* 14, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in conversation with my Italian colleague, I learnt that M. Ilg, when in Rome, sounded the Foreign Minister, the Marquis Visconti Venosta, as to Italy's attitude in the eventuality of war occurring between Ethiopia and another Power.

I understand that M. Ilg seemed somewhat disappointed when he received the reply that Italy would observe a benevolent neutrality.

In connection with M. Ilg's visit to Rome, it is curious to note that, although he spoke as though he would arrange all matters pending between Italy and Abyssinia, he has, since his departure from Jibuti, sent no communication to King Menelek, and the Italian Agent has, short of actually signing the Frontier Convention, the form of which is *en route*, settled the frontiers of Erythræa on terms more favourable than those offered when M. Ilg was here. Italy retains the Marab–Belesa–Sai–Muna frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 3.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 2.)

(No. 32. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, May* 14, 1900.

IN accordance with instructions received from Viscount Cromer, I have the honour to report that I informed King Menelek of the arrangements made by Her Majesty's

Government, whereby, as a temporary measure, half the market dues of Gallabat will be paid to His Majesty.

The arrangement is one which apparently gave His Majesty great pleasure.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 4.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 2.)

(No. 33. Confidential.)

Addis Abbaba, May 16, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that I have ascertained on the most reliable authority that previous to his departure for Europe, M. Ilg was granted a gold concession over a tract of country in the Walega district.

It is this district where the French mining engineer, M. Camboul, has been working for some years past.

I have reason to believe that M. Duparchy, one of the contractors of the Jibuti Railway, has provided much of the funds necessary for the entertainment of M. Camboul.

The probability is that a French company will be formed to work the concession, and another important French interest thereby created in Abyssinia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 5.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 2.)

(No. 58. Confidential.)

Camp, Sheikh, June 14, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to quote extract from a letter to my address from Mr. Gerolimato, giving further information with reference to the 30,000 rifles reported in my despatch No. 51 of the 18th ultimo, as being on their way to Addis Abbaba, and other importations of arms into Abyssinia.

Mr. Gerolimato writes, under date of the 3rd June;—

"These 30,000 rifles are a present from Russia to the Emperor Menelek, and are exactly of the same pattern as the French Gras. They were imported into Jibuti about ten months ago, and arrived here in February or March.

"This year, from March 1889 to March 1900, about 65,000 rifles were imported into Harrar, of which 30,000 are the above Russian rifles. 5,000,000 rounds of ammunition were also imported, of which 3,000,000 were Russian for the Russian rifles.

"From January to May, 315 Lee-Metfords were imported into Jibuti by the British firm, E. W. Carling and Co., of London. You know this firm very well at Muscat. This firm has made a contract with an Armenian, by name, Sarkis Terezian, for 1,000,000 rounds of Gras ammunition to be delivered in Jibuti about the end of the present month. 780,000 rounds arrived in Jibuti some twelve days ago. The cases would be marked A. B. M. (A. B. Messulam) S. T. (Serkis Terezian) and it seems that Carling refused to put on their mark."

This Serkis Terezian is one of the individuals referred to in my despatch No. 84 of the 24th October last, in connection with the illicit importation of arms into the Protectorate by King Menelek's agent, Ato Josef.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

N.B.—A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Captain Harrington, and the Intelligence Branch, Simla.

J. H. S.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 27. Confidential.)

Addis Abbaba, May 9, 1900.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 26, Confidential, of the 2nd May, I have the honour to report that to-day I sent to King Menelek the extract from Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General's Report on Egypt and the Soudan, dealing with relations with Abyssinia and the state of frontier arrangements.

When read to King Menelek His Majesty seemed pleased, and remarked that it was what I had already told him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 2.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 56. Confidential.)

Camp, Sheikh, June 8, 1900.

My Lord,

NEWS was received from Harrar last week that the Abyssinians are preparing another expedition into the Ogaden against the Mullah, who is said to be somewhere between Haradiggit and Fafanyer, to the east of Haradiggit.

The strength and composition of the force is not known. I have to-day received information from Berbera, brought in by a caravan from Jig Jiga, confirming the news that the Abyssinians are again preparing to move into the Ogaden, but there were only 500 Abyssinian soldiers at Jig Jiga when the caravan left about ten days ago.

As rain has fallen plentifully in the Ogaden, an Abyssinian force would now encounter no water difficulties in an advance on Haradiggit.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Captain Harrington, and the Intelligence Branch, Simla.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 3.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 111.)

Cairo, June 13, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that, in accordance with a request made to me by the Greek Consul-General, I have forwarded to Captain Harrington a letter from His Majesty the King of Greece to the Emperor Menelek, requesting that the British Representative may be allowed to take charge of Greek interests in Abyssinia.

I have instructed Captain Harrington to present this letter to the Emperor, and to assume charge of Greek interests upon receipt of a favourable reply.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

No. 4.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 112.)
My Lord,

Cairo, June 16, 1900.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 80 of the 15th instant, I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a telegram which I have received from Colonel Jackson, reporting the movements of Major Austin and his survey party.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 4.

Colonel Jackson to Viscount Cromer.

(Telegraphic.)

Omdurman, June 15, 1900.

MAJOR AUSTIN and survey party have arrived at Nasser. Austin has come on to Duem to get rations, as he had to abandon stores 150 miles up river beyond Nasser. Austin returns to Nasser, and will bring down men and transport. The following extract from Austin's telegram :—

"All well. Could you wire our safe return home to Foreign Office ?"

No. 5.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received June* 25.)

(No. 168. Africa.)
My Lord,

Brussels, June 23, 1900.

I THINK it right to call attention to the inclosed telegram from Paris published in the "Étoile Belge" this morning ; although much of this information is not correct, it is desirable your Lordship should know the sort of news which is served up by the Belgian press with the view of prejudicing public opinion in regard to the Belgian claim to the Bahr-el-Ghazal.

Now that the sudd has been cleared away and the Anglo-Egyptian gun-boats can patrol the river up to Fort Berkeley, Her Majesty's Government must rely on the direct information procured through Cairo more than on any details which it may be possible for Her Majesty's Legation to glean from unwilling officials in Brussels.

The officer referred to in this telegram is Major Henry, whose journey down the Nile was reported in your Lordship's telegram to me No. 7 Africa, of the 22nd ultimo. He arrived here last week, and M. de Cuvelier, whom I have seen this afternoon, tells me that Major Henry had been admirably received by all the British authorities with whom he had come into contact, and was most grateful for all the kindness shown to him on his journey down the Nile.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

P.S.—The "Étoile Belge" to-day publishes the inclosed statement that no change has been made in the Congolese garrison on the Nile.

F. R. P.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

Extract from the "Étoile Belge" of June 23, 1900.

D'APRÈS une information de source Anglaise, les forces de l'Etat Libre du Congo sont en train d'occuper très rapidement le Bahr-el-Ghazal.

Un officier Belge qui revient de cette région raconte qu'il y a en ce moment de ce côté 60 à 70 soldats Belges et 5,000 soldats indigènes armés de carabines à repétition.

Les Belges ont construit à Kéro un fort important armé de canons Krupp, de quatre Nordenfeldt, et de trois Maxims.

Ce fort est occupé par une garnison de 1,500 hommes. A Lado il y a une garnison de 250 hommes avec deux canons; à Rejaf, il y a 400 soldats avec trois canons; à Bohr, 200 soldats avec un Maxim, quatre cannonières battant pavillon de l'État du Congo naviguant sur le Nil et surveillant étroitement la rive de l'Abyssinie, où l'on dit que le Comte Léontieff agit en faveur de l'État libre.

Les autorités du Congo semblent croire que l'Angleterre s'est désintéressée complètement du Bahr-el-Ghazal et permettra au Roi Léopold ce que bon lui semblera.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

Extract from the "Étoile Belge" of June 24, 1900.

LES nouvelles publiées au sujet d'un renforcement des forces militaires dans l'enclave de Lado sont inexactes. Aucune expédition nouvelle n'est en cours ni au voie d'organisation; les effectifs de la région n'ont reçu aucune augmentation et restent fixés aux mêmes chiffres qu'antérieurement pour assurer la tranquillité dans le pays.

Il est évident, au surplus, que les Agents de l'État du Congo n'ont aucun rôle à remplir ni aucune mission à exercer du côté de l'Abyssinie.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 2.)

(No. 34. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, May* 17, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 26, Confidential, of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report that I have had four long discussions with King Menelek with a view to his making further proposals for a southern frontier. During three discussions, the officers who are the frontier officers, viz., Ras Tassamma Nadoo, Fitaurari Hafta Giorgis, and Dejasmatch Balcha were consulted. At one interview two Borana Gallas of the Borana Karayu tribe were present, with a view to ascertain their tribal limits.

The information gathered during these discussions was as follows—*vide* Bottego's map showing itinerary of his second expedition, 1895–97, to the Omo.

On the west of Abyssinia, and south of the Sobat, Ras Tasamma Nadoo seemed familiar with the country inclosed by the Acobo River, and spoke of the Ghimirra, Santu, Bocol, and Maciu as being in his country, while Scuirro is under Ras Wala Giorgis. At Cherri is Fitaurari Dejafi, and in Amarr-Cocche is Fitaurari Imani. Captain Welby last year informed me of Abyssinian posts at these two places when he passed them. North of Lake Stephanie the Galana Sagan River is the boundary of Dejasmatch Balcha's country to the south, on the east the foot of the hills east of the upper waters of the Sagan, marked Badditu. Owing to last year's drought 5,000 troops have been recently withdrawn from Balcha's Province to Addis Abbaba. They report the Sagan dried up this year. East of Lake Stephanie commences Fitaurari Hafta Giorgis' country. The Tertale were known to him as Taltal, and so far as could be ascertained from the Gallas present, with the help of the map, the Karayu country lies east of the Tertale, commencing near Carraju, and extending to the Daua on the east, and to about Edger on the south.

Mention was made of an occasion when the Tertale, who were stated to be tributary to the Karayu, had refused their tribute to the latter, and Abyssinian assistance was given to the Karayu to obtain the same.

At the present moment an Abyssinian garrison, about 1,000 in strength, was stated to be at Ell Uaje. Ascebo is not the name of a town but of a person. The Gallas spoke of Argasa as a town.

East of the Daua the King seemed somewhat indifferent about, as it appears there are no Abyssinian garrisons there. Dejasmatch Asfau Darghie once led an expedition through the Liban country, along the west bank of the Ganale Doria to Lugh.

In the discussions that ensued there was considerable familiarity, both on the part of the King and his officers, with the country north of the 4th degree, and west of the Daua River. South of the Galana Sagan and Ell Uaje the King admitted there were no garrisons, but stated that he did not send soldiers there so long as the Barana paid their tribute.

The King seemed to attach considerable importance to the Boran tribes known as Wadditu (probably Badditu on Bottego's map) and Karayu. The reason is, I believe, that he obtains a very large quantity of ivory from these regions.

The general impression received from these discussions was that though the King may offer better proposals for a frontier east of the Daua, it is extremely doubtful whether he will yield west of that river.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Map of the Basin of the Juba River and of the Countries to the North and West.

[Not printed.]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received May* 18.)

(No. 26. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, May* 5, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that at an audience with King Menelek yesterday, His Majesty broached the subject of frontiers, and asked me what were the views of Her Majesty's Government on his proposals.

I replied that, so far as the Soudan frontier was concerned, he might look on that frontier as practically settled. I remarked that no very great changes were likely to occur between Todluk and the Sobat beyond those which tribal and geographical conditions would demand. South of the Sobat I said it depended on the survey in operation whether His Majesty's proposals would be accepted, as we were desirous of satisfying ourselves that we possessed country over which we could make the Cape to Cairo Railway. His Majesty remarked: "But there is no objection to the railway going through my country."

His Majesty then asked: "What about Metemmeh?" I replied that in former times when the Egyptians were in Metemmeh the town was on two sides of a stream—the Khor Abuakara. The portion to the east of the stream was regarded as Abyssinian and that to the west Egyptian. We proposed making this stream the boundary, so that the former condition of affairs would continue.

His Majesty seemed considerably relieved at my statements, and remarked that if this was the state of affairs it did not matter if the survey did take some time. His Majesty seemed to be satisfied with the proposal as to the division of Metemmeh.

He then inquired about the southern frontier, and I informed him that when I left England no orders had been given, but the impression I had received was that His Majesty's proposals were not considered satisfactory. If His Majesty was prepared to submit fresh proposals, I was ready to put them before Her Majesty's Government, as I was convinced that with a little time and patience one would succeed in coming to an amicable settlement.

His Majesty replied that he would look at the map and see what could be done.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON, *Captain.*

[Confidential.]

No. 1780-E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

Foreign Department,
Simla;
The 3rd September 1900

By order, &c.,
(sd) J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints:
Section 1, dated the 1st, 9th, 11th, 14th, 16th and 24th July 1900
Sections 2, 3 and 4, dated the 16th July 1900.

*With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential.

No 522 of 8

Political Department,
Bombay Castle, 8th September 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Hudson

Acting Secretary to Government

WC.

Rec'd with letter No 34, of the 3rd Aug 1900, from the Secy, Post & Tels Dept.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 1.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Camp, Shuleh, June* 29, 1900.

REPORTS have been received that the French commercial expedition has returned to Jibuti after killing, in French territory, four natives.

Renewed disturbances have occurred on the railway, and the position is becoming like that of last year.

Inger is now said to be in Jibuti.

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 60. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp Sheikh, June 16, 1900.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 53 of the 30th ultimo and my telegram No. 1 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to submit copy of a letter from the Governor of Jibuti to the Acting Consul at Zeyla, from which it appears that, notwithstanding my refusal to allow passage through the Protectorate, this French expedition left Jibuti on the night of the 10th instant and moved towards our frontier.

I heard at the same time from Mr. Hampson that the expedition was accompanied by twenty sepoys, and that he had learnt from other sources that the expedition had moved to Biyo Kaboba, and intended entering the Gadabursi country with the avowed intention of shooting elephants, which it is well known in Jibuti is prohibited, the whole of the Gadabursi country being in the Reserve.

It was further reported by our native Agent in Jibuti, who arrived in Zeyla on the afternoon of the 12th instant, that for some days past a mysterious vessel has been lying off Jibuti; she was so far off that her colours could not be seen, and no one, not even the medical authorities, had been able to get on board. It was thought that Carl Inger, who is expected in Jibuti, would land from this vessel, but apparently he has not. It would seem that this vessel has been waiting for Inger, and that another attempt may be made by this filibusterer to land on our shores.

Whether the object of this French expedition is to sell arms in the Ogaden, or to take advantage of the present state of affairs in that country and attempt to draw our Ogaden trade to the French Protectorate, I know not; but, under all the circumstances, it is impossible to look on this expedition without extreme suspicion, and if Carl Inger has a hand in it, as is not at all unlikely, its objects will certainly be hostile to us.

If Inger succeeds in getting into the Ogaden he will doubtless join the Mullah; whether he will be welcomed or not is another matter. He is well known in Jibuti, and his intentions are no secret there. In a late issue of the "Jibuti Weekly" I noticed a paragraph in which that journal informed its readers that Inger was credited with the modest programme of preaching a religious war in the British Protectorate.

The communications to which I have referred in this despatch reached me at 10 A.M. yesterday; at 1 P.M. twenty-seven of the Camel Corps, under the command of the Commandant of the Police Forces, left for Hargaisa to intercept the expedition, if possible.

The instructions I gave Captain Swayne were to avoid a conflict as far as possible, but that, if the party were found in our territory, to turn them back if he did not find himself in a position to effect their arrest. Hargaisa is 80 miles from here, but the road the expedition will probably take is a difficult one, and the Camel Corps may be in time to stop the party in our territory.

At the same time, I wrote to the Resident at Aden, informing him of the facts, and suggesting that the vessel said to be off Jibuti be watched by one of Her Majesty's ships. This letter should reach the Resident early to-morrow morning.

I would invite your Lordship's attention to the attitude of the French authorities of Jibuti in this matter. After I had courteously, but distinctly, refused permission to a so-called commercial expedition to pass through our Protectorate, on the grounds that the present condition of the Ogaden was quite incompatible with mercantile transactions or the ingress of caravans headed by Europeans, the

Governor allows an armed party to leave Jibuti with the expressed intention of entering our territory with or without leave. No steps are taken to prevent their departure, the Governor merely disclaiming all responsibility for their conduct. One of the party, who are styled adventurers, M. Monatte, is a merchant established at Jibuti, and is personally known to me. He has several times tried to get into the Protectorate on the excuse of shooting, and is credited with endeavouring to intrigue with our tribes.

The Harrar authorities have been warned of the departure of this expedition, and also of the possible arrival on the scene of Carl Inger.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure in No. 1.

The Governor of Jibuti to the Acting Consul at Zeyla.

Djibouti, le 11 *Juin*, 1900.

M. le Gouverneur,

J'AI eu l'honneur de vous adresser il y a quelque temps une demande de MM. Joubert et Monatte, demandant l'autorisation d'emprunter le territoire Anglais, pour le passage d'une caravane commerciale se dirigeant vers l'Ogaden.

J'ai communiqué à ces messieurs la réponse de M. le Consul-Général de Berberah auquel vous vous étiez référé. Malgré la défense de M. le Consul-Général de Berberah, et malgré mes propres observations, MM. Monatte, Grandjean, et Zanetto ont quitté de nuit la ville de Djibouti, et se sont dirigés vers les possessions Anglaises. Je laisse par suite à ces aventuriers toute la responsabilité de leur conduite.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signature illisible.)

No. 2.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 9.)

(No. 64. Confidential.)

Camp Sheikh, June 23, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE this day received your Lordship's telegrams of the 13th and 14th, and am replying that I can spare half the Yao Battalion at once, if necessary. In view of the state of affairs in the Ogaden, and the prospect of renewed activity on the part of the Mullah, I do not consider that the whole battalion could be withdrawn. This messege will be sent to Aden by Buggalow, as it is impossible for me to catch the steamer which leaves Berbera to-day.

I reported in my telegram No. 2 of the 15th instant that the Governor of Harrar returned to Harrar on the 5th instant, and reported that the rumours of an advance by the Mullah were untrue. The only foundation for the scare at Harrar seems to be the fact that the Mullah is undoubtedly collecting a force again; that he would ever venture to attack Harrar is highly improbable.

I hear to-day from Mr. Gerolimate that he is said to be back again in Harradiggit, and the reports I receive from native sources fluctuate between Harradiggit and Daghabour.

Lately many of the Aligheri have gone to join the Mullah from the Karias, two days march south of Bohotele, and this as well as reports from natives returning from the Ogaden point to the Mullah's contemplating another move at an early date.

The whole of the Ogaden are reported to have rebelled against the Abyssinians, and in this respect the Mullah has succeeded in uniting the Ogaden tribes to his cause, with perhaps the exception of the Rer Ali. Years of oppression by the Abyssinians in the past on the Ogaden tribes have given the Mullah his opportunity

to raise the cry against Abyssinian rule in the Ogaden, but his immediate hold over the tribes is mainly due to his possession of fire-arms and to the fear his treatment of the Chiefs and tribesmen who refuse to obey his summons spread throughout the country.

I have said that half the Yao Battalion can be spared for Ashanti on the assumption that it is not proposed to co-operate with the Abyssinians in the suppression of the Mullah by pushing infantry into the waterless tracts of the Ogaden.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 11.)

Treasury Chambers, July 10, 1900.

Sir,

THE Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury have had under consideration your letter of the 12th instant, with its inclosures, further with regard to the question of railway construction in connection with the British Somali Protectorate, and I am to request you to submit the following reply to the Marquess of Salisbury:—

In view of his Lordship's opinion that political considerations would prevent the line from Jibuti from being altogether abandoned, there appears to be no substantial advantage to be derived from any further endeavour to buy up the French Concession with the object of diverting their line to Berbera.

The alternative proposed in the concluding paragraph of your letter under reply is to promote the construction of a British line from Berbera to Harrar, a project which, it is stated, is not likely to find financial support in this country without the assurance of assistance in some form from Imperial or Protectorate funds. With regard to this alternative, I am to state that, until it is known what the probable cost would be for such a line, and whether Berbera as a port has advantages which would enable it to compete with Jibuti, my Lords are not in a position to say whether the line would be worth making.

In any case, their Lordships are not prepared until the Uganda Railway is completed to make fresh proposals to Parliament for incurring further Imperial liabilities for railway construction in Africa.

I am, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS MOWATT.

[2169 *l*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 14.)

(No. 349.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 13, 1900.

THE evening papers announce that M. Lagarde, French Minister in Abyssinia, has arrived to-day at Marseilles, accompanied by a Special Embassy sent by the Emperor Menelek, with the object of expressing to the President His Majesty's regrets at not being able personally to visit the Exhibition, and his best wishes for its success.

A copy of the Notice, as published in the "Temps," is inclosed herewith.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Temps" of July 14, 1900.

Marseille, le 13 *Juillet*, 1900.

"L'OXUS," des Messageries Maritimes, courrier de Madagascar et de Djibouti, est arrivé, ramenant 235 passagers, parmi lesquels M. Lagarde, Duc d'Entoto, Ministre de France auprès de l'Empereur Ménélik. Il est accompagné par une Mission officielle envoyée par le Négus et composée d'une douzaine de personnes. L'Ambassadeur principal, le Likamakouas Nado, parent de l'Empereur, qui a déjà fait partie de la Mission venue en France il y a deux ans et qui a été décoré de la Légion d'Honneur à cette occasion, est un sincère ami de notre pays.

L'Empereur Ménélik, m'a dit M. Lagarde, avait espéré pouvoir venir lui-même, mais des préoccupations graves le retiennent dans ses États. Il a chargé son Envoyé d'exprimer au Président de la République ses vifs regrets et ses vœux pour la pleine réussite de l'Exposition. L'Ambassade séjournera assez longtemps en France; elle visitera les principales villes et fera des rapports détaillés au Souverain.

Notre Ministre en Éthiopie est porteur d'une lettre autographe de Ménélik pour le Président de la République. L'Ambassade a quitté Addis Abbaba le 12 Mai, et elle a eu à souffrir de pluies torrentielles et continuelles pendant un mois. A Harrar, elle s'est arrêtée pendant un certain temps, à cause des troubles soulevés par les révoltés Somalis et, dans le désert, entre Harrar et Djibouti, elle a dû prendre des précautions pour les mêmes raisons. La chaleur a été effrayante dans la dernière partie de la route.

Les Ambassadeurs Éthiopiens partent ce soir pour Paris.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Sir H. Johnston to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 135.* Uganda.)

My Lord, *Entebbe, Uganda, May* 26, 1900.

IN reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 73, regarding the action of M. Leontieff and other French and Belgian adventurers at the north end of Lake Rudolf; and also with reference to despatch No. 43, giving confidential information regarding an interview between Her Majesty's Agent, Captain Harrington, and the Emperor Menelek, I have the honour to repeat what was said by me in a former despatch, viz., that native reports lead me to believe that this first essay on the part of M. Leontieff and his associates has been a failure, due to great mortality amongst the Europeans in the unhealthy district at the mouth of the River Omo, and to the determined hostility of the natives, who detest the Abyssinians on account of their cruel raids. At the same time I pointed out to your Lordship that the present resources of the Uganda Protectorate make it impossible for us to undertake any determined move to the north end of Lake Rudolf. I am of opinion myself that this country is distinctly worth preserving to British influence and control, and I would therefore respectfully submit to your Lordship that the Treasury might be approached on the subject, and that means perhaps might be found for the employment in that province of the Yao contingent at present stationed in Somaliland.

Native reports as to mineral wealth though no doubt exaggerated all tend to the belief that the countries to the north-west and west of Lake Rudolf will be found to contain considerable mineral wealth.

Putting aside this inducement, however, it would be obvious to your Lordship that the establishment of foreign rule along the west coast of Lake Rudolf will have a most prejudicial effect not only on our trade but on our political hold over the Protectorate of Uganda.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. H. JOHNSTON,

Her Majesty's Special Commissioner.

No. 2.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 39.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, May* 30, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that there is a report current here that 15,000 Somalis, under the Somaliland Mullah, have besieged Kondoto, near Jarso, some 25 miles south-east of Harrar.

It is said that the Governor of Harrar, with a force of 4,000 men, left Harrar last night, accompanied by a Frenchman, Count Laguibougière, in charge of his artillery.

It is impossible to state what truth there is in the above report. It is, however, certain that there is renewed activity on the part of the Mullah in the neighbourhood of Harrar, as two days ago Fitaurari Apta Giorgis and Dejasmatch Balcha were ordered with their troops to Harrar.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Consul-General, Somali Coast.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

---

* *Vide* despatch No. 133.

No. 3.

Viscount Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 118.)

My Lord, *Cairo, July* 6, 1900.

WITH reference to my telegram of to-day's date, I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of a telegram which I have received from Colonel Jackson, reporting the circumstances of the meeting of Italian irregulars and Gedaref postmen on the Atbara.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CROMER.

Inclosure in No. 3.

Colonel Jackson to Viscount Cromer.

(Telegraphic.) *Omdurman, July* 5, 1900.

FOLLOWING from Collinson :—

"The postmen from Gedaref report that on arriving at Mogatta from Gedaref they went down to water their camels on the west bank. On the east bank were four Italian irregulars with an Italian flag, who cursed and abused them, and said, 'If you come down to water your camels again, we will shoot you.' As the river is in full flood, the postmen could have had no intention of crossing the river. The postmen then continued their journey to Fasher and crossed by ferry boat, as they always do."

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 84. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 24, 1900.*

THE Marquess of Salisbury has given his careful consideration, in consultation with the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, to the question of railway construction in Somaliland which formed the subject of your despatch No. 48, Confidential, of the 7th May last. Copies of his correspondence with their Lordships is inclosed herewith.*

I am directed by his Lordship to state that Captain Harrington will be consulted on the matter on his arrival in England, but meantime I am to ask whether you can furnish any further information or suggestions which would be useful for consideration, especially as to the capabilities of Berbera and the amount of traffic that could be counted upon for a line from Berbera to Harrar.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

* To Treasury, June 12; Treasury, July 10, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 66. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp, Sheikh, June 25, 1900.*

THE Acting Consul at Zeyla has already informed your Lordship by wire of a further attack by the Aysa on the French railway.

The reports which have been received are to the effect that the attack was made on the night of the 15th instant on a party of labourers working at the present extremity of the line, and that from ten to twenty labourers were killed; the victims being mostly Greeks.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Captain Harrington, and the Intelligence Branch, Simla.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

No. 2.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury,—(Received July 16.)

(No. 68. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp, Sheikh, June 29, 1900.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 66, I have the honour to submit further information regarding the state of affairs on the Jibuti Railway, received this day from Zeyla.

Mr. Hampson writes under date the 26th instant:—

"The position on the Jibuti Railway would seem to be serious. The attack on Friday the 15th, which I reported, was the first of a series, in which altogether eleven Europeans and thirty-two natives have been killed.

"The first attack, on Friday night, was at Bija Hama (the end of the works as I understand); and there were seven of the workmen killed. On Saturday morning an attack was made at Ra'ab, when six workmen were killed; on Monday Derin was the scene of the attack, where sixteen of the railway people were killed. The remainder of the forty-three were victims at intervals on the roads, &c. The Aysa say they have only lost two in all.

"The Aysa are still threatening the line in large numbers; while the French and railway coolies are in laager at a place called Dawanla. No work is going on on the railway.

"I hear that five Akils have been imprisoned at Jibuti; and there is a story that a French captain, said to be also implicated, is under arrest. The Aysa are evidently much excited.

"I have just heard that Inger is now at Jibuti, his baggage, a considerable number of arms, &c., being already there. Meanwhile his Dragoman is here, having been expelled Jibuti by the French. He is a Berbera man, at present very ill. I am having him carefully watched, and I think I shall send him into Berbera as soon as possible. He says that Inger means to go to Harrar, and thence to the Ogaden. I am informing Mr. Gerolimato."

I have this day heard from Mr. Gerolimato that the Harrar authorities have been duly warned as to Inger's possible movements, and that he will not be allowed to proceed if he passes by Jigjiga or Harrar.

I am having the Dragoman sent into Berbera as soon as he is well enough to move, where his antecedents will be inquired into.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia, and the Intelligence Branch, Simla.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir H. Johnston to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 133. Uganda.)

My Lord, *Entebbe, Uganda, May* 26, 1900.

IN telegram No. 33 I had the honour to send your Lordship an abstract of information furnished to me by Mr. Fraser, who, together with Dr. Donaldson-Smith, had journeyed from Berbera (which he had quitted in August 1899) to Lake Rudolf and to the Upper Nile.

Your Lordship will be aware that Dr. Donaldson-Smith is a well-known American explorer of Eastern Africa. Dr. Donaldson-Smith engaged Mr. Fraser as his assistant. The last-named person is a man who was once in the service of the African Lakes Company, then for a long time an engineer in the service of the Church Missionary Society, and then an employé of the Imperial British East African Company.

Dr. Donaldson-Smith started from Berbera with about fifty Somalis and a few Indians—Gourkhas and Sikhs.

They journeyed across the Ogaden country to Boran, and thence round Lake Stefanie to the River Omo and the north end of Lake Rudolf. In the Boran country their Somali escort and camel-drivers suddenly mutinied and struck for higher pay.

Dr. Donaldson-Smith, who had made an agreement with these men before the authorities at Berbera, promised them everything they asked for, including a most extravagant rate of wage. They then continued the journey to Lake Rudolf, and ultimately to Fort Berkeley on the Upper Nile. Here Dr. Donaldson-Smith brought up the mutineers before the British officer in charge. The mutineers were reduced to the rate of wages set forth in their original agreement, and were punished by a fine for their mutiny.

With this exception the expedition met with absolutely no disagreeables on the whole of its route, being everywhere well received by the natives (except perhaps in the Boran country, where the treacherous behaviour of the Somalis caused a temporary unfriendliness on the part of the natives, not, however, resulting in any overt act of hostility). Arrived at Fort Berkeley, Dr. Donaldson-Smith resolved to part company with Mr. Fraser, and to return to Europe either down the Nile or across the Congo Free State as circumstances might cause him to decide. Mr. Fraser was to take the men of the caravan through the Uganda Protectorate to Mombasa, where they were to be paid off and dismissed.

Mr. Fraser states that they were very favourably impressed with the beautiful country at the north end of Lake Rudolf and round the River Omo. Here they spent December and part of January. He declares that up to the time they left in January there was no trace, rumour, or tradition whatsoever of the arrival of M. Leontieff, or any other Europeans.

The natives reported that the Abyssinians had attempted to raid this country, but that they had driven them off.

Traces of Abyssinian raiding, however, were quite patent to the Donaldson-Smith expedition round about Lake Stefanie, and the natives informed Mr. Fraser that the Abyssinians regularly raided the whole of the Samburu country to the east of Lake Rudolf for distances far down into British East Africa.

Sometimes they spoke of these raids as tax-gathering, and, in fact, this tribute, when paid with willingness, was collected without violence to be transmitted to the Emperor Menelek.

Such chance Abyssinians as the party came across were not hostile. But all the natives at the north end of Lake Rudolf declared that the Abyssinians had given up any attempt to raid the western side of the lake, owing to the determined hostility of the powerful Turkana tribe.

From the north end of Lake Rudolf the travellers journeyed to Mount Naita and Mount Lali. All this country, and thence for some distance to the westwards, they

describe as being mainly of quartz formation, and showing signs of gold-bearing. (This is the country called Donyiro on Major Macdonald's map.)

At Mount Lali the travellers heard detailed accounts from the natives of the vicinity of white men armed with rifles—possibly some exploring party coming from the Egyptian Soudan.

Starting north-west from Naita, the expedition endeavoured to penetrate into the unknown country between the Sobat and the Nile, but after journeying five days without water, they were compelled to abandon the attempt, and direct their steps in a south-westerly direction. All this unknown country they describe as being a monotonous plain, which at the time of their visit was an absolutely waterless desert, but which might possibly, in heavy rainy seasons be a marsh. The rivers which rise in the Dodinga and Latuka Mountains do not, Mr. Fraser says, fall into the Nile, as shown on Colonel Macdonald's map, but lose themselves in this plain. The party visited Mount Harogo,* and thence journeyed north-west and south-west to Tarangole, in Latuka. From Tarangole† they travelled without much difficulty to Fort Berkeley.

In all these journeys between Lake Rudolf and the Nile they found the natives absolutely friendly. In some cases, as in Latuka, their friendliness and hospitality were remarkable. The Sultan of Latuka repeatedly expressed a wish that he might have a British Resident at his capital. He conversed with them in Arabic.

I forward with this despatch a rough map which Mr. Fraser has been good enough to furnish me with in order to fill up the blank spaces between Lake Rudolf and the Nile. Mr. Fraser has no objection to this map being used by the Foreign Office and the Intelligence Division, but he does not wish it to be published in any way until Dr. Donaldson-Smith's return, as he is, of course, a paid employé of Dr. Donaldson-Smith.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. H. JOHNSTON,
Her Majesty's Special Commissioner.

---

* This is not correct: they only sighted this mountain.

† Or Tangeli.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 69. Confidential.) *Camp, Sheikh, June* 29, 1900.

My Lord,

THE Acting Consul at Zeyla informs me that it is reported that the late attacks on the Jibuti Railway have been made at the direct instigation of the Aysa Ughaz, who, it will be remembered, came in to Zeyla to be installed a few months ago.

A stern warning is being sent at once to the Ughaz that no interference will be allowed with events in the French Protectorate by tribes subject to us, and that the consequences of any infringment of these orders will be most serious.

At the same time, the precautions I took when the disturbances broke out in the French Colony last year are being repeated. Our Akils of the Aysa are being again warned against allowing any of their tribesmen to mix themselves up with affairs in the French Protectorate, and this warning is being publicly tomtomed in the Zeyla bazaar, with the further intimation that any one contravening these instructions will be severely dealt with.

The position of the Aysa Ughaz is somewhat exceptional. Although we hold him responsible for the conduct of our Aysa tribes, of whom he is the elected Chief, he is also as much the elected Chief of the black Aysa, who are French subjects, and who are now concerned in the disturbances on the Jibuti Railway, and for the most part he lives outside our territory. He is now believed to be outside the Protectorate in the neighbourhood of Gildessa.

I am not yet aware what truth there may be in these reports, but, under all the circumstances, it seems necessary to issue this warning to the Ughaz, who is young and inexperienced, and may very probably allow his authority to be made use of by the Elders of the black Aysa.

If it is true that the authority of the Ughaz has been used in the manner indicated, the next thing we shall hear of is the circulation of reports in Jibuti that the disturbances have been fomented from our Protectorate.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer and to Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

One S. C. for
Poll Reed at Ar

[Confidential]

No. 1856-E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, &c.,
Sdf. J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department,
Simla;
The 18th September 1900

North-East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints;
Section 1, dated the 6th August 1900.
Section 2, dated the 24th July 1900.

*With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No 7038

Political Department,
Bombay Castle, 24th September 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W Hudson

Acting Secretary to Government.

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 6.)

(No. 125.) *Cairo, July* 26, 1900.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a telegram which I have received from Colonel Jackson, Acting Governor-General of the Soudan, reporting Abyssinian raids from Beni Shangul on Soudanese tribes, which he believes to be unauthorized, and submitting that representations should be made on the subject to King Menelek.

The substance of this Report has been forwarded to your Lordship by telegraph.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Colonel Jackson to Sir R. Rodd.

Omdurman, July 23, 1900.

(Telegraphic.)

MUDIR SENNAAR reports that Abyssinians under Fitari, the Abyssinian Commander on frontier in vicinity of Beni Shangul, have been reinforced by 600 men. Fitari has demanded from people 30 okes of gold for release of Mahmoud Mohammed, now their [*sic*] captive, who lives between Jebel Surkum and Jebel Ghezan, in very debatable ground. Jebel Surkum is in Soudan territory, but Jebel Ghezan is in Beni Shangul. Mahmoud's brother (?) was sent out to raid, and captured thirty Baruns. He then attacked Jebel Gum Gum and took 180 slaves. The Barun country begins about latitude 8° 45′, longitude 34° 10′; but the Baruns are scattered for a considerable distance north. They are all Soudanese subjects. Jebel Gum Gum is well within Soudan territory (latitude 10° 20′, longitude 34° 15′).

It is believed that another raid is contemplated against Jebel Tabi, a mountain in Dar Tung, right in the centre of the Ghezira, latitude 11° 30′, longitude 34° 10′.

I trust that the British Representative in Abyssinia will be informed about these raids, as I feel sure that they are being committed without King Menelek's knowledge. If the raids continue, it will be impossible to prevent retaliation along the border.

No. 2.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 6.)

(No. 129.) *Cairo, July* 28, 1900.

My Lord,

WITH reference to Lord Cromer's despatch No. 118 of the 6th instant, drawing attention to an incident which had occurred on the frontier between the Soudan and Erythræa, in the neighbourhood of Mogatta, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a letter which I have received from the Italian Agent and Consul-General, in which he states that the Governor of Erythræa has informed him by telegraph that he has conducted an investigation and ascertained that the incident in question never took place.

I have communicated the substance of this letter to the Acting Governor-General of the Soudan, and requested him to furnish me with his observations thereon.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

Inclosure in No. 2.

M. Tugini to Sir R. Rodd.

Le Caire, le 26 *Juillet*, 1900.

Cher M. Rodd,

FAISANT suite à la lettre que j'ai adressée à Lord Cromer le 12 courant au sujet des employés de la poste de Ghedaref à Mogatta, je vous communique les informations suivantes, qui viennent de m'être télégraphiées par M. Martini.

De l'enquête opérée par M. Martini il résulte que le fait en question n'a jamais eu lieu. Il résulte également d'informations indirectes mais sûres, que les chameliers de la poste eux-mêmes nient le fait et s'étonnent de ce qui a été reporté au Commandant de Kassala, dont la bonne foi a été évidemment surprise.

Dans ces circonstances l'enquête étant terminée de son côté, M. de Martini n'est pas à même de prendre aucune mesure à ce sujet.

(Signé) TUGINI.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 24.)

(No. 41.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, June* 4, 1900.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 31 of the 4th ultimo, forwarding me the report of M. Leontieff's Company for the exploitation of the Equatorial Provinces of Abyssinia, I have communicated a summary of the contents to King Menelek.

As regards the 18 tons of ivory said to be in course of transit to Antwerp, His Majesty remarked that all the ivory brought by M. Leontieff from his Province was three mule loads (at the outside this would be about 775 lbs.), half of which the King was paid for, and the other ivory taken by M. Leontieff, in amount under 1,000 faraslas (37,500 lbs.), was purchased from him at the rate of 162 dollars per farasla, when other merchants could only offer 120 dollars per farasla.

His Majesty said he owed M. Leontieff money for ammunition, &c., which, no doubt, he had been made to pay heavily for, and he was glad to get such a price for his ivory.

From another source which, I believe, is reliable, M. Leontieff's last year's purchases of ivory were 600 faraslas. Since his departure none has been purchased on his account.

As regards placing a stern-wheeler on the Omo, His Majesty said M. Leontieff had asked his permission, and that he had replied that he could bring a vessel out, and that if he liked it, he would take it for use on Lake Zwai.

I explained to the King the undesirability of M. Leontieff being allowed to place any boat on the Omo, as he was such an unprincipled scoundrel, that we should probably have him raiding the whole country round Lake Rudolf, thereby endangering the good relations existing between him and Her Majesty's Government.

It would be advisable to ascertain if M. Leontieff is in negotiation for a stern-wheeler, as in such a case, should no action be taken to show our authority on Lake Rudolf, I feel certain that M. Leontieff will repeat his disgraceful behaviour of last year over a wider extent of country next time he comes out.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

I.S.C. for Petersburg. at the

[Confidential]

No. 1902-E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, &c.,
sd/- J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department,
Simla;
The 24th September 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints:
Section 1, dated the 14th, 21st and 29th June and 28th July and 2nd August 1900.
Section 2, dated the 9th July, 1900
Section 3, dated the 24th July 1900.

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 7184

Political Department.
Bombay Castle, 29th September 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

Acting Secretary to Government.

ME.

Rec.d with letter No. 388 of the 24th. Aug. 1900, from the Secy. to Treas. & Sec. of St.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. J. W. Johnston to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 14.)

Sir, 46, *Leadenhall Street, London, June* 14, 1900.

REFERRING to your letter of the 19th March, the reason for my apparent neglect to write you further, was, that I desired to have something more definite to submit to you as justification for my application for a concession of lands in the regions of the Sobat River and Valley of the Tumat.

As explained verbally, I have for many years performed services for the Belgian Government in an honorary way, such as collecting information respecting European port charges and other commercial topics.

On one occasion, when I had the honour of being received by His Majesty the King of the Belgians, I remarked that I was much interested in rubber growing in the Crown Colony of British Honduras; and that I was also anxious, when the Valley of the Nile got settled, to apply to the British Government for a concession of lands between Abyssinia and the east bank of the White Nile.

Asked upon what terms the English Government would grant my request, I replied that there was my difficulty, and that I hesitated to make an application till I could give a distinct gain, but that if I could persuade His Majesty to let the transport of the material for the extension of the Congo Railway, pass by the Nile, instead of the Congo, it would be such a grand thing for the Egyptian Government that I did not doubt it would consider it in the light of a *quid pro quo*.

Some authorities think the Nile will be the natural route for all the territories adjacent to it for many years to come. Doubtless this may be true from a geographical point of view, but one must not forget that there may be some difficulty in overcoming the Belgian proper national sentiment in favour of the Congo route.

With his usual kindness to English business men, His Majesty said my request would receive consideration.

The accompanying letter dated the 5th June from the Secretary-General of the Independent State of the Congo is the outcome of that interview, and I earnestly trust that you will share my opinion that it would indeed be a grand thing for the Egyptian Government generally, and the Nile route in particular, if the many hundreds of thousands of pounds which the transport of the railway material will cost, could be diverted from the Congo to the Nile.

May I venture to ask you to be so kind as to pass my letter through the proper channel, or to give me instructions how I should proceed in order to obtain the concession of the territories in question?

I may add that the people associated with me are quite competent to successfully accomplish anything they undertake.

Will you be so obliging as to consider this communication private, as I do not desire to promote any needless opposition in Antwerp?

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN W. JOHNSTON.

Inclosure in No. 1.

M. de Cuvelier to Mr. J. W. Johnston.

Monsieur, *Bruxelles*, 20, *Rue de Namur, le* 5 *Juin*, 1900.

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer qu'il serait intéressant pour l'État du Congo d'être complètement renseigné sur la possibilité et les conditions du transport de marchandises et spécialement du matériel de chemin de fer jusque Lado par la voie d'Alexandrie et du Nil.

Si le coût du transport par la voie du Nil n'excédait pas celui par la voie du Congo, nous serions heureux d'entendre les propositions que vous pourriez nous faire pour le transport des marchandises et du matériel par Alexandrie et Karthoum jusque Lado.

Nous estimons, en effet, qu'en raison de sa proximité avec les provinces du nord-est de l'État du Congo, la voie du Nil est appelée à un mouvement de transit considérable et qu'il se créera par là un important courant commercial. On peut évaluer, si les conditions du transport étaient favorables, à plusieurs centaines de milliers de livres sterling, l'importance du trafic qui, du Congo, trouvera par le Nil un débouché naturel.

Veuillez, &c.

Le Secrétaire-Général,

(Signé) A. DE CUVELIER.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Messrs. Little and Johnston to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 21.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, 46, *Leadenhall Street, London, June* 20, 1900.

AGREEABLY with the request made in your esteemed letter of the 16th instant,* I beg to subjoin herewith details of the privileges which my friends and I desire to obtain from the Government of the Soudan.

1. A Concession or grant of land or areas to be selected by us on the River Tumat, extending from 34° to 36° east longitude, and from 9° 20′ to 11° north latitude, as indicated in the accompanying map.†

2. A Concession in the valley of the Sobat River, bounded on the north by 10° north latitude, on the east by 34° east longitude, on the south by 6° north latitude, and on the west by the White Nile and Bahr-el-Jebel, as shown on the inclosed map.†

As we shall have a large initial expense in the development of the country, we would respectfully ask that the Concessions should give to us exclusive rights for prospecting and acquiring mines, as well as for the collection and cultivation of india-rubber and other natural products.

I earnestly trust that Lord Cromer will consider the application as reasonable, and as commensurate with the great financial advantage which will accrue to the Government of the Soudan should I be able to divert to it the hundreds of thousands of pounds sterling which the transport of the extension of the Congo Railway viâ the Nile would involve.

It scarcely becomes me to assume that the letter of the Secretary-General of the Congo State, dated the 5th June, in your possession, is an absolute guarantee that the Nile route will obtain a preference over the Congo route; but as I know of the personal and earnest desire of His Majesty the King to assist me, I think I am safe in saying that the benevolent disposition evinced in the letter will take the shape of a practical assurance if the matter is decided soon.

Again I beg that my letter may be considered as confidential, as if my designs were known in Antwerp I fear considerable opposition might ensue, and my object may be defeated.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN W. JOHNSTON.

---

* *Qy.* 19th. † Not printed.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Anglo-Belgian Africa Company to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 29.)

Sir, 46, *Leadenhall Street, London, June* 29, 1900.

WE have acquired a Concession from His Majesty the King of the Belgians to collect rubber, &c., in the north-east portion of the Independent State of the Congo.

It was a source of great personal satisfaction to His Majesty to find that Englishmen were desirous to develop the district, and every encouragement and facility was afforded us for the purpose.

The absence of roads hitherto prevented our exercising our privileges, but now that these have been constructed we propose to send out six or seven men from Edinburgh, some of them gardeners, and others who have already had experience in African cultivation under the African Lakes Company and the British South African Company.

Previous to the Soudan campaign our intention was to send our employés by way of the Congo, but since the victories of the Anglo-Egyptian army, it is obvious that there is no other possible route to this corner of the Congo State than the Nile, where, moreover, British employés would enjoy throughout the whole route the protection of the British flag. Therefore we earnestly and respectfully solicit that the Secretary of State will be pleased to authorize any reasonable consideration and safe conduct being extended to our employés by Her Majesty's Representatives in Cairo and the Soudan.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LITTLE AND JOHNSTON.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1900.

SHOULD the intelligence received from Sennaar, and reported in your telegram No. 91 of the 24th July, of an Abyssinian raid on the Barun tribe at El Guru be confirmed, and found not to be based on native reports only, you are authorized to send the following telegram, through the Resident at Aden, to Her Majesty's Consul at Zeyla from Captain Harrington :—

"The following message is for early communication to the Emperor Menelek : Please ask Her Majesty's Consular Agent at Harrar to forward it to the Italian Representative at Addis Abbaba for that purpose.

"A report has been received from the British Officer Commanding at Sennaar stating that Abyssinian troops from the Beni Schongul frontier have been raiding on the Egyptian side of the proposed frontier, and have carried off 180 slaves from El Guru. Further frontier raids are said to be intended. Such raids are calculated, in the opinion of the Governor-General of the Soudan, to cause trouble between the tribes on both sides of the frontier, and Her Majesty's Government are convinced that, in face of the Emperor's orders to the frontier officers, they must have taken place without his knowledge. Her Majesty's Government feel confident that His Majesty will again issue fresh orders that the *status quo* is to be respected by the frontier officers."

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Anglo-Belgian Africa Company and the British Tropical Africa Company to Foreign Office.—(Received August 2.)

Africa House, 46, *Leadenhall Street, London,*
August 1, 1900.

Sir,

WE have the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 9th ultimo, in which you state that before giving a definite reply to our request that facilities may be granted to our employés travelling by the Nile to the territories leased to us by His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the Marquess of Salisbury would wish to be informed of the exact latitudes and longitudes over which the area of this Concession extends, and also of the route by which our employés would travel after leaving the Nile.

In order to place his Lordship in full possession of the salient and important facts of the case, the Board of the two connected Companies, the Anglo-Belgian Africa Company (Limited), and the British Tropical Africa Company (Limited), consider it desirable to forward to you a statement, herewith inclosed, which will give the Secretary of State an accurate account of the position and intention of these industrial undertakings.* Should you further desire to receive the Articles of Association of the Companies they would at once be forwarded, with any other information in our possession, but the brochure which we inclose will probably be sufficient to meet the requirements of the Foreign Office.

It is to be observed that these Companies have not appealed to the public for capital, and the entire money necessary has been raised by public subscription; nor is it intended to make any public issue.

The Concessions granted are two in number: one within the fixed limits of the Congo Free State on the Akka River which it is proposed to make the centre of our preliminary operations; the other granting rights of development and commercial exploitation over that portion of the territory granted to his Majesty under lease by the British Government which is not in the possession of the Belgian Company, the "Société Générale Africaine." The area allotted to the two Anglo-Belgian Companies is clearly shown in the map accompanying the brochure inclosed.

The Agreement between Great Britain and His Majesty King Leopold II granting the lease of these territories to be occupied and administered on certain conditions and for a certain period of time was signed at Brussels on the 12th May, 1894, and the official Map illustrating the Agreement is to be found at p. 1008 of Sir Edward Hertslet's edition of the "Map of Africa by Treaty," of 1896, which can be compared advantageously with the map affixed to our brochure.

On the 25th July following, His Majesty made a Commercial Concession of this territory to the "Société Générale Africaine," which Concession over a larger portion of the territory in question, was transferred to Mr. John Williamson Johnston, one of the members of the firm which has now the honour of addressing you as Joint Secretaries, and by direction of the Joint Board of the Anglo-Belgian Companies.

The reasons for which steps have not been earlier taken to utilize the terms and the advantages of these Concessions will be obvious to Her Majesty's Government. Not only was it impossible to take effective action in the Southern Soudan during the predominance of the Khalifa, whose power was broken by Lord Kitchener at Omdurman, but, until the phenomenally successful clearance of the Upper Nile from the sudd which choked it against all water transport, there existed a closed barrier against any commercial development. These difficulties having been overcome by the energy and skill of the officers employed by Her Majesty's Government, the time has arrived to utilize the Concessions which have been granted, and the Companies which are now reported to you were definitely formed with a strong financial backing and with the full and cordial aid and approval of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, who is strongly convinced of the advantages which may accrue to the Congo State by the introduction of English energy, capital, and methods of colonization.

Such being the case, the united Boards of the two Companies would solicit

* Not printed.

the support of Her Majesty's Government, and its recommendation to its distinguished officials in Egypt, Lord Cromer at Cairo, and the Sirdar, Sir Francis Wingate, at Khartum, to give all reasonable assistance to our employés who have been engaged and are now waiting the order for embarkation. These men are mostly Scotchmen, gardeners and agriculturists by profession, with two or three superior officers, and unless they receive much friendly assistance from the European authorities on the Upper Nile, their difficulties will be great, and perhaps insuperable.

It will be understood that the united Companies have no administrative powers, and that their only object is the industrial and commercial development of the Upper Soudan on lines which are entirely in accord with those which the British Government have laid down for the observance of its servants in all quarters of the world in which they have to deal with uncivilized races.

There can, further, be little doubt that the commercial development of this large tract of country will be of the utmost benefit to the revenues of the Soudan and of the railway connecting that province with Egypt, and will also assist the development of the Nile route for goods traffic.

It is not possible to answer exactly the last question of your letter, as the route which our employés would take when leaving the Nile is not yet decided. As before stated, our operations may commence in the small reserves at Akka within the Congo Free State borders, but it may be considered advantageous to establish our principal station at Lado or some other point on the Nile.

We would further forward copy of a letter on our part to Commandant Liebrecht, the Secretary-General of the Department of the Interior of the Independent State of the Congo, of the 3rd July, and a reply from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the Independent State of the Congo, dated the 12th instant, showing the arrangement for our assistance that the Congo Free State will be able to make.

In conclusion, the Board of the United Companies would venture to express the hope that Her Majesty's Secretary of State will be graciously pleased to accord them his powerful assistance and support.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LITTLE AND JOHNSTON,
Joint Secretaries.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN. [July 9.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Little and Johnston.

Foreign Office, July 9, 1900.

Gentlemen,

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letters addressed to Mr. Brodrick and his Private Secretary on the 14th and 20th ultimo respecting your application for land concessions on the Sobat River and in the valley of the Tumat.

I am to inform you that the matter will be referred to Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt on his return to England on leave of absence this summer, when he will have an opportunity of consulting the Governor-General of the Soudan, who is now in this country, on the subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN. [July 24.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 3.

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 24.)

(No. 91.) *Cairo, July* 24, 1900.
(Telegraphic.) P.

I AM informed by Acting Governor-General of Soudan that the Commandant of Sennaar reports Abyssinian raid on Beni Shangul frontier. With a reinforcement of 600 men they attacked the Barun tribe and took away 180 slaves from Jebel Gum Gum, which is in latitude 10° 20′ and longitude 34° 15′. The Barun are Soudanese subjects. Abyssinians intend making further raid in the Shezira. Colonel Jackson considers the King to be ignorant of these proceedings; he adds that retaliation cannot be prevented if there is recurrence of these raids. He hopes, therefore, that representations will be made.

[2169 *aa*—3]

1 S.C. for Pol. Bodt. at Aden.

[Confidential]

No. 1978-E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

Foreign Department,
Simla;
The 8th October 1900

By order, &c.,
(Sd) J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints:
Section 1, dated the 9th, 10th, 11th, 14th, 15th, 20th and 27th August 1900.
Section 2, dated the 2nd and 13th August 1900.
Section 3, dated the 13th August 1900.

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident, Aden.

Confidential

No. 7533

Political Department,
Bombay Castle, 13 October 1900

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. H. Morison

Acting Secretary to Government.

MHC

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Captain Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 9.)

(No. 44. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp Lagahardim, June* 16, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 34, Confidential, of the 17th May, I have the honour to report that, after a series of lengthy discussions, His Majesty the Emperor Menelek made the following proposals for a frontier between Abyssinia and British East Africa.

"Following tribal limits the proposed frontier line east of Lake Rudolph is as roughly marked on the accompanying map (Carta Insieme Expedition Bottego). Starting from the bend of the Ganale Doria, the line runs south to the Daua River, then west to Lake Stephanie, so that the Karayu and Wadditu tribes remain Abyssinian.

"The Tortala, if they are a distinct sub-tribe of the Borana Galla, remain under the British Government, but if they are a sub-tribe of the Karayu or Wadditu they are to be under Ethiopia.

"Thence the frontier line follows the southern shore of Lake Stephanie due west to Lake Rudolph.

"West of Lake Rudolph the frontier will be the river marked Maurizio Sacchi on the map.

"His Majesty the Emperor will grant sufficient ground in a healthy situation on the west bank of the Omo near Lake Rudolph to Great Britain for a commercial station."

An explanatory map is forwarded with this despatch.*

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 2.

Captain Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 9.)

(No. 45. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp Burka, June* 19, 1900.

IN continuation of my previous despatch No. 44, Confidential, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that during the discussions that took place concerning the southern frontier of Abyssinia, Ras Tasamma Nadao and Fitaurari Hapta Giorgis, the officers most effected by the Emperor's proposals were present and joined in the discussion.

In discussing the frontier I made a determined attempt to obtain a frontier on the lines of those suggested in the Memoranda by Sir Arthur Hardinge and Mr. Jenner, inclosures in your Lordship's despatch No. 36, Confidential, of the 10th November, 1899.

Mr. Jenner's suggested frontier when hinted at, closed the discussion for the day, and left the Emperor in an extremely bad temper. He remarked that he had already withdrawn his claim from the 2nd degree to the 4th degree north, that on the Soudan side he had considerably reduced his claims to country which had formerly belonged to Abyssinia, and had been obliged to share Gallabat which he looked on as his, and that now I wished to leave him nothing at all.

I most carefully explained the view we took of the situation, but I plainly saw both from the Emperor's face and manner and the faces of the Chiefs present that any hope of obtaining Mr. Jenner's suggested frontier meant running the risk of incurring a considerable disturbance of the present friendly relations which exist between His Majesty and the British Government.

When the subject of the frontier was renewed I then attempted to obtain a line

* Not printed.

similar to that suggested by Sir Arthur Hardinge, and the discussion ended with no result.

Among the remarks made by the Emperor *à propos* of the Boran country which I attempted to have divided so as to save Aflata's southern town, was one to the effect that he had sent ploughs to the Boran country and started cultivation, the country being settled and under his control.

On my strongly urging a division of the Boran country, the Emperor remarked to Fitaurari Hapta Giorgis: "Well, if they want it, let them have the Karayu country, and pay me for it."

To this the Fitaurari at once replied: "But if you do that, how are you going to feed the troops now in the Boran country?"

The audience ended without any progress having heen made, and the discussion was not resumed until the Emperor returned from Bulga, where he went on the 18th May.

During his residence there His Majesty sent for Mr. Beru, the Agency Interpreter, to discuss the French Railway Concession. The southern frontier was spoken of, and Mr. Beru told His Majesty plainly that I had shown the frontier I thought Her Majesty's Government would accept, and that it was a question for His Majesty to decide whether the friendship of Her Majesty's Government was worth more than the territory in dispute. His Majesty, it appears, made similar remarks to Mr. Beru, regarding our wishing to take all, to those made to me.

On His Majesty's return the discussion was resumed, and after three protracted discussions I succeeded in obtaining the frontier proposals mentioned in my previous despatch.

The following morning I sent His Majesty a marked map and a written statement of his proposals by the hand of the Agency Interpreter, who, after an hour's absence, returned to say that the Emperor had only looked at the map, that apparently all the long discussions I had had were to no effect, and that His Majesty wished me to come to the Palace at once.

This I did. His Majesty, on my arrival, remarked that what I had marked on the map was not what he meant, and tried to reopen negotiations again.

This I refused to do, saying that my caravan was already two marches out of the capital, aud that it was useless to think that if over thirty hours' discussion had come to nothing, we were likely to come to any decision in a few days.

The conversation become somewhat heated on both sides.

I told His Majesty that he had better ask Her Majesty's Government to replace me, as I had no wish to remain at his Court after what had occurred.

He inquired why, and I replied that his action was tantamount to informing me that I wished to deceive him.

Eventually, after much talk, and explaining to him that, to enable us to put his proposals on paper, we must make a line on the map, and that the line marked had absolutely no value unless read in conjunction with the written statement of his proposals.

His Majesty asked for the written proposals.

When His Majesty saw these he exclaimed that they were quite correct, and what he meant; so I informed him that if he had taken the trouble to look at the written proposals in conjunction with the map, we should have avoided a good deal of unpleasantness.

His Majesty allowed this, and practically admitted that ever since the Treaty of Uccialli he was frightened of anything on paper.

I may add to these remarks on the frontier discussions, that I think I made use of every conceivable argument that could be used in favour of our case, at times even using language that was little less than a veiled menace.

I incline to the opinion that these proposals represent the maximum that the Emperor will yield willingly, and I humbly venture to suggest they are worthy of serious consideration by your Lordship.

It seems to me desirable that some steps should be taken to settle the southern frontier with Abyssinia, because the local Chiefs are always pushing forward, and I very much fear that we may find Abyssinian posts in the Liban country. The longer we delay a settlement, the more likely we are to find an extension of Abyssinian influence, thus rendering a satisfactory settlement more difficult.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 3.

Captain Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 9.)

(No. 46. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp Goreysa, June* 20, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that on conclusion of the final discussion concerning the southern frontier His Majesty the Emperor informed me that, when affairs were at their worst in South Africa, he had been urged by the others (referring to the French and Russian Ministers) to take advantage of our difficulties and to menace us, as in that case he would obtain a much more satisfactory frontier arrangement.

His Majesty remarked that he had listened to their suggestions, but had not acted on them, because he wished to remain good friends with Her Majesty's Government.

I have every reason to believe that the suggestions mentioned by His Majesty were made.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

No. 4.

Captain Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 9.)

(No. 47. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp Goreysa, June* 20, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that the morning of my departure from Addis Abbaba I was sent for by Queen Taitou.

Much to my surprise, the Queen discussed the political situation, showing that she was thoroughly acquainted with the discussions that had taken place with the Emperor.

The Queen remarked that previous to the English Mission of 1897 they had heard nothing but evil of the English, and that even since my arrival they had heard nothing but evil reports of us and our intentions.

Further, that ever since the time of Count Antonelli (the negotiator of the Uccialli Treaty), the Abyssinians had been afraid of Europeans, but that since they had come to know the English they were beginning to have confidence in us, because they had found there was no truth in the reports that had been spread about concerning us.

The Queen finally concluded a long conversation by saying that she hoped I would do my best to conclude the frontier negotiations between the two countries, and thus dispel the suspense which at present existed.

Bearing in mind that the better class of Abyssinians are adepts in the art of polite speech making, it is difficult to say whether any importance is to be attached to Queen Taitou's remarks or not. The interview and conversation which ensued were, however, so unusual, considering the attitude the Queen has hitherto observed towards me, that I think it advisable to mention the matter to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.



[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 154. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 10, 1900.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith, for your confidential information, copies of correspondence, as marked in the margin,* with Messrs. Little and Johnston in connection with a request which has been made by them that facilities may be granted to their employés for travelling through the Soudan to certain Concessions granted by the Sovereign of the Congo State which the Anglo-Belgian Africa Company and the British Tropical Africa Company propose to work.

In connection with this question I think it will be desirable that you should consult the Acting Governor-General of the Soudan as to the possibility of establishing at the proper season of the year some Anglo-Egyptian posts up the Nile as far as the limits of Belgian occupation.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

* Messrs. Little and Johnston, June 29; to ditto, July 9; Messrs. Little and Johnston, August 1; to ditto, August , 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Little and Johnston.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, August* 11, 1900.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant, in which you bring to his Lordship's knowledge that in virtue of the Arrangement made between Great Britain and the Independent State of the Congo on the 12th May, 1894, granting to the Sovereign of that State leases of certain territories in the Valley of the Upper Nile, His Majesty King Leopold II made on the 25th July following a Commercial Concession of these territories to the "Société Générale Africaine," and that this Concession, so far as regards the larger portion of the territories in question, was subsequently transferred to Mr. John Williamson Johnston. The exact date of this second transfer is not mentioned. It appears from your letter that two connected Companies, the Anglo-Belgian Africa Company (Limited), and the British Tropical Africa Company (Limited), have been formed for the purpose of working this Concession, but you state that no active steps have hitherto been taken for this object for reasons which will be obvious to Her Majesty's Government. Now, however, that the domination of the Khalifa has been broken by the effective action of the Anglo-Egyptian forces, and that an Egyptian expedition has been successful in clearing a waterway in the Upper Nile, the Companies are desirous of utilizing the Concession, and request the support of Her Majesty's Government and the assistance of the Egyptian and Soudanese authorities for the employés whom they propose to send out.

I am to observe in reply that an Agreement was concluded with the French Republic by the Congo Free State on the 14th August, 1894, of which Article 4 is as follows:—

"The Free State binds herself to renounce all occupation and to exercise in the future no political influence west or north of a line thus determined:—

"Longitude 30° east of Greenwich (27° 40′ east of Paris) starting from its intersection of the watershed of the Congo and Nile basins, up to the point where it meets the parallel 5° 30′, and then along that parallel to the Nile."

In pursuance of that Agreement it appears to Her Majesty's Government that the Sovereign of the Congo Free State was bound to cancel at once any Concessions which might have been granted by him for territories lying to the west or north of the line specified. Her Majesty's Government are unable to recognize as valid Concessions which were thus by implication formally renounced, of which Her Majesty's Government have been kept in complete ignorance, and which have in practice been left in abeyance during the six years that have elapsed since they were first granted.

I am further to state that at the time of the signature of the Agreement between Great Britain and the Congo Free State of the 12th May, 1894, formal notes were exchanged between the Plenipotentiaries, recording "the assurance that the parties to the Agreement do not ignore the claims of Turkey and Egypt in the basin of the Upper Nile."

Her Majesty's Government have thought it right to remind the Government of the Congo Free State of this assurance and to warn them that the rights of Egypt have revived in full vigour as an outcome of events resulting from the victory of the Anglo-Egyptian forces at Omdurman. A communication to this effect was made by Her Majesty's Minister at Brussels in May of last year.

In view of these circumstances Lord Salisbury regrets that he cannot undertake to support or to recommend to the Egyptian authorities attempts to utilize the Concessions mentioned by you, in so far as they apply to territories lying within the basin of the Upper Nile.

I am, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir F. Plunkett.

(No. 97.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 14, 1900.

I HAVE had under my consideration your despatch No. 166 of the 6th ultimo, reporting that M. de Cuvelier had conveyed to you a message from the Sovereign of the Congo State to the effect that the Congolese Government were anxious to obtain the consent of Her Majesty's Government to its supplying its north-eastern stations with provisions and stores by the Nile route.

Should M. de Cuvelier recur to the subject you are authorized to inform him that Her Majesty's Government do not wish to interpose any obstacles to temporary facilities for the transport of stores by the Nile route to the Congolese posts on condition that such facilities are clearly understood to be temporary and provisional, and subject to withdrawal at any time if such a course should appear expedient, and, further, that they must not be taken as affecting in any way the general principles held by Her Majesty's Government as to the rights of the Egyptian Government in the regions referred to.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

[2255 *o*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 155.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1900.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 131 of the 2nd instant relative to the complaint made by Egyptian postmen from Gedaref that threatening language was used to them by Italian irregular troops at Mogatta.

I approve the terms of the note which you addressed to the Italian Consul-General on the subject on the 2nd instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 2.

Foreign Office to the Law Officers of the Crown.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, August* 15, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you, by direction of the Marquess of Salisbury, the papers noted in the accompanying list relative to an Agreement signed on the 9th March, 1897, by which the Emperor Menelek of Abyssinia gave permission to M. Ilg, a Swiss engineer, who is His Majesty's Principal Adviser, to form a Company for the construction of a railway from Jibuti, a port on the Gulf of Aden in French Somaliland, to Harrar in Abyssinian territory, and thence to Antoto and the White Nile.

The position of these places will be seen from the accompanying map of Africa (Paper A).

The French text of the Agreement by which the Concession is granted is inclosed in despatch No. 498 of the 22nd July, 1897, from Sir E. Monson, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris (Paper B).

M. Ilg made over the Concession to a French Company, which is now engaged in constructing the railway.

It is feared that the railway, when completed, will have a very injurious effect on the British Somaliland Protectorate which adjoins French Somaliland, as the trade between the ports of the British Protectorate and Abyssinia is likely to be diverted to Jibuti. It has been suggested that, in the interest of the trade of the British Protectorate, it would be advisable to construct a railway from the British port of Berbera to Harrar, and the question has arisen whether the terms of the Concession granted to M. Ilg would prevent King Menelek from sanctioning the construction of such a line.

Article 3 of the French text contains the following stipulation:—

"En conséquence, il est convenu qu'aucune autre Compagnie de Chemin de Fer ne sera autorisée à construire de lignes concurrentes partant soit des bords de l'Océan Indien, soit des bords de la Mer Rouge jusqu'en Éthiopie, soit de l'Éthiopie jusqu'au Nil Blanc."

According to this version of the Agreement the Emperor Menelek would appear to have bound himself not to grant Concessions for any competing lines from the shores of the Indian Ocean or of the Red Sea into Abyssinia or from Abyssinia to the White Nile.

It will be seen, however, from the accompanying despatches from Captain Harrington, Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia, No. 40, of the 30th May, and No. 48, of the 25th June of this year (Papers D and E), that the Emperor Menelek himself does not take this view of the obligation contracted by him.

His Majesty contends that the word in the original Amharic text of the Concession, which is represented in the French translation by the word "concurrentes," has been wrongly translated, and that the correct English translation is "near," and he denies that the Agreement was intended to confer, or did, as a matter of fact, confer, a monopoly of the construction of railways in Abyssinia.

A literal English translation of the Amharic text is inclosed in Captain Harrington's despatch No. 40 (Paper D).

I am to request that you will be so good as to take the papers transmitted herewith into your consideration, and furnish Lord Salisbury with your opinion as to whether the Agreement of the 9th March, 1897, conferred on the Company to be formed under it a monopoly of railway construction in Abyssinia.

His Lordship would also be glad to be favoured with any general observations which you may have to make on the question of the interpretation and bearing of the Agreement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

List of Papers.

(A.) Bartholomew's Map of Africa.			
(B.) Sir E. Monson..	..(No. 498)	July	22, 1897.
(C.) Ditto	..(No. 500)	July	23, ,,
(D.) Captain Harrington	.. (No. 40)	May	30, 1900.
(E.) Ditto	.. (No. 48)	June	25, ,,
(F.) Treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia	.. ..	May	14, 1897

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 136.)

My Lord, *Cairo, August* 9, 1900.

ON the receipt of your Lordship's telegram No. 38, of the 29th ultimo, I requested the Acting Governor-General of the Soudan to endeavour to obtain confirmation of the reported Abyssinian raids on the Soudanese tribes, known as Baruns, in the neighbourhood of Jebel Gum Gum, and also to report to me the name of the Abyssinian officer responsible.

Colonel Jackson now telegraphs in substance as follows:—

"The Abyssinian Commander at Kaka, three days south-west of Beni Shangul, is named Fitarari Enara. He has not left that place, but the natives of Asoza, in order to supply slave tribute to Abyssinians, have been raiding tribes which have considered themselves subject to Dar Fung for hundreds of years.

"The raids in June are reported to have resulted in the capture of 230 slaves, a small portion of whom were taken by the Abyssinians, who only demand young men. Captives not answering this description were sold by rebels. There is no corroboration of June raid, but there is of raids in April 1900 and October 1899 against Jebel Tabi and Jebel Surkum, by natives of Asoza districts."

It would appear, therefore, that it is not the Abyssinians themselves that have raided the Soudanese Baruns, but certain local tribes who are required to furnish a tribute of slaves.

Under these circumstances the message which I was instructed conditionally, in your Lordship's telegram No. 38, to convey to King Menelek through the Italian Representative at Addis Abbaba, requires certain modifications, if it is to be sent at all, and I therefore venture to submit that, as Her Majesty's Representative in Abyssinia is now in England, the additional information secured should be communicated to him with a view to a new message being drafted, if your Lordship shall approve, which would reach Zeyla more expeditiously if sent direct from England.

Jebel Gum Gum is located by Colonel Jackson as lying in latitude 10° 20′, longitude 34° 15′, which he considers well within Soudan territory. Jebel Tabi is in Dar Fung in latitude 11° 30′, longitude 34° 10′.

Colonel Jackson considers the attitude of the Abyssinian Commander greatly encourages slave-raiding in Dar Fung, as the guilty raiders are able to retire into security in Abyssinian territory.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

[2255 *u*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 141. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Cairo, August* 20, 1900.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 154, Confidential, of the 10th instant, I have the honour to report that the Acting Governor-General of the Soudan is of opinion that a small post may be formed on the left bank of the Nile at a point some 5 miles north of Kiro under a British officer who would have a gun-boat at his disposal.

Reference to Major Peake's Report, which was forwarded to your Lordship in Lord Cromer's despatch No. 103 of the 2nd June last, will make the actual position of Kiro plain.

Kiro is the most northern position now occupied by the Belgians, who have, according to Major Peake, shown no signs of advancing beyond that point. It has been fixed by British officers as situated in latitude 5° 30′ north, that is to say, the limit of northern extension sanctioned by the Arrangement between France and the Congo Free State of the 14th August, 1894. Kiro was at the time of Major Peake's visit the head-quarters of the Belgian officers, but it was contemplated shortly to transfer these to Lado, a short distance to the south. The station was reported by the Belgians to be unhealthy, but Major Peake was of opinion that this reputation might be attributable in some measure to the very deficient sanitary arrangements of their stations.

Some 5 miles north of Kiro the bank of the river is high and thickly wooded; in fact, a good wood station is shown in Major Peake's table of distances some 7 miles north of Kiro, and this was practically the first dry ground met with by the sudd-cutting party on the left bank of the river.

It would appear, therefore, that, both on practical grounds and from political considerations, this position 5 to 7 miles north of Kiro would be the best that can be found for the establishment of an Anglo-Egyptian post.

It may also be found possible to place a very small post on the left bank between Shambe and Kenisseh (see Intelligence Department, War Office Map, No. 1319). With regard to this suggestion, Colonel Jackson will consult the Officer Commanding at Fashoda.

Although the Congo State officers have as yet shown no signs of advancing their posts beyond parallel 5° 30′ north, it is not impossible that, when the answer which has been returned to Messrs. Little and Johnston has been communicated to Brussels, some instructions in this sense may be given to Commandant Chaltin.

I therefore venture to submit that, if the proposal to occupy the position described above be approved, no time should be lost in giving effect to it as soon as climatic conditions permit, as to which I am now in communication with the Acting Governor-General.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

[2255 *dd*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 2.

No. 1.

Sir Rennell Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 2.)

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, August* 2, 1900.

THE Egyptian Government entirely concur in the views expressed in your Lordship's telegram No. 39 of the 31st July, as regards the proposed procedure in respect to Lake Tsana in the negotiations for the delimitation of the Abyssinian-Soudanese frontier.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Captain Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 13.)

(No. 49. Confidential.)

My Lord, *London, August* 9, 1900.

WITH reference to my Confidential despatches Nos. 44 and 45 of the 16th and 19th June I have the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of a Memorandum furnished me by Dr. Donaldson Smith concerning Abyssinian control over the Boran country.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Memorandum by Dr. Donaldson Smith.

Milmil.—In 1892 the Abyssinians first began to levy taxes.

The people made no resistance and suffered to no appreciable extent in consequence. In 1893 I heard of the "robberies" of the Abyssinians when I was near Milmil, and I saw one Abyssinian driving a flock of sheep. I was unduly exercised about these raids, which I now believe to have been grossly exaggerated by native report.

In August 1899 the people were rich, undisturbed in their tribal government, and fairly content with Abyssinian rule. They feared the advent of the Mullah from the Dolbahanta country.

Sessabane.—In 1894 I passed through at the time of Abyssinian raids and heard much of the atrocities perpetrated by the soldiers. I also had ocular proof of some barbarous treatment in the shape of two Ogadens who had been freshly mutilated and many women and children left to starve.

Two prisoners who had escaped from the Shoans I took into my employ. Native report made out that the Abyssinians were driving everything before them; taking away all girls and boys into slavery and killing and mutilating adults.

From the suffering that I was witness to I gave too much credence to the more exaggerated reports.

In 1899 I found a thriving population, rich in camels and other live stock, and although some of their numbers have undoubtedly lost their lives or been enslaved in the earlier raids, the goodly population remaining are to all intents and purposes contented.

Sheneli.—Large population midway between Sessabane and the Webi Shebele. Same conditions as at Sessabane.

I was surprised in 1899 to see the enormous droves of camels. People very rich and contented.

They refused to sell me camels except at exorbitant prices.

The young Chief of one large village, upon my rating him for the policy of extortion which the Ogadens practise upon English-speaking people, confessed to me in a contemptuous manner that the Ogadens had so many camels that they could get everything they desired whenever they wanted and were under no necessity of helping a "sahib." Therefore a "sahib" must pay double.

They enjoy not helping an Englishman as a matter of pride, and behave in an impudent and arrogant manner.

Yet these people complain to the "sahib" of Abyssinia because the latter takes a moderate tax and treats them in a high-handed manner.

They are irritated by their loss of pride more than by their loss of necessities of life, which I believe to be almost nil.

If an Abyssinian comes among them they acknowledge at once by their respectful deportment that they understand the people of the north to belong to a superior race.

So much for Abyssinian methods in Ogaden, and what applies to this part of East Africa, obtains also in the Boran country and wherever the Abyssinians have spread.

The Boran are rich and retain their original Chiefs, even though Abyssinian soldiers with their families are stationed in various Boran villages.

These soldiers do not loot; they are given by their Government a certain number of animals in proportion to their rank and a section of land for grazing purposes. I will say this for the Boran, that they differ from all the tribes to the east of them, *i.e.*, the Ogaden, Aulihan, Afgab, Dagodi and Gerre Gallas, in that they do not hold the English in contempt, and they are pleased to assist the latter.

They were most kind to me in sending me presents of animals, and a special messenger from their Chief informed me that his people had always regretted their hostile behaviour to me in 1895, and confessed their attack to have been prompted by ignorance, and by cupidity on the part of their young men. The Boran King sent me word that he would prefer the English to the Abyssinian Government. In answer to the messenger's complaints of Abyssinian taxes I asked if the present richness of the people, of which I had ocular proof, did not conflict with his reports.

He made no direct reply, but endeavoured to enlist my sympathy by telling me that the Abyssinians resorted to corporal punishment frequently.

I learned from him and other Borans and from an Abyssinian soldier whom I met at Goff that there were about 150 Abyssinians scattered throughout the Boran country with their wives and children, but that there was no large force nearer than Konso, where the Abyssinians have their base.

Passing to the northern end of Lake Rudolph I found the natives in the first throes of Abyssinian treatment.

The Rusia ("Reshiat" of Count Teleki) have ceased to exist, and the Murle are impoverished and disseminated by the northern raiders.

Conclusion.—The Abyssinians are severe and often cruel in their advance, but when they have permanently subjected the various tribes to their government they are moderate in their measure and exercise such forethought for the native's advantage as well as their own.

The greater part of the country along the course I recently took, *i.e.*, Sessabane, Shebele River, a little south of Karanleh, Wetkal, Fidigan, El Modu, El Dere, presents very much the same features as the Habr-Awal except that it is greener than the latter.

The majority of it is only fit for grazing. The low-lying plains along all the perennial rivers are excellent agricultural land but too unhealthy for European colonists. There are spots in the higher plateaux where cultivation can be carried on, but these are limited.

A consideration of the remote chance of windmills being introduced would change the aspect.

On the Haud for instance, water could be found, I believe, a very short distance below the rich soil, and the great plain could be turned into a garden.

In the same manner the greater part of the country to the west could be cultivated. The questions of labour, transport, market must postpone such a consideration indefinitely.

The best land is between Egder and the southern end of Lake Stephanie. Here the rich green plateaux and valleys are 4,000 ft. to 5,000 ft. above the sea. There is more rainfall, and more areas could be cultivated by irrigation. It is a splendid grazing country at present. These uplands continue south to Mount Karoli and Marsabit.

Hôtel National, Geneva, August 6, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 13.)

(No. 131.)

My Lord, *Cairo, August* 2, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 129 of the 28th ultimo, transmitting copy of a letter from the Italian Consul-General in which M. Tugini stated that the investigation conducted by the Governor of Erythræa into the reported incident at Mogatta had established that the incident never took place, I have the honour to report that on the receipt of this letter I requested the Acting Governor-General of the Soudan to obtain from the Commandant at Kassala further information on the subject.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a paraphrase of the telegram which I have received in reply, and copy of a note which I have consequently addressed to the Italian Consul-General.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Colonel Jackson to Sir R. Rodd.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Omdurman, July* 31, 1900.

WITH regard to the Mogatta incident, I learn from Collinson that the matter was reported to him by the postmen as soon as they arrived from Gedaref. One of them has been further questioned; he maintains truth of story, declaring that he never made any statement such as reported by Martini. Collinson thinks latter's information was very indirectly obtained, and adds that there is little likelihood of post contractor and two camel men inventing the story: all three are reliable men.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to M. Tugini.

M. le Ministre, *Alexandrie, le 2 Août*, 1900.

JE ne serais pas revenu sur l'affaire de Mogatta, qui forme le sujet de votre lettre du 26 Juillet, si la réponse de son Excellence le Gouverneur de l'Érythrée ne m'avait pas obligé de demander autres informations au Commandant de Kassala. Celui-ci vient de me faire savoir que l'incident lui a été rapporté par les chameliers de la poste venant de Gedaref immédiatement après leur arrivée à Kassala.

Le "rais" ainsi que les deux chameliers sont, selon le Colonel Collinson, gens de confiance qui n'auraient rien à gagner en inventant une pareille histoire.

Après avoir reçu ma dépêche le Colonel Collinson a de nouveau interrogé un des hommes, qui se trouvait à Kassala. Celui-ci adhère entièrement à son premier témoignage et nie catégoriquement la répudiation qui lui a été attribuée par M. de Martini à la suite d'informations indirectes.

Je ne crois pas qu'il sera utile de poursuivre plus loin une affaire qui n'a pas une grande importance, mais je ne peux pas vous cacher que dans ces circonstances j'aurais mieux compris une réponse indiquant que les recherches opérées étaient restées infructueuses qu'un démenti net des faits rapportés au Commandant de Kassala, lesquels lui ont paru, après interrogation faite, bien fondés.

(Signé) RENNELL RODD.

I.S.C. for Pol. Bndt. at Sea

[Confidential]

No. 2026-E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

Foreign Department,
Simla;
The 12th October 1900

By order, etc.,
(Sd) J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints, Section 1, dated the 7th July and 24th and 30th August 1900.*

*With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 7596

Political Department,
Bombay Castle, 16th October 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Hudson

Acting Secretary to Government.

MH

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[July 7.]

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

MAP given to Lord Salisbury by the Italian Ambassador in illustration of the Italian claim between Sabderat, Todluc, and the Atbara.

Foreign Office, July 7, 1900.


Protocollo Anglo Italiano 15 Aprile 1891.
Tracciato sul terreno fatto dagli ufficiali topografi da Ras Casar al Barca. 7 Decembre 1898.
Tracciato sul terreno fatto dagli ufficiali topografi dal Barca a Sabderat. 1° Giugno 1899.
Territorio retrocesso il 25 Decembre 1897, Articolo II del protocollo 15 Aprile 1891.
Confine proposto da Menelic, tra l'Eritrea e l'Etiopia - Giugno 1897.
Territorio dell' Eritrea.
Todluc, estremo limite della linea proposta da Menelic all'Inghilterra.
Confine proposto da Menelic all'Inghilterra.
Territorio che rimarrà all'Inghilterra dopo la conclusione del l'Omordo con l'Etiopia.
37°
38°
39°
18°
17°
16°
15°
14°
36°
16°30'
Tocar
Ras Casar
Barca
Carora
Altipiano di Haggar
Ambacta
M.ti Eschenia
Beni Amer
Habab
Anseba
Fillik
Metkinab
M.te Tedelaied
Cheren
Agordat
Massaua
Asmara
TACA
Cassala
Sabderat
Basch
Sabderat
Beni Alghedem
Baria
El Gulsa
Todluc
M. Abu Gamel
Ar Mengi (Beni Amer)
Bazza
Sona
Mareb
Gunana
Gnaia
Ombrega
Setit
Ghira
Tacazzè
Adua
Scala: 1: 2,000,000.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Lieutenant Harold.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 24, 1900.

THE following is a message from Captain Harrington :—

"Pray request the Consular Agent at Harrar to be so good as to communicate the following to the Italian Agent for communication to the Emperor Menelek with the least possible delay.

"A report has been received from the British officer at Sennaar to the effect that the Baruns in the neighbourhood of Jebel Gum-Gum, which is on the Egyptian side of the proposed frontier, have been raided by natives of the Azoza district, in the Beni Schongul country, which is tributary to Abyssinia.

"Fitarauri Enara, the Abyssinian officer at Kaka, south-west of Beni Schongul, must know of these raids, which are for the purpose of capturing individuals as slaves, and which have taken place this year in April and June and last year in October. He is evidently disobeying Menelek's orders. Recently 230 slaves were taken from Egyptian territory, and it is reported that further raids have been planned."

As these raids are contrary to the Emperor's orders to his frontier officers to respect the *status quo*, Her Majesty's Government feel certain that they are unknown to him. They are confident that he will take steps to punish those who have disobeyed his orders by slave-raiding, that His Majesty will cause all persons captured as far as possible to be returned to Egyptian territory and will issue fresh orders by which a repetition of such incidents as raids across the frontier proposed by His Majesty will be prevented.

[2255 *aa*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 30.)

(No. 142. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Cairo, August* 22, 1900.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Major Gibbons, who has just reached Omdurman from the Zambezi by the Nile, has reported to the Acting Governor-General that during the past few months the Belgians have lost eight European officers out of twenty on their Nile stations, and that he was informed that the average mortality among the men was 75 per cent. He reports, however, that for a Nile station Fort Berkeley is quite healthy.

After conversation with Major Gibbons, Colonel Jackson confirms his view, as reported in my despatch above referred to, that the establishment of a post at a point some 5 miles north of Kiro is advisable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

18.c. for Rd. Rodd. at Aden.

[Confidential]

No. 2086-E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

Foreign Department,
Simla,
The 22nd October 1900

By order, &c.,
Sd. J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints;
Section 1, dated the 28th August and 1st, 3rd and 6th September, 1900.
Sections 2 and 3, dated the 3rd September, 1900.
*With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 7783

Political Department,
Bombay Castle, 26th October 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information

C. W. Hudson

Acting Secretary to Government.

mlc.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul Alvarez to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 28.)

(Separate and Secret.)

My Lord Marquess,

Benghazi, August 18, 1900.

I HAVE to report that an Imperial letter to Senoussi, received by Mutessarif by last mail, was intrusted to two Sheikhs of the order Sidmustapha, Sheikh of Kutuira Convent, and another, Elatawy, who left for Grand Sheikh's residence last night, or early this morning, with orders to be back at Benghazi without fail within 100 days. As the death of Rabeh Zobeir must be known at Constantinople, I conjecture that the Sultan's letter refers to policy to be adopted by Senoussi towards the French in the Lake Tchad districts.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JUSTIN ALVAREZ.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Law Officers of the Crown to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 1.)

My Lord, *Royal Courts of Justice, August* 31, 1900.

WE were honoured with your Lordship's commands, signified in Sir Thomas Sanderson's letter of the 15th instant, stating that he was directed by your Lordship to transmit to us the papers noted in the accompanying list relative to an Agreement signed on the 9th March, 1897, by which the Emperor Menelek of Abyssinia gave permission to M. Ilg, a Swiss engineer, who is His Majesty's Principal Adviser, to form a Company for the construction of a railway from Jibuti, a port on the Gulf of Aden in French Somaliland, to Harrar, in Abyssinian territory, and thence to Antoto and the White Nile.

That the position of those places would be seen from the accompanying map of Africa (Paper A).

That the French text of the Agreement by which the Concession was granted was inclosed in despatch No. 498 of the 22nd July, 1897, from Sir E. Monson, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

That M. Ilg had made over the Concession to a French Company, which was now engaged in constructing the railway.

That it was feared that the railway, when completed, would have a very injurious effect on the British Somaliland Protectorate, which adjoined French Somaliland, as the trade between the ports of the British Protectorate and Abyssinia was likely to be diverted to Jibuti. That it had been suggested that in the interest of the trade of the British Protectorate it would be advisable to construct a railway from the British port of Berbera to Harrar, and the question had arisen whether the terms of the Concession granted to M. Ilg would prevent King Menelek from sanctioning the construction of such a line.

That Article 3 of the French text contained the following stipulation :—

"En conséquence, il est convenu qu'aucune autre Compagnie de Chemin de Fer ne sera autorisée à construire des lignes concurrentes partant soit des bords de l'Océan Indien, soit des bords de la Mer Rouge jusqu'en Éthiopie, soit de l'Éthiopie jusqu'au Nil Blanc."

That according to this version of the Agreement the Emperor Menelek would appear to have bound himself not to grant Concessions for any competing lines from the shores of the Indian Ocean or of the Red Sea into Abyssinia, or from Abyssinia to the White Nile.

That it would be seen, however, from the accompanying despatches from Captain Harrington, Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia, No. 40 of the 30th May, and No. 48 of the 25th June of this year, that the Emperor Menelek himself did not take this view of the obligation contracted by him.

That His Majesty contended that the word in the original Amharic text of the Concession which was represented in the French translation by the word "concurrentes" had been wrongly translated, and that the correct English translation was "near," and he denied that the Agreement was intended to confer, or did, as a matter of fact, confer, a monopoly of the construction of railways in Abyssinia.

That a literal English translation of the Amharic text was inclosed in Captain Harrington's despatch No. 40 (Paper D).

That Sir Thomas Sanderson was to request that we would take the papers transmitted to us into our consideration, and furnish your Lordship with our opinion as to whether the Agreement of the 9th March, 1897, conferred on the Company to be formed under it a monopoly of railway construction in Abyssinia.

That your Lordship would also be glad to be favoured with any general observations which we might have to make on the question of the interpretation and bearing of the Agreement.

We have taken the papers submitted to us into our consideration, and, in obedience to your Lordship's commands, have the honour to

Report—

That we are of opinion that the effect of the Concession granted to M. Ilg is to debar the Emperor from granting any Concession for the construction of a railway in Abyssinia which would be a competing line with that authorized by M. Ilg's Concession. The question whether any proposed railway would so compete would be a question of fact, bnt it would appear clear that any line running from the coast of British Somaliland to Harrar would be both "competing" and "near."

We have, &c.

(Signed) R. B. FINLAY.
E. CARSON.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 143. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Cairo, August* 24, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a Memorandum forwarded by the Commandant at Kassala to the Acting Governor-General of the Soudan on the subject of the Italian occupation of the country contained in the parallelogram south of Kassala between the Gash and the Atbara, which has formed the subject of recent negotiations.

The antecedents of the man who has been placed by the Government of Erythræa in charge of the post hastily created in this district, which had been left entirely abandoned until we suggested a reconsideration of the frontier, are not calculated to insure peaceful relations on the frontier, and your Lordship has already had occasion to appreciate the spirit in which any representations which our officers have occasion to make on frontier questions are likely to be received in connection with the incident at Mogatta (see my despatches Nos. 129 and 131 of the 28th July and 2nd August).

Far more serious, however, than the somewhat unfriendly attitude which the Governor would appear to have adopted in this respect is the reported attempt made by this Sheikh Hasaballa to place a dam across the river Gash. It is, of course, impossible to say what truth there may be in the rumours that the Italians intend, after the subsidence of the present flood stream, to divert the water of the Gash for irrigation purposes; but I venture to submit that it is of the highest importance that a definite understanding should be arrived at on this point with the least possible delay, and that it should be definitely laid down that the upper waters of a stream which flows through two territories cannot be diverted in one territory to the detriment of the other. The fact that the attempt has been made by Sheikh Hasaballa to dam the Gash seems to afford the necessary pretext for drawing the attention of the Italian Government to the question, and requesting guarantees for the future.

I have little doubt that precedents can readily be found for requesting such a guarantee, and I venture to remind your Lordship that by Article III of the Anglo-Italian Protocol of the 15th April, 1891, the Italian Government engages itself not to undertake on the Atbara, in view of irrigation, any work which might sensibly modify its flow into the Nile. The Gash is a tributary of the Atbara, and therefore, I venture to submit, included in the reserves made in Article III.

It is obvious that without a spirit of conciliation and friendly co-operation the relations between European Powers on their coterminous frontiers in regions not yet reclaimed to civilization must soon become impossible, and I can imagine nothing more likely to disturb these friendly relations than the employment at a frontier post of a man with the record and characteristics of Sheikh Hasaballa.

It is possible that the Italian Government do not fully realize how difficult it is to make the new situation on the frontier clear to the local tribes, who before the Dervish domination always looked to Egypt, and so do not readily recognize how their position has been modified by Protocols to which they were not parties. We have, however, striven loyally to carry out those engagements, and feel entitled to expect that the task should not be rendered more difficult by the attitude adopted on the other side of the frontier.

Experience has shown that but little progress can be made in dealing with such questions here. I therefore venture to hope that it may be possible to make representations at Rome, at any rate with regard to the all-important question of guaranteeing the water supply of Kassala, which would become untenable if the attempt made to dam the stream of the Gash were to be renewed on a large and successful scale.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Memorandum on the Occupation of the Country West of the Gash by the Italians.

UNTIL Colonel Talbot visited the Italian Governor of Erythræa at Asmara, for the purpose of discussing the question of the Italian Soudan frontier south of Kassala, the Italians have never made the slightest attempt to govern this country, or exercise any rights over it whatever. The only people who ever went into it were a few wandering Hadendoas, grazing their flocks on the Atbara, and, perhaps, a very few Italian Beni-Amers, who watered their flocks in the wells in the bed of the Gash, and grazed principally on the east bank.

On Colonel Talbot, however, suggesting the line of the Gash as far as Todluk for the Italian-Soudan boundary, the Italians at once made an effort to show actual occupation of the country between the Gash and the Atbara. An Italian officer, with about thirty mounted men, constructed a zareba just south of Gulsa, then went across to the Atbara and established a post on the eastern bank of the Atbara, opposite Mogatta, returning by Gulsa to Sabderat, a force of some twenty men being left in the zareba at Gulsa under Hasaballa Recamalla, a renegade Shukrieh. I think it would be as well here to explain who Hasaballa is.

Hasaballa Recamalla, originally a Shukrieh camelman and robber, of no family or reckoning among the Shukrieh, joined the Italians some years before they occupied Kassala, with a following of all sorts, who were too bad even for the Dervishes. These were formed by the Italians into a "banda," and Hasaballa made a Sheikh. On the occupation of Kassala by the Italians he became their chief Intelligence Agent, and with his banda, which by then had been increased by all the outcasts of every tribe in the Eastern Soudan, was the head raider of flocks and herds for the Italians, his thorough knowledge of the country of the Shukrieh enabling him to do this.

On our taking over Kassala, Hasaballa and his banda were taken into our service, and to a certain extent his services were useful. At the same time he was allowed to raid the flocks and herds of Shukrieh, who were undoubtedly friendly to us, and had sent in here to say so. Even after the fall of Omdurman he raided the herds of the Abu Sin family and other Shukrieh who had come in to the Government.

On the disbanding of all irregulars in January 1898, Hasaballa was exceedingly discontented, and continually lettering for a pension or Government employment. He was told to settle down as an ordinary individual, and given permission to live in Kassala, as he dare not return to the Shukrieh country.

Some time in April I heard from native sources that Hasaballa had been sent for secretly by the Italians; a few weeks afterwards I heard that he had removed all his flocks, family, &c., up the Gash; then came the Italian occupation, as mentioned before, and after the Italian officer had left I heard that Hasaballa had been taken into the Italian service, placed at the head of a banda, and put in charge of their post at Gulsa and Mogatta, his men consisting mostly of those who had been with him before. I need hardly point out that the presence of a man of this class in charge of a border district within 20 miles of Kassala is very likely to give rise to unpleasant incidents. Hasaballa himself is a thorough scoundrel, and, except for his being in his present position on the border, his joining the Italians is a good riddance.

There is a post of one non-commissioned officer and six men of the Arab battalion at Abu Gamal, and Hasaballa sent them a message the other day that if any of them came over the border they would be disarmed, and if they would not give up their arms he would shoot them.

About the same time the Italian post on the east bank of the Atbara at Mogatta abused our postmen from Gedaref, who were watering their camels on the opposite bank, and threatened to shoot them if they came there again.

I have also just heard that a son of a Shukrieh Sheikh, named Ahmed-el-Fahl has just gone to Hasaballa to act as his assistant, receiving pay from the Italian Government. He was sent for from here by Hasaballa.

I consider this sending for our subjects by the Italian Government under the inducement of pay, and making them Sheikhs on our border, can hardly be considered friendly.

There is another and much more serious question connected with the Italian occupation of the Gash. This year Hasaballa attempted, with the few men he had, to make a dam across the Gash, but it was washed away by the first flood. At the same time it is rumoured that next year the Italians intend constructing a dam on the Gash and

turning the water off to the west; this is quite feasible, and very probable, considering the limited amount of country the Italians have suitable for cultivation. This report is causing considerable anxiety among the inhabitants of Kassala and district, and naturally so, as were the Italians to carry out any such scheme, we would have to abandon Kassala, and with it all the Eastern Soudan.

It is, I know, the intention of the Italian authorities to open a direct road from Sabderat to Mogatta, on the Atbara, so as to avoid Kassala, and draw the Gedaref trade as much as possible to Massowah. This will not only injure Kassala and Suakim, but will necessite our establishing a permanent post at Mogatta, on the west bank, and also a Customs staff at Gedaref, and extra expense on the Soudan Government.

I need hardly mention that the fact of the Italian occupation of the country between the Gash and the Atbara, added to the fact of some of the best Hadendoa grazing country having been given them by the Walter Boundary Commission, is giving rise to considerable talk among the natives, who only look at it from the point of view of seeing us giving up their country to the Italians.

(Signed) COLLINSON, *Mudir of Kassala.*

July 12, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Intelligence Division to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 6.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, in returning the documents named in the margin,* adverting to the question of the proposed establishment of an Anglo-Egyptian post at Kiro, on the White Nile, desires to offer the following remarks:—

There is no record in the Intelligence Division of any determination of the latitude of Kiro, a place which does not appear on any of the existing maps of Upper Egypt prepared in this Department, except in the reproduction of a sketch executed by Colonel Martyr, where it is placed in latitude 5° 27′ north.

Presuming that the 4° 30′ in the decypher of Sir R. Rodd's telegram is an error for 5° 30′, or that Colonel Martyr's value is correct, a post 5 miles to the north of Kiro would be outside Belgian territory as defined in the Franco-Congolese Treaty of the 14th August, 1894.

With reference to the position assigned to Kiro by Major Gibbons, according to the telegram above alluded to, Sir John Ardagh would point out that there is a village called Kiri on the White Nile, of which the latitude is about 4° 20′, and it is possible that some confusion may have arisen between the two places, or that 4° 21′ in the telegram is an error for 5° 21′.

There are thus three values for the latitude of Kiro, viz., 5° 21′, 5° 27′, and 5° 30′; but in the absence of any information as to how they were obtained, Sir John Ardagh is unable to say which is correct. The approximate agreement between the observations made by Colonel Martyr and those of the Belgian officers, as reported, together with the fact that in the map of this region compiled by Colonel Macdonald the latitude of Kiro is shown as 5° 29′, disposes him to think that the true value will be found between 5° 27′ and 5° 30′, and that there would, therefore, be no objection perhaps to the occupation of the proposed post.

Intelligence Division, September 6, 1900.

---

* Sir R. Rodd, No. 141, Confidential, August 20; ditto, No. 94, Telegraphic, August 28; and ditto, No. 96, Telegraphic, August 30, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 3.)

(No. 80. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp, Hargaisa, August* 5, 1900.

IN continuation of my telegram of this day's date, I have the honour to report that the raid by the Mullah's horsemen, mentioned in my despatch No. 77, has spread consternation over this portion of the Protectorate. From Odweina to Jefir Medir the tribes have hurried back *en masse* from the Haud with their herds of camels and flocks into their winter grazing-grounds, where they are crowded up with the tribes upon whom they have fallen back, with the inevitable result of disorder and panic in the heart of the Protectorate.

Shortly after my despatch above mentioned was written the Habr Yunis came rushing back from Odweina with reports that the water at Haradiggit had fallen short, and that the Mullah was preparing to attack Hargaisa, or make a rush for the Odweina water. Without attaching credence to these reports of an advance I could not altogether ignore them, and made preparations to move to Odweina with a company of the Central Africa Regiment to secure the water supply, after reassuring the Habr Yunis, who agreed to return to Odweina if I proceeded there.

In the meanwhile the reports I received from Captain Swayne, who was at Hargaisa holding an inquiry into the case of the seizure of the French caravan, as to the position of affairs here were so disquieting that I determined to ask Major Plunkett to proceed with the company to Odweina whilst I came on here. This he has done, and I have since heard that the Habr Yunis have returned to their grazing grounds in the vicinity of that place.

At Hargaisa the position on my arrival was briefly this: The Aidagalla had come right back from the Haud on to Au Barkadleh and Hargaisa, occupying the grazing-grounds at present tenanted by the Ayal Ahmed, with whom they are on bad terms; more to the west the Samanter Abdillah have fallen back to Usbali; some of the sections of the Ahmed Abdillah have retired on the Jibril Abokr, others have scattered towards the Abyssinians; Sheikh Mattar has removed all his Karias and property towards the Guban, and most of the inhabitants of Hargaisa have fled. Owing to the crowding of the tribes at this time of the year in these scanty grazing-grounds there is continual quarrelling amongst them, and close here there have already been two fights in which a number of people have been wounded.

Numerous Akils and deputations from the tribes came in to see me as soon as they heard of my arrival. Although they were somewhat calmer than they appeared to have been before Captain Swayne some days previous they were still in a very excited state, clamouring for arms and to be at once let on to the Mullah.

They openly say that we do not protect them on their summer grazing-grounds, and that if these are closed to them by the armed forces of Mullah they must lose all their livestock by starvation, as the nearer grazing-grounds—their winter resort—cannot hold them all at this season of these year, and if the grass there is now consumed they will have nothing to fall back upon at the conclusion of the summer rains. This is all perfectly true. They attach no importance whatever to our holding the water places of Adadleh, Odweina, and Hargaisa, as they say that troops located there are useless to protect them on their summer grazing-grounds, which is also true. Had we ten times the number of troops here we could not insure the protection of the tribes' herds over the vast waterless area they frequent miles to the south of our positions, though I am pretty certain that were we not holding Hargaisa now the tribes in the neighbourhood would have all rushed back on to the Guban.

The tribes urge that formerly they were at times at war with the Ogaden, and at times at peace, and that the fights mattered very little, as in the end the losses adjusted themselves; but now, since the Mullah has appeared on the scene, all this is altered, and they are exposed to attacks by raiding parties armed with rifles, against which they cannot contend.

One and all, they wanted to know whether we were going to help them, and, if so, how?

Some immediate arrangement was absolutely necessary to separate the tribes, and get the Aidagalla, Samanter Abdillah, and Ahmed Abdillah on to the nearer grazing-grounds to the south of this. At the present moment there is not a soul south of a line drawn from Odweina to Hargaisa, and thence along the Hargaisa River. I decided to issue a limited number of old Snider rifles which I had obtained from Berbera, with a small amount of ammunition, as a temporary measure to protect the nearer grazing-grounds. Ten rifles, with twenty rounds of ammunition, were made over to the Akils of the Habr Yunis, Samanter Abdillah, and Ahmed Abdillah, to be given to selected men whose names have been recorded, and the Akils of each tribe are made personally responsible for the safe custody of the ten weapons given to each tribe, and that no improper use is made of them.

The Aidagalla, the most important tribe to get to move a bit south, I was unable to trust with arms in their hands, both on account of internal feuds and dissensions, and because the attitude of Sultan Deria is very doubtful. He is known to have been in communication with the Mullah; and the Abdi Bari section of the Aidagalla, who were the chief sufferers by the raid, have received letters from the Mullah offering to restore them their property if they will join him. I decided in the case of the Aidagalla to entertain twenty Baladiyahs, and distribute them among the different sections to protect their herds. They will be required for one or two months, according to whether the autumnal rains fall or not. The cost will be between 300 and 600 rupees, for which, under the extreme urgency of the case, I would solicit your Lordship's sanction.

This measure had the effect of partly allaying the excitement, and I am hopeful the tribes will now move south again for a short distance sufficient to get grazing. There were, of course, many more demands for arms which I was unable to meet.

But it would be idle to imagine that this temporary expedient in any way satisfied the tribes as to the general position. They wanted to know whether we would make a general issue of arms for the protection of the grazing-grounds, or whether we would at once lead them against the Mullah, saying that the state of affairs had now become unbearable, and that they were all ready to follow us, or go by themselves if we would arm them. That the Mullah is a long way outside our territory, and that it is the business of the Abyssinians to deal with him in the country he now occupies, are facts which they would not comprehend. They look upon the Mullah as being practically master of the situation, allowed to do as he pleases, and they do not understand our hesitation in taking steps to suppress him.

Your Lordship will have seen from my telegram of this day that I consider the position to be serious. The tribes are losing confidence in our ability to protect them, and unless that confidence is maintained we shall not be able to count on their allegiance, and they will be driven to make the best terms they can with the Mullah for the safety of their herds and flocks, on which their very life depends.

If we cannot soon co-operate with the Abyssinians to put an end to the Mullah's movement, I have proposed to punish the Aligheri, who are the Mullah's chief supporters in the Protectorate, and who will probably be found between Ber and Bohotele. In such a move we could count on the support of all our Ishak tribes, and it would have the effect of drawing off from the Mullah his Dolbahanta contingent, by whose aid he is overawing the Ogaden.

I am proceeding as soon as I can to Odweina, and thence to Burao, where the tribes have been awaiting my arrival for some time past.

I will report by telegram from Burao what steps I propose to take against the Aligheri should they still prove refractory.

The fact of my being expected at Burao has had the effect of keeping that part of the country quiet, and when I am there I hope to be able to make such arrangements as will result in the Dolbahanta trade resuming its normal course. For some months past that part of the country has been so unsafe that the Dolbahanta tribes have been unable to secure the safety of their own caravans, and this is the reason I prohibited our tribes nearer Berbera from trading with them, insisting that their Headmen should come in themselves, as until they do so no satisfactory settlement is possible.

If a scare occurs on the eastern side of the Protectorate, such as there has been here, we shall at once have a backward rush of the tribes, and a recurrence of a good deal of the trouble we had last year.

I have said in my despatch No. 77 that the Aidagalla have themselves to blame

for this raid from the Ogaden. This is true to a great extent, but it is impossible to get the tribe to see the matter in this light, especially the Abdi Bari, who are the principal sufferers. They had little to do with previous raids by the Aidagalla on the Ogaden, and they were the one section of the Aidagalla who complied with my instructions to return the animals they looted. I have, accordingly, handed them over the Aidagalla share of the animals returned by the Abyssinians.

The real cause of the panic here is the danger which the Habr Gerhajis and Habr Awal tribes, consequent on the recent raid, see their summer grazing-grounds to be in from organized attacks by the Mullah's followers; and in this connection, as well as the Mullah's movement in general, I have had to assure the tribes that we are not unmindful of their interests, and that we would consider what is best to be done, but that what action is taken, and when, must be left for the decision of the Government.

The question is a difficult one. If the Mullah's movement does not collapse of itself, or he is not suppressed by the Abyssinians, with or without our help, it will arise in an aggravated form next April, when the summer rains draw the tribes to the Haud. If the present position then still continues, we shall have to seriously consider the question of issuing some 200 or 300 Sniders to the tribes for the protection of their herds. There will be risk in this both of some of the arms reaching the Mullah, and of improper use being made of them by our people. But if we do not succeed in suppressing the Mullah before the spring, I do not at present see that we have any other alternative, as the Abyssinians, so long as the Mullah's movement continues, can afford our tribes no protection on the border, and we could not establish a cordon of posts in these waterless tracts.

It is absolutely necessary, if our position in the Protectorate is to be tenable, that our tribes be reinstated in their southern grazing-grounds, at least in the nearer portions within our border.

For the present I am hopeful that the measures which have been taken will suffice to protect our tribes in the nearer grazing-grounds; it is late in the season, and they will not now venture far south.

Sheikh Mattar, the Chief of Hargaisa, has expressed himself as most grateful for the assistance rendered him by the presence here of the company of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment, and has begged that when it is withdrawn it may be replaced by a post of our police.

Owing to the 2nd Central Africa Regiment being under strength, and to the companies which proceeded to Ashantee being made up to full strength, and leaving units, the half battalion remaining in the Protectorate now consists of 6 officers (including the medical officer), 7 Sikhs, and 4 weak companies of 84 Africans each, with a large proportion of sick.

Their present location is as follows:—

Berbera, 1 officer, 1 Sikh, and 42 Africans.
Sheikh, 1 Sikh, and 30 Africans.
Adadleh, 2 officers, 1 Sikh, and 83 Africans.
Odweina, 2 officers, 2 Sikhs, and 111 Africans, with Maxim.
Hargaisa, 1 officer, 1 Sikh, and 100 Africans.

As soon as I can safely do so I propose to withdraw the companies from Hargaisa and Odweina, leave a police post at the former place, and concentrate our strength on the Sheikh–Burao line to anticipate any move by the Mullah on the eastern side of the Protectorate.

When the water fails in the Haud he must either move west to the Abyssinian frontier, east to Walwal and Wardair or Bohotele, or south to the Webbe Schebele. A move west would bring him within the reach of the Abyssinians; with the exception of the Aligheri tribe, he has now but little hold over the Dolbahanta, and it seems doubtful if he will venture back to Bohotele, though it is quite possible he may do so. There is always water at Walwal and Wardair, in the centre of the Ogaden, and the probability seems to be that he will make his winter quarters there as he did last year.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer and to Her Majesty's Agent at Addis-Abbaba.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 3.)

(No. 83. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp, Adadleh, August* 13, 1900.

IN connection with the French caravan, the seizure of which was reported in my telegram of the 18th July, I have the honour to submit copy of Reports by Lieutenant Byrne, 2nd Central Africa Regiment, of the papers of the inquiry held by Captain Swayne, whom I deputed to Hargaisa for the purpose, and of other papers connected with the case.

It appears that the party first left Jibuti on the 13th June with the intention of entering the Protectorate in spite of my prohibition and the "observations" of the Governor of Jibuti, whatever these may have been, that after an encounter with the Aysa in French territory, in which three of the latter were killed, the party retired to Adeli, a station on the railway, and that the Somali portion of the armed followers declining to move forward again, part of the expedition returned to Jibuti to engage Soudanese in their place.

This being done a second start was made. After the Camel Corps, who had been dispatched from Sheikh to Hargaisa, a distance of 100 miles, to intercept the caravan, returned from Hargaisa, Lieutenant Byrne was warned to be on the look-out should another attempt be made to enter our territory, and two sowars were left in the Gadabursi country to bring in news.

On the 11th July intimation reached Lieutenant Byrne, through these Sowars, that the caravan was actually in our territory, and he at once moved out, and after an arduous march of three days, eventually came up to the caravan at Usbali on the 14th, arrested it, and disarmed the expedition.

The party consisted of four Europeans:—

M. Charles Monat, a Frenchman, merchant of Jibuti.

M. G. Grandjean, a Frenchman, merchant of Jibuti.

M. Arturo Donoti, an Italian, lately arrived in Jibuti.

M. Mark Golliez, a Swiss, in the employ of the railway, with twenty-seven Soudanese and Arabs, and three Somalis.

The arms consisted of fifty-one rifles and six boxes of ammunition, containing in all about 7,500 rounds. The only commercial goods were four bales of cloth, which were probably intended to be exchanged for provisions, with which the caravan was but poorly supplied.

The caravan is identical with the one for which permision was asked, and refused, for passage through the Protectorate. It has figured as a commercial expedition and as a hunting expedition. It had been refused permission to enter Abyssinian territory both by the Governor of Jibuti and the Abyssinian authorities. That the expedition left Jibuti with the approval of the French authorities, if not with their direct encouragement, is amply born out by the statements of the Europeans and the letter they received from the Secretary to their Government on the eve of their second departure, and that when the Governor was aware, as he wrote to me, that they were bound for our frontier. I hear, further, that there is considerable excitement in Jibuti at the Governor's action in this matter; the merchants accusing him of misleading them into the belief that my prohibition was merely formal, that it could be easily got over, and that we were powerless to enforce it so far from the coast.

There is no evidence to show what the real intentions of this expedition were on reaching the Ogaden, but I have no doubt that their object was to open up a trade in arms, and common report in this part of the Protectorate has it that they were going to the Mullah, who is said to be much put out at their being stopped. Two of the Europeans are reported to be trained locksmiths.

However much these possible intentions may have influenced me in my determination to stop the progress of the expedition through the Protectorate, they could not well be taken in account in dealing with the party after it had been arrested.

After careful consideration I decided to retain all the arms and ammunition and march the party down to the coast to be brought up before the Consul at Zeyla, whose authority the Europeans had ignored, and thence sent to Jibuti with a letter to the Governor from the Consul.

I considered that sufficient effect would be produced by the arrest of the expedition, the dispatch of its members virtually as prisoners to the coast, and the loss which the leaders have suffered through the failure of the expedition, without having recourse to the imprisonment of the Europeans; this would have necessitated a trial, which, on the whole, I thought it best to avoid.

I trust the action taken in this matter may meet with your Lordship's approval.

I would wish to bring to favourable notice the energy and tenacity of purpose evinced by Lieutenant Byrne, and the powers of endurance shown by his men in marching 80 miles through a strange and difficult country in two and a-half days.

I will await your Lordship's instructions as to the disposal of the arms and ammunition belonging to the expedition. They should, I think, be confiscated under section 18 of the Fire-arms Regulations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Lieutenant Byrne to Consul-General Sadler.

Sir,

Usbaleh, July 15, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that I caught the Frenchman and his party at 11 A.M. yesterday, the 14th instant, after having marched over 80 miles since Wednesday, the 11th instant, night.

The party consists of two Frenchmen, one Italian, one Swiss, twenty-seven Soudanese, and three Somalis.

The Europeans have a rifle and revolver each, the Soudanese and Somalis are all armed with rifles and ammunition. Having no authority I have not opened the baggage, but it appears to contain the following things:—

Seventeen rifles, making a total of fifty-one rifles in all; six boxes of ammunition, about 7,500 rounds; four bales of cloth; one box of boots; and rice, medecines, and private clothes.

The Europeans call themselves a shikar party, but from several circumstances I feel sure they have done their utmost to evade me, and the Somalis here tell me that had I been an hour or two later they would have left here for the Ogaden country. It was only by leaving my camels and weakly men behind and moving on here without food that I managed to overtake them. Their own camels are in an awful state—one we found yesterday on the road, and I believe they have killed two others.

Should my camels come in this morning unless I receive other instructions I shall move half way to Hargaisa and go on to Hargaisa to-morrow. In any case I expect to be at Hargaisa to-morrow (the 16th) where I shall wait for further instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. BYRNE, *Lieutenant*,
2nd Central Africa Regiment.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Lieutenant Byrne to Consul-General Sadler.

Sir,

Hargaisa, July 20, 1900

I HAVE the honour to submit the following Report, for your information, of the holding up of the French caravan and of the route taken:—

About 2·30 P.M. on the 11th instant two sowars arrived here with the information that a caravan consisting of four Europeans and some African soldiers were at Jifa Medii on the 10th instant. (I afterwards discovered this caravan was at Hindesa, and were stopping there to buy camels.)

Believing this to be the caravan Captain Swayne went out to stop I at once decided to try and stop it, and sent a horseman to you direct with this Report. Taking one Sikh and sixty men, each carrying seven days' rations with four camels—two for water—and accompanied by your Dragoman, Hassan Ahmed, and the two sowars, I left Hargaisa at 8 P.M., and marched to Dobolek, 15 miles, where we camped for the night. We left Dobolek at 6·30 A.M. on the 12th instant, and marched 2 miles further on to Yusball, where the men had their food. As I could obtain no further information I decided to push on.

This was against the advice of Hassan, and as events have proved he was right, but whether the caravan would have taken the same route, had I remained at Yusball, I think is very doubtful.

Filling up our water tanks we left Yusbaleh at 9·30 A.M., and marched almost due west. At 6·30 P.M. I halted for the night, having covered 18 miles from Yusbaleh; there was no water here.

We started at daybreak on the 13th instant, and marched to Hed-ujawaji (a place south-west of Yujawaji) about 11 miles. Here the men had some food, and the head Somali had some water brought for our use.

The caravan was reported to have been at Gibileh on the 12th instant. I could not go straight back to Yusbaleh because there was not enough water, and also it was impossible to get information along that route, there being no Somali Karias. I therefore marched 9 miles to Garabad between Uyjawji and Arabsiyo, where are some wells. We passed Uyjawaji on the way and there was no water there. Then another Sowar here met me with the information that the caravan was then at Arabsiyo. As the company had marched 35 miles in the first twenty-four hours, and 20 miles that day, I decided to take the best of the men, with only their rifles and ammunition, and go straight on to Arabsiyo, leaving the remainder under the Sikh Havildar with the camels. I started at 5 P.M. with thirty-four Africans, and reached Arabsiyo about 9·30 P.M., a distance of 11 miles, only to find the caravan had passed Arabsiyo at midday, and had not even stopped to take water. The men had now marched 31 miles and were tired out, so we camped for the night.

A Somali here told me that when the caravan was passing as soon as the front man saw his zariba he fired a rifle into the air, and one of the Europeans crawled up to his zariba and peered over and then told the caravan to go straight on. I quote this incident because one of the Europeans has been giving out that he is an Englishman on a shooting expedition, and that he was coming to see you. In that case such conduct combined with their rapid marching is very strange.

We left Arabsiyo at 4 A.M. on the 14th instant, and following the trail of the caravan, marched to Yusbaleh, a distance of 14 miles, passing one camel in a dying condition, which the Frenchmen had been obliged to leave behind. The caravan was here filling up with water for the four days' march across the desert to the Ogaden country.

The four Europeans came to meet me, and at once agreed to my request for their men's arms to be filed. I then took away their ammunition and all knives, and placed a guard over the arms and round the camp, making prisoners of the three Somali guides (two Esa and one Gadabursi, a shikari).

I may add here that the Europeans with this caravan have made no opposition to any suggestion made by me while they have been in my charge, thus preventing any collision between my men and theirs, and helping me considerably.

The men having had nothing to eat for twenty-four hours, I obtained some milk, which was willingly given by the Somalis, the Habr Awal, and Rer Shadun, who also offered to help me in the event of a fight. I also bought four sheep. My camels and the remainder of the company did not reach Yusbaleh till the following morning.

We left Yusbaleh at 4 P.M. on the 15th, and, staying the night at Harad, arrived at Hargaisa the following morning, where I have since been waiting further instructions. This completed a march of 97 miles in four and a-half days, 80 miles of which the first party, to reach Yusbaleh, covered in two days fourteen hours, carrying their full equipment, and seven days' rations in addition, with the exception of the last two marches, which I think is very creditable to them. Only one man fell out, and that during the first day's march. He rode the rest of the way.

Hassan Ahmed was of the greatest assistance to me in obtaining information and guides, and in many ways.

In my Report dispatched on the 14th instant I gave the composition of the caravan, and the number of rifles and ammunition. These numbers are only approximate, and I cannot check them till I receive instructions to search the caravan. The Frenchman

assures me that the guns and ammunition with them are for their own protection only, and for the purpose of shooting game. He also assured me that they were waiting for me at Yusbaleh, but I do not think this was the case. The Somalis say they were filling up with water as quickly as possible, and the sowar, whom I had sent on ahead, reports they did not put their tent up until he told them I was coming, although, according to their admission, they heard at Gibile of my move to stop them.

The distances are all calculated by time very carefully, and on referring to the map I find the total distance to be about 3 miles less.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H BYRNE, *Lieutenant*,
Commanding Detachment, 2nd Central Africa Regiment.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Captain Swayne to Consul-General Sadler.

Consul-General, *Hargaisa, July* 22, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that I arrived at Hargaisa at 6 A.M., and arranged immediately to separate the Soudanese soldiers from the four Europeans, to take down the latter's statements in writing, and to inspect the baggage.

As I have an urgent matter to report under separate cover, necessitating my sending a runner to you to-night, I have hurried on matters so as to take advantage of the same runner to take this report to you; I would therefore request your indulgence for the rough drafts now submitted.

I am clearly of opinion that the Europeans in the caravan intended making a trial trip to the Ogaden with a view to finding a profitable market for merchandize and rifles.

They understood very well that they would not be allowed to go through Abyssinian territory, and also they cannot really have had a doubt as to the explicitness of the orders directing them to report themselves at Zeyla. They acknowledge receipt of this letter, and in fact showed it to Lieutenant Byrne. They, on finding that the tribes were informed that Government was against their proceeding, attempted to deceive them into believing that the journey was allowed. They pretended that they were going to confer with an Englishman, and that an Englishman was one of their party. On finding it was probable they would be stopped, they made the best arrangement to hedge they could think of.

The notes of evidence will bring out several other points, and especially an interesting one connected with the Governor of Jibuti's action.

I attach the merchants' copy of the original letter from the Jibuti Protectorate Office; the original was shown to me.

It will be noticed that no claim is made now to be considered a "Commercial Mission," although there can be no doubt as to the identity of this party with the Commercial Mission referred to by the Governor of Jibuti in a separate letter to you.

Should you take my view as to the *mala fides* of the evidence, I would submit that the case be tried in the Consul's Court at Zeyla, where charges would lie for smuggling merchandize or for contravention of the Arms Regulations. Perhaps this would be preferable to taking up the case as that of an armed force of strangers brought forcibly into the Protectorate.

The Mullah is offering very large and disproportionate profits to any one bringing him arms and ammunition, so large, indeed, that only a correspondingly heavy penalty will, in my opinion, prevent other adventurers from embarking in what would, on a large scale, be an exceedingly profitable business.

The results of the Mullah's obtaining a large quantity of ammunition to train his men with are easy to imagine.

The risk is very great indeed. This caravan has been stopped by great good luck; we may not be so fortunate with the next, and once the traffic obtains a footing it will be impossible to check it.

When I informed the Europeans that the their statements would be sent to you, and that they would have to wait for at least three days, they attempted to induce me, by a somewhat blustering manner, to send them to the coast at once. Evidently not relishing the idea of their defence being submitted to your judgment.

The statements were made in reply to questions by me. They were translated by me, and, in conclusion, were retranslated to the four Europeans, who all attested the fairness of the translations.

Having marched 23 miles in the early morning, and having been occupied steadily since then till now, 7 P.M., I regret I cannot make a fair copy without delaying the runner, but will fair it if you will kindly return it to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. SWAYNE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

Statement by Lieutenant Byrne.

ON the 11th instant two Somali horsemen, left behind by Captain Swayne, came in with the information that a caravan, consisting of four Europeans and some African soldiers, was encamped at Jefu on the 10th instant, and was purchasing camels. Believing this to be the caravan which Captain Swayne went out recently to stop, I took one Sikh and sixty Africans, carrying seven days' rations, and left Hargaisa at 8 P.M. on the same day that the news was brought to me, viz., the 11th instant, and proceeded to Dabolok, near Yusbale. I was accompanied by Captain Swayne's two Sowars and Hassan, the Government Interpreter.

We left Dabolok at 6·30 A.M. the following day (the 12th instant), and marched to Hed Ujawaji, arriving on the morning of the 13th. Here I heard that the caravan seen by the horsemen had arrived at Gibili on the 12th instant, marching viâ Hendesa, and that it had left Gibili the same day for Arabsiyo. This news was confirmed by a horseman I immediately sent out. Upon this I marched to Garabad Wells, on the way to Arabsiyo, and there another horseman brought me information that he had left the caravan within 3 miles of Arabsiyo. Most of my men and camels being tired out, I left at once for Arabsiyo with thirty-four Africans only and some Somali horsemen, taking no rations or kits.

We reached Arabsiyo at 9·30 P.M. on the same date (the 13th instant), only to find that the caravan had not stopped at Arabsiyo, but had gone on towards the Ogaden country. We camped for the night and left again at 4 A.M. on the following morning, on the tracks of the caravan. Whilst at Arabsiyo I was informed by a man of a karia (pitched here) that when the front man of the caravan saw the karia he fired a shot into the air, and thereupon a European cautiously came up to the karia and peered over the thorn fence,

This conduct—showed the Somali's statement to be true—appeared very strange to me, especially as when I eventually overtook the caravan I was told by the Europeans that they were merely a shooting party, and with a little merchandize, and were, in fact, on their way to Dabolok, where they intended waiting until they received the Consul-General's permission to proceed.

We eventually overtook the caravan at Yusbale, near Dabolok, about 9·30 A.M. on the 14th instant, having passed on the road one camel in a dying condition, the saddle lying in the jungle at the side of the track. This points to the haste with which the caravan was travelling, and the miserable conditiou of the caravan's camels further attested this. I had sent a Somali horseman on in front of me to get news, and he overtook the caravan only about half-an-hour before we did, he having lost his way in the night. When he first saw the caravan, the water vessels were being rapidly filled, preparatory to the march across the Haud to the Ogaden country. The camels were standing by collected and ready to move off. On the horseman telling the caravan that an armed Government party was close behind him, the Europeans of the caravan had their tent pitched.

When I arrived, the Europeans were at table, and the Soudanese askaris were standing in a body with their arms in their hands. On seeing me the four Europeans came out of the tent to meet me. I requested that, first of all, arms should be piled. This was done without demur. I took away all arms and ammunition from the Soudanese and placed a guard upon the camp, placing three Somali guides found with the caravan under the immediate supervision of the guard. I told the Europeans that I had been specially sent to stop them, and that the whole caravan must come to Hargaisa with me. I also informed them of the restrictions which I proposed to place upon the movements of the askaris in camp. We reached Hargaisa on the morning of the 16th.

I roughly counted the caravan at Yushale; it consisted of 4 Europeans, 27 Soudanese, and 3 Somalis. I afterwards found the actual number to be 4 Europeans, 24 Soudanese, and 4 Somalis.

The arms consist of 49 military rifles, of various pattern, 5 military or sporting rifles, ditto, 1 shot-gun, 4 revolvers; ammunition, about 7,000 rounds ball ammnuition (various), and 23 bayonets (various).

There were 13 camels, 5 mules, and 1 donkey.

Under Consul-General's instructions I to-day took an inventory of the baggage, which consists of—

4 bales cloth (trade).
1 box rope-sole boots.
1 box looking-glasses, soap, &c.
1 bag of twine.
1 box of provisions.
1 box of medicines.
2 boxes of ghee (4 tins).
6 bags of rice.
1 bag of salt.
1 bag of peas.
½ bag of flour.
2 boxes private European clothes.

(Signed) H. BYRNE, *Lieutenant*,
2nd British Central Africa Regiment.

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

Statements.

GUIDE Greydi Mude Ker Gudabersé states :—

When Captain Swayne left me and Alli at Ujawaji, with instructions to follow up and report upon a European he had got news of at Sattawa, we remained there that night, and the next morning I went straight to Gawa Pass to Ugas Nur's karias. Ugas Nur informed me that he hadr eceived a messenger from some Frenchmen at Jibuti, saying they were coming to his karia, and that he, Ugas Nur, had thereupon replied that they would not be allowed to come.

The Frenchmen again informed Ugas Nur that in any case they were coming. Ugas Nur told me to inform Captain Swayne that he would do his best to stop the Frenchmen. I came back to Ujawaji where I found Alli my companion, and Alli went on to Gibili to inform Captain Swayne, but did not reach him until he had got to Hargaisa. On Alli's return from Captain Swayne we both went to the Gawa Pass and there heard that the French caravan had just marched from Au Boba to Arro, and thence to Bajar Ja and Halisa and Hendesa. We left our horses, so as not to be noticed, at Gawa, and went on foot to Headesa to the Rer Nur Akils Absiyeh Geydi and Kibar, who had been called to Captain Swayne's camp at Tug and had returned to Headesa. We explained to the Akils our instructions from Captain Swayne to stop the caravan and asked the Akils to help, to which they agreed. We both of us, Alli and I, then went and saw the French caravan encamped at Hendesa and counted the white men, who are here now. Alli remained to follow the caravan about wherever it might go, and I and a Gadabursi guide came to Hargaisa as ordered by Captain Swayne to report. We did not find him there, but reported to the military officer who is here now; afterwards, when the officer and his African soldiers went out to stop the caravan, we marched about the country under his instructions.

Alli Geyli Jebriel Yunis Gadabursi, states :—

I have heard read out to me the evidence of Geydi Muda. It is true.

Alli Badeyd Jebriel Yunis Gudabursi, states :—

I joined the Frenchmen at Au-boba to act as guide to Dabolok, on the way to Ogaden. When we reached Bagager from Au-boba a letter was brought from Zeyla by Geyli Weyd and Masalsal to the Europeans, and the Europeans sent a reply, saying bring back its further answer to Dabolok. The men who brought the original letters from Zeyla informed us that the Frenchmen would not be allowed to proceed by the British Government; I thereupon, with the other Somali servants, refused to go on with the Frenchmen.

They, however, told me that the letter from Zeyla did not want them to stop; that they had permission to go on, and that one of them was an Englishman. We thereupon agreed to go on.

When the Camel Corps, under Captain Swayne, was at Tug and sent out horsemen I heard of it, as did all Jibril Yunni's karias, but we did not know the purpose. I did not hear of the Frenchmen having made a previous attempt to come into the Gadabursi country and that they had returned.

The white men said they were going to shoot elephants in the Ogaden. I do not know of any baggage that was left behind in the Gadabursi country. At Amboba I heard from the other Somali servants that one camel and one mule of the caravan had died on the march, and two I actually saw die since on the road to Dabolok. They were worn out by continual marching without a rest. They marched during from about 6·30 A.M. till 3 P.M. or thereabouts. Many of the other camels are quite used up. I did not think anything of so many camels dying as I had not been with white men before.

When we wanted to leave a sick camel behind at Jifi-Uri, on the way between Halisa and Hendesa, the white men said, "No, we will take it on to Gibili, where we are about to meet other white men." At Botor I heard from Abseyeh that the Camel Corps was out to stop the French caravan, but he did not quite understand this.

Au Haiyeh Shirwa Momosan Abdalla Gadid Ba Gurgura states :—

I joined the Frenchmen at Jibuti as guide. Whilst at Bolol a messenger came with three askaris from Mr. Harrington, who was on his way down from Harrar to Boya-Kababa. The messenger said the Frenchmen must wait for Mr. Harrington. The Frenchmen thereupon sent a letter to Mr. Harrington and waited for two days at Bolol, I thereupon objected to go with the Frenchmen, and at the end of the two days they produced a letter and said, "We have got leave to go on," and they showed me a map and said, "The places which are marked on this we have permission to go to and from, you to take us to Ogaden from Bolol." On my objecting further they brought one of the white men and said, "This is an Englishman, so there can be no objection." I thereupon, seeing that no further messenger came from Mr. Harrington, thought that the Frenchman spoke the truth and that Mr. Harrington did not wish to stop them. I therefore took the caravan to Anboba. I there attempted to run away, but was prevented by them. I thereupon got Geyli Assowa to come instead. The white men, however, would not let me go but persuaded me to become an askari and made Geyli Asowa their boy. At Bagagar, Masalsal and Geyli Agwima brought a letter from Zeyla and said the white men must stop; they had no orders actually to stop the white men, but only to get a letter from them. We are Zeyla people and are afraid of Government. We wanted to stop the Frenchmen for we heard that the Camel Corps and Englishmen had come out into the jungle from Berbera to stop them. The Frenchmen, however, persuaded us saying, "We will go on and meet the Englishmen at Gibili, aud if they forbid us we will go back, but come so far." I do not know of any boxes which have been left behind.

The Frenchmen said they were going to shoot elephants in Ogaden because the rest of the Gadabursi country was in the Reserve. I believed them because one of the white men said he was an Englishman and read out the places of the country from a map, so I thought he must really be an Englishman to know the places so well.

Servant Geyli Asowa Momasan Abdalla Gaded Ba Forlaba, states :—

I have heard the above evidence, it is true.

Jama Derid Ker Malaya Makahiel H.A., states :—

I engaged as a cook boy to one of the Frenchmen at Jibuti. I was told by him we were going shooting to the Darud country. On two occasions, at Beyo Gurgura and at a well in Gadabursi country I heard teat the British Government wished to stop the caravan. I did not run away, because I am lame and ride a donkey, and how could I get away from the Gadabursi country where I have no friends and when I do not know the road.

Seyad Hamed Sowakini, Soudani townsman, states :—

I engaged with one of the Frenchmen at Jibuti as askari and afterwards acted as cook in the absence of a proper one. The caravan was going to the Gadabursi country for shooting purposes. I do not know whether any of the white men were Englishmen.

We heard we were forbidden to go on whilst in the Gadabursi country. The white men, however, said it was all right; they had a paper giving permission.

Abdalla Mahomed Shukria Gedorif, Soudani country, states :—

I engaged with one of the Frenchmen at Jibuti as askari. I know of no baggage of the caravan being left behind. The caravan was going to the Habr Awal and Ogaden country for elephant shooting. I don't know the difference between Englishmen and Frenchmen: they are all white. We heard in the Gadabursi country it was forbidden to go on; but how could I leave the sahibs in a strange country? Had I known in the beginning I would not have gone. I now look after the mules.

The undermentioned men state they are askaris engaged at Jibuti; they did not know at any time during the journey that they were forbidden to go through British territory; they understood it was a shooting party to the Gadabursi country and to the Ogaden. Eight men had been to Mombasa six years ago. None had recently come from there; none had been in Oganda.

[For names see attached list marked "A."]

Statement of the Europeans of the Caravan.

M. Charles Monat, French :—Négociant of Jibuti, where he has been for eight years.

M. Georges Grandjean, French :—Négociant of Jibuti, where he has been for one year.

M. Artuto Donoli, Italian :—Rentier of Jibuti. Just arrived at Jibuti (5th June) from Italy.

M. Mark Golliez :—Transport agent of Jibuti employed by the railway.

M. Monat states he has for some time past occupied himself with shooting elephants, and the present expedition was organized for this purpose. We intended to go to Bourka and Lug viâ Dabolok and the Habr Awal country. We wished to go by the shorter way viâ Jiggija, but our intention becoming known to the Governor of Jibuti he sent a letter forbidding us to do this on account of the Abyssinians probably objecting to the passage of Europeans through their territory into the Ogaden whilst the two countries were in a state of war.

The merchandize which is with us is only intended as barter to enable us to procure the means of living, such as buying sheep, &c. We did not intend to do any commerce, and we are not a commercial expedition, except as regards our trying to shoot ivory to bring for sale to the coast. We have twenty spare rifles. They are not for trade, but they are intended to replace broken weapons (we have already had two become non-effective), and also to arm any natives who might be willing to take service with us should we hereafter find that it would be advisable to increase our numbers owing to the hostility of the natives on the Jouba.

Our shooting intention was not for sport merely, but above all as a good commercial speculation in ivory. We were, in fact, elephant hunters.

We were encouraged to hope there would be a profit even when the expenses of our escort were paid, by the fact that I had previously, three years ago, made a profitable expedition on the borders of Harrar and Somaliland.

We are associated, it is true, with merchants of Jibuti. M. Oudot and M. Joubert, ingénieur, who wished us during our excursion to look out for favourable markets for goods, with a view to the future establishment of trading posts at Lug and on the Banadir.

As regards the matter of permission to pass through British territory—on asking the Governor of Jibuti he told me and M. Grandjean that it would not be necessary to ask permission to enter British territory, but only to inform the English Consul-General that we were going; that we need not necessarily, unless we wished, to take an English Aban. We did not think of asking about customs duty on receiving the above affirmation from the Governor of Jibuti.

Two days before we actually started we received an English letter through the Governor of Jibuti, saying that the British Government did not refuse permission, but at the same time advised that the country was in a disturbed state, and that caravans were not now passing to and fro.

We left Jibuti on the 10th June by caravan route (Jibuti to Harrar), and on arrival at Mardali we were attacked by the Odagol, the Fortabba and Agaz Gun Essa. Three Essa were killed, and one died afterwards.

We returned to Adeli, a station on the railway. After staying two days at Adeli, pending the arrival of M. Galliez, all our caravan men unfortunately ran away. We thereupon returned (the 20th) to Jibuti, and engaged the new lot of men we now have, and they were paraded before the police authorities and inspected by them. The Governor did not object to our going, although he knew of our intention to pass into the Ogaden, and he even offered to place a carriage of his own train at our disposal for the transport of our men. (See Appendix B.)

We left with our men by train on the 25th, arriving at Adeli on the evening of the 26th June. We marched from Adeli on the 27th to Mardali, 28th, Garbali, 29th, Arroweina, 30th, Beyo Gurgura.

At Gurgura we were met by four men belonging to Mr. Harrington, who said that Mr. Harrington would that evening be at Beyo Kaboba, and they asked what we were doing, &c. We thereupon wrote to Mr. Harrington, telling him of our intention, and the number of men, and asked Mr. Harrington if he had any objection to our journey to write to us at Bolol. We arrived at Bolol the 2nd July, and halted there the whole of the 3rd for the answer. The 4th we marched to Deria-ader; the same evening, Obol; the 5th, Anboba; the 6th, Bagager; the 7th, halted at Bagager; and we here received a letter from a Mr. Stampson, of the Zeyla Consulate, in English, which appeared to forbid our going on. However, as it was so old in date, we thought that our later correspondence with Mr. Harrington annulled it. We replied, therefore, that we had written to Mr. Harrington and explained the matter, and asked that any communication he might wish to send us should be forwarded along the route we specially indicated. We said that in any case we would wait for a reply at Dabalek, where we hoped to arrive on the 14th.

On the 7th July, the same day as we received the Zeyla letter, we heard that an Englishman was at Gabili, but were not told if he was a sportsman or a Government officer. We therefore went on our way to Dabolok. When at Yuffun we heard an Englishman had passed and gone on in front of us. We therefore went on to Arabsiyo, and arrived at Yusbali or Dabolok the 13th. About an hour or two after our camping, a Somali horseman came to say an Englishman was coming, and that we should wait; we agreed, and shortly before midday the Englishman arrived.

Read and translated to the Europeans named in the body of the statements, and acknowledged to be correct by them.

(Signed) E. SWAYNE, *Captain,*
Commanding Police Forces.

Inclosure 6 in No. 1.

Protectorat Français de la Côte des Somalis,
Jibouti, le 23 Juin, 1900.

Monsieur,

J'AI le plaisir de vous faire connaître qu'en principe vous monterez sans le train. Je vais cependant rafraîchir la mémoire du Gouverneur, et en même temps vous ferez bien de vous présenter vers 9 heures au train, de façon à ce que le Gouverneur à votre vue se souvienne de ce qu'il a dit.

Bien à vous. Bon voyage et cordiale poignée de main.

(Signé) LEFÈVRE, *Secrétaire du Gouvernement.*

Pour copie conforme:
(Signé) CH. MONAT.

N.B.—Cette copie a été donnée en communication afin de prouver que le Gouvernement a plutôt favorisé le départ de notre caravane.

Inclosure 7 in No. 1.

Captain Swayne to Consul-General Sadler.

Consul-General, *Hargaisa, July* 26, 1900.

I HAVE, since sending you my Report on the French caravan, received information from one of their Soudanese askaris as follows:—

"Murjan Mahmoud—a Soudanese settled in Zeyla, a kinsman of Jemadar Bakkit, Somali Camel Corps, and recognized by the latter, states:

"Having been able to find no paying work at Zeyla, I went to Jibuti, on chance, in a boat, to find work.

"On the day of my arrival I went about asking for employment, and after wandering about some time, a man brought me a letter, saying I would find work with a Frenchman to whom I would take the letter.

"I accordingly went and found some other Soudanese just engaged as askaris, and also a number of Habr Awal men, the Chief of whom was Farah Abdi. He and four others are, I hear, now prisoners at Berbera Bulhar.

"We went as far as Mordan, when we were attacked at night by the Esa; fortunately the sentry was awake, and warned us in time, and every man of us fired, and after a time the Esa cleared off, leaving tbree dead on the ground, and several others got away wounded; none of us were killed.

"The next day the Habr Awal deserted towards Zeyla, leaving their guns and clothing.

"The rest of us went back to Jibuti, where more men were engaged, and a second start was made by railway.

"Some of us who had been out the first time thought everything was not quite correct, and so insisted on going before the Government before engaging ourselves the second time, and the Frenchman therefore took ns before the French police, where we were properly engaged.

"The man with the old Dunkali scar on his chest (M. Monat) is the Head of the expedition, the other Europeans are only assistants.

"When we finally reached Buya Kaboba we heard that an English force had gone out from Berbera and Hargaisa to stop us with camel sowars, and that it was blocking our way. The Frenchman upon this camped in out-of-the-way places, and march with precaution, as if they were wanting to hide.

"When at Mordali we saw that only five bags of rice had been laid in for our rations, and having then become aware that the expedition would last many months, we asked what arrangements were made for our further supply of food when the five bags were consumed. We were then told we were going to Ogaden, and that the spare rifles in the baggage and the ammunition would be sold to buy food for us. When we reached Biya Kaboba we were still not satisfied, but were again persuaded to go on by the same story.

"Now, all the Soudanese can testify to the truth of what I say, but, being inhabitants of Jibuti, they are afraid to tell, because of fear of the French. I tell because I am a British subject of Zeyla, and am not afraid of the French, but I would ask to be sent to the coast separately from them. Farah Abdi and the other Habr Awal also know the truth regarding these spare arms, for they heard what the Frenchman said. You can ask the five Habr Awal now at Bulhar.

"We do not now believe the Frenchmen wanted to shoot elephants at all, as they have no large guns; but they were going into Ogaden for other purposes.

"The Frenchmen said one of them was an Englishman, and at Gibli they said they were going to meet an Englishman in front of them, but on getting to Yuzbale, M. Monat said we had only one hour to wait, and then we would go straight on into the Haud."

Note.—On Jemadar Bakkit's arrival at Hargaisa I told him to inspect the Soudanese, whom I had already separated from the Europeans. He recognized the witness and several other men as having been at work in Zeyla, but none as having previously served Government.

Jemadar Bakkit has a firm conviction that the witness is speaking the truth.

(Signed) E. SWAYNE, *Captain,*
Commanding Police Forces.

Inclosure 8 in No. 1.

Memorandum by Captain Swayne.

THE Elders of the Rer Samanter, H. A., on the 25th July came to me to ask that four men arrested by the police at Bulhar recently might be released. They say the men originally belonged to the French caravan, but after the fight with the Esa they heard that the British Government had forbidden the progress of the caravan, and, therefore, they left it, leaving behind clothes and arms.

They eventually came to Bulhar by boat, intending to return to their karias near Hargaisa, but were arrested owing to one of them, Farah Abdi, being in possession of a revolver.

The names of the men are :—

Farah Abdi (Headman).
Ali Gabosa.
Husan Yusuf Ab.
Abdulla Abdi.
Karia Hirsi.

On reading out these names to M. Monat, he recognized them as belonging to some of the Habr Awal men who left him at Moradi on the occasion of his first start from the railway. He said they had taken a month's pay, but had most of them left behind their guns, &c.

Please see the Soudanese witness' testimony regarding the intention of the Europeans to sell guns in Ogaden. It would be worth while getting this confirmed by Farah Abdi (see above) and the other Habr Awal.

The Italian with the caravan says that he had no special inducement in going with the other Europeans, but that after the American–Fillipino war, in which he served, he had drifted about seeking remunerative employment; that had he known the British Government was set upon stopping Europeans from passing through Somaliland, he would have refused to come; but he always understood from M. Monat that the objections were only formal, and could be overcome.

(Signed) E. SWAYNE.

Hargaisa, July 26, 1900.

Inclosure 9 in No. 1.

Statement of Accused No. 2, *Farah Abdi, H. A. Samanter Abdulla Bawaradyo.*

ACCUSED No. 2 re-examined, states :—

I have been in the employ of the French Railway Company at Jibuti for the last seven years. I was a maccadam, and received a medal and two chevrons (produced). My employer was one M. Manod.

About four weeks ago the latter and three other Frenchmen, named M. Goliasse, M. Karishan, and another whose name I do not know, said they were going to Harrar, and asked me to collect some Somalis as sepoys. They did not say what their object was. I collected nineteen men of the Samanter Abdallah, five of whom were the accused now before the Court. There were also seven Soudanese. We each received a rifle, in all twenty-one. Seven were single-loading French rifles (cartridge produced). There were also two black Aysa and two Gadabursi. We left Jibuti with fourteen camels and five mules; they carried ten bags rice, ten tins ghee, twenty thars cloth, and three large wooden cases, and several small ones. They were all very heavy. I do not know what they contained. We left Jibuti by the Harrar road, and after five days' march reached Mordaleh. There M. Manod called me up, and said he was going to Harrar, then to Jifa Uri, then to Dabolok, into the Ogaden country, and thence to the Webbe. I called up the other Somalis and told them this. We had been told in Jibuti that we were only going as far as Harrar. We decided to return to Jibuti as we were afraid of going into unknown countries. That same night a number of Aysa attacked the camp. The four Frenchmen seized their rifles and opened fire, killing three Aysa. Next morning we loaded up and proceeded to Addalay. Seeing the Aysa were hostile, we renounced our intention of returning. At Addalay we told the Frenchmen we would

not go any further. We gave up our rifles and left. The seven Soudanese and four Gadabursi remained behind with the Frenchmen, who said they would get some other Somalis. M. Manod returned with us to Jibuti, and complained against us to the French Governor, M. Berot. We were put into prison, and told that we must either return with M. Manod, or refund the advance of one month's pay which we had received. M. Manod then returned with some Soudanese to replace us. We then spoke to his agent, and said we would go anywhere with M. Manod provided that we did not go into British territory. Thereupon all my companions were released from gaol, but I was kept prisoner. My case was inquired into, and I was released. We then all left Jibuti. The revolver was given me by M. Manod several years ago. I had no intention of breaking the law; and having lived in Jibuti for so long was not aware of the Fire-arms Regulations.

Before me,
(Signed) H. E. S. CORDEAUX, *Vice-Consul.*

True copy:
(Signed) H. E. S. CORDEAUX,
Vice-Consul.

August 11, 1900.

Inclosure 10 in No. 1.

Acting Consul Hampson to Consul-General Sadler.

Dear Colonel Hayes Sadler, *Zeyla, July* 14, 1900.

THE French expedition were camped four days ago in our territory near Sattawah, and refused to quit in spite of the protests of the Gadabursi Chiefs and the delivery of my letter. They falsely declare that they have permission from Harrington, Harold, and the French government to pass through our territory and go to the Ogaden.

The Gadabursi sent me a special messenger, proposing to try and capture the expedition (four Europeans, twenty Soudanese, and a few Aysa), and bring them here. I have sent back word that they are, if possible, to avoid a conflict, but are to refuse all help to the expedition, and to hamper its progress in every peaceful way they can. I am at the same time writing to the Officer in Command at Hargaisa (viâ Bulhar), informing him of the whereabouts of the expedition, and asking him to take steps to intercept their further progress.

I can do nothing from here, as nearly all my camel sowars are at Hargaisa.

I am sending a further short and peremptory note to the leaders of the expedition.

In great haste, yours, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES S. HAMPSON.

Inclosure 11 in No. 1.

Acting Consul Hampson to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 333.)

Sir, *Zeyla, August* 6, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt by Captain Swayne of your despatch of the 24th July respecting the French caravan arrested near Hargaisa.

The inclosures in your despatch are returned herewith.

Captain Swayne arrived at Zeyla by buggalow from Bulhar on the afternoon of the 4th instant with the European members of the arrested caravan.

The latter appeared before me in Court this morning. I addressed them in the words which I quote in an inclosure herein. I declined to enter into any discussion with them.

At their request I gave them a short note stating the reasons for their arrest and for the retention of all the arms of the caravan. Copy of this note is also inclosed.

The four Europeans left for Djibuti by buggalow this afternoon. Captain Swayne has gone with them; and I transmit copy of a letter which he will deliver from me to the Governor of Djibuti.

The native members of the caravan will, as soon as they arrive here, be sent under escort to the frontier and handed over to the French outposts there.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES S. HAMPSON.

P.S.—The native members of the caravan to the number of twenty-five having arrived last night appeared before me in Court this morning. They will be sent to the frontier to-morrow with the baggage animals of the expedition.

C. S. H.

Inclosure 12 in No. 1.

Speech addressed by Acting Consul Hampson to Messrs. Charles Monat, George Grandjean, Arturo Donati, and Mark Golliez.

VOUS avez été arrêtés, portant des armes, sans permis, en territoire Anglais, malgré la défense expresse du Consul-Général d'entrer.

En plus, y ayant entré, vous avez négligé d'obéir à mes ordres écrits de vous présenter devant moi pour expliquer votre présence.

La défense du Consul-Général vous a été communiquée par son Excellence le Gouverneur de Djibouti. Vous n'avez pas écouté les ordres de son Excellence non plus que vous n'avez écouté ceux du Consul-Général et les miens.

Je ne peux donc vous qualifier que de la même épithète dont se sert son Excellence le Gouverneur: "d'aventuriers," d'aventuriers armés, ainsi que de celle de contrebandistes.

En outre, vous avez trompé nos sujets noirs en leur racontant que le permis de voyager en notre territoire vous avait été accordé par le Gouvernement du Protectorat, par le Capitane Harrington, &c. En empiétant, contre les ordres du Gouvernement, et armés, notre territoire, vous vous êtes exposés à une punition sévère, sous les Règlements sur les Armes, et si le Gouvernement du Protectorat se montre clément envers vous, je vous prie de croire que cela n'arrivera pas une seconde fois; que tous aventuriers de votre genre seront traités avec toute la rigueur de la loi.

Vos armes seront détenues; vous-mêmes et vos hommes seront expédiés immédiatement à Djibouti, où son Excellence le Gouverneur jugera quelle punition vous recevrez pour votre grave désobéissance à ses ordres.

Inclosure 13 in No. 1.

Note by Acting Consul Hampson.

MM. CHARLES MONAT, George Grandjean, Arturo Donati, and Mark Golliez, accompanied by an armed escort, having been arrested in British territory, which they had entered in direct disobedience to the orders of the Government of the British Protectorate, communicated to them by his Excellency the Governor of Djibuti, and having been brought to Zeyla:

The members of the expedition are sent back to Djibuti, and all the arms which, under the Arms Regulations, they were illegally possessed, have been retained by the Government of the Protectorate.

(Signed) CHARLES S. HAMPSON.

Zeyla, August 6, 1900.

Inclosure 14 in No. 1.

Acting Consul Hampson to the Governor of Jibuti.

Excellency, *Zeyla, August* 6, 1900.

WITH reference to your Excellency's letter of the 11th June last on the subject of the adventurers, Messrs. Monat and company, who, in spite of the refusal by

Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for the British Somali Coast of permission to enter British territory, which was communicated to them by your Excellency, disobeyed your orders and persisted in doing so, I have now the honour to inform your Excellency that the adventurers in question, having been arrested in British territory 150 miles from ths coast and brought to Zeyla are herewith, by order of Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, sent to Djibuti to be dealt with as your Excellency may see fit.

The native members of the expedition will be sent by land to the frontier and handed over to the French outposts there.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES S. HAMPSON.

[Confidential]

No. 2141. E. A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

Foreign Department,
Simla;
The 29th October 1900

By order, &c.,
Sd/ J. B. Wood,
Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints,
Section 1, dated the 30th July, 5th and 23rd August, 7th and 17th September, 1900.
Section 2, dated the 28th August and 6th and 10th September, 1900
Section 3, dated the 20th and 30th August and 10th September 1900
Section 5, dated the 13th August, 1900.

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 7914

Political Department
Bombay Castle, 2nd November 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Hudson

Acting Secretary to Government

WP.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Adadleh, July 30, 1900.*

THERE were 20 spare rifles and 7,000 rounds of ammunition with the French caravan. It had no trading goods to speak of, and was short of provisions.

It has been treated as a filibustering expedition; the party is being escorted to Zeyla to be sent on to Jibuti, and all arms and ammunition have been retained. A despatch will follow.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 5.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Hargaisa, August 5, 1900.*

YAO half-battalion embarked on the 21st July; the other half-battalion cannot be spared. The Mullah's followers have raided property from the Protectorate valued at 1,60,000 Indian rupees; there is a panic among our Ishak tribes, and reports are current of further move by Mullah against our tribes.

Our tribes have all deserted their grazing grounds in the Haud, and are cramped up round their water places, and are clamouring for assistance.

The position, owing to the Mullah's movement, is becoming insupportable, and may be critical if it continues. Unless we can soon operate with Abyssinia to suppress the Mullah I shall have to create a diversion by moving with available forces, supported by tribal levies, to punish tribes who are Mullah's principal supporters round Bohotele. This could be safely done, as the Eastern Ishak tribes are friendly and united.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 160.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 23, 1900.

WITH reference to Lord Cromer's despatch No. 84 of the 1st May last, I transmit to you herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter from the War Office, stating that a sum of 100,000*l.* was included in the Supplementary Army Estimate for 1900-1901 for the provision of permanent accommodation for British troops at Khartoum.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

* War Office, August 17, 1900.

[2255 s—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir H. Johnston.

(No. 279. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 7, 1900.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia relative to the question of the delimitation of the frontier between Abyssinia and British East Africa.*

I request you to furnish me, by telegraph, with your observations on the proposals made by the Emperor Menelek.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

* Mr. Harrington, No. 34, May 17; ditto, No. 44, June 16; and ditto, No. 45, June 19, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 150.)

My Lord, *Cairo, September 9, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to report that somewhat earlier in the year it was arranged between Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General and the Belgian Representative in Egypt that in case of the necessity arising certain stores might be forwarded to the Congo Free State stations by the Nile route, without prejudice to the question of an eventual agreement for general transport to the Belgian posts on the Upper Nile.

A steamer was due to leave Khartoum on the 1st instant, and two or three days before that date the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires asked me whether it would be possible to supply from the stores at Omdurman and send up to Reggaf by that steamer 20 tons of rice for the use of the garrison. This went somewhat beyond the spirit of the arrangement above referred to, but having ascertained from the Acting Governor-General of the Soudan that the rice was available and could be spared, but that the departure of the steamer could not be delayed, I instructed Colonel Jackson to comply with the request of the Sovereign of the Indepedendent Congo State, as preferred by the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires, on the understanding that the cost, freight, and all incidental charges would be reimbursed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, August 28, 1900.

WITH regard to the occupation of a post 5 miles north of Kiro, as proposed in my despatch No. 141, I am informed by Colonel Jackson that an expedition can be dispatched any time after the 1st September to this place.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 284. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 6, 1900.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia relative to the question of the delimitation of the frontier between Abyssinia and British East Africa.*

I request you to furnish me, by telegraph, with your observations on the proposals made by the Emperor Menelek.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

* Mr. Harrington, No. 34, May 17: ditto, No. 44, June 16; and ditto, No. 45, June 19, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 10.)

(No. 84. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp, Gubatto, August* 19, 1900.

MR. HAMPSON learns from Jibuti that the notorious Karl (Suleiman) Inger, who was arrested by the French authorities on his arrival there recently, has now been condemned to two years' imprisonment in Jibuti, the charge being understood to be that of defrauding some of his companions in his former expedition.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer and to Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

No. 1.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 20.)

Sir,

War Office, August 17, 1900.

WITH reference to your letter of the 15th May last, forwarding copy of a despatch received from Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, pressing on the Secretary of State for War the necessity for the provision of permanent accommodation for British troops at Khartoum, I am directed to acquaint you, for the information of the Marquess of Salisbury, that a sum of 100,000*l.*, of which 35,000*l.* is for expenditure this financial year, was included in the Supplementary Estimate for Army Services 1900–1901, recently voted by Parliament, and instructions have been issued for the immediate commencement of the works necessary.

2. The question whether any portion of the expense should be recovered from the Egyptian Government will be considered hereafter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) R. H. KNOX.

[2255 *u*—2]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 30.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, August 30, 1900.

WITH regard to the latitude of Kiro, Major Gibbons, who called on me before leaving for England to-morrow, would place it in 4° 21′ north according to his maps. But it has been fixed by our officers as 4° 30′, the Belgians themselves having so located it. There seems, therefore, no objection to our occupying the post 5 to 7 miles north of this place, as suggested in my despatch No. 141.

No. 2.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 30.)

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, August 30, 1900.

BELGIAN Representative here, on instructions from the King, asks if Congo posts can be supplied with twenty tons of rice, to be dispatched at once by the Soudan Government to Reggaf. As it is doubtful if so much rice can be had in Khartoum, I have asked Colonel Jackson whether grain can be supplied, in case there is not sufficient rice.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 10.)

(No. 209.)

My Lord,

Brussels, September 8, 1900.

WITH reference to Sir R. Rodd's telegram No. 97 of the 30th ultimo, copy of which was inclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 103 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that as M. de Cuvelier has never recurred to the subject of forwarding provisions to the Congo State by the Nile route, either with me or Mr. Raikes, I have not communicated to him the contents of your Lordship's despatch No. 97 of the 14th ultimo, stating under what conditions the transport of such provisions would be permitted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. R. PLUNKETT.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 13.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Adadleh, August* 13, 1900.

AT Hargaisa the excitement has been partly allayed by the issue to approved Headmen of a few old rifles to protect the near grazing-grounds.

Before taking any action towards Bohotele I shall submit my proposals.

[2255 *n*—5]

1 S.C. for Pol. Resident at

[Confidential]

No. 2159 E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

Foreign Department,
Simla:
The 2nd November 1900

By order, &c.,
Sdf. H. Daly,
Deputy Secretary to the
Government of India.

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints;
Section 1, dated the 10th and 24th September 1900.
Section 1, dated the 24th September 1900.
Section 2, dated the 24th August and 17th and 21st September 1900
Section 3, dated the 6th September 1900.
Section 4, dated the 24th July 1900.

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 8082

Political Department,
Bombay Castle 9th November 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Lee Warner

Acting Secretary to Government.

Rec'd with letter No 443 of the 28th Sept 1900, from the Asstt Secy, Political Dept, India Office

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 10.)

(No. 146.,

My Lord, *Cairo, September 3, 1900.*

SOME time ago the Italian Agent and Consul-General handed to Lord Cromer a Memorandum embodying various complaints and charges brought by the Governor of Erythræa against the Soudan Administration.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the reply which I have sent to the Italian Agent and Consul-General for communication to M. de Martini.

I have forwarded a copy of this Memorandum, and of the reply to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Pro-Memoriâ.

IL Capitano Talbot, con un buluk di ascari, proveniente da Sabderat e dal Monte Gulsa, risali il Fiume Gasc, senza permesso delle autorità Eritree, rilevando per un estensione di cerca 200 chilom. il territorio Eritreo. Ciò avenne prima che il Colonello Talbot si recasse a Asmara per incontrarsi col Signor Martini.

(Translation.) — Captain Talbot, with a buluk of askaris, coming from Sabderat and Mount Gulsa, ascended the River Gash, without permission of the authorities of Erythræa, traversing some 200 kilom. of Italian territory. This took place before Colonel Talbot proceeded to Asmara to meet Signor Martini.

2.—(*a.*) Sin dall'inizio del loro governo, i Commandanti di Cassala parve tenessero il Gasc quale confine fra il Sudan e l'Eritrea, e reputassero di loro dominio tutto il territorio a sinistra di quel fiume.

(*b.*) Vi nominarono ed armarono capi.

(*c.*) Vi mandarono ascari e guardie, vi esercitarono la giustizia.

Reply.

"CAPITANO TALBOT" was in reality Colonel Talbot, who met Signor Martini at Asmara. After the negotiations at Rome in November 1899, in which it was agreed that the frontier south of Kassala should be reconsidered, Colonel Talbot was sent to Asmara to discuss the question with the Governor of Erythræa. In order that he should be in possession of the necessary information, he was anxious to fix one or two points by observation. It is to be regretted that no previous communication was made to the Governor on this subject, and that it should have been assumed, after the negotiations at Rome, that the region in question could be regarded as debatable land. His escort only consisted of two non-commissioned officers and twelve askaris.

2.—(*a.*) Colonel Collinson, the Commandant of Kassala, replies that the only jurisdiction he has ever exercised in any of the country between the Gash and the Atbara has been over the Hamran Arabs, who lie south of the Tomat-Todluc line, the limit towards the south of Italian territory, according to the admission of the Italian Government. This tribe, who live on the north bank of the Setit, have been allowed five rifles, and their Sheikh has been instructed to prevent illegal hunting of game.

(*b.*) No other arms have been issued to any other tribe.

(*c.*) No soldiers or guards have ever been sent into the country, and the Commandant has not exercised judicial functions in that district.

Pro-memoriâ.

(*d.*) Imposero dazii alle caravane.

(*e.*) Ultimamente i pastori Beni-Amer che vi pascolavano furono ammoniti che o tornassero nel territorio Eritreo o si assoggetassero al pagamento del tributo.

(Translation.) — (*a.*) From the beginning of their administration, the Commandants of Kassala seem to have looked upon the Gash as the boundary between the Soudan and Erythræa, and considered as within their domain all the territory left of that river.

(*b.*) They appointed and armed Sheikhs.

(*c.*) They sent askaris and guards; they exercised jurisdiction there.

(*d.*) They imposed taxes on caravans.

(*e.*) Finally, the Beni Amer shepherds who graze there were warned that they must either return to Erythræan territory or they would be subjected to the payment of tribute.

3. Il Commandante del distaccamento di Taclai conferma che al confine Anglo-Egiziano si fa propaganda perche i pastori abbandonino il territoiro Eritreo per popolare quello dipendente da Souakin. Ad invogliarne l'esodo si e sparsa la voce che il Governo Anglo-Egiziano ha tolto ogni tassa per quest'anno, e gia alcuni Rasciaida-Baratieh se ne son andati.

(Translation.)—3. The Commander of the detachment at Taclai confirms the information that on the Anglo-Egyptian border a propaganda is carried on to induce shepherds to abandon Erythræan territory and colonize the Soudan. To encourage the exodus a rumour has been spread that the Anglo-Egyptian Government have remitted all taxation this year, and already certain of the Rashaida Baratieh have crossed over.

4. Gli ascari Anglo-Egiziani del posto di Carora eccitano il movimento emigratorio. Si possono citare parecchi testimoni e vittime di imposizioni indebitamente fatte da quei funzionarii sovra sudditi Italiani, che, secondo essi, avevano passate il confine.

(Translation.)—4. The askaris of the Anglo-Egyptian post of Carora provoke this emigration. Evidence can be cited and victims produced who have suffered from the impositions of these functionaries, although Italian subjects, because it was alleged they had crossed the frontier.

Reply.

(*d.*) No taxes have been levied on caravans in that district to the Commandant's knowledge.

(*e.*) Colonel Collinson denies *in toto* that Beni Amer shepherds have either been warned to return to Erythræan territory or threatened with taxation.

This charge seems all the more uncalled-for inasmuch as the whole of the Kassala district has for several months been overrun with Beni Amer tribesmen grazing their flocks and herds without any interference whatever; whereas, under the Martini-Parsons Agreement, any tribes crossing into Erythræan territory have been called upon to pay heavily for the privilege of so doing.

During March and April last Colonel Collinson reports having personally seen as many as 5,000 in one evening, the property of Italian Beni Amers, being watered within 3 miles of Kassala.

It might have been expected that reciprocal treatment should have been adopted, but these tribes have hitherto been allowed to graze freely; the charge brought against the authorities at Kassala is the more incomprehensible.

3. Colonel Collinson knows nothing of any attempts being made to induce Arab shepherds to abandon Erythræan territory, and has never countenanced any such proceedings in any way.

Last year a section of the Rashaida Arabs came from Akik and settled on the Atbara, but Colonel Collinson had previously known the Sheikh of this section of the tribe at Tokar and Akik, and concludes that they are Egyptian subjects.

4. To this charge Colonel Collinson replies:—

"With the exception of fifteen men at the depôt at Kassala, all the askaris of the Arab battalion were at Gedaref and Galabat from October 1899 to April 1900, and not in touch in any way with Italian subjects, I therefore fail to see how they can be accused of inciting this emigrant movement."

Pro-memoriâ.

5. Per l'accordo doganale fra l'Eritrea ed il Sudan, le merci che dall' Eritrea entrano per la via di Cassala nel territorio Anglo-Egiziano debbono essere gravate di un dazio dell' 8 per cento *ad valorem*, da calcolarsi secondo le bollette di origine. Invece, sino a giorni recenti, il Commandante di Cassala volle calcolato il valore delle merci secondo il loro costo al giungere nella dogana: volle, cioè, che l' 8 per cento si computasse aggiungendo al valore loro assegnato nelle bollette il prezzo del trasporte traverso il mare e l'Eritrea, contrariamente allo spirito ed alla lettera di quell'accordo. Con quest'accordo si volle difatti stabilito che le merci provenienti dall'Eritrea fossero gravate dei medesimi dazii che s'imponevano alle altro provenienti da Suakin. Pero in seguito alle proteste dei negozianti Italiani, Arabi, e Greci, le autorità Anglo-Egiziane cessarono di applicare tale erroneo sistema.

(Translation.)—5. Under the Customs Agreement between Erythræa and the Soudan, goods which enter Anglo-Egyptian territory from Erythræa by the Kassala route should be assessed for duty at a rate of 8 per cent. *ad valorem*, to be calculated according to their certificates of origin. Instead of this, up till recently the Commandant at Kassala insisted on calculating the value of the goods according to their cost on arrival at the custom-house, that is to say, the cost of sea transport and of transport across Erythræa, contrary to the spirit and the letter of that Agreement. It was intended by this Agreement to establish that the goods sent from Erythræa should be weighted with the same duties as those coming from Suakin. However, in consequence of the protests of Italian, Arab, and Greek merchants the Anglo-Egyptian authorities have ceased to apply this mistaken treatment.

Reply.

Further: "With the exception of a small post at Abu Gamal, 15 miles from Kassala, on the Gash, and Colonel Talbot's escort mentioned above, no askaris have been sent anywhere on the Erythræan frontier."

Colonel Collinson asks to be furnished with particulars of the instances which can be cited of taxation being unduly levied on Italian subjects by "these functionaries;" and states that this cannot have been done either by askaris or Government officials, as in the first place, they have had no opportunity of doing so; and, secondly, no taxes at all have been collected in the district up to date.

5. The Customs Agreement between Erythræa and the Soudan provides that goods, which are not the *bonâ fide* produce of the Colony of Erythræa, shall pay on entering the Soudan no higher duties than those payable under the Egyptian Tariff for the time being in force on the importation into Egypt of the like goods coming from any third country.

Now, the Egyptian Tariff is at the present time 8 per cent. *ad valorem*, calculated on the estimated value of the goods, *plus* the cost of freight and insurance. The Commandant at Kassala has, therefore, only applied the system in force in Egypt and universally adopted in assessing *ad valorem* duties.

Neither Article 1 nor Article 2 of the Agreement, which deal with the Tariff on produce not specially reserved, make any mention of certificates of origin. These are only referred to in Article 7, which governs the procedure in the case of goods in transit.

Colonel Collinson states that the merchants in Kassala who obtain goods from Massowah are all agents or branches of Massowah firms. They receive in Kassala mixed consignments of all sorts of articles, and it would be almost impossible for these to be accompanied by certificates of origin. The value of the articles, with a view to assessing the *ad valorem* duty, is determined at Kassala by a Board of merchants who meet and draw up a price list of all articles imported from Erythræa, which is revised every three months. A similar system prevails in Egypt for such goods as fluctuate constantly in price.

Pro-memoria.

6. Infine, le autorità Anglo-Egiziane, allegando necessità di governo, sequestrano i cammelli delle caravane Eritree quando giungono a Cassala: ciò che ha per effetto d'intracalciare il commercio fra l'Eritrea e il Sudan.

(Translation.)—6. Finally the Anglo-Egyptian authorities, alleging reasons of state, have sequestered camels belonging to Erythræan caravans, on their arrival in Kassala. This impedes the freedom of commerce between Erythræa and the Soudan.

Reply.

6. No case of the impressing of camels for Government work has occurred since February 1899, when a certain number of camels were required for telegraph construction, and paid for at market rates. A similar complaint was preferred last year by Colonel Trombi. The complaint was duly dealt with at the time, and as no case has occurred since, it is not understood why the charge is now revived.

From January to April of the current year Beni Amer camelmen were constantly applying to the Commandant for work for their camels. It is possible that this may have led to misrepresentations being made to the Governor, but it is quite untrue that the camels of Erythræan caravans have been impressed by the Government.

Cairo, September 2, 1900.

Rec'd with letter No 449 J. the 5th Oct 1900, from the Asst Secy, Coll & Dcpt, India Office

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September* 24, 1900.

I APPROVE the proposal, contained in your despatch No. 141 of the 20th ultimo, that a small Anglo-Egyptian post should be established about 5 miles north of Kiro, on the left bank of the Nile.

Instructions should be given to the officer charged with the establishment of the post not to discuss the question of territorial rights with the officers of the Congo State. If approached on the subject he should state that he has no authority to discuss such questions, which are subjects for negotiations at Brussels or London. Should any allusion be made to Major Peake's communication to M. Chaltin during his visit to Regaf, the officer should say that, so far as he is aware, Major Peake was equally without authority to enter upon the discussion of questions of this nature.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 48. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Harrar, June* 25, 1900.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 40 of the 30th May and previous correspondence, I have the honour to report that I have had several further conversations with the Emperor on the subject of the French Railway Concession. I have been most careful in pointing out to His Majesty that my objection to the Concession was not that it was in French hands, but because it was a monopoly of railway construction in Abyssinia.

In the course of conversation, His Majesty remarked that a railway could be made elsewhere without infringing the Concession already given. I replied that the only possible lines that could be made would be to the British Somaliland frontier, which would necessitate a line from Berbera, and to the Soudan frontier. So far as the former line was concerned, I doubted whether he could offer any inducements to people to take the matter up with a competing line so near, and as for the latter, the distance was so great that I doubted the possibility of obtaining the requisite capital.

His Majesty, pointing to Fazokl on the map, said, "But you are going to bring the Soudan railway there; why should you not make a railway from there to Adis Ababa?"

I remarked that so far as I knew there was no immediate intention on the part of the Egyptian Government to extend the Soudan railways beyond Abu Harras, and that it was likewise very uncertain when this extension would take place. I further added that, from my knowledge of the finances of the Soudan, there was not the remotest possibility of any extension of the Soudan railways to the Abyssinian frontier within the near future.

His Majesty remarked that a railway could be made from his capital to Fazokl, and that from there goods could be carried by boats to the sea.

I replied that it was doubtful whether, with the disadvantages that such transhipment entailed, and the expenses that railway construction from Fazokl to the capital would entail, His Majesty would be able to offer sufficient inducements to any English capitalists to construct a line.

His Majesty said he would offer coal Concessions and further gold Concessions, and from his remarks led me to believe that if necessary he would grant land concessions and a right to levy 5 per cent. on the traffic till it was found the line would pay. He has given me a specimen of the coal, which appears to me to be lignite, for analysis.

I explained to His Majesty, to the best of my ability, the advantages and disadvantages of a railway, pointing out that my opinion on the railway Concession was valueless, and that he ought to have legal opinion on his Concession. I further added that the amount of capital that would be necessary to connect up with the Soudan railways would be so large, that I doubted whether there was any chance of interesting English capitalists in the matter; moreover, that I had no desire, considering the opposition which would be raised to any such scheme were it known that His Majesty was inclined to seriously consider it, to have anything to do with the matter. Moreover, I told him that unless he had perfect confidence in the good intentions of the British Government and their desire to see Abyssinia remain independent, I personally advised him to leave the question of railway connection with the Soudan alone.

His Majesty declared that he had every confidence in our good intentions towards him and his country, and that he desired me to obtain him a legal opinion on the Concession already granted which would show its advantages and disadvantages, and to inquire whether any English capitalists would consider the scheme of railway connection with the Soudan.

I replied that I should do what he wished, though I had very little hopes that any capitalists would seriously consider the scheme, and still less that if they would that His

Majesty would, in face of the arguments that would be brought to bear on him, carry the matter to a conclusion.

This suggestion His Majesty indignantly repudiated. I must admit that there seems to me to be an extremely remote probability of any first-class capitalists, none other must be allowed to do business in Abyssinia, seriously considering the question of linking up Abyssinia with the Soudan railways, when the length of line to be constructed is taken into consideration.

There is, however, a very slight chance that if the mineral deposits along the western edge of the Abyssinian plateau are valuable, the Syndicate who possess mining Concessions in the Beni Schongul country might be inclined to study the question, particularly so, because such a line would tap a tremendously fertile country and one capable of immense development.

In any case, I venture to suggest that a legal opinion on the French Railway Concession should be prepared for His Majesty, as there is a possibility of finding a flaw in the Concession which would enable us to construct a line from Berbera to Harrar, should we desire to do so at any future date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 17.)

(No. 149. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Cairo, September* 8, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to point out that in the map which was handed to your Lordship by the Italian Ambassador on the 7th July last, in illustration of Italian claims between Sabderat, Todluc, and the Atbara (North-East Africa and Soudan Print, Section No. 1, of the 7th July) I notice that the portion of territory inclosed between the Tomat–Todluc line, the Setit and the Soudan–Abyssinian frontier, is described in the note at the top left-hand corner of the map as "territory which will remain to England after the conclusion of the Agreement with Ethiopia."

It is the use of the future tense in this case to which I venture to draw your Lordship's attention.

Although no actual delimitation has yet taken place with Abyssinia, Her Majesty's Government have signified to the Emperor Menelek that the line proposed by him after negotiation with Captain Harrington is generally accepted, and for administrative purposes the Soudan Government have acted as though the frontier were now definitely agreed upon, and exercise authority up to the approximate limits of that frontier. The same prevails on the Abyssinian side.

This frontier-line was communicated to the Italian Government in November last, and an exchange of notes took place at Rome in which the Italian Government recognized the modification which this arrangement would entail in the arrangements effected by the Anglo-Italian Protocol of the 15th April, 1891.

I submit, therefore, that we are now entitled to consider this territory as definitely under the Soudan Government, and not as conditioned by an eventual Delimitation Agreement with Menelek, and would point out that in any case, the Italian Government having notified to us, before we began to negotiate with Menelek, that the southern limit of the territory which they claimed was the Tomat–Todluc line, we are entitled to consider any connection between this territory and the Government of Erythræa as definitely sundered.

My reason for drawing attention to this small matter of detail in the Italian map is not only that Colonel Talbot was given to understand by the Governor of Erythræa at Asmara that his Excellency was extremely vexed at the recognition accorded by the Italian Government to the claims of the Soudan to this small piece of territory, but that in a recent Memorandum of frontier grievances forwarded here by M. de Martini, it is complained that the Soudan authorities have appointed and armed Chiefs in Italian territory between the Gash and the Atbara. Now the only district where any Chiefs have been appointed or armed is in that occupied by the Hamran tribe on the north bank of the Setit and south of the Tomat–Todluc line. This would appear to indicate that M. de Martini still contests the right of the Soudanese Government to exercise administrative functions in the triangle referred to, south of the Tomat–Todluc line.

It is true that on the Italian map the "Hamran" are marked as occupying the north side of the Tomat–Todluc line, but this, like several other details in this map, is, according to our information, quite incorrect, the old-established seat of the Hamran being on the banks of the Setit. No doubt at times they may range northwards and crossed beyond the Tomat–Todluc ideal line, which is likely to be a fruitful source of difficulties in the future, but the Setit is their proper country.

I venture to submit, therefore, that it might be desirable to notify to the Italian Government, with reference to this map, in which it is implied that the claim of the Soudan Government to the territory in question is conditioned by an eventual agreement with Ethiopia; that such agreement is considered by Her Majesty's Government as having been arrived at in so far as the boundary with the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan is concerned, and that the Soudanese Government consequently claim entire jurisdiction south of the Tomat–Todhuc line.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Lord Currie.

(No. 101.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 21, 1900.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch from the Acting British Agent and Consul-General at Cairo relative to the proceedings of Sheikh Hasaballa,* whom the Italian authorities have placed in charge of the district south of Kassala, between the Rivers Gash and Atbara, which has formed the subject of recent negotiations.

According to the Memorandum of the Commandant of Kassala, inclosed in Sir R. Rodd's despatch, Hasaballa has this year attempted unsuccessfully to make a dam across the Gash, in order to divert its waters into Italian territory, and it is rumoured that the attempt is to be renewed next year.

As the execution of such a project would deprive Kassala and a great part of the Eastern Soudan of their water supply, I should wish you to make a serious representation to the Italian Government in regard to this matter.

You should point out to them that the Gash being a tributary of the Atbara, Article III of the Anglo-Italian Protocol of the 15th April, 1891, by which the Italian Government engaged not to construct on the Atbara, in view of irrigation, any work which might sensibly modify its flow into the Nile, is applicable to the Gash, and you should request them to forbid any interference with that river until an opportunity has been afforded to the technical advisers of the Egyptian and Soudanese Governments to express an opinion on any project which it may be proposed to execute.

It would also be desirable that you should call the attention of the Italian Government to the character and antecedents of Hasaballa, in regard to which information is furnished in Colonel Collinson's Memorandum.

Sir R. Rodd points out the difficulties of the authorities of the Soudan in dealing with the tribes on the Italian frontier and the importance of friendly co-operation between the Italian and Soudanese authorities, which is rendered very difficult by the appointment of such a man as Hasaballa to command a frontier post.

Your Excellency should represent these considerations to the Italian Government, and suggest to them the advisability of removing Hasaballa.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

---

* Sir R. Rodd, No. 143, Confidential, August 24, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Anglo-Belgian Africa Company and British Tropical Africa Company to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 6.)

Sir, 46, *Leadenhall Street, London, September* 5, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th August addressed to the Secretaries of the two above-named Companies of the Joint Board, of which I am the Chairman, stating that Lord Salisbury regrets that, having regard to circumstances recorded, he cannot undertake to support or to recommend to the Egyptian authorities attempts to utilize the Concessions mentioned in our communication of the 1st August, in so far as they apply to territories lying within the basin of the Upper Nile.

I trust that the Secretary of State may be pleased to reconsider his opinion of the circumstances of the case when further facts and arguments have been submitted to him, and it would seem proper for me on behalf of the Joint Board of the Companies to state the grounds on which the validity of the Concessions made to them seem to be based, leaving any further political considerations, with which we are not competent to deal and with which we are not directly concerned, to be the subject of discussion between His Majesty King Leopold II, Sovereign of the Independent State of the Congo, and the British Government, should such seem desirable and necessary.

I have first the honour to observe that the Agreement between Great Britain and His Majesty King Leopold II, granting the lease of the territories on the Upper Nile, having been concluded on the 12th May, 1894, and the transfer of commercial rights to the English concessionnaire taking effect on the 1st August, 1894, while the Convention between France and the Congo Free State is dated the 14th August, 1894, it is clear that the English Concession is in no way affected by the French Convention which subsequently bound the Free State to renounce for itself occupation or political influence, in the future, in certain districts.

The English Concession could not be unfavourably affected by an agreement made subsequent to the grant of its rights and having special reference to the future alone, even supposing that those rights formed any part of the subject of the Convention, which they do not, seeing that the Anglo-Belgian Companies were formed for commercial, industrial, and agricultural purposes alone, and have neither occupation, administration, nor political influence.

Your letter notices that Her Majesty's Government have been kept in complete ignorance of these Concessions; but I would respectfully venture to observe that if the Congo State and His Majesty were acting within their legal and unquestioned rights, acquired under the Convention with England, there was no advantange to or obligation on the English concessionnaire to refer to the Foreign Office, seeing that the rights under the Concession were necessarily dormant until the recent pacification of the Soudan.

When order had been fully restored, the Anglo-Belgian Companies were founded on the English Concession, and I hastened, on their behalf, to solicit the assistance of Her Majesty's Government in carrying out commercial schemes which will materially benefit the revenues of the Egyptian Soudan.

The sound legal position of these Companies with regard to the British Government and His Majesty King Leopold II would thus seem unquestionable, and they would not be adversely affected by any of those political considerations which are discussed in your letter, the principal one being a question of the validity of Concessions which might seem to have been, by implication, formally renounced in the Convention between France and the Congo Free State of the 14th August, 1894, in pursuance of which Agreement the Sovereign of the Congo Free State might be thought justified in cancelling at once any Concessions which might have been granted by him for territories lying to the west or north of the line specified in the Convention. This question may possibly form the subject of some modification of the Agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the Sovereign of the Congo Free State. I am not in a position to

discuss it, not possessing full knowledge of the correspondence which may have been already exchanged; but, in order to justify the existence of the Companies above named, and my own position as their Chairman and representative, you will, perhaps, permit me to state, as briefly as possible, the argument which convinced me, and the eminent lawyers to whom I referred the case, after the most careful examination of such material as was available, that the original lease of the British Government remained valid, and carried with it the validity of the English Concession.

I would, first, respectfully join issue with a possibly misunderstood assumption which seems to underlie the penultimate and ante-penultimate paragraphs of your letter that the victory of Omdurman has in any way affected the rights of Egypt or the validity of the lease. That important event has probably enhanced the value of the territories leased by England and commercially conceded by His Majesty, but the rights of Egypt remain such as they were on the 12th May, 1894, when the lease was signed, and the supplementary assurance not to ignore those rights was recorded. They cannot revive in full force within the territories covered by the lease, because they are by its provisions temporarily suspended, unless it be argued that the Convention of the 12th May, 1894, is altogether abrogated. The reiteration of the rights of the Egyptian Government add nothing to their force. They have never been disputed, and will only revive when the conditions of the lease have been fulfilled.

The Agreement of the 12th May, 1894, between Great Britain and His Majesty the King of the Belgians was concluded for reasons of convenience fully set forth in the Earl of Kimberley's despatch to Mr. Hardinge of the 23rd May, 1894. Germany and France at once objected to its provisions. The former disapproved of the lease of territory by the Congo State to Great Britain between Lake Tanganyika and Lake Albert Edward, uniting the two British spheres of influence, and Article III was consequently withdrawn, under agreement with the Congo Free State, in the Declaration of the 22nd June, 1894. France objected to the lease to the Congo State of the territories of the Bahr-el-Ghazal, which she had long coveted, and which she was then engaged in endeavouring to effectively occupy.

It is asserted that had Great Britain supported the Congo Free State, and insisted on the maintenance of the Agreement of the 12th May, 1894, as against France, the Boundary Agreement between these States of the 14th August would never have been concluded. But this support not having been given, and the Congo Free State being unable alone to withstand French pressure, the Agreement was signed, and was duly notified to Her Majesty's Government.

However this may be, I have failed to find in the documents which have been published any denunciation of the original lease in consequence of the Convention between the Congo Free State and France, to which Great Britain was not a party, and with which she, consequently, had no concern. It might, superficially, be argued that the Agreement with France bound the Congo State to abstain from political action in certain districts; but, on the other hand, the lease with Great Britain was not affected by an Agreement to which she was not a party, and to which she had never objected, while both by silence and by subsequent action she has allowed its continual validity. In confirmation of this I would refer to the official collection of Treaties of Sir Edward Hertslet, K.C.B., second edition, vol. iii, of 1896, which contains the Agreement of the 12th March, 1894, with its modification of the 22nd June, 1894, and the Franco-Congo Agreement of the 14th August, 1894, and the official map of the territories under the lease at p. 1008, but does not notice that, as between the Congro Free State and Great Britain, the lease was subject to any further modification than that of the 22nd June, 1894.

The battle of Omdurman; the collapse of the Mahdi's power; the dispute with France over Fashoda and the subsequent Convention of the 21st March, 1899, with Great Britain, strengthen and not weaken the original lease. For whatever the pretensions of France may have been in 1894 in the Bahr-el-Ghazal, she absolutely renounced them in 1899, and it is impossible that Great Britain should allow her to interfere again within the territories which were the subject of the lease. Moreover, and this is a point to which the highest significance must be attached, the validity of the lease has been expressly affirmed by Lord Salisbury himself in his despatch of the 6th October, 1898, to the Ambassador at Paris, wherein he writes:—

"The next warning was given by the Agreement with the King of the Belgians which gave him, for his lifetime, up to Fashoda, and which Agreement is in existence and full force still. It has never been cancelled and never repudiated by this country. It was true that the King of the Belgians was persuaded, without any consent on the part of Great Britain, to promise the French Government that he would not take

advantage of it beyond a certain limit; but that concession on his part did not diminish the act as an assertion of her rights by England."

Seeing that Articles 2 and 3 of the Agreement were the only Articles of importance or which stood independently, and that Article 3 was withdrawn by special agreement with England, it would seem reasonable to infer that Lord Salisbury's assertion that the Agreement was in existence and full force, and had never been cancelled or repudiated by this country referred to Article 2, which concerns the lease under which the Anglo-Belgian Africa Company and the British Tropical Africa Company hold their Concessions.

Even should the Convention of the 14th August, 1894, be held to influence in any way the action of Her Majesty's Government, it can in no way limit or annul the rights of the concessionnaires which were acquired previously, as its prohibition is alone concerned with the political action of the Congo Free State, and does not affect commercial and non-political engagements made with private individuals or Associations.

Consequently, the Joint Board of the two Companies would most respectfully solicit a further consideration of what they must maintain to be their rightful and indefeasible claims from Her Majesty's Secretary of State.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LEPEL GRIFFIN.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Harrington to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received July* 24.)

(No. 40. Secret.)

My Lord, *Addis Abbaba, May* 30, 1900.

IN the course of discussion with His Majesty King Menelek on the subject of the southern frontier, among the remarks made by me was one to the effect that the natural objection which would be raised against any cession of territory south of the 6th degree north to him, was why should the English Government cede territory which they claimed, to him, when he had placed practically the whole future commercial development of his country into the hands of the French.

His Majesty asked me what I meant and I referred him to the Railway Concession granted to M. Ilg, and sold by the latter to a French Company. So far as my knowledge went of the Concession, it was a monopoly of all railway construction in Abyssinia. Moreover, the Concession would naturally cause English people to remark, in case of our recognizing his claims south of the 6th degree, why should we cede territory to him when he had deliberately cut off all trade between Harrar and British possessions, on the Somali Coast. His Majesty replied that the Concession was not a monopoly, and that he had no intention of interfering with British trade.

I read to His Majesty the terms of the Concession as published by the prospectus issued by the Railway Company, and His Majesty denied the correctness of Article 3, stating that he had only written in the Concession that no other railway would be permitted "near" the French railway, and that he had never intended a monopoly. His Majesty sent for the original Concession, photographs of which I have taken, and a literal translation is herewith inclosed.

Your Lordship will be able to compare this with the French translation furnished your Lordship in despatch No. 498, Confidential, of the 22nd July, 1897, from Her Majesty's Ambassador in Paris. The whole question turns on the translation of a word; the Amharic version reads "near," whereas the French version reads "competing," and in this way resembles the Ucialli Treaty.

On comparison of the French text with the Amharic text, I informed His Majesty that I failed to see that there was any very great licence in translating the Amharic word in question, "concurrentes," considering that the concessionnaire had specified the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and White Nile. To me it was apparent that the concessionnaire had intended a monopoly, otherwise he would not have defined these limites; moreover, the prospectus of the Railway Company declared that the Company had a monopoly of all railways in Abyssinia. Further, a Havas telegram from Jibuti had been published in the press purporting to emanate from His Majesty, officially declaring that the monopoly of railways in Abyssinia had been given to a French Company, and that it was consequently impossible for him to take into consideration any further applications for Railway Concessions (*vide* Sir E. Monson's despatch No. 500, of the 23rd July, 1897).

Thus everything known to the public confirmed me in looking on the Concession as a monopoly, and everything published by the Company proved that they considered themselves in possession of a monopoly.

I briefly pointed out to His Majesty how the Concession was detrimental, not only to his interests, but also to both the English and Italian Governments, who saw all chance of their subjects sharing in the future development of Abyssinia debarred them.

With regard to trade between British Somaliland and Harrar, I drew His Majesty's attention to Article 10 of the Concession. His Majesty declared that he never intended a monopoly, and had never given authority for any such telegrams as mentioned by me to be sent. He said M. Ilg was his servant, and that he would have the Concession altered.

I pointed out to His Majesty that it was no longer M. Ilg he had to deal with, but the French Company to whom the Concession had been sold, and that the probability

was that in any dealings with the Company he would find the French Government behind them.

He at once remarked that if the Government entered into the question, the Concession would, by this very fact, be annulled. I drew his attention to the fact that no mention of this was made in the Concession, and explained to him the attitude of Governments as regards the investments of their subjects in foreign countries such as his, and that everything tended to prove that the French Government were considerably interested in this Concession. I may here remark that it was apparent that his view of the interest likely to be taken by Governments, where their subjects were concerned, has never been explained to His Majesty.

His Majesty said he would discuss the subject again with me on his return from Bulga.

There seems no doubt, from the preoccupation of the King on the subject of the Railway Concession, that he never realized what he was signing. Subsequent to my remarks on the subject, he sent one of his Chamberlains to my Italian colleague to discuss the Concession, and has also spoken to him on the same subject. He also asked my interpreter to come to Bulga to compare the French translation with the Amharic text. I allowed my interpreter, M. Beru, to go to Bulga, and he reports that he had three long conversations with the King, who is extremely preoccupied with the Concession.

The King may ask the assistance of English capitalists, and as there is a possibility that the question as to whether the Concession is a monopoly may give rise to strained relations with France, which I have cautioned the King about, and which I shall use every endeavour to prevent, it seems to me that the time has come when both the English and Italian Governments, who are interested in the preservation of an independent Abyssinia, must decide as to their attitude concerning the French Railway Concession. The clauses of the Concession which seem to me to particularly affect British interests are Articles 3, 9, and 10. The last Article is difficult to reconcile with Article III of the Treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia, of the 14th May, 1897, and might possibly be so interpreted as to give a commercial monopoly of Abyssinia to Jibuti.

The Concession is open to many objections, the chief of which, to my mind, is that it appears to be of a negative rather than a positive order. It is intended in the restraint of enterprise and with a political object, if I rightly understand the attitude of the French Government, as represented by its Minister here, and not in the furtherance of international intercourse, commercial growth, and the independence of Abyssinia.

A remark recently made with reference to the railway by Prince Henry d'Orléans in a Conference at Marseilles is significant, and may be taken as the views of the advanced French Colonial party. "Le chemin de fer du Harrar qui s'achère (parce qu'il est poussé par une idée) nous permettra alors de commander la Vallee du Nil."

I have reliable authority for stating that M. Lagarde, French Minister here, who is now *en route* for the coast, has received intimation of the King's changed attitude towards the Railway Concession. He has been inquiring whether M. Cheffneux (Joint Concessionnaire with M. Ilg) has arrived at Jibuti, and giving orders that if he has, that it is most important that he should see him.

I have, &e.
(Signed) J. L. HARRINGTON.

Inclosure in No. 1.

(Seal of the Emperor.)

Concession for the Railway to be laid from Jibuti to Harrar.

ARTICLE 1. His Majesty King Menelek II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, has given permission to M. Alfred Ilg, the engineer, to build a railway in the name of the King of Kings of Ethiopia, by gathering a Government Company, from Jibuti to Harrar, Harrar to Entoto, and from Entoto to Kaffa and the White Nile.

Art. 2. But if all these roads are to be examined into, or are to be begun, or to be built, they are to be divided into three different parts :—

1. Jibuti to Harrar.
2. Harrar to Entoto.
3. Entoto to Kaffa and the White Nile.

But this present Agreement is only to the laying of a railway from Jibuti to Harrar.

Art. 3. This Railway Concession is given for ninety-nine years, beginning from the day the construction of the railroad is finished, and from the time the train begins to run; but Concession will be made for each road (*i.e.*. section) apart.

But, on the side of the Indian Ocean, and from the Red Sea to Ethiopia, and from Ethiopia to the White Nile, we have agreed that near our railway no other Company should lay a railway.

Art. 4. The Company who have got this Railway Concession which is to make a railway from Jibuti to Harrar, if they do not begin (the work) before the elapse of two years from the date of this Concession, our Agreement is annulled.

Art. 5. From the time this road begins until the Concession period ends, the Company will have to look after the trains and the railway material properly.

Unless something urgent compels them, they cannot stop the train from going to and fro.

Art. 6. The Company who is holding this road will have to lay telegraph wires along this road at their own expense, and find all the necessary workers for dispatching messages.

This Telegraph Company is to send all messages sent by the Ethiopian Government free of charge. But the public will have to pay for the use of the wire according to what will be settled hereafter. But if the first wire laid is not sufficient, the Company will have to lay another line as far as the railway goes.

Art. 7. The Company, without a letter from the King of Kings of Ethiopia, cannot take to and fro troops and war material.

But if it should be found that they had done so without a letter, they will have to give the railway to the Ethiopian Government. The troops and war material of the Ethiopian Government shall pay for their transport to and fro at the rate agreed upon by the King of Kings of Ethiopia and the Company ; and the tariff for the King of Kings of Ethiopia will be less than to other people, but in time of war troops and war material will be carried to and fro free of charge.

Art. 8. But tariff rates for the public and for the things that go to and fro will be according to what the Company arranges ; but when they arrange it they cannot put the tariff rates more than what it is now, but they are to lessen it.

Art. 9. Until now the taxes levied at Harrar for His Majesty, at the rate of 5 per cent., does not exceed 1,000,000 fr., therefore to hurry the work of the railway, and so as to pay the interest on the money spent, His Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia has granted to the Company to levy a commission of 10 per cent. on all goods that go and come by rail.

But this commission which we have mentioned in the 9th Article, if the Company's profits come up to 2,500,000 fr., they shall only draw a commission of 5 per cent.; if the profits for one year come up to 3,000,000 fr., the commission will be altogether stopped.

If the income of the Company of one year's tariff, without including the tax, exceed over 3,000,000 fr., the Company will have to give half the sum of the profit which is over to the Ethiopian Government.

Art. 10. His Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia will give orders that all goods that go down from Harrar and come up from Jibuti should go by rail. In all places, if goods are found which enter, the Government tax collector will have to watch and take the tax at the place.

Art. 11. His Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia will measure out land on both sides, and give the ground to the Company to lay the railway, all along with its woods and stones and water. Its width in the desert (the word used also means "uninhabited place") shall be 1,000 metres.

Art. 12. His Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia will see that the railway is not touched, and the Company will carry the trrops that guard it without pay.

Art. 13. His Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia will not levy tax on all the different material the Company gathers for this work, whether from the country or from other country. As long as the railway is in the hands of the Company all the necessary

1 S.C. for Pol. Resident at

coal and material the Company can bring in without being taxed as we have mentioned here before.

Art. 14. When the period of this Concession ends, such things as the rails and material, all which are fixed permanently, will pass over without price to the Ethiopian Government; but for the train cars and provisions for the train, the Ethiopian Government has to pay their price before they take them.

Art. 15. For this Concession the Company will give to His Majesty King Menelek II 100,000 dollars, but His Majesty will receive for the amount of this sum shares in the railway.

Written in the city of Addis Ababba, the 9th May, 1894.

This Concession, which speaks His Majesty's permission, I agree to it (or I have received).

(Signed) ALFRED ILG.

o

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 24.)

(No. 152.)

My Lord, *Cairo, September* 11, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 136 of the 9th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a detailed report by Major Smyth, V.C., commanding at Rosaires, on the slave raids from the Abyssinian border into Dar Fung.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Report by Major Smyth, V.C., on the Slave-raids from the Abyssinian Border into Dar Fung.

THE following raids on Dar Fung have been reported by the Mamur, Dar Fung :—

1. In October 1899 against the Burun Hills near J. Surkum. Raiders comprised a few Abyssinians, with riflemen from Asoza district, under Mohammed Ali Mussa Hamdi. They took slaves and durra. Report was furnished by Sheikh Idris, of Dar Fung, who was apprised of the raiding by fugitives from Surkum. Corroborated by a letter from Mek. Regeb Hussein (El Badeiro), of Famaka, sent to Commandant, Rosaires, in June 1900, and by Ahmed Agha, of Fazoghli, who wrote that the raid was against the hills of Sheikh Idris.

2. In March 1900 against the hills of the Burun tribe, including Surkum, Wadaga, and against J. Tabi, of the Inkassana tribe. Raiders were from Asoza district under Ibrahim Mahmoud Hamdi. Abyssinians do not seem to have been actively engaged. The Burun made a counter-attack by night, and recaptured a few slaves.

Particulars were given Sheikh Idris while he was touring through the Burun country in April. Corroborated by Ahmed Agha, of Fazoghli, in June 1900, and by the Mek of Famaka.

3. In May 1900 against the Burun in Surkum neighbourhood. Raiders were from Asoza, armed with rifles under Ibrahim Mahmoud Hamdi. Reported by Sheikh Idris' Wakil, who was left with the Burun in the south of Dar Fung.

4. At the end of June 1900 against the Burun Hills; 50 rifles, under Hamed Mahmoud Hamdi, from Asoza, took 50 Burun slaves. Afterwards with 100 rifles he took 180 slaves from Gumgum. The Abyssinians took the young men slaves as tribute; the remainder were sold to Arab traders. Reported at Guli by Ali Matwali, a well-known merchant, on the 13th July.

5. 16th, 17th, and 18th July, 1900, raid on the Fung at Jebel Silak, 30 miles south of Dar Fung Police-post. Raiders were about 200 Inkassana from Jebel Bedali, with 4 rifles and about 6 horses. They surprised the quarantine post of Sheikh Idris' Jehadia, and captured a number of women and children, who were retaken next day. The Fung, however, lost over 40 killed, their Sheikh and many more wounded, and 60 rifles with very little ammunition. The raiders left 20 dead. Report by Sheikh Idris' men. Corroborated by natives of J. Buk, to Commandant, Rosaires, the 7th August.

(Signed) N. M. SMYTH, *Bimbashi*,
Commandant, Rosaires.

August 9, 1900.

Letter and Roll of Names explaining disposal of Liberated Slaves, Dar Fung.

Inspector, Sennar Mudirieh,

The slaves seized by you were handed over to Sheikh Idris Wad Regeb, who effected their distribution as per attached list. For the remaining fifty-seven men, women, and children he gave a written statement that he took their responsibility upon himself. A copy of his statement was sent to the Mudirieh, and another is kept here.

(Signed) HUSSEIN MUSTAFA,
Mamur, Dar Fung.

August 3, 1900.

Mudir, Wad Medani,

Forwarded.

(Signed) N. M. SMYTH, *Bimbashi.*

Rosaires, August 9, 1900.

Roll of released Slaves at Dar Fung.

Three women and three children, handed over to Mek Suduk, of J. Olo.

Three women and two children, handed over to Mek Imam, of J. Abu Deggo.

Two women and one child, handed over to Mek Juda, of J. Kakar. (Latter are originally from Abu Salmu.)

Mamur, Dar Fung,

The slaves released by Bimb. Smyth were distributed as shown in above list, each lot being handed over to the Mek of the country they belong to, except those from Kooma, who were given to Mek of Abu Dugo, their native country being very far.

(Sealed.) (Signed) Sheikh IDRIS WAD REGEB.

Dar Fung, July 1, 1900.

[Confidential]

No. 2255-E.A.

A copy of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

By order, &c.,
Jdf G. H. S. Clarke,
Assistant Secretary to the
Government of India.

Foreign Department,
Fort William,
The 7th December 1900

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential Prints;
Section 1, dated the 14th, 22nd, 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th September and 1st, 2nd, 5th and 8th October 1900.
Section 2, dated the 24th, 27th and 28th September and 1st October 1900.

* With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 8826

Political Department,
Bombay Castle, 12th December 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W. Hudson

Acting Secretary to Government.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 14.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Camp Dubbur, September* 14, 1900.

THE Mullah has raided Somali tribes close to Jigjiga, and done considerable damage.

A force of 2,000 men has been dispatched from Harrar by the Abyssinians.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 180.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 22, 1900.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 150 of the 9th instant relative to the dispatch of 20 tons of rice from Omdurman to Reggaf, for the use of the Belgian garrison.

Your action in this matter is approved.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 181.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 26, 1900.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 146 of the 3rd instant inclosing a copy of a note addressed by you to the Italian Agent and Consul-General for communication to the Governor of Erythræa in reply to various complaints and charges brought by the latter against the Soudan Administration.

The terms of your reply are approved by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

[2319 *cc*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN.

[September 27.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Consul Alvarez to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 27.)

(No. 4.)

My Lord Marquess,

Benghazy, September 16, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Greek sponge fishers have landed at various points on the coast a large quantity of gunpowder, which has been conveyed into the interior. The Bedouins are now well supplied with Greek rifles and powder. The price of the latter article is now half-a-napoleon for 9 okes, or a little over 6 piastres the oke.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JUSTIN ALVAREZ.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul Alvarez to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 28.)

(No. 8. Africa.)

My Lord Marquess, *Benghazi, September* 13, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatches No. 9, Africa, of the 27th June, 1899, and No. 2, Africa, of the 29th January last, referring to the Senusy Mission to and propaganda in Darfur, I now have the honour to report further information as to its cause.

It seems that the Grand Sheikh's agent, Sheikh Mahomet Senny, on arrival in Waday, was received with open arms by the Sultan, was treated at first with much courtesy, and received many presents both for Sid-el-Mahdy and himself. But when the Grand Sheikh removed to Geru and established himself there the Wadayan Chiefs began to suspect that his object in thus approaching their territory was to occupy that kingdom. This belief met with entire credence on the part of the Sultan, who at last issued orders forbidding anybody, whether Wadayan, Tripoline, or of the Mejabra, from communicating in any way with Mahomet Senny under penalty of death. This was duly reported to the Grand Sheikh, whereupon the relations between him and the Sultan of Waday assumed a very unfriendly character. With the object of diminishing or ruining the trade of Waday the Grand Sheikh sent five persons of distinction (I have not yet been able to learn who they were or the date of their departure) to Darfur, in order to come to an understanding with the Sultan of that country as to the opening up of commercial communications between Geru and Darfur, whereby trade might be diverted from Waday. The Mission has not yet returned with a reply.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JUSTIN ALVAREZ.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington.

(No. 40. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 29, 1900.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 26, Confidential, of the 5th May last, and previous despatches, relative to your negotiations with the Emperor Menelek in regard to the frontier between Abyssinia and the Soudan, I have to inform you that you are authorized to conclude an Agreement for the settlement of that frontier with the Emperor, subject to ratification by Her Majesty's Government.

I transmit to you herewith copies of a paper containing reports* by Major Gwynn, R.E., and Major Austin, R.E., on the country in the neighbourhood of the proposed frontier. The reports are accompanied by a map showing the maximum of concession which the writers suggest might be made to Abyssinia. You should endeavour to obtain, if possible, a line not less favourable to the Soudan than that marked on the map; but it is left to your discretion to consider proposals of the Emperor which involve some further concession of territory on the part of the Soudan, provided that the Anglo-Egyptian Government obtain a line suitable for the establishment of a chain of frontier posts between the Sobat and the Blue Nile.

The Agreement should contain a stipulation for the delimitation of the frontier on the spot by a Joint Commission.

You should also endeavour to arrange with the Emperor Menelek that there is to be no interference with the waters of the Blue Nile and Lake Tsana, except in agreement with Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Soudan, that navigation on the Blue Nile and the Sobat River, with their tributaries, where navigable, is to be free, and that Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Soudan are to have a right to construct a railway through Abyssinian territory to connect the Soudan with Uganda.

These arrangements might be included in the Agreement for the delimitation of the frontier, or form the subject of separate Agreements.

You will be provided with full powers from Her Majesty's Government which will enable you to sign the Agreement or Agreements contemplated.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

---

* These will appear later in the North-East Africa Print in a Section dated September 3 as soon as the Intelligence Division send the maps for which we are waiting.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 1.)

(No. 90. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp, Dubbur, September* 12, 1900.

ON the 18th ultimo I proceeded to Odweina. The presence of the company of the 2nd Central African Regiment had restored confidence in that direction so far as bringing the tribes back, and the Habr Yunis were on their grazing grounds in the Toyo Plain.

As Odweina is quite destitute of grass and my animals had suffered from want of forage in a two days' march through a parched-up country, I decided to move on the same afternoon towards Burao, the company of the 2nd Central African Regiment following me as soon as transport could be collected. Major Plunkett at the same time returning to head-quarters at Adadleh.

At Gubatto, the first day's march towards Burao, I found an oasis of grass with some rain-water collected in ditch-like depressions in the ground. Here numerous deputations of the Habr Yunis came in, and I halted for three days. At one time there must have been between 400 and 500 tribesmen collected, of whom many were horsemen.

Here, as at Hargaisa, the great cry was for arms for the protection of the grazing grounds. There had been no serious scare since the tribes had returned to Toyo, but the Elders were very uneasy and feared a raid at any moment; and both Haji Musa of Hahia and the leading tribesmen urged that the company be left at Odweina till the situation was a bit clearer.

There were many matters for settlement between the various sections of the Habr Yunis who came in to meet us, and my time and that of the Vice-Consul were fully occupied in adjusting long-standing differences which both parties were anxious should be settled through our mediation.

Amongst other questions that of the Sultanship of the Habr Yunis came up, all sections present admitting their allegiance to Madar Hirsi—Nur's old rival—in place of Nur, who is hopelessly committed with the Mullah's movement. I shall allude to this subject in a separate despatch.

Before leaving Gubatto I issued four rifles to Haji Musa for the protection of the Hahia Tarikha, and ten to Madr Hirsi for the protection of the grazing grounds. These were given out on the same conditions as those issued at Hargaisa, and complete the number I intend to issue at present.

In all forty-four old Sniders were issued at Hargaisa and Gubatto. They are all in the hands of Elders who can fairly well be trusted. The number is small considering the vast area the tribes frequent, but the effect of this measure, certainly for the time, will be out of proportion to the number of arms given out. Exaggerated accounts of the arming of our people are certain to reach the Ogaden, and a certain measure of confidence has been assured to our people, who look to us for assistance.

A guard was placed over the rain water at Gubatto to keep it for the company of the 2nd Central African Regiment, none being found till Burao is reached. This was just as well, for this water came in very handy, and after the Africans had replenished their barrels the water was rapidly exhausted by herds of camels and flocks brought in on the news circulated by the tribesmen who came in to us to their Karias that water was to be found at Gubatto.

At Burao I found the country as burnt up as at Odweina, and every animal in my camp had to be sent 6 miles off to the edge of the Arori Plain to get grazing.

On the arrival of the company of the 2nd Central African Regiment, it took up a position on high ground on the right bank of the river commanding the permanent wells. These wells are not—as is usually the case in Somaliland—dug in the bed of the river, but are sunk through slightly elevated ground on the left bank of the river. Water is found throughout the year at a depth of about 60 feet.

The Habr Yunis, Musa Ismaïl, came in, and a few representatives of the Rer Yusuf, the principal section of the Dahir Farih, one of the two large sub-divisions

of the Habr Toljaala. A few of their Karias were in the neighbourhood in the Arori Plain with the Habr Yunis, but owing to the drought the tribe was much scattered.

Leaving the detachment at Burao I proceeded with the Vice-Consul 20 miles to the south to Ber, the principal watering-place of the Habr Toljaala tribes after Burao. Here the Tug Der had changed its channel, rendering the old wells useless, and owing to the drought no Karias were to be found. Several deputations of the Adan Madoba came in a day's journey distance to meet us, and a settlement regarding the return of looted property was effected between this tribe and a deputation of the Mahomed Aysa, who had joined us at Burao from Sheikh, and who came on with us to Ber.

We returned quickly to Burao, as Ber was destitute of vegetation, and though its name implies a garden, such was the effect of the drought that the trees were all black, and not a leaf was to be seen.

It was here ascertained that the Aligheri had moved south of Bohotele, and were in the Abyssinian Ogaden, and not between Ber and Bohotele, as had been previously reported. Any move to punish this tribe will therefore not be advisable at present, more especially as we cannot withdraw the Hargaisa detachment so long as the Mullah is near Milmil, and it is also desirable to hold Odweina.

The country round Burao is quiet, and as there are no signs yet of the Mullah returning in the direction of Bohotele, the company of the 2nd Central African Regiment is now returning to Odweina. A blockhouse has been completed in the walled inclosure made by the Africans at Sheikh. It will be sufficient for the present to hold this post with a guard of our military police. The detachment of the 2nd Central African Regiment is accordingly returning to head-quarters at Adadleh, where the Berbera detachment of the regiment has already been moved owing to sickness among the men in Berbera.

The impression which my tour to Burao and Ber has given me is that, with the exception of the Gashanboor section, but little reliance can be placed on the attitude of the Habr Toljaala tribes. Should the Mullah return to the eastern districts they would either join him or us, whichever they found the stronger. The Musa Ismail section of the Habr Yunis, too, as well as the Abdi Hirsi and Weid Hirsi, would probably follow the lead of the Rer Yusuf, with whom they are more in touch than with their kindred sections of the Habr Yunis.

Since leaving Burao reports have been received that plentiful showers of rain have fallen there and at Odweina.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

P.S.—A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer.

J. H. S.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 2.)

(No. 154.)

My Lord, *Rome, September* 28, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy and translation of an article which appeared in the "Tribuna" newspaper of the 25th instant, announcing the satisfactory conclusion of the frontier negotiations between Italy and Abyssinia, on the basis of the Mareb–Belesa–Muna line.

On inquiry at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, I have been informed that the information contained in the article is correct.

I have, &c.
(For Lord Currie),
(Signed) STEPHEN LEECH.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Tribuna," September 25, 1900.

(Translation.)

FROM news which we have received from a most trustworthy source, it appears that the question of the southern frontier of Erythræa, which has been the subject of long negotiations between Italy and Ethiopia, may at last be considered as finally settled.

We are assured, in fact, that the Negus Menelek has formally recognized the Mareb–Belesa–Muna line, which comprises the territories hitherto disputed with us by Abyssinia, Seraè and Oculè–Cusai, two of the best districts of the Colony.

By this outcome of the negotiations, the actual occupation of these districts, which from the first were one of the causes of the conflict between Italy and Abyssinia, and which Italy after the last war had continued to hold, and could no more abandon without a sensible diminution of her dignity, is regulated in due terms of right.

The solution of the border question is the greatest and surest guarantee for the tranquillity of the Colony, and one may therefore hope that those too ready scares which used to arise in a section of Italian public opinion at every little fluttering movement (*lit.*, rustling of the leaves) beyond the Mareb, will be finally allayed.

But it is useless, we suppose, to insist on the importance of the result obtained.

Some papers have even spoken of money compensation given or to be given by Italy to Abyssinia; such news is inexact.

What is true is this, that for a long time various questions on financial matters have been dragging their weary length between Italy and Abyssinia, and it was natural that this opportunity should be seized for settling, at the same time as the border question, every other question which could contain a germ of discussion between the two countries.

These financial questions which are still pending are to be liquidated by agreement between the two States. As yet, it is impossible to say to what figure this liquidation may amount. It may be taken as certain, however, that the figure will be much lower than was announced—as much as 12,000,000—and that the Government proposes to provide for it without asking for new funds from the Chamber, out of the Budget of the Colony, which will acquire greater elasticity from the settlement of the border question.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Lord Cromer.

(No. 186. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 5, 1900.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith instructions which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia in regard to the conclusion of an Agreement with the Emperor Menelek for the settlement of the frontier between the Soudan and Abyssinia.*

I request that your Lordship will show the instructions to the Egyptian Government and inquire whether they concur in them.

Copies of the instructions and of the papers which accompany them are also inclosed.†

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

* To Colonel Harrington, No, 40, September 29, 1900.

† Reports by Majors Austin and Gwynn and Map.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington.

(No. 42. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 8, 1900.

WITH reference to your Confidential despatches No. 44 of the 16th June and No. 45 of the 19th June, relative to discussions which you had had with the Emperor Menelek in regard to the frontier between Abyssinia on the one hand and British East Africa and Uganda on the other, I am to inform you that you are authorized to conclude an Agreement with His Majesty for the settlement of that frontier, subject to ratification by Her Majesty's Government.

You will endeavour to obtain a frontier as favourable to the British Protectorates as possible, the minimum which you should accept being the line reported in your despatch No. 44 as having been proposed by the Emperor. In the event of that line being adopted, it should be stipulated, as also proposed by His Majesty, that he shall grant sufficient ground in a healthy situation on the west bank of the River Omo, near Lake Rudolf, to Great Britain for a commercial station.

It would be desirable to obtain from the Emperor, if possible, an undertaking not to alienate without the consent of Her Majesty's Government any territory south of 6° latitude north.

The full powers with which you will be provided will enable you to sign the Agreement contemplated in this despatch.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

[2394 *h*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 24.)

(No. 153. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Cairo, September* 11, 1900.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 141, Confidential, of the 20th ultimo respecting the establishment of a post on the Upper Nile, the Acting Governor-General has also submitted a proposal for creating posts in the Bahr-el-Ghazal as soon as the receding of the waters in that region enables communications to be opened up. He proposes for this purpose to employ Government and Dervish irregulars, who came originally from that district, and who have volunteered for service, with a certain backing of regulars. The most suitable season for the reoccupation of the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province, which the Acting Governor-General strongly recommends, would be in December or January.

Should your Lordship approve of this proposal, the preliminary measures will be put in hand forthwith.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.



[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul Alvarez to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 27.)

(No. 3.)

My Lord Marquess, *Benghazi, September* 14, 1900.

REFERRING to the subject of my despatch, as marked in the margin,* I am reliably informed that the Governor of Benghazi has received orders from Constantinople to obtain Senusy's consent to the establishment of a Kaïmakam at Kufra. He is authorized to send a mission for this purpose, if he thinks it necessary.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JUSTIN ALVAREZ.

* No. 2, February 24, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received September* 28.)

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Cairo, September* 28, 1900.

AN expedition leaves Khartoum to-day in order to establish a post north of Kiro, as decided upon.

The Sirdar has, immediately upon his arrival, received a pressing request from the Belgian Representative for the dispatch of 40 tons of rice to Redjaf. As this demand for a further supply has been most urgently made, and rice being their principal food, Sirdar thinks Belgians may intend to make an advance. He has made no definite reply, but points out the difficulty of arranging for dispatch of steamers more than once a-month, and of finding room in them for such supplies. Some further delay may easily be obtained before a final decision is taken; but, in the meanwhile, I venture to think that the reoccupation of the Bahr-el-Ghazal, which will become possible in November, should be carried out with as little delay as circumstances will permit.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 91. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp, Sheikh, September 14, 1900.*

IN continuation of my telegram of this day's date, I have the honour to submit copy of a demi-official note from our Consular Agent in Harrar regarding the Mullah's raid on the Habr Awal at Harrhe, which is about 15 miles to the east of Jig-Jiga. The accounts which reached me from Hargaisa are to the effect that about fifty Karias were looted, and a number of men, women, and children killed. This number is set down by the Abyssinians at 100.

The tribes that principally suffered are the Ahmed Abdullah and the Samanter Abdullah, who during the grazing season inhabit the country ceded to the Abyssinians by the late Treaty, but who are to be found in our limits in the dry season.

Mr. Gerolimato is not yet aware as to whether the force of 2,000 men dispatched from Harrar is intended for operations against the Mullah, or merely to occupy Jig-Jiga. For the last two months, reports from native sources, have reached me of the dispatch of expeditions from Harrar to Jig-Jiga, only to be shortly followed by reports that they had returned to Harrar. Apart from the reluctance of the Abyssinians to embark in extended operations in the Ogaden, there seems reason to believe that so long as the Mullah dominates the Ogaden, the Harrar authorities are uneasy as to the attitude of the subject tribes within their own border, and adjacent to Harrar. It is only on this assumption that I can understand their allowing the Mullah to establish himself at Milmil, where he is now reported to be.

It will be observed from the concluding portion of Mr. Gerolimato's letter that neither Ras Makunan nor the Garazmach Bante are very sanguine as to the Abyssinians being successful in establishing their authority in the Ogaden. If this prove to be the case, and the Mullah is left in undisputed possession of that country, it will mean that we shall be forced to have a permanent military occupation of this Protectorate.

In the meanwhile the position of affairs in the Ogaden spells ruination to our trade. Under present conditions it is impossible to take any steps to reopen Kafila communication with that country. None of our caravans could now go there. And it is equally certain that after the raids by the Mullah's forces on the Habr Gerhajis and Habr Awal the safety of no Ogaden caravan could be guaranteed on our border.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

P.S.—A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, and to the Intelligence Branch, Simla.

J. H. S.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Mr. Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.

(Confidential.)

My dear Sir, *Harrar, September 4, 1900.*

I RECEIVED your letter of the 13th August. The Mullah reached Harrhe near Jig-Jiga and raided the Abyssinian Habr Awal, capturing a good deal of camels and killing about 100 men, as Abyssinians say; so the Gurasmatch Banti left yesterday with about 2,000 men to pursue the Mullah, who, I believe, will be far from Jig-Jiga when Banti reaches there.

Ras Makunan paid me a visit before yesterday, and told me that he sends Banti to protect now their tribes against the raids of the Mullah, and after he intends to send a great expedition to pursue the Mullah into the Ogaden. Gurasmatch was also present, and before me Makunan told Gurasmatch to go no further than Jig-Jiga. Makunan knows that I understand Amharic, and I think his instructions to Gurasmatch before

me were a firework; he was not in need to give Gurasmatch his instructions before me and in my house; perhaps he thinks that I believe him; perhaps I am wrong, but I think that Gurasmatch will go into the Ogaden now, as preparations for a great expedition for the Ogaden were made long time ago. I told Ras Makunan that Mullah's horsemen raided a large quantity of camels from the Aida Galla and Abdi Bars from inside of our border, and he told me he will try to punish the Mullah, and after told me that if they did not reconquer again the Ogaden, they are unable to do anything; on this question I have also a letter from Gurasmatch Banti by which he says the same.

The Abyssinians told me nothing about our having armed our tribes.

Yours &c.

(Signed) J. GEROLIMATO.

One S. C. for Poll Book

[Confidential]

No. 2308 E.A.

A copy* of the foregoing prints is forwarded confidentially to the Government of Bombay, in the Political Department, for information.

Foreign Department,
Fort William;
the 13th December 1900

By order, &c.,
Sdy. J. B. Edwards,
Officiating Under Secretary to the
Government of India.

North East Africa and Soudan Confidential hints;
Section 1, dated the 11th, 12th, 15th, 16th and 22nd October 1900
Section 2, dated the 8th and 22nd October, 1900.
Section 4, dated the 3rd September 1900.

*With 1 spare copy for the Political Resident at Aden.

Confidential

No. 9114

Political Department.
Bombay Castle 20th December 1900.

Copy forwarded to the Political Resident, Aden, for information.

W Hudson

Acting Secretary to Government

mc.

One D. C. for Pol. Resst. at Aden

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND SOUDAN. [October 11.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Intelligence Division to Foreign Office.—(Received October 11.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, in returning Colonel Hayes Sadler's No. 55, dated the 6th June last, wishes to make the following observations:—

The armed force at present at the disposal of the Consul-General of the Somali Protectorate appears to consist of—

(*a.*) A wing of the 2nd battalion, Central Africa Regiment (referred to in the despatch as the British Central Africa Rifles).

(*b.*) A police levy of Somalis, seventy-eight strong.

(*c.*) A Somali camel corps, fifty-three strong.

Of these forces, (*b*) and (*c*) only are permanent. In other words, there are but 131 armed men to preserve order in the Protectorate and keep open the trade routes, a number which, in the circumstances, as reported by Consul-General Sadler, appears to be altogether inadequate.

The proposals now made for increasing the permanent force, although extremely moderate in nature, seem to have been very carefully considered by the local authorities. Sir John Ardagh would therefore recommend their adoption for the present, although he is doubtful whether some further expansion of the local forces may not become necessary in the near future.

As regards the details of the scheme, the period for which it is proposed to enlist the Somalis does not appear to be stated. It would seem for consideration whether a reserve might not be built up by relegating to their own homes, with a retaining fee, a certain proportion of the men after a sufficient period of training with the corps, their places being taken by fresh recruits. The Consul-General and the Commandant might be asked to consider the feasibility of this suggestion.

The Director of Military Intelligence regrets to note that the Consul-General proposes to retain Martini-Henry rifles for the Somali infantry and police, while arming the Indians, camelry, and mounted infantry with Lee-Metford weapons. The objection against having two kinds of ammunition applies equally to a small force, which may have to act in an isolated position, as to a large. Boxes of the wrong ammunition may be sent to units at a critical moment, or a portion of the force armed with one rifle may expend all its reserve of ammunition and be unable to use the untouched reserves of the units with another.

It is most necessary, therefore, that the Somali infantry and police should also be armed with weapons such as the Martini-Enfield rifle, using the same ammunition as the Lee-Metford or Lee-Enfield. Indeed, it would be better to arm the whole force with single-loading rifles of ·303-inch calibre than to arm a portion with ·303-inch magazine weapons, leaving ·450-inch rifles in the hands of the remainder.

It is not clear from the despatch under consideration whether it is proposed to arm the camelry and mounted infantry with rifles or carbines. Page 7 of the despatch itself states that "the best arm would be a Lee-Metford carbine with magazine attachment," but the estimate inclosed (p. 13) refers to Lee-Metford rifles.

Sir John Ardagh would remark that it is the invariable practice to arm mounted infantry in the regular army with rifles, not carbines, and that the whole of the mounted infantry, yeomanry, and colonial corps, as well as on occasion some regular cavalry regiments have been so armed in South Africa. The adoption of a carbine for the Somali Protectorate forces cannot therefore be recommended.

The Director of Military Intelligence would be glad if he might be favoured with a copy of the despatch now returned.

18, *Queen Anne's Gate, London,*
October 10, 1900.

[2394 *l*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Sadler.

(No. 113.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 12, 1900.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches No. 83 of the 13th August and No. 92 of the 15th ultimo, relative to the arrest of a caravan from Jibuti in the territory of British Somaliland.

Your proceedings and the conduct of Lieutenant Byrne in connection with this matter are approved.

His Lordship sanctions your proposal to confiscate, under section 18 of the Arms Regulations for the Protectorate, the arms and ammunition taken from the caravan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

[2394 *m*—1]

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 15.)

(No. 96. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Camp, Sheikh, September* 21, 1900.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 91 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to submit copies of two news-letters from our Consular Agent in Harrar.

It will be observed that any forward move by the Abyssinians into the Ogaden is not immediately contemplated, and that the troops sent to Jig Jiga remain there on the defensive for the present.

The news concerning the withdrawal of the 200 Abyssinian soldiers employed on the Jibuti Railway is confirmed by information received at Zeyla from Jibuti.

Copies of this despatch and inclosures and of my previous despatch No. 91 have been sent to Viscount Cromer.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Mr. Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.

(Confidential.)

Dear Sir, *Harrar, September* 9, 1900.

IN a conversation I had with Ras Makunan, I ascertained that the orders he has given to Gurasmatch Banti are to stay at Bersouk and Jig Jiga to protect their tribes, because now the Ogaden country is feverish, and they cannot advance more, but that after one or two months, when the fever will disappear, he, Makunan, intends to go himself to stay at Jig Jiga, and send the troops into Ogaden to pursue the Mullah as far as possible, and to defeat him. We shall see if what he says is true; but about Gurasmatch Banti, he repeated thrice that his orders are to stay between Bersouk and Jig Jiga.

He also told me that news reached him that Mullah's men retired in the direction of Milmil, after having raided the Gadurbursi tribes and Habrawals.

I don't see the usual preparations here for any expedition, as pounding dhura, &c.; perhaps they have it ready.

With kind regards, yours, &c.

(Signed) J. GEROLIMATO.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Mr. Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.

(Secret.)

Dear Sir, *Harrar, September* 11, 1900.

BEFORE yesterday Atto Marcha, Governor of Jildessa, who was in Jibuti, arrived here. There were in Daranli 200 Abyssinians to protect the line against the Essa, the Company paying 12 dollars per month for each Abyssinian soldier; now the Company paid them 8 dollars instead of 12 dollars, and the Abyssinians have withdrawn these 200 men.

Just now I have been informed that the Abyssinian protected Habrawal have sent yesterday a letter to Makunan, by which they say that the Mullah raided and

looted them, and that if the Abyssinians are unable to send their troops to protect them they declared they will emigrate into the British territory, because the English know how to protect their subjects. That is exactly the contents of the letter in Arabic, and I have it from the man who read it. Makunan received this yesterday, and was amazed at receiving such a letter.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) J. GEROLIMATO.

P.S.—Just now Makunan received a letter from the Ugaz of Essa; he has not yet read it. I hope this evening to know the contents.

J. G.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 16.)

(No. 335.)

My Lord, *Zanzibar, September* 22, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, copy of a despatch which I have received from Her Majesty's Sub-Commissioner at Kismayu, respecting the rumoured movements of the Somali Mullah, Mahomed Abdullah.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Vice-Consul Jenner to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 113.)

Sir, *Kismayu, September* 14, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Abdurahman Mursaal, who returned to-day from Bardera, reports that three men, agents or messengers of the Mullah (or Wadad, as the Somalis call it), Mahomed Abdullah, the Somali Mahdi, have arrived at Bardera. The Mullah is said to have a large force at Lugh and to have expelled the Italian garrison from there, but this rumour is extremely vague, and is evidently not altogether credited by Abdurahman himself.

Abdurahman informs me that he does not think the Mullah has particularly hostile intentions towards the English, and that his energies are at present directed mainly towards keeping the Abyssinians out of Somaliland.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. C. W. JENNER.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to War Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 22, 1900.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you, to be laid before Her Majesty's Secretary of State for War, printed copies of two letters from the Sirdar of the Egyptian army,* transmitting reports by Major Gwynn, R.E., and Major Austin, R.E., on their recent survey of the country through which it is proposed that the frontier between the Soudan and Uganda on the one hand, and Abyssinia on the other, should run.

I am to request that Lord Salisbury's thanks and approval may be conveyed to Majors Gwynn and Austin, and also to Major Bright, Rifle Brigade, and Lieutenant Jackson, R.E., who assisted them in the work, for the excellent manner in which they have carried out the survey under circumstances of great difficulty.

I am, &c.

(Signed) T. H. SANDERSON.

* September 1 and 2, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(*Received October* 8.)

(No. 210. Africa. Very Confidential.)

My Lord, *Brussels, October* 6, 1900.

DURING my conversation with the King of the Belgians at the Court dinner last night, His Majesty made some cursory references to the Congo question.

With some elation His Majesty remarked that he hoped shortly to be a good trade customer for Egypt and the Nile districts, and to be able to develop extensively the trade with the Congo State by the Nile route.

Did His Majesty refer, I inquired, to the supplies for the Belgian posts introduced by the Nile route? The King replied that he referred to export and import trade in general, which had been rendered difficult owing to the high tariffs of the Congo railway. But if trade were rendered difficult by the Nile route, the Government of the Independent State was now in a position to purchase the Congo railways and make its own tariffs.

It appears to me probable that His Majesty, who has only just returned from his travels, was referring to the sought-for development of trade by the Anglo-Belgian and British Tropical Africa Companies, and that he was not as yet thoroughly in possession of the correspondence between your Lordship's Department and Messrs. Little and Johnston.

Upon the conversation turning on the question of African delimitations in general, I remarked upon the trouble as to those dependent on meridians or parallels, and to the preference to be accorded to natural boundaries as being more intelligible to natives.

His Majesty seemed disinclined to this view, citing instances of how little river or even lake boundaries had proved operative.

I did not therefore judge the opportunity to be a favourable one for mooting the question of the Semliki boundary. His Majesty did not, as I understand to be his wont, enter upon the question of the various categories of leases and their validity, but when the conversation turned upon M. Hanotaux and the Belgian Mission to Paris in 1894, the King observed that one word from Her Majesty's Government would have obviated the necessity of the Franco-Belgian Treaty of August that year. I restricted myself to remarking that the withdrawal of Article III of the Treaty of the 12th May seemed to prove that it had not been a very seriously matured instrument, and that that word was at the time difficult to speak. His Majesty merely observed that the Treaty of the 12th May was the necessary corollary of antecedent negotiations and engagements, and the question dropped.

On taking leave of me later in the evening, His Majesty said that whenever I was desirous to see him on the Congo or any other question, I was not to scruple about asking for an audience.

I may mention that M. de Goffinet, the Chef de la Liste Civile, practically works with His Majesty on important Congo questions, and that gentleman, with whom I became on terms of intimacy when he came to Paris in 1894, informed me that the King is unlikely to appoint any new Minister to replace M. van Eetvelde, but that His Majesty is his own Minister. Whilst he, M. de Goffinet, would be pleased to make any confidential communications to the King, formal matters would more properly go through M. Cuvelier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CONSTANTINE PHIPPS

being in military occupation of Egypt, and, conjointly with Egypt, concerned in the government of the Soudan, would have sanctioned the vindication of the rights of Egypt as against the leaseholder.

The whole question of the rights of Egypt need not be further discussed here, as it is only perfunctorily alluded to in Sir Lepel Griffin's letter.

The rest of the letter is occupied with an attempt to prove that the leases originally granted to the Congo State, or to King Leopold, remain, in spite of all that has occurred since, valid over the whole of the area lease, and that, consequently, Concessions granted under that lease have still validity, even in the portions of the territory in which the Sovereign of the Congo State renounced the right of occupation or of political activity.

After the signature of the Anglo-Congolese Agreement of the 12th May, 1894, the Sovereign of the Congo State was undoubtedly entitled to grant Concessions of the nature referred to, which would remain valid so long as the lease had effect.

But no sooner were the terms of this lease made known than the French Government intervened, and brought pressure to bear on the Sovereign of the Free State to renounce the rights and privileges acquired by the above-mentioned Agreement over the larger portion of the area of the lease.

The frontier between the Congo Basin and the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province (as it may be called for convenience) had up to that period never been defined. But Belgian officers had, in 1894, not only occupied posts north of the Mbomu Thalweg, but had also pushed forward posts into the Bahr-el-Ghazal, and had entered into agreements with the Emir Fadl-el-Maula, and with Sheikh Hamed Wad Musa, to administer the Bahr-el-Ghazal in the interests of the Congo State.*

By the Agreement signed the 14th August, 1894, between France and the Congo State, the northern boundary of that State was defined from the junction of the Mbomu and Ouelle eastwards up to the 30th meridian of east longitude, while a line was drawn from the Nile westwards along parallel 5° 30′ north to its intersection with meridian 30, and southwards along that meridian till it reached the boundary-line above referred to. North and west of this line the Sovereign of the Congo State undertook to refrain from all occupation, and to exercise no political action in future. (It may here be asked parenthetically whether the granting of Concessions is other than a political act, for, as will be seen later, at the elventh hour of these negotiations, the very Concessions were granted whose validity in these regions the Companies in question still assert.) The northern frontier-line of the sphere of activity of the Congo State was now, by this Agreement, defined from the junction of the Ouelle and Mbomu up to the Nile.

By the same Agreement any posts occupied by Agents of the Congo State north of this line were to be handed over to Agents of the French Government at such time as they should present themselves to take them over. The Agreement of the 14th August, 1894, therefore, read as a whole, cannot be looked upon as other than a transference from the Sovereign of the Congo Free State to France of all political rights claimed or acquired north of the line above described, and though part of the transaction was couched in terms less calculated to offend the country from which King Leopold had just accepted the lease of a portion of these territories, the transfer was no less effective.

What now became the position of concessionnaires in such portions of the territories leased as were, by this arrangement, deliberately made over to France? One of three things. Either the Concessions granted while these negotiations were proceeding became invalid in such portions of the leased territory as had now been transferred to a third party; or they would be held of King Leopold's reversionaries, *i.e.*, the French Government, as succeeding to his privileges and obligations; or, as appears probable, though no mention is made of it in the Treaty, some specific arrangement was come to with the French Government under which Concessions to Commercial Companies in these regions granted prior to the signature of the Convention were recognized as valid. It was rumoured at the time of the negotiations in Paris that King Leopold had secured the privilege of commercial exploitation in the regions over which he had renounced political control in favour of France. Without some such explanation, it is hardly conceivable that only a fortnight before the signature of the Convention, when it was obvious that he would be obliged to renounce all political action in the area north of 5° 30′ north, His Majesty could have disposed of Concessions extending over the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province. If such an arrangement was made, and the Anglo-Belgian Companies, in which, it is understood, His Majesty is a large shareholder, were to be allowed to develop the

* Papers found in Khartoum.

country commercially, it is clear that thereafter such Concessions became dependent on the French Government. The Congo State cannot have it both ways. It cannot be argued that the Sovereign was, on the one hand, able to dispose of political rights and obligations acquired, and hand over posts in occupation to the French Government by an agreement with France, and, at the same time, to maintain the validity of Concessions in the same regions under agreement with Great Britain. Nor can it seriously be argued that Concessions granted at a moment when certain territorles were actually being transferred by negotiation, can still be held of the original grantor after the regions in which they had effect have passed out of his control.

How complete the transfer of these regions to France was held by the French Government to be is shown by the arguments used by the French Ambassador in his despatch to M. Delcassé of the 12th October, 1898 (French Yellow Book, 1897–98, "Haut-Nil et Bahr-el-Ghazal").

In consequence of the action of the Sovereign of the Congo State a new situation was created. In the negotiations ensuing on the Fashoda incident Her Majesty's Government had to deal with the French Government, who claimed actual possession of the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province, based on several years' occupation by French posts. These posts had been enabled to establish themselves in these regions through the assistance given them by the Congo State. This assistance made it clear how entirely the Congo State had abandoned any claims over them in virtue of the British lease. Although Great Britain had consistently refused to recognize the right of France to occupy these regions, her occupation was, thanks to the action of the Congo State, an accomplished fact, which could only be undone by war or negotiation.

By the Declaration of the 21st March, 1899, signed by the Representatives of France and Great Britain, France renounced all political influence and occupation in the Bahr-el-Ghazal. In consequence of this Declaration she withdrew her posts, and a practical re-transfer, so far as France was concerned, took place. The Anglo-Egyptian Government of the Soudan are now the reversionaries of the French occupation. No stipulations or reservations were made respecting Concessions granted by, or held of, the intermediary incumbents.

In spite of the various phases which these regions have passed through since the granting of the lease in 1894, Sir Lepel Griffin argues that the original lease must still be valid because the Agreement in which it was ceded has never been denounced, and because, apparently, he assumes that if the lease is taken away, nothing remains of that Agreement. This is, however, a contention which is easily disposed of by reference to the Agreement itself.

The Agreement consists of six Articles. Of these :—

Article 1, defining the frontiers of the Congo State (*a*) north of the German sphere and (*b*) north of the Zambezi, remains fully in force ;

Article 2, by which Great Britain granted a lease of certain specified territories to King Leopold and to the Congo State on certain conditions, remains in force for all such territories as were not subsequently renounced by a formal Convention signed by the Congo State with France. In virtue of this Article the Congo State is still in occupation of a port on Lake Albert and of the left bank of the Nile up to 5° 30″ north ;

Article 3 was withdrawn by a Declaration signed on the 22nd June, 1894 ;

Article 4 remains in force for such territories as remain leased under Article 2 ;

Article 5 remains in full force ; and

Article 6 also, as far as regards the territories still occupied under the terms of Article 2.

There was, therefore, no occasion to denounce the Agreement because of the renunciation by the Congo Free State of a portion of the privileges which it conferred. Of the other Articles, the Congo State is at the present time enjoying full advantage. In referring to this Agreement as still in force in his despatch of the 6th October, 1898, to the Ambassador at Paris, Lord Salisbury did not omit to mention that the King of the Belgians had undertaken not to take advantage of it beyond a certain limit ; it is difficult, therefore, to understand how this passage can be cited in favour of the validity of Concessions in the very districts in which the King formally renounced the advantages of the lease conceded to him.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

Cairo, October 11, 1900.

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 1.

Major-General Sir F. Wingate to Foreign Office.—(Received September 3.)

Sir, *Dunbar, September 2, 1900.*

I HAVE the honour to forward the Report compiled by Major C. W. Gwynn, D.S.O., R.E., on his recent expedition from the Blue Nile to the Sobat River.

Major Gwynn was accompanied by Lieutenant L. C. Jackson, R.E., and the value of the topographical results obtained by these two officers in difficult country and under trying conditions is, I consider, highly satisfactory.

The valuable information that has been acquired will no doubt form the basis on which the final delimitation of the Abyssinian-Soudan frontier will be settled.

The enforced detention of Major Gwynn's expedition for a period of five weeks was unfortunate, but no blame can be attached to that officer, who, I consider, carried out the difficult and important duty with which he was intrusted with much skill and judgment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. REGINALD WINGATE, *Major-General,*
Sirdar and Governor-General of the Soudan.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Lieutenant-Colonel Talbot to Major-General Sir F. Wingate.

Sirdar, *Glenshiero Lodge, Kingussie, N.B. [undated].*

IN forwarding the inclosed Report by Major C. W. Gwynn, R.E., on the surveying expedition conducted by him along the Abyssinian frontier from Famaka to Nasser, I wish to point out the extremely satisfactory character of the surveys made by him with the assistance of Lieutenant L. C. Jackson, R.E.

By the aid of these officers I was able to give satisfactorily the positions of Wad Medani and Sennar by telegraph from Omdurman. Starting from Sennar, Major Gwynn succeeded in carrying his longitude with great accuracy down to Nasser, where it coincided practically exactly with that obtained for the same point by Major Austin's expedition, a result which reflects great credit on all officers concerned.

Major Gwynn and Lieutenant Jackson have also executed accurate topographical sketches of all the country visited, besides bringing back valuable Reports on all the routes traversed by them.

From a technical point of view, the task was a difficult one, and the results have considerably surpassed my expectations.

The fact that no survey was made of the Sonka River is, I think, of little importance, and I entirely agree with Major Gwynn's opinion that it was impossible to make it in the circumstances.

(Signed) M. G. TALBOT, *Miralai,*
Director of Army Survey.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Major Gwynn, R.E., to the Director of Surveys, Egyptian Army.

Cairo, May 26, 1900.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to snbmit, for your information, the attached Report in connection with the survey of the country in the neighbourhood of the proposed Egypto-Abyssinian boundary, carried out In accordance with your special instructions of the 18th November, 1899.

In doing so, I wish to place on record my appreciation of the services rendered by my assistant, Lieutenant L. C. Jackson, R.E. The greater part of the more laborious work of the survey fell on this officer, but he carried out his duties most untiringly and willingly, and I could not have wished for a more capable assistant.

I have already submitted a Report to the Acting Sirdar at Omdurman on the excellent behaviour of my escort.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. W. GWYNN, *Captain, R.E.,*
Brevet-Major.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

BLUE NILE SURVEY PARTY.

CONTENTS OF REPORT.

1. General Report on the proposed frontier, with Map I.
2. Proposals and Estimates for a delimitation and survey party, season 1900–1901.
3. General narrative of survey expedition.

APPENDICES.

Notes on Fazokli.
„ Abu Ramla, Gumsa, and Guba.
„ Kehli.
„ Dul.
„ Beni Shangul.
„ Gomasha, Assosa, Fadasi, Kirin, Abdul Hadi s, and Kutu.
„ Lega Galla.
„ Barun Districts.
„ Nuers and Nyuaks.
„ Physical features of country.
„ Railway and telegraph extensions.
„ Trade goods, presents, and currency.
List of positions fixed by astronomical and trigonometrical observations.

Report on the proposed Egyptian-Abyssinian Boundary between the Blue Nile and Sobat Rivers.

THE errors and deficiencies in topographical detail in the Intelligence Division War Office Map No. 1319, render it impossible to transfer the line representing the proposed frontier with any certainty to the revised map. I have, however, entered on Map 1, in a firm red line, my own interpretation of this line, the intention of which appears to have been to leave the following districts to Abyssinia :—

1. That portion of Fazokli lying south of Khor Baba, and including Ghezan.
2. Beni Shangul.
3. Gomasha, in which it is probably intended to include that portion of the Dul district which includes J. Dul and the villages on it.
4. Assosa.

5. Kirin.
6. Sheikh Habdul Hadi's district.
7. Kutu.

It would be impossible to define this line accurately by any formula, as the boundaries of these districts are ill-defined, especially on their western sides.

The northern portion of Fazokli, the district of Kehli, and the outlying villages of Dul, together with the practically uninhabited Barun districts extending to the south and west, would fall to Egypt.

About this portion of the frontier region the Emperor seems to have been well informed, and the line as far south as the Kuzai Range represents very accurately the extreme limits of Abyssinian raids, though it is drawn considerably west of the line of effective occupation, which I consider is fairly represented on the map.

South of the Kuzai Range the Emperor cannot have had any more information than was shown on the old map, as the K. Sonka represents no tribal division, and the local Abyssinian officers have no idea where it discharges.

Abyssinian raids have never penetrated the Nuer districts on the north bank of the Baro, and all Abyssinian influence is confined to the Nyuak district of Yambo. There is no probability of the Abyssinians attempting to occupy the Nuer districts, as they are afraid of the climate, and the Nuers are not easily raided. The claim, therefore, to these districts appears quite unjustified if the boundary is to correspond with the extreme limit of Abyssinian influence. The true limit of Abyssinian influence in this region is indicated on the map.

The chief objection to the proposed frontier is that it would be an impossible frontier for the Soudan Government to police or occupy up to, as all communications, water supply, and possible sites for posts lie on the Abyssinian side. It will, I think, be found essential to occupy up to the frontier as far south at least as the Komo Range, as otherwise it will be impossible to prevent the Abyssinian frontier officers raiding over the boundary into the unprotected Barun country. The trade which should soon develop with the populous Galla districts and the gold districts of Beni Shangul would, I think, amply repay the costs of the posts.

I am convinced that by the Assosa and Galla trade routes a large part of the west of Abyssinia can be tapped, but till the Abyssinian frontier officers are under supervision, there will be no security for caravans.

To modify the boundary so as to give the Soudan a line of possible posts, it would be necessary to make what on the map appears a considerable change, but the country affected is, excepting in the immediate proximity of those posts, an absolute desert, and the concessions required would really be trifling. The points where I think posts should be maintained are Kehli, Dul, and Kirin.

At these points water could be obtained and rations for small posts could be purchased locally. Communication with them would be maintained by the road from Abu Shanina through Masarkum to Kehli; and thence to Dul and Kirin by the route I followed.

This road could easily be improved, and would be the natural trade route.

It is probable, also, that a direct route from Kirin to a point on the White Nile near J. Ahmed Aga could be opened, which would be available at least in the dry season.

The map shows the boundary I recommended with alternative lines in two cases which would make a more favourable frontier; if, however, the question was being opened for the first time, I should have recommended the water-parting between the White and Blue Nile basins as the boundary between J. Gule and J. Kuzai.

As regards the Sonka and Baro Valleys, I do not think it matters much how the line is drawn, as the Gallas do not push their raids any distance. The Yambos appear to be on good terms with the Gallas, and may fairly be left in the Abyssinian sphere.

A trading post might perhaps be conceded by the Abyssinians at the head of the navigable Sobat on the same principle as has been adopted on the Niger.

The following formula would express the two frontier lines I have suggested :—

(A.)—*Minimum Claim.*

The frontier south of the Blue Nile will follow the Khor Amilia from its mouth to a point due east of the summit of J. Falughut; thence to the summit of J. Falughut; thence to the nearest source of Khor Baba; thence along the Khor Baba to its junction with the Tumat; thence to the summit of the northern of the two Gule peaks; thence along

the watershed between the Blue and White Niles to the point where the main road from Dul to Goha crosses the watershed; thence to the summit of J. Fana Oge; thence to the summit of J. Kirin; thence to a point on the Khor Khudush due south of J. Kirin; thence down that Khor to the limit of the Kirin district; thence to the junction of the Khor Makeir with Baro, following such physical features as may form suitable boundary marks.

(B.)—*The Alternative Frontier represented by the line of Red Crosses.*

The frontier south of the Blue Nile will follow the Khor Amilia to its source in J. Faronge: thence to the summit of J. Faronge; thence along the ridge forming the eastern limit of the Tumat Valley to the southern boundary of the Fazokli district of Ghezan, crossing the Tumat Valley between the village of Ama Ghezan and Ghezan; thence it will be directed on to the northern of the two Gule peaks, so as to leave all the mountains belonging to the districts of Fazokli and Kehli to Egypt, and of Beni Shangul to Abyssinia; thence along the watershed of the Blue and White Niles to the point where the main road from Goha to Shaso crosses the watershed; thence southwards along this road, which shall remain Abyssinian, to the K. Shiba; thence along this stream and the K. Yabus to the western limit of the Kirin district, and thence as above.

P.S.—I have explained verbally to Captain Harrington that taking into account the worthlessness of the country I do not think there would be any objection to allowing, as a concession, the boundary to run from the summit of J. Gemi to the mouth of the K. Makeir. At the same time I adhere to my opinion that the Abyssinians have no real claim to this country, and I do not anticipate they will ever occupy it.

C. W. G.

London, August 26, 1900.

Proposals and Estimates for Delimitation and Survey Parties, Season 1900–1901.

The following party would be required for delimitation purposes:—

One British officer as Commissioner with good knowledge of plane-table surveying, and, if possible, astronomical and trigonometrical work.

One British officer to represent the Mudir of the frontier district, and to assist Commissioner.

Party of one Soudanese native officer, three N.C.Os., and fifteen men as escort and to take charge of transport.

Party of 25 Jehadia as transport drivers and labourers to erect cairns.

One Abyssinian interpreter.

One Arabic interpreter.

If possible, a native surveyor should also be obtained from the Indian Survey Department.

If delimitation has to be carried out in a previously unsurveyed country as between Gallabat and the Blue Nile, it is essential that the Commissioner should have a good knowledge of astronomical and trigonometrical work, and he should therefore be a Royal Engineer officer; in this case too, unless an Indian surveyor can be procured, an assistant, for survey work exclusively, is necessary.

If the frontier south of the Western Yabus is thrown on to well-marked physical features, it will practically be unnecessary to delimit it on the ground. The terminal point on the Baro could be fixed at any time by an officer sent by steamer up the river. The frontier from the Blue Nile to Kirin presses for delimitation, and can best be carried out by a party with its base at Famaka. If the party reached Famaka on the 1st December it should be able to complete the delimitation as far south as the Western Yabus, and to return to Famaka by the end of January. This would leave ample time for the survey and delimitation northwards to Gallabat in the same season.

Estimate of Cost.

	£
Pay of one special service officer as Commissioner, eight months at 700*l.* per annum	470
Travelling expenses from England and back	60
Mudir's Representative, lent by Soudan Government	Nil.
Pay of detachment lent by Soudan Government	"
Special grant to above detachment, at rate of 33 per cent. extra pay for six months	40
Pay of Jahadia, at P. T. 90 per mensem for six months	135
Pay of Abyssinian Interpreter, lent by Soudan Government	Nil.
Pay of specially employed Arabic Interpreter, six months at 12*l.*	72
Pay and expenses of Indian Surveyor (?)	150
Pay of guides, &c.	50
Rations for men and transport animals	100
Purchase of 100 donkeys	300
" 10 cast mules from E. A.	100
Hire of transport animals	50
Purchase of presents	100
Instruments, pack saddles, &c. (are available from stores of 1899–1900 survey parties).	
Total	1,627

If a British officer is employed as Survey Assistant instead of an Indian surveyor, his pay and expenses (say two-thirds 500*l.* plus 60*l.*), amounting to 400*l.* should be added, and 150*l.* subtracted.

The above estimate is excessive both for time and rates, and probably 1,500*l.* with one special service officer, or 1,750*l.* with two, would easily cover all expenses for delimitation from Blue Nile to Kirin, and for survey and delimitation from Blue Nile to Gallabat.

C. W. G.

Blue Nile Survey Expedition.

General Narrative.

The party, as marginally detailed,* left Omdurman on the 19th November in three sailing-boats, taking 10 mules as well on one of the boats. After two days' sailing it was found better to land the mules, and a small party was detailed to bring them along. They easily kept pace with the boats.

Halts were made at Wad Medani and Sennar, and the positions of these places were fixed telegraphically. Karkoj was reached on the 7th December, and here transport animals and rations were purchased. Forty-five donkeys had been purchased at Gedaref, and sent to Karkoj. The Mamur of Karkoj had also collected donkeys and camels of which I purchased twenty-five donkeys and hired six camels (camel and driver hired at P. T. 8 per diem), making up the total of transport animals to six camels, ten mules, and seventy donkeys. I did not consider it advisable to buy more donkeys, as I had only sixty saddles, and native saddles were unobtainable. Subsequently I found that donkeys hired with native saddles got sore backs even after short marches, and could not carry as heavy a load as with the special saddles made to Major Austin's design in the arsenal at Cairo.

The amount of dura purchased was also less than I had intended, as the bags made at the arsenal only held 40 lbs. of unground dura instead of from 50 to 60 lbs.

I had a few large sacks, and these were filled as camel loads, but no sacking could be obtained locally to supplement deficiencies.

The animals were marched light from Karkoj to Roseires, the rations being put on board the gyassas.

Roseires was reached on the 14th December, and from this point survey operations commenced.

All the values of longitude subsequently obtained are referred to the value assumed for Roseires, the correctness of which will remain doubtful till a true value is obtained telegraphically.

* Lieutenant Gwynn, R.E., Lieutenant Jackson, R.E., Mul. Awal Farag Effendi Hassan, 12th Soudanese; 1 Shawish, ditto; 2 Onbashi, ditto; 19 Nafar; 22 Jehadiah; 1 interpreter, 3 private servants.

Two days were spent taking the necessary observations, making up loads, and telling off animals to drivers.

The party started early on the 17th December, reaching Abu Shanina on the 19th December. Camels were useless beyond this point, so those hired at Karkoj were dismissed. To spare my transport animals as much as possible, I decided not to take my main body through Fazokli, but sent it under Farag Effendi by easy stages to Dul, there to await my arrival.

Lieutenant Jackson and I, with a small party for which I was able to hire donkeys (at P. T. 3 per diem—I supplied the saddles), marched to Fazokli on the 21st December. Two days were spent in getting the survey properly under weigh, and J. Fazokli was ascended twice, as it commanded a wonderful panorama. From Fazokli the party marched due south to Ghezan in order to ascertain the true boundary with Beni Shangul and the position of the Khor Baba.

J. Agaru was ascended and its position well fixed, the difference in latitude between it and J. Fazokli making an excellent base for plane-table work. From Ghezan it was found necessary to return most of the way by the same road, as the track by J. Falagut and J. Faronge was reported overgrown, and impracticable for transport animals, and the water supply was very uncertain.

We consequently retraced our steps till the road branched off to Kiri, and from Kiri we visited the Khor Amilia, which is the eastern limit of Fazokli; subsequently returning to Fazokli to write the advanced Report, sent in on the 1st January, 1900.

Two men, who had developed chronic complaints, were sent back by Farag Effendi, and I handed them over to O. C. Famaka to send back to their battalion.

On the 2nd January the Fazokli party started to overtake the main body, and at Kehli overtook it on the 5th January. Farag Effendi had gone to Dul, in accordance with my instructions, but when there received a message from the Mek of Kehli begging him to return as the Abyssinians were threatening to attack Kehli. Farag Effendi consequently came back with the idea of rejoining me at Fazokli, but was stopped by a letter I had sent him from there, informing him of my movements.

I took no notice of the Mek's action, as the people were in a state of great unrest, doubting whether to throw in their lot with the Abyssinians or not. They unanimously desired a return of the Egyptian Government, but were in an immediate terror of the Abyssinians, who, they were convinced, would raid them if they openly favoured the "Turks."

Later on I discovered that the report was widely circulated that my party had come to attack the Abyssinians. Our numbers were greatly exaggerated, and we were credited with the possession of three Maxims. The Abyssinians themselves were thoroughly alarmed, and had taken defensive measures in Beni Shangul and Assosa. I had written a letter to Degaz Damassi from Roseires, but the minor Abyssinian officers had no definite information about me till long afterwards, as Degaz Damassi had referred my letter to Addis Abbaba.

My instructions prevented my informing the native Sheikhs of the true situation, and they not unnaturally refused to believe that my mission was unofficial. The Mek of Kehli was quite reassured by my arrival, and gave every assistance. Lieutenant Jackson and myself ascended J. Kehli, and mapped a large extent of country from it. The ascent is difficult, but the view commanded is very wide.

After buying enough dura to make good what had been eaten, we left Kehli on the 8th January, and reached Dul on the 9th, camping in the old Egyptian lines which are still easily traced. The Dul people proved most unsatisfactory to deal with, being in great terror of the Abyssinians, who had raided them more than once, and whose head-quarters at Goha were within a day's march.

The Mek himself had taken up his residence in J. Jerok, so as to have as long a start as possible, in case of a raid. I found it very difficult to get hold of him, and though there are several Sub-Sheikhs, no one seemed to have much authority. I tried to get into touch with the Abyssinians at Goha, sending a letter to Fiterari Gululatti, and following it next day myself with a small party as far as the top of the escarp which was about three-fourths of the way, and which I wanted to ascend for survey purposes. As I received no reply I came back after spending a day surveying, my instructions prohibiting my entering an Abyssinian post uninvited.

Returning to Dul I found that a letter had come by another route from Goha saying that Fiterari Gululatti was away, and that in his absence his steward had no

authority to receive me. I learned that Fiterari Gululatti was away on a slave-raiding expedition in the Komo district, south-west of Kirin.

The Dul people were now more alarmed than ever as they looked on the fact of our not going as far as Goha as a sign of hostility between us and the Abyssinians. The Mek roundly accused us of bringing trouble on him, and he said the Abyssinians would punish him for receiving us. After this interview it was impossible even to get a guide.

Fortunately I had previously got an itinerary for the route along the lower ground to Kirin, as, even putting aside the prospect of trouble with the Abyssinians, the tremendous steep ascent of the escarp would have been too much for most of the animals, if we had gone by the usual route through Assosa. The itinerary was not very reliable and the description of the road not very reassuring, but I was very unwilling to take a guide by force, so decided to advance without one. A refugee from the Dervishes (a native of Assuan) showed us the first mile or so, but was afraid to stay with us. Later on we picked up another man, who took us a little further. After this the road, though only a little-used track, was fairly obvious. On the pass between J. Fanaogi and J. Fanagamenta we picked up a Bertawi, who, though very friendly, told us that the people of Kirin were under arms, as they had received a message from Dul that we were going to attack them.

I consequently stopped at Khor Arahad and sent a letter forward to reassure the people of Kirin, as I had been unable to get a messenger at Dul to take a letter there announcing my movements.

The following day, while waiting a reply, we halted and ascended J. Taza for survey purposes. In the evening a deputation from Kirin came in, and were easily satisfied.

The next day, the 18th January, we advanced to Kirin, and were well received by Sheikh Hamid, who is a very intelligent man, though, I believe, rather a marauder. His village and people were in excellent order, and there was a large store of dura halfway up the Jebel. He asked me straight out whether I was going to fight the Abyssinians, saying that though he would prefer the Egyptian rule, he must keep on friendly terms with the Abyssinians, if he was finally to be under them. I departed from my instructions in this case, and told him that our relations with Abyssinia were friendly, and that the question of the boundary was being arranged with Menelek; that I had nothing to do with the settling the boundary, but had been sent to make maps as the Government did not know the country well. In the meanwhile, I advised him to stay quiet and give offence to neither side.

He was quite satisfied with this, and hoped that the question would be settled quickly, as till then there would be no security.

After this we stopped a few days to bring the survey up to date and ascended J. Kirin.

Before leaving I bought some dura for six weeks' rations, which I estimated would last to Sobat, even if we failed to replenish in the interval. Hamid also gave us guides and letters to Sheikhs in front.

I had intended to try and move south from Kirin in two parties, the main body viâ the main road on the high ground direct towards Gambela, whilst a small party went outside the Komo Hills across the Jawas and Sonka Khors, shown on Schuver's Map. I abandoned this idea, partly because I knew Fiterari Gululatti had been raiding somewhere in the district, and I did not wish to run the risk of coming on him unexpectedly, and partly because Sheikh Hamid had assured me it would be impossible to get transport animals over the paths, and porters were unobtainable. Water was also said to be very scarce, if obtainable at all, at this time of the year.

From what I saw of the country subsequently, I am convinced that I should have had very little chance of getting through, and in the unsettled state of the country it would probably have raised a good deal of suspicion to have two parties moving about.

I believe April or May would be the best time for exploring these districts, but progress through them would be sure to be very slow and difficult, unless porters were obtainable.

Such inhabitants as there may be would also probably be hostile, as they have been continually raided by Hojali Wad Hassan and the Abyssinians.

We started south on the 23rd January, and found the road very difficult. Sheikh Hamid had advised us to go to Assosa, so as to get on the main Abyssinian road from Lega Galla to Beni Shangul, but this was impossible until we had got into communication with the Abyssinians. The road we actually went by would not have been so bad,

but that the whole country from the Mintek-Abobo-Shandu to Gabu Gola was covered with bamboo cane and, in spite of cutting, the animals were continually getting caught up. This, combined with the fact that all the streams flowing into the Jawas and Yabus had perennial water and flowed in steep clayey beds which became very greasy, made progress very slow. On the 26th January we struck into the main road near Gabu Gola, and from this point the cane nuisance ceased, though the streams were often difficult to cross. At Gabu Gola (Sheikh Abdul Hadi's) we found a soldier belonging to Basha Zodi, who, we learnt, was the Abyssinian officer administering the country immediately in front of us. I took the opportunity of sending him on with a letter to Basha Zodi, explaining who I was. On the 28th January we reached Kutu, a village almost on the crest of what Schuver calls the Komo Mountains, and the head-quarters of the most southerly Assosa Sheikhdom.

From J. Kershe, which is close to the village, we had a good view of the Sonka Valley, and got a good idea of the general lie of the country in front. Here we received an answer from Basha Zodi, containing an invitation to come and see him; and two Abyssinians of a better class, one being Basha Zodi's brother, came to escort us.

On the 30th January we accordingly advanced to Shaso, where Bashi Zodi received us. He is a very fine-looking man and very friendly, evidently well in touch with the most recent ideas from Addis Abbaba, and full of the notion that Abyssinia was going to take rank as a great Christian Power. A dispute had arisen about the transfer of Kutu to Degaz Goti's Galla district, and Basha Zodi had been sent down recently from Addis Abbaba to administer the district in dispute, pending Menelek's decision in the case which was being laid before him personally by Degaz Goti and Hojali Wad Hassan; for it was the latter, and not Sheikh Kutu, nor the Abyssinians in charge of the Assosa States, that objected to the transfer. This is rather an interesting instance of Abyssinian methods of administering the territories they have absorbed, which I have described more fully in Appendix VII.

Advancing from Shaso next day, we entered Galla proper on the crest of the Komo, or rather Shakadobi range.

The change was most remarkable from the moment the summit of the pass was reached. Not only were the colour of the people, and the appearance of their houses different, but we passed, in a few steps, from an overgrown wilderness into a densely populated country. Where not under cultivation, the soil produced short close-growing grass, and there was no bush, but large numbers of fine forest trees, standing singly or in small clumps.

At Shaso there was a small party of Abyssinian soldiers, but when we reached Kelim, we found Fiterari Ashenar had a considerable force, 200 men or more, well armed. They were, however, all Gallas, and in this country there are very few Abyssinians, except a few priests and the clerks and interpreters required to carry on communications between the Abyssinians and the Gallas. The relations between the Abyssinians and the Gallas are rather curious, and are gone into more fully in Appendix VII.

Our reception at Kelim was on the whole very good, but from this point onward the difficulty of obtaining information greatly increased as the Gallas are extra-ordinarily suspicious, and either refuse information, referring one to higher authority for it, or else deliberately mislead one.

To carry on the survey properly I was very anxious to ascend J. Sonka, and insisted that our next march should be to it. From the appearance of the country and Schuver's Map, I was convinced that our road south must pass near this hill, and this afterwards proved to be the case. The Gallas, however, absolutely denied this, and insisted that I should go on to Degaz Goti's place at Gidami. To satisfy Fiterari Ashenar, I agreed with him to go to Gidami after visiting J. Sonka, even though I was convinced it was off my road. He consented to this, chiefly owing to my receiving a letter from Basha Zodi, sent to him by Degaz Damassi, giving him instructions to assist me. This was the first result of the letter I had written to Degaz Damassi from Roseires. In spite of his consent to my plans, Fiterari Ashenar, apparently at the last moment, instructed the guides to take me straight to Gidami, and they tried to do so.

We reached J. Sonka, however, all right, and went on to Gidami the following day. There we were received by Degaz Goti's *locum tenens*, Womber Yembo, who was friendly, but very suspicious, though he made no definite objection to my proposed movement, which I detailed to him. A few hours after this I was given a mail, which Degaz Damassi forwarded with a letter from himself acknowledging my letter written from Roseires, already alluded to. Degaz Damassi had apparently not been warned of the probable arrival of the party, and had received no instructions from Menelek till he

forwarded my letter to Addis Abbaba. The mail contained a telegram from Colonel Talbot instructing me, if possible, to return by the Blue Nile, and warning me of the interruption of navigation on the White Nile.

This, of course, upset all previous arrangements, and I decided to leave my main body at Gidami, under Farag Effendi, while Lieutenant Jackson and I, with a small party, pushed on to the Baro. The country in front had all the appearance of being very difficult, and I knew there must be a great drop into the Baro Valley, which would probably prove too much for the whole transport on the return journey, though it might be practicable for a smaller party, with lightly loaded animals. I had another interview with Womber Yembo, and explained my new plans and the reasons for the change.

He was not very well satisfied at first, and only consented on the condition that I gave him Degaz Damassi's letter, which I had shown him, to keep as a certificate to cover his action. He was reassured when he understood that I was leaving Farag Effendi in charge of the men, and I explained to him that I wished to pay for everything. I had to leave my Abyssinian interpreter behind so that I could communicate with Farag Effendi in writing through him. This made it necessary for us to have an Arabic-speaking guide, and there was some difficulty in getting the Womber to allow a man to go. However, on the following day (the 3rd February) we started, being taken by a road which led much further east than I liked.

The track, though evidently much used, was over a succession of steep spurs, and was terribly trying to the animals, the ascent and descents being from 1,500 to 2,000 feet and the road very rocky in places. The first day's march took us into the Baro Basin, the watershed being covered with a forest of magnificent trees, broken here and there by open glades of bracken and brambles (on which were blackberries), which gave it quite an English appearance. The second day we crossed the head waters of the Garre, which is here a shallow stream about 50 yards wide. The road was better, though still very hilly, and this portion of the Garre Valley is thickly inhabited by Gallas; the population, however, only extends a day's march down stream. The end of this day's march brought us across a high spur into a deep valley running due south, and this stream is in all probability the "Sacco," which is shown on the map in "L'Omo"—Vanutelli's account of Bottego's last expedition.

The next day's march appeared to be due east into the Anfilo Gallas' country, and I have little doubt that we were on the road by which Bottego advanced from the Baro, though the route is only filled in from memory on Vanutelli's Map, and is quite inaccurate.

On the morning of the 5th February, just as we were starting, messengers arrived from Womber Yembo, asking us to return, as a letter had been received from Menelek with orders that when we arrived in Galla country we were to wait, and he was to be informed. I did not believe in the existence of the letter, but considered it only a pretext to induce me to return. I decided, however, to return, as if the Womber meant to make trouble, it was essential that the party should be concentrated, and I had hopes that I should be able to talk him over.

When I returned I had a long interview with the Womber and explained to him that Menelek had given us leave to move freely in the country. I tried to get him to consent to my starting afresh for the Baro, pointing out that the presence of my main body at Gidami was a proof that I had no intention of leaving the country till he had heard from Addis Abbaba.

He was perfectly friendly, and expressed the deepest regret that it was his duty to stop me, but was obstinate. I imagine he was acting on a sort of standing order, and am sure he had received no recent instructions from Menelek, as he refused to show me the letter he stated he had received, and subsequently admitted he was acting on general instructions.

Under the circumstances, I judged it best to write to Captain Harrington to get Menelek to send definite orders about me, as I was sure they would be obeyed at once, and the Womber agreed to send the letter. I stipulated, however, that my party should be rationed gratis while waiting, and retained the five weeks' provisions I had in hand, as a reserve in case it became necessary to force my way out. The Womber willingly agreed to this, and during our five weeks' detention we were very well fed.

If I had decided otherwise, I do not think there would have been any serious risk of a collision, but I found out afterwards a force, quite sufficient to wipe out my party, had been collected, though it was not brought "en évidence." Still the risk did exist, and bluffing would, I think, have been dangerous as I could hardly have kept my men in hand. The fact, too, which I did not know at the time, that Bottego's party had been successfully stopped by force at this very point, might have encouraged the Gallas to

repeat the performance. Apart from this risk, the physical features of the country in front made it unsafe to advance without guides, and trustworthy guides would have been unobtainable. The survey would have been reduced to a mere route traverse, and information about the country would have been unprocurable.

I calculated that I could delay my advance till the middle of March without risk of being caught by the wet season, and this would give time to receive an answer. I considered that the better results which I hoped to obtain by waiting would more than compensate for the delay.

The letter to Captain Harrington was dispatched on the 7th February, and, whilst waiting for the answer, our camp was formed at the foot of the hill where Bottego was killed; though I did not ascertain this till later.

We kept on excellent terms with the Womber, and were able to get a certain amount of surveying done in the neighbourhood, though at first our movements were regarded with a good deal of suspicion and, even to the end, were always under surveillance. I satisfied myself, however, that there was a road south by the pass near J. Sonka, and decided to take this road in case I had to go without permission, though I found there would be difficulties for water by this route.

On the 8th March, just as I had drafted a letter warning the Womber that I could not stay beyond the 10th March, and inclosing a letter to Menelek explaining why I could not wait, I received Captain Harrington's reply with a permit from Menelek; Womber Yembo had also received orders to let us go.

We started south on the 10th March, sending one man north, with letters and a tracing of my map, to go viâ the Blue Nile to Colonel Talbot. This time I took my whole transport with me, as from information I had received from a Dinka merchant, I was pretty sure I should find it easier to return by march route along the Sobat and White Nile than through the hill country to the Blue Nile. I postponed final decision, however, until reaching the Baro.

Womber Yembo, all the time we were at Gidami, was exceedingly friendly, and, I believe, acted in perfect good faith up to what he considered his duty. He is a very old man and understands nothing of Menelek's ideas of a new Abyssinian civilization. Though the Gallas on the whole are a very unpleasant people, for the Womber himself I have a considerable feeling of friendship. If Menelek had, as he had promised, informed officers down the frontier of our probable arrival, and had given instructions to them to help us, the work of the survey party would have been much easier, and all risks of a collision would have been avoided, as no Abyssinian would, I believe, dare to disobey a direct order of Menelek, though they are constantly doing things of which they know he disapproves, hoping that it will not be reported to him.

The Womber provided us with guides to the Baro by the road which he now admitted existed over the pass near J. Sonka. These guides ran away on our second day's march, but as I had taken the precaution to secure a man on my own account whom I thought was more reliable, I took no trouble to stop them.

The first two days' march took us to the bottom of the Kuzai Range, on to the plain which stretched to the Baro. The country immediately south of this range is absolutely uninhabited as far as the Garre and Alau Rivers, and there is a great scarcity of water.

It is, however, a great country for elephants, which are preserved by Menelek. When he sends down an order for ivory, over 100 are said to be killed sometimes in a day; though I think this must be an exaggeration.

The descent of the Kuzai range is very severe, and the ascent would only be possible for strong animals.

The Sonka breaks through the range in a very curious way, but, after passing it, water is very scarce till the Alau and Garre are reached. In the Alau water can be obtained by digging, and in the Garre there are pools. On the banks of these streams are numerous Barun villages, the inhabitants of which can generally speak Galla, and are certainly under Galla influence.

The Garre was reached, on the 13th March, at the village of Abajala, after we had been taken rather out of our way by our guide, who wished to go direct to his own country. I was, however, able to get a Barun guide to Abajala, and there picked up a Nyuak who took us to the Baro. As there is no water at this time of the year in the strip between the Garre and the Baro, we had to go down the Garre till the distance became short enough to traverse without carrying water.

Shortly below Abajala, Nyuaks replace the Baruns, though their villages were almost empty, the inhabitants having migrated to the Baro to fish as they always do in the dry season. On the 15th we reached the Baro at the village of Kaich, at about

9 P.M., after a march of nearly 30 miles from Abajala. Our guide did not let us know we had passed the last water till we were two hours' march into the waterless strip. I had intended to make two marches of it, but thought it better to push on rather than turn back when we had gone so far.

Kaich must be almost the furthest up-stream village of the Nuers, as my guide intended to take us to a Nyuak village, and was very much frightened when he heard Nuers talking as we approached the village in the dark. To avoid frightening the inhabitants who had not heard us approaching, I left the main body some 100 yards off, and went on with one man, who knew Dinka, and the guide. The people were perfectly friendly, and at once lit fires to show the road to the party left behind, and led us down to the water.

The following day we halted, and I heard news of Major Austin's party which led me to suppose he was returning to Nasser. I was also told that the post had been withdrawn from Nasser. Neither of the reports, of course, were true, but they made me doubtful of being able to get fresh supplies at Sobat, or for my journey up the White Nile, by which route it was obvious I must return, owing to the difficulties of the road just traversed. I consequently decided to abandon the idea of pushing up to Gambela with a small party, as I had hoped to do, and devoted myself entirely to getting my party safely out of the country.

Starting on the 17th, we found the "going" over the dry marsh much better than I expected, though no definite track was found till Malwal was reached.

The animals came along very well on the flat ground, though they had shown signs of staleness and weakness among the hills.

All the inhabitants, as far as Nasser, were Nuers, living in their temporary fishing villages. Their permanent villages are in the belt of trees which fringes the marsh through which the river runs.

On the north bank the marsh appears to extend about 4 miles on each side of the river, although near the mouths of what I believe to be the Garre and Sonka it is much wider, probably 10 to 15 miles. The forest belt, where we crossed it, is not much more than 1 mile deep, and not at all dense, though the trees are large.

We reached Nasser on the 22nd March, and halted there two days to rest the animals. I was luckily able to fix the position of Nasser pretty well in relation to the rest of the survey, as on the day we started J. Gemi was visible for a few minutes at dawn; the result obtained agreed, to within a negligeable distance, with Major Austin's position.

From Nasser we marched to Fashoda in eight days, fording the river to the south bank a day's march below Nasser in order to get on the good road, and again to the north bank at Uryong, two days' march from the mouth of the Sobat. At both these points there was a very perceptible current, though in the deep stretches between them the water appeared almost stagnant.

From Uryong we marched across the corner to Fashoda. The first march, mainly done at night, was to Donyol, through dried-up swamp all the way, except in a thick belt of white thorn, 3 miles wide, beginning 2 miles north of Uryong. We stopped during the heat of the day at the wells at Donyol, where there was hardly sufficient water for all our animals, and then, in the evening, on to the Nile, opposite Fashoda which we reached at midnight, the 1st April.

We halted at Fashoda, waiting for the arrival of rations stored at Sobat, and were able to get hold of two gyassas going down stream empty; in these we put all the baggage and a proportionate number of the men, leaving sufficient to bring the transport animals along without loads. These, marching by the right bank, reached Ahmed Aga in four days, and from Ahmed Aga to Jebel Ein in five days, from Jebel Ein to Goz Abu Guma in two. From Goz Abu Guma the whole party came on by steamer, reaching Omdurman on the 26th April.

C. W. G.

APPENDIX I.

Notes on the Fazokli District.

Boundaries.—The boundaries of Dar Fazokli are roughly as shown on the accompanying map. In most places, however, there are no definite physical features to mark the exact boundary, but some hills are claimed by Fazokli and some by the adjoining districts. This applies to all the district boundaries in the country traversed, and frequently a hill may belong partly to one district and partly to another, or there may be detached portions of a district, forming, as it were, islands in neighbouring territory. As a rule, if a mountain near the boundary is uninhabited it is claimed by neither party, but in some cases the population has merely withdrawn temporarily, and then the claim is always maintained. Thus, on the right bank of the Nile, J. Menze and Dimr, though now uninhabited, owing to Guba raids, are still claimed by Fazokli.

On the right bank of the Nile, Derkuyu is the most westerly Gumsa village, and the Khor Bumboti marks the boundary.

The Khor Amilia seems now to be universally accepted as the eastern boundary of Fazokli on the left bank of the Nile, and Armide is its most easterly village on the river bank. The district is said to have extended to the Yabus formerly.

J. Falughut and Faronge are both inhabited, and are claimed by Fazokli.

The Ghezan district appears to have fallen into the hands of Tur-el-Guri, but has now reverted to Fazokli, at least all that part of the district which lies north of Ama Ghezan, which is the most northerly Beni Shangul town in the Tumat Valley. This village is situated some 5 or 6 miles south of J. Ghezan, and there is a slight ridge crossing the valley, which is said to coincide with the district boundary between these points.

From J. Ghezan to the Nile the western boundary of Fazokli is ill-defined. J. Ghezan itself belongs to Fazokli, but a little north of it the Khor Gaza is reported to join the K. Tumat, and from the junction northwards for some way the Tumat appears to form the boundary between Kehli and Fazokli. Half of J. Agaru is, however, claimed by Kehli, and half of Kashangaru admittedly belongs to Fazokli, as does also half of J. Ragreig. The western limit of the district on the left bank of the Nile was not ascertained, but it includes Abu Shanina. On the right bank Khor Zarifa marks the boundary with the Roseires district.

Mek and Inhabitants.—The Mek of Fazokli, Ragab Hussein, is a middle-aged man, and appears to have a good deal of influence, but he is said to be addicted to drink. He claims to be a Fungawi.

The Sheikh of Kiri, Abu Ras, appears to be a most active and intelligent man; his village looks very prosperous, and is kept in excellent order.

Sheikh Bikori, of Masarkum, is a very old and infirm man, but has apparently been a strong man in his time. He suffered considerably from Dervish raids, and lost all his cattle.

In the hills the inhabitants are all Bertas, and very few can talk Arabic. They are, as a rule, finely developed and healthy-looking, but are dull and lazy to a degree. Their villages are built in most inaccessible places, the tukls being wedged among great boulders. It is difficult to understand how the inhabitants subsist, as they only grow small patches of dura, and depend entirely on the rain to irrigate it. During the dry season, even for drinking, water has to be carried immense distances, and I believe it is partly this that makes the men disinclined to make any exertions which would promote thirst. A great many fowl are kept in the villages. The men in some places wash for gold in the khors.

The riverain villages contain a mixed population of Hamegs, Gumsas, and refugees from various down-stream tribes. Arabic is universally spoken among them.

A good deal of trade is carried on with Beni Shangul, chiefly from Abu Shanina, which is the head-quarters of most of the merchants.

Fazokli produces a little gold, which is found in all the khors coming from J. Faronge; K. Ed Daheb, near Ghezan, being the richest.

In Ghezan there is a considerable area under cultivation, but, with this exception, there is practically none south of a line drawn from Kiri, through J. Kukuru, to Masarkum, and thence up K. Masarkum.

In the Tumat Valley, west of J. Fazokli, the dura crop is very fine, but semsen is chiefly grown between Kiri and Fazokli.

Kiri is the most prosperous-looking place in Fazokli, and is built on a very healthy site.

The uncultivated area in Fazokli is covered with low-growing trees, acacias, and thorn, with low-growing grass in the more open places. I saw no sign of gum being collected, or on the trees.

There are practically no cattle in Fazokli, as they were all carried off by the Dervishes.

Ground close to the Tumat would undoubtedly repay cultivation, but at present the more easily cleared areas near the Nile are amply sufficient for the population.

Plenty of water would always be obtainable by digging in the Tumat, but in other places water is very scarce.

C. W. G.

APPENDIX II.

Notes on Guba, Gumsa, and Abu Ramla.

TO the north-east and east of Fazokli are the districts of Abu Ramla, Guba, and Gumsa.

Abu Ramla is a large hill, standing out clear from the main group of mountains forming the escarp of the Abyssinian plateau. The inhabitants are said to be independent of Guba, but have accepted Abyssinian protection, and there is said to be an Abyssinian post there.

Gumsa lies on both banks of the Nile, and adjoins Fazokli. It is only a sub-district, subject to Guba, and is governed by a Sheikh (name not ascertained) under the Mek of Guba (name not ascertained).

Derkuyu is the furthest down-stream village of Gumsa.

Gumsas and Gubas are essentially hillmen, and raid the low country. The great majority of the inhabitants live on the right or north bank of the Nile, and there are only a few villages among the hills on the south bank, between the mouths of K. Yabus and Amilia.

On the north bank J. Guba and its out-lying spurs form a huge mountain block, apparently well represented on the Roseires sheet of I.D.W.O. Map, No. 1281.

The people are turbulent, and while I was at Fazokli the camp fires, of what must have been a large raiding party, were visible among the hills.

The trade route into Abyssinia along the Blue Nile appears at present to be unused, owing to the insecurity of the road.

Guba is said to be more powerful than Fazokli; the mountainous nature of the country would make it a very difficult district to keep in order.

I found it impossible to get any reliable information about these districts.

C. W. G.

APPENDIX III.

Notes on the Kehli District.

Boundaries.—Kehli is bounded on the south by Beni Shangul, Gomasha, and Dul, and on the east by Fazokli. It claims to divide with Fazokli the mountains of Agaru, Kashangaru, and Ragreig, though practically the whole of Agaru belongs to Fazokli, and the whole of Ragreig to Kehli. J. Gainshur belongs to Kehli.

I was unable to identify, either on the existing maps or on the ground, the exact boundaries with Beni Shangul. The Mek of Kehli describes them thus:—

The Khor Gaza* which rises in J. Tinze,* and joins the Tumat a few miles north of J. Ghezan, practically forms the boundary throughout its length, though J. Sude,* or Sule, south of it, belongs to Kehli; J. Obi* being the most northerly Beni Shangul hill at this point. J. Tinze* belongs to Kehli, as well as the following mountains to the west of it, J. N'Zila J. Dish, and J. Bine. J. Onko* is the nearest Beni Shangul mountain, and J. Gule belongs to Gomasha.

Kehli claims to receive tribute from Dul; and half of J. Kurmuk belongs direct to Kehli, and half to Dul.

On the west, Kehli includes J. Maiak, J. Surkum, and J. Abduldugu, and on the north stretches as far as, though it does not include, J. Tabi.

Inhabitants.—Hamdan Beshir, Mek of Kehli, is brother of the Mek of Fazokli, and is a Fungawi. He is very friendly and anxious to receive Egyptian protection, as he has suffered a great deal from Tur-el-Guri's raids, and is greatly afraid of the Abyssinians. He does not appear to be nearly as able a man as the Mek of Fazokli, or to have as much authority; he is a prosperous, easy-going man.

The valley between J. Ragreig and J. Kehli forms a regular oasis, and must have a population of several thousand; it is a very pleasant place in the dry season, though in the rains the low ground becomes a swamp.

Water is obtained from wells and from pools in the khors, while on the face of J. Kehli itself are several springs, from which the more particular carry their drinking water. J. Kehli is consequently exceptionally well wooded, though it is one mass of huge granite boulders. J. Ragreig is dry, and though it has a smoother surface, only grows small trees, and is of the same type as most of the hills of the country. In the valley there is a great deal of dura grown, and there are plenty of cattle, sheep, and pigs.

* None of these features were identified on the ground.

The majority of the inhabitants are Ragreigs, who are mere farm slaves; they are of Berat origin, and their villages run right up to the top of J. Ragreig, 1,500 feet above the bed of the valley. The better class of people are Hamegs and Watawit (foreigners) from various parts. There is one large family who fled from the Dervishes from Abu Haraz.

Several tribes are represented in the out-lying hills of the district. In those bordering on Fazokli and Beni Shangul are Bertas, while to the west, in Surkum and the neighbouring hills, are Baruns, with Hamegs, and a proportion of Watawit.

The people of J. Kehli are very healthy-looking and prosperous.

A certain amount of dura is grown on the road to Dul, but it had failed this season on account of the drought; very little appears to be grown away from the immediate neighbourhood of the hills. Egyptian currency, M. T. dollars, or gold rings, are readily taken here.

C. W. G.

APPENDIX IV.

Notes on Dul.

Dul covers a very small area, being little more than the villages on J. Dul. Half J. Kurmuk and J. Jerok belong to it however, and J. Kumfo should do so, though it is at present in possession of Wad Mahmud, Sheikh of Gomasha, who resides there.

J. Dul is a round-topped hill, standing 2,000 feet above the general level, and only connected with the escarp by a low col. There is a great deal of soil on it, and the rock is of a slatey character, very different from the neighbouring granite hills.

Dul owes its existence to the gold found on J. Dul, and in the banks of the streams that drain past it. Almost no cultivation seems to be carried on in the district, but all food supplies are imported from Assosa and neighbouring districts, and are paid for in gold.

Tribute is paid to both Kehli and Gomasha, and the Abyssinians have several times made raids from their head-quarters at Goha, which is only a day's march off. The remains of the old Egyptian lines are still clearly visible and the remains of the houses built by the Egyptian officers exist.

The Mek (name not recorded) is an old man completely cowed by constant fear of raids. He is stupid and apparently exercises little authority over the various Sheikhs who represent the different sections of the villages of Dul. His residence at present is in J. Jerok, where he lives in order to be as far away from the Abyssinians as possible. He is, I believe, a relation of the Meks of Kehli and Fazokli.

The population is very mixed, and the upper classes are a lazy good-for-nothing lot, supported by Berta slaves, who do the gold-washing. The villages on the lower slopes of the western and northern side of the mountain form an almost continuous scattered town, and there are some huts on the north side of the stream. The water supply is drawn from the stream on the north side of the mountain, which at all times has a little running water in it. Lower down water can only be obtained by digging in the dry season, and this applies to the Khor-ed-Daheb, and other streams in the district.

I imagine almost all the gold in the district comes from J. Dul itself, as I saw no signs of workings in the streams above the point at which the drainage from the mountain empties into them.

The shafts or pits from which the "dirt" which is washed for gold is obtained are to be seen more than half-way up the mountain, and exist in a great number all round the foot of it. There are also washings near the village of Khumfo, and in the Khor Ed Daheb, where the road from Kurmuk to Dul crosses it. At these places, though the "dirt" is washed in the river bed, it is obtained from shafts, sometimes 100 yards off, sunk in the red clay of the banks.

These shafts are about 3 feet in diameter, and are sunk unrevetted 15 to 20 feet. The clay is so stiff, that the sides are notched in successive rungs, forming a ladder for ascent and descent.*

The sand in the river bed itself is white, and appears to be washed down from the granite formation of the escarp, in which the streams rise. It does not contain gold.

The washing is done by women with wooden dishes. They wash the red earth away, leaving a small residue which is quite black with slight signs of "colour" in it; nuggets of any size are uncommon. From this residue the gold is melted out, and moulded into small bars. The dust which I saw left in the black residue, after washing, was in thin flakes, not exceeding one-tenth inch in diameter.

The Dul gold field is quite separate from that of Beni Shangul, and has the reputation of being as rich or richer than any part of the latter. I have no knowledge of mineralogy, and can give no opinion of the richness of the specimens of "dirt" I saw, or of the probability of gold being found in other conditions here.

A very considerable trade is carried on between Dul and the Assosa districts in food-stuffs, and the road up the escarp, at the head of the valley immediately south of J. Dul, is very much used, though it is one of the steepest and worst roads imaginable. There appears at present to

* Illustration not reproduced.

be very little traffic with Kheli or the Blue Nile districts, though the road from Abu Shanina is easy, and with a very little clearing could be made passable for camels.

The people of Dul would eagerly buy European goods, clothes, &c., as they make great display of the articles they have.

Dul would make a most excellent advance base for a trade route to the Lega Galla and Assosa districts, which now draw most of their goods through Addis Abbaba, from the Red Sea Coast.

Though no crops are at present grown in Dul, there evidently has been considerable cultivation, and the soil appears fertile.

C. W. G.

APPENDIX V.

Notes on Beni Shangul.

Little information could be obtained about Beni Shangul, as my instructions prohibited my entering it. Its boundaries, as far as they effect the frontier question, are described in the Appendices dealing with Kehli and Fazokli.

The inhabitants are evidently very anxious to get rid of the Abyssinians and a deputation was sent to me, when I was at Ghezan, under the impression that I was coming to take over the country.

There is a post of thirty Abyssinians at Beni Shangul, under Genyazmatch Shetti. I did not ascertain in what part of Beni Shangul the gold workings were.

The general character of the country, as seen from a distance, was a wide, well-watered, valley, covered with shrubs and, near the streams, forest trees. Its general elevation must be from 3,000 to 4,000 feet above the sea, and the climate should be excellent. The ruling classes seem to be chiefly Watawit (foreign) merchants, and the lower classes, Bertas. There is said to be plenty of dura grown there.

C. W. G.

APPENDIX VI.

Notes on Gomasha, Assosa, Kirin, Fadasi, Abdul Wadi's, and Kutu.

These districts formed one group under the leadership of Hojali Wad Hassan, whose head-quarters were at Assosa until he was taken prisoner, with Tur-el-Guri, by the Abyssinians. He is generally kept at Harrar with Ras Makonnen, but has recently been at Addis Abbaba, having been summoned by Menelek on account of a dispute that has arisen over Kutu, described below. He wrote last year to his Sheikhs secretly, to direct them to try and obtain Egyptian protection, and his liberation through British intervention. Hamid, Sheikh of Kirin, said that, after Omdurman, a letter was addressed to the Government asking for protection, but that no reply had been received.

Gomasha.—Gomasha lies south of Beni Shangul, and its natural western boundary would appear to be the escarp which coincides with the watershed between the Tumat and the White Nile. There are, however, some Gomasha villages on the spurs which project from the escarp, and Kumfo, which is on the lower ground south of Dul, is the residence of Wad Mahmud, nominal Sheikh of the district.

The village marked as Gomasha on the old maps was apparently Wad Mahmud's old residence. I believe it no longer exists, having been destroyed by the Abyssinians. If it has been rebuilt it is no longer known as Gomasha. The actual head-quarters of the district is Goha, which is on a spur projecting into the Tumat Valley. The Abyssinians have a post there of thirty men, under Fiterari Gululatti, the Abyssinian officer responsible to Degaz Damassi for all the Beni Shangul and Assosa districts occupied of recent years.

Wad Mahmud and other Sheikhs are now responsible to him, instead of to Hojali Wad Hassan.

Gomasha probably receives tribute from Dul, and the Abyssinians would, I am sure, claim that district as an integral portion of Gomasha.

The part of the district on the top of the escarp does not appear to be thickly populated, though the soil is evidently fertile and well watered.

Judged by European standards it is a most attractive country, covered as it is with flowering shrubs, and small trees, and intersected with small running streams, bordered with forest trees.

Assosa, Fadasi and J. Bela.—Assosa, which is the same as Agoldi on the old maps, was not

visited. It is the head-quarters of a great deal of trade, and the point where traders from Lega Galla and the south meet those of the north. The Gallas bring their horses, cattle, ivory, fowl and slaves, receiving gold in exchange.

I was unable to obtain clear information as to the names of the Sheikhs of these districts, as there was a confusion between the names of the acting Sheikhs and those who had been, but who are now prisoners with the Abyssinians.

The Sheikh of Assosa, I believe, is Homad Wad Mahmud, who is a prisoner at Harrar. Hamid Wad Mahmud is the acting Sheikh.

Mohamed Wad Hassan is Sheikh of Fadasi, with head-quarters at Gorgura, but there is an Abyssinian post there.

J. Bela is a small district under Jasin, a son of Hojali Wad Hassan.

Kirin.—Kirin is under Sheikh Hamid, a strong, intelligent, middle-aged man, who appears to be very little interfered with by the Abyssinians, though he assists them in their raiding parties. He would be an awkward man for the Abyssinians to attack, as he has established a large grain store in a very strong position, half-way up J. Kirin, and there are springs in the mountain, which would provide him with water. He could probably muster about fifty rifles, and the rest of his people are armed with very fine bows, 5 to 6 feet long, and spears. The Fanaoge and Fana Gamenta mountains bound Kirin on the north, and it extends to, and includes, Gonza and J. Bange on the south.

I could obtain no reliable information as to the boundaries between Kirin and Assosa, but I do not think there are any Kirin villages east of J. Kirin.

The three principal men of Kirin are Barbekr, Hamid (not the Sheikh), and Ahmed Wad Jimr, who own villages and cultivate a lot of dura at the places shown on scale 1 : 250,000 map. They are Watawit and Arabic-speaking, but the majority of the inhabitants are Bertas (in these districts absolutely naked).

Kirin extends to J. Tungshur and J. Fanfan on the west, where it is bounded by the Barun district of Komo, but there is a strip of uninhabited country between; consequently, the boundary is vague.

There are slight signs of gold-washing near Kirin, but these are of no importance. Sheep, goats, pigs, and fowl are plentiful, but no cattle. This season there was a failure of the dura crop from drought, but sufficient was produced for the requirements of the inhabitants.

I heard complaints that Hamid occasionally loots merchants on the road from Galla to Assosa, and he raids the Baruns for slaves. I think, however, he has enough intelligence to see it would pay him to behave if he came under Egyptian protection.

The tukls are remarkably well built, and generally Kirin is in advance of the other places on our route.

Abdul Hadi's.—South of Kirin is the small district under Sheikh Abdul Hadi, which lies between J. Gonza and the Yabus Streams. Abdul Hadi resides at Gabugola, a scattered village on the main Abyssinian road from Lega Galla to Assosa. There are a number of merchants here, and there is a good deal of cultivation and a considerable population in the neighbourhood. Abdul Hadi himself was friendly, but more under Abyssinian influence than the Sheikhs of the north.

Kutu.—South of the Western Yabus, and extending along the northern slopes of Shakadobi Range, is the district of Kutu, under Sheikh Kutu. He now lives at a small village at the head of the Harodima Stream. When Hojali Wad Hassan was taken prisoner, Degaz Goti wished to absorb Kutu into his district; but to this Sheikh Kutu objected, as he wished to be treated in the same way as other districts of the Assosa group. I do not think Degaz Damassi or Fiterari Gulu-latti objected to the transfer; but somehow the case was referred to Menelek, who summoned Degaz Goti and Hojali Wad Hassan to come and lay the facts before him; and sent down Basha Zodi to administer the district, independently either of Degaz Goti or Fiterari Gululatti, pending his decision. Basha Zodi's head-quarters are now at Shaso. I believe it is Menelek's intention, when the boundary question is settled, to reinstate Hojali Wad Hassan with an Abyssinian title, and, if this is done, Kutu would probably revert to him.

Sheikh Kutu is an old man, but intelligent and active. He would, I think, be satisfied with any arrangements which prevented his coming directly under the Gallas.

There are a fair number of cattle at his village, which is on a fine site on an open spur over 5,000 feet above the sea level. The other villages of Kutu are small and far apart.

C. W. G.

APPENDIX VII.

Notes on Lega Galla.

The contrast between the Lega Gallas and the black population of the country north and west of them is very marked. The language is quite distinct, and there is very little sign of cross-breeding, though there are numbers of black slaves among the Gallas. The Abyssinians and Gallas term all the black tribes indiscriminately "Shangalla."

The most extraordinary thing about Galla is the density of the population and the sharpness of the line defining its limits. Beginning at the north at the very crest of the Shakadobi Moun-

tain, it is sharply defined to the west by the escarp forming the extreme limit of the Sonka Valley. The Galla farms run up to the very edge of this, but the few that exist in the Sonka Valley itself are all inhabited by blacks. On the south, too, there are no Gallas on the southern slope of the escarp, though they are in considerable numbers in the Garre Valley, above the point where the stream breaks its way out of the mountains.

The strip actually inhabited is therefore very narrow, for the Yabus Valley is one wide marsh, and the lower spurs which project into it are considered too unhealthy for habitation.

The Gallas are a very light brown, lighter than most of the Shoans I saw, and are healthy and well developed, though not big men. They are unattractive people, being lazy, suspicious, and stupid. They have none of the quickness of the blacks, though undoubtedly they are much higher in the scale of humanity, and capable of much more development.

All the field labour is done by slaves or women.

A good deal of clothing is worn, chiefly native cloths, though a certain amount of Manchester stuffs come through from the Red Sea Coast.

There are very few defined villages in the country, each house standing in the middle of its own farm; though when these farms are of large extent there are a considerable number of slaves' huts surrounding the main building. The huts are of the ordinary tukl pattern, and are not well built; a great feature, however, is the row of miniature tukls, containing grain, in front of the dwelling-house.

All the trade of the country is carried on at recognized "gabas," or market-places. These are generally situated on some convenient hill, and the market is held once a-week—thus the market at Kelim is on Tuesday, and on Thursday at Gidami. The markets are carried on in a most orderly manner, though generally attended by some thousands. All disputes and disturbances are summarily dealt with by the local official, who is present while the market lasts, *i.e.*, generally from 10 A.M. to 5 P.M. The native produce sold consists of cattle, sheep, and horses; dura, Indian corn, teff, and other grains; honey, cotton, and native cloths; ivory ornaments, spear shafts, spices of various kinds, and butter. Gold rings, Maria Theresa dollars, and Abyssinian salt are the currency; while imported goods are beads, ornaments, coloured threads, and Manchester cottons.

Till sixteen years ago Lega Galla was independent of Abyssinia, but Menelek, as King of Shoa, sent down an army to annex the country. The King (or Obi) was then Tulu, father of Degaz Goti, and he decided not to fight. Menelek consequently established him as Degazmatch, and all his Headmen were given Abyssinian rank. A small Abyssinian party was left to form the Degazmatch's personal guard, but the great majority of the armed men of the country are Gallas, and all authority is vested in local men.

Priests were sent down to convert the Gallas (who are pagans) to Christianity, and this process is gradually being carried out; most of the children of the leading men, including those of Degaz Goti, being brought up as Christians, though their parents remain pagans.

A few Abyssinians are employed by the Headmen as clerks and interpreters, but as a rule Gallas, who have learnt Amharic, are employed.

The Gallas have refused to join Abyssinian armies fighting at a distance, but for local defence they are well armed, and would be formidable. They are not afraid of the Abyssinians, and only admit to owing allegiance to Menelek himself, though for him they have a great regard. If Menelek had tried to impose Abyssinian officers on these people he could not have kept them in hand at all, as the approaches to the country are very difficult, and rebellion would have been easy. Such Abyssinians as I saw had no authority even with the blacks; and evidently have no idea of making their authority felt where they are not backed up by physical force.

Tribute is paid to Menelek as he calls for it; and it is collected by Degaz Goti through the district officers. A tax of 2 M. T. dollars for each slave is imposed; and independent farmers, too poor to own slaves, contribute one day's work a-week on the farms of the local officers. Menelek draws a considerable revenue from the ivory of the herds of elephants in the Upper Garre Valley, which he strictly preserves.

Justice is administered under the old Galla laws, though capital cases have to be referred to Addis Abbaba. The local Magistrates hold weekly Courts, and the procedure is very orderly and regular, counsels being employed both for defence and prosecution.

The Galla religion appears to be rather indefinite, a single supreme Being, "Wag," representing both good and evil influence. There is no regular priesthood and ritual, though idiots are supposed to be more or less inspired. Polygamy is practised, even among the recent converts to Christianity.

The Gallas refuse to eat fowl or fish, though great numbers of the former are reared in the country for exportation. The Galla is a very moderate feeder, and, though he drinks merissa and the Abyssinian honey wine, appears to be temperate.

The names of neighbouring Galla tribes are accurately given by Schuver, and they appear to be in very much the same condition as the Lega Gallas, though some of the northern tribes are Mahommedans.

In the direction of the Baro, on the direct road from Gidami to Fincheo, the Galla population extends for three days' march, then there is one day's desert; the fifth day's march is through Yambo (Nyuak) country. The Gallas do not extend into the flat country, west of the edge of the hills.

Gobo was the old capital of Lega Galla, but Degaz Goti moved to Gidami. When Degaz Goti is away his duties devolve on his steward (or Womber), not on the next senior Magistrate; throughout the country every magnate has a similar functionary.

The rains in this district begin about the end of March, very much earlier than in the country further east. During the rains the clay soil and muddy bottoms through which the streams run make the country impassable.

A number of ponies are bred by the Gallas, but they are very small and without much substance. Mules and donkeys are chiefly imported from further east. A good riding mule will fetch up to 100 M. T. dollars, while horses rarely run to more than 30. It is considered undignified to ride a donkey, and they are reserved for transport work; their price varying from 10 to 30 dollars. Sheep cost from 1 to 2 dollars, and some of them are very fine.

The main trade routes are to Assosa on the north and to Leka on the east. There is a certain amount of trade, too, with the Yambos, and a route passes through Fincheo and Gambela to Gore.

Skins and cotton are obtained from the Baruns of the Garre Valley, but there is no trade with the Nuers. To the west the country is raided for slaves.

C. W. G.

APPENDIX VIII.

Notes on the Baruns.

The Baruns are said to be related to the Bertas, but those met with in the Garre Valley were lighter in colour than the Bertas generally are, and spoke a different language

They appear to be found in the whole of the centre of the Gezira from 12° north latitude southwards till the Dinkas of the Sobat are met with. Neither the Gallas nor Arabic-speaking people to the north appeared to know much about the Baruns, and they never enter the Barun districts, except to raid. The northern Baruns acknowledge Sheikh Idris, of Gerawi, as their chief, and there is said to be another Sheikh in Komo, who is the head of the southern Baruns.

The Baruns have apparently no tribal organization, and live in very small widely-scattered villages wherever water can be found. The great distances and want of water isolating each village. The inhabitants live by hunting, and they have so long been subject to raids that they attack every person who goes through their country.

Hojali Wad Hassan raided their villages as far north as Gerawi, and the Abyssinians have made at least three raids that I know of. In one of these Fiterari Gululatti's predecessor was killed.

I cannot say how far the Barun villages on the Alau and Garre are typical, the whole area inhabited being so enormous. Here there was plenty of water, and the population was dense enough to make them too formidable for the Gallas to attack. Plenty of dura was grown near the villages, and the inhabitants hunt a great deal, though they have no fire-arms. The villages were full of heads of game, and meat was common.

The people were frightfully diseased, almost every man suffering from elephantiasis. They were, however, friendly and intelligent.

C. W. G.

APPENDIX IX.

Notes on the Nuers and Nyuaks.

A considerable number of Nyuak villages were found on the Garre, though most of the inhabitants had gone to the Baro to fish. This district is called Chai. The villages were clean and well built, and such Nyuaks as I saw, though physically not to be compared with the Nuers, appeared to be higher in the scale of humanity.

The Yambos who live in the district bordering on the hills are said to be Nyuaks, and their district extends about 25 miles down-stream from Fincheo.

The Nuer district on the north bank of the Baro is called by the Gallas "Abi Gar" and the Gallas use the term "Dinka" indiscriminately for both Nuers and Nyuaks. Kaich must be almost the furthest up-stream village of the Nuers on the north bank, as my Nyuak guide coming from the Garre expected to find Nyuaks there. From this point down-stream the Nuers extended continuously as far as the Nyuak district of Amol.

The Nuers up-stream of the Pibor mouth were exceedingly friendly and a wonderfully fine lot of men, extraordinarily healthy-looking, they had none of the sores and ulcers which disfigure the skin of most natives. They are bright and intelligent enough, but are like animals, without the least sense of decency.

Below the Pibor, where the old Egyptian régime had been felt, they were not so friendly, and there was a good deal of disease among them.

On the Upper Baro the marsh belt necessitates all cultivation being carried on at some distance from the river in the narrow forest strip. The permanent villages are established there, 5 miles from the river or more, and these have to be deserted in the dry season, when temporary fishing villages are constructed near the river bank. The Nuer does not appear to hunt at all, though game abounds, but chiefly lives on fish and dura. In some of the villages a good many sheep and goats are kept.

There is practically no trade among the Nuers of the Upper Baro, and they have no dealings with the Abyssinians, and there have been no Abyssinian expeditions down the north bank. A few Dinkas pass through the country from the Lower Sobat to Galla with slave children, but this traffic seems to have almost ceased of latter years. The Dinka language appears to be a sort of "lingua franca" among both Nuers and Nyuaks, but many of them do not understand it.

C. W G

Notes on the Physical Features of the Country between the Blue Nile and Sobat.

Fazokli, Kehli, and the greater part of Dul and Kerin and the Barun districts are essentially flat. The hills in these districts being scattered promiscuously and rise steeply from the surrounding country. They are generally covered with detached boulders and stunted trees. The plain itself is generally gravelly or stony, and is intersected with dry rocky khors. It is covered near the foot of the hills with thorns and stunted acacia, but away from the hills the bush is generally thinner and thorn trees are not so common. Before it has dried up the grass among the bush would probably make it impossible to leave the path; but in the dry season there is generally no difficulty in getting through the bush excepting at the khors. The whole of this country suffers greatly from want of water, and even where there is water in the streams near their sources it soon disappears into the ground. Water can, however, often be found in the stream beds by digging, though generally only in small quantities. On the Gomasha Plateau, which is bounded by a continuous steep escarp, all the streams flowing east to the Tumat contain running water, but the channels running west are dry, or only contain water for a very short way. The same thing occurs at the watershed between the Sonka and Eastern Yabus. In fact the only west-running water is at the break in the escarp between J. Bange and the Komo Range. This strip of country should be fertile, but it is at present almost entirely overgrown with bamboo canes. These canes reach a height of about 20 feet, and grow five or six in a clump. Bamboo occurs pretty frequently in all the country between about 3,000 and 5,000 in level, but nowhere else, except in a small district on the south side of J. Kuzai, in anything like this quantity.

The whole of Assosa and Fadasi is probably well watered, as the water supply evidently depends on the geological conditions, which appear to be similar to those of Gomasha and Galla.

Forest trees of any size are not met with north of Gabugola, but there are fine trees fringing the tributaries of the Western Yabus south of this point, and also in the Harodima Valley. In the northern districts honey is fairly common, but from Gabugola, southwards through the Galla districts, there are immense quantities, and all the trees are hung with cylindrical wicker hives.

On the top of J. Shakadobi there is a considerable amount of wood, and through the Galla country there are large trees; but it is only on the spurs of Tulu Wallel and on the watershed between the Eastern Yabus and the Garre that there is continuous forest. The Gallas cut down a great many trees for firewood and building. The wood seems of good quality, as excellent spear-shafts are made from it.

The map represents fairly the relative height of the various mountains, which are generally very bold in outline. There is a considerable rise in the Yabus Valley, Gidami being 6,000 feet above sea level. Tulu Wallel is a fine peak, over 10,800 feet in height. South of it the plateau does not end in such an abrupt escarp, but runs off into low spurs, with low-detached hills beyond them.

The general characteristics of the Baro Valley are very similar to the flat country to the north, but the trees are rather larger. I think the width of the marsh on each side of the Baro itself has been exaggerated, and it seems generally to be about 4 or 5 miles wide on each side. Fringing the marsh is a narrow belt of forest, and behind that the usual sandy or gravelly, thorn-covered country. Near the mouth of the Garre the marsh belt is much wider.

I was not able to ascertain definitely that the mouths of the Garre and Sonka were correctly identified, but these two dry khors were of a quite different appearance to all others, being deep cuts with sandy bottoms, while other khors, such as the Wakau, near Nasser, were merely shallow depressions in the mud, by which flood water drained back to the river.

The Western Yabus probably reaches the White Nile as the Khor Adar or Yal, one mouth of which is about 20 miles south of Ahmed Aga, as here again white sand is deposited. One report stated that the Sonka turned north and met the Yabus, in which case the Khor Makair is probably a khor rising in the south-western spurs of J. Gemi, but I think it more probably is the Sonka. East of Nasser there are very few trees near the river, and anything like regular steamer traffic would soon exhaust the supply of fuel. The water of the Baro itself is brown, but the Pibor turned it quite white.

white beads. Coloured beads are practically useless and cloth not much valued. Spear heads are prized by the men, and axes and fasses by the women. This latter point is worth noting as the women appear to control the supplies of the country; the men can do little except act as guides.

Currency.

At Abu Shanina the gold rings which pass everywhere along the frontier can be obtained in exchange for M. T. dollars; here, however, the value of the dollar is going down and the gold is going up. Among the Gallas, on the contrary, the dollar was maintaining its value, and gold was as low as 32 M. T. dollars an ounce [?], though at Abu Shanina it varied from 36 to 37.

The gold rings are made in halves, quarters, eighths, and sixteenths of an ounce [?], and every merchant has his testing scales.

The M. T. dollar was not much used in Kehli and Fazokli, and Egyptian money was taken quite as readily. It would probably pass among the merchants or Sheikhs of any Arabic-speaking district.

In Galla, Abyssinian salt bars form the small change. Three-and-a-half bars going to 1 M. T. dollar; the bars are broken up as required for smaller sums.

The M. T. dollar is never accepted if the brooch on the shoulder is not pretty clearly distinguishable.

Menelek's dollar was only seen once or twice, and none of his smaller coins are in use.

C. W. G.

Men, animals, and rations were accommodated in one sandal and two gyassas, which were towed by the "Tamai" up to a point on the Sobat River, about midway between the Sobat and Nasser posts, beyond which navigation was impossible.

End of navigation was reached on the 19th December, 1899, and the whole party, with stores, &c., commenced to disembark the following day on the left bank of the river, the steamer returning to Sobat on the morning of the 22nd December. The positions of Goz Abu Guma, Fashoda, and Sobat had been carefully fixed, astronomically, *en route*, and the point of disembarkation near a single Dom palm tree on the river bank, was fixed similarly by time carried from Goz Abu Guma. The position thus obtained formed the basis on which all subsequent survey work was carried out.

The donkeys brought from Omdurman were in a wretched and most impoverished condition, as never being particularly robust before they started, they had little chance of picking up during the time they were herded together on board the sandal, where they were so crowded that it was practically impossible to insure that each got a fair share of the grain and grass with which they were supplied during the voyage. Happily, however, we had only lost one by death, so there were still 129 more or less alive ones left. To start off on a long journey with animals in this state was quite out of the question, as they would inevitably have broken down in a few days' time. I decided therefore to give them a week's rest as grazing was abundant, and we still had large quantities of grain remaining from the month's supply that had been brought for them.

At the end of this time I hoped they would be sufficiently serviceable to admit of the column making a start for Nasser post.

As there still remained also some ten days' rations for the men out of the original month's supply for the voyage, and I was unable to carry more than the two months for the land journey, I decided to form an advanced food depôt for this, and consequently dispatched an advanced party with nine mules with orders to stock three or four days' food at a village agreed upon, and then to return.

This party returned on the 27th December, and as in the interval all preparations had been finally completed, and the donkeys had picked up wonderfully, it was arranged to start for Nasser the following morning.

The Dom palm camp was abandoned, therefore, on the 28th December and Nasser reached on the 4th January last by easy stages—75 miles in eight marches—as I did not wish to try the donkeys too highly at the start, and one mule and one camel were temporarily unfit for work.

During this period we only lost two more donkeys, one of which was left with the Sheikh of a village some 12 to 13 miles from Nasser, as it was unable to march. The man was promised a reward if he would have it sent on after us to Nasser, where I proposed halting for two or three days. It never turned up, however, and we subsequently heard that the good man, in his ignorance, had tied the donkey up to a tree, and, in order to strengthen it, had tried to feed it on fish. It died!

On arrival at Nasser, as there still remained seven and a-half weeks' food in hand, I should liked to have at once proceeded in a southerly direction along the Pibor River to its junction with the Akobo or Juba River, and so work down towards Lake Rudolf along the latter river. The orders I had received, however, required me first to proceed up the Sobat River as far as Gambela, in order to locate the nearest Abyssinian post, and to fix a closing point for Major Gwynn's survey from the north, before striking south to Lake Rudolf.

With this end in view, therefore, the column left Nasser post on the morning of the 7th January, and reached the junction of the Sobat and Pibor Rivers on the following day. The crossing of the Pibor was accomplished on the 9th January, and the journey along the Baro or Kir River (as the Sobat is known to the Nuers above its junction with the Pibor) continued in an easterly direction.

The Adura River, a loop of the Baro, was met with and easily crossed on the 11th January, as, owing to the abnormal dry season, the water was nowhere knee deep at the crossing, which was over 100 yards broad.

After following the Baro for several days longer, the column struck across country to the Adura River on the 16th January, as the two rivers were then only 2 or 3 miles apart, and the course of the latter river was adhered to until the point where it takes off initially from the Baro was reached on the 17th January.

The journey was then continued as before along the Baro, and on the 20th the boundary between Nuer and Anuak country was crossed, as well as a large swampy khor known to the Nuers as the River Nigol, which I subsequently identified as the

Aluro of the Anuaks; this stream, flowing from the Abyssinian hills, ended in swamp near our camp of the 19th January.

Shortly after camping on the 20th there occurred, I regret to report, the death of one of the Jehadia, Hamadan by name. For several days previously he had been suffering from some internal complaint, and was so ill that it had been necessary to carry him daily on one of the camels. His loss was a heavy one to the column, as he was a hardworking and capable man, and the only one of our transport drivers who thoroughly understood camels and their ailments. Subsequently, as I will relate in due course, we lost all our camels by death, which may perhaps have been avoided had his advice on their sickness been obtainable.

Hitherto we had travelled through a most dreary and uninteresting country, consisting for the greater part of open, grassy plains, which are swamp after the rivers rise, and the rains are at their worst. For several days at a time we barely saw a single tree even to break the monotony of the dead level scenery. No hills were visible at that season of the year owing to the heat haze. The Nuers, too, are a particularly low type of humanity, and in every way most unattractive.

Now, however, we had reached a well-wooded country, thickly populated by a peaceful and industrious people, who along the river banks had grown large quantities of dura, which was standing 10 to 12 feet in height. Unfortunately, these fine crops were not yet ripe, and the further we proceeded up the river the less advanced became its condition, and as Gambela was approached little or no cultivation existed on the river banks, and the population was scanty.

The site of the French boat "Faidherb," which had been abondoned by Major Marchand on a small island in the river below some rapids, was reached on the 26th January. This point was carefully fixed, as it seemed a very suitable position, and one that could unmistakably be identified, for Major Gwynn's survey to close on. Two days later a halting-place was selected in the Gambela district near the Sheikh's village, and men obtained to carry a letter through to Dejaj Tasamma to acquaint the Abyssinians of our arrival, and asking them to send food down to us on payment, in order to admit of our continuing our journey.

We had by this time little over a month's supply of food left, so tried to purchase more from the Anuaks. The market, however, proved a dismal failure, as practically no food was procurable in this district.

The grazing, too, for the transport animals was meagre in the extreme, as the whole country was parched and dried up for want of rain.

We learnt that no water was now to be found by a route I had hoped might be practicable, striking in a southerly direction along the foot of the Abyssinian escarpment.

Taking all these things into consideration, therefore, I decided to accept a most cordial invitation we had received from the Abyssinians, asking us to go up to Buré, where grazing was plentiful, and where food and everything would be supplied us, and men sent down to assist us in the climb to the summit of the plateau. I hoped that, once the summit was reached, we might be able to work along it down to the River Gelo, and thus get out on to the plains again by the time the rains broke, which they were reported to do in this neighbourhood early in March.

On the 1st February, therefore, we started off again, accompanied by Galla guides, who had been sent by the Abyssinians to show us the road to Buré.

We almost at once entered the gorge by which the Baro finds its way through the mass of hills on to the open plains we had lately been traversing. Going became more laboured now, and the grazing more scanty, if possible, than before at Gambela; but we experienced no real difficulty until after crossing the Baro on the 3rd February.

The crossing was made a few miles above the point where the Birbir River from the north joins the Baro from the east, the combined streams being known to the Anuaks as the Upeno.

We were now at the foot of the Buré heights, which rose over 3,000 feet above the level of the Baro valley below. The guides, however, reassured me by affirming the French had made a good mountain road the whole way up, and that there was nothing to prevent the transport animals accomplishing the ascent with their loads.

On the 4th February, therefore, the ascent was commenced, and after a long day we reached a rocky nullah some 1,400 feet above the Baro, and only 4 miles from our last camp on that river.

Abyssinians and Gallas came down from Buré to meet us, and afforded us

every assistance, so by evening we had got all the animals and their loads into camp, although the camels had to be unloaded and their loads carried in by Gallas, as well as the loads of some eight donkeys, who had pushed each other into a deep khor, some 50 to 60 feet below the level of the rough hill-side track. Quantities of food and drink were sent down to this camp by the Abyssinians that night for the men, who were pretty well exhausted after their long hard day with the animals.

We were now informed, however, that the final ascent of some 1,800 feet to the summit was impracticable for any loaded animals, but that next day hundreds of Gallas were coming down to carry up all our loads for us, so that all the animals could go up empty. We need therefore think of nothing. It took the 5th and 6th February to get the whole of the baggage to the summit, and it was not until the 7th that six of the seven camels were got up.

The seventh camel had died during this awful climb of 1,800 feet in $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles, and we had also to abandon one of the mules and several donkeys during the ascent from the Baro. We were now at an elevation of 5,200 feet above sea level, and the fine mountain air was most exhilirating after the intense heat of the plains below. The view from our lofty position was grand in the extreme, especially across the deep Baro and Birbir valleys, lying so far below us.

Azaj Cheronet, the Governor of the Buré district, had been pressing for us to go on to the populated parts, as the edge of the plateau is uninhabited hereabouts, and I had intended at length, when all the loads were up, to proceed on the 7th, but was unfortunately taken ill with violent fits of vomiting. Feeling better next day, however, we marched some 7 miles through beautiful country, and were received by the Governor with much pomp and ceremony, at a place where quarters were provided for the whole party in a stockaded inclosure on the top of a small hill. The Governor himself lived in another part, some 7 miles further off still along the Goré road, and after seeing us comfortably settled returned to his head-quarters, expecting to receive us there next day. He had no sooner left than I was again seized with the violent fits of vomiting I had previously suffered from. This time I was taken seriously ill, and for the next week I was unable to keep anything down. I became so weak and exhausted from these constant fits that it appeared doubtful whether I should have the strength to withstand them much longer. Thanks, however, to the assiduous attentions of Major Bright, who did all in his power to keep my strength up, I slowly began to take a turn for the better about the tenth day, and was soon able to sit up for short spells at a time. It was not until the 22nd February though—a fortnight since I had been taken ill—that I felt even strong enough to sit on a mule, which was provided by the Abyssinians to convey me to Goré.

Although there had been plenty of grazing at the camp on the edge of the plateau, unfortunately there was very little for the animals at the place where I had been taken ill, and where we had been forced to halt for a fortnight. This had a bad effect on our transport, who lost condition considerably, and some seven donkeys died here in addition to two cows.

When we reached Azaj Choronet's therefore and found there, at that time, excellent grazing, I decided to halt for a day to give the animals an opportunity of getting a good feed.

I, myself, too, was far from well, and suffered from severe pains in the head, which leads me to think my illness was entirely due to a bad attack of sun. Fever I did not suffer from the whole time.

By easy stages we at length reached Goré on the 28th February, passing *en route* through thickly-populated districts of Gallas, who cultivated large areas of ground along the valleys and ridges with which this country is intersected. During this period the survey was conducted by Major Bright, who, in a very difficult track, consisting of an amazing network of valleys and small hills, accomplished a highly creditable piece of work.

At Goré, which is the head-quarters of the Abyssinians under Dejaj Tasamma, and is situated on a horse-shoe shaped ridge at an altitude of 6,580 feet above the sea, we were most effusively welcomed by Kanyazmach Walda Gabriel, then Acting Governor in Dejaj Tasamma's absence at Addis Abbaba. This man at first did everything to make us comfortable; but subsequently he proved to be a lying, hypocritical knave, who, though outwardly pretending to help us, obstructed us in every conceivable manner in order to prevent us getting out of the country. What his object was is difficult to imagine, unless he hoped that we should be compelled to abandon the bulk

of our stores, which would consequently fall into his hands. He had been so profuse in his offer of help with porters, &c., which had been most readily given to get us into the country, as we had been unable to load our camels owing to the difficult nature of the road, that we naturally looked to him for the assistance required to get out again.

In a short time the cold had worked such havoc amongst our animals that, unless we were able to purchase donkeys and mules from the Gallas round about, we had become more or less dependent on him. Of our situation he evidently intended to take every advantage. Notwithstanding repeated promises to provide us with porters, and to make the Gallas bring in animals for sale, he did nothing beyond obstructing our purchase of donkeys in an underhand sneaking manner.

Shortly after we had reached Goré I had decided that to proceed through Abyssinia towards the Gelo River, with the rains coming on, would be practically impossible with my transport animals, owing to the necessarily hilly nature of the country, and the intense cold, to both of which they were quite unaccustomed. Moreover, the delay of a fortnight caused by my illness made it so late now that I considered it advisable to descend into the plains again by the shortest route, viz., that by which we had come, as the rains were daily expected.

By the 12th March our Omdurman donkeys had been reduced to eighty-two in number, and we had only purchased seventeen fresh ones from the Gallas. Of the eighty-two, so wretched had their condition become, it appeared doubtful if more than forty were capable of carrying loads. Moreover, we had only four camels left, and they and the mules also were in very poor condition. I could get no assistance from Gabriel, in spite of repeated promises, so decided to send all the Omdurman donkeys and camels back to Gambela, with some forty saddle-loads of gear, and trust to being able to arrange subsequently for the rest of the stores by purchasing animals slowly from the Gallas.

Seeing that we were anxious to get out of the country before the rains came on, Gabriel refused to provide any porters, because he had coveted the Berthon boat, for which he had asked me several times, but which I had absolutely declined to part with under any consideration. We therefore decided to do the best we could without his assistance.

The column was divided up into two parties, and the advanced party under Shaweesh Fadlalla left Goré, *en route* for Gambela, on the 12th March, with 82 donkeys, 40 loaded; and the 4 camels and the 3 remaining cows of the 6 we had brought with us.

On seeing the departure of the advanced party (of which he had been previously informed), Gabriel at once put one of his officers over the camp to take tax from any one who brought donkeys round for sale, thus keeping would-be sellers away, and raising our prices. It was useless my expostulating, and pointing out that the work I was engaged in was as much in the interests of the Negus Menelek as those of the Soudan Government. He merely pretended that the officer was placed there in my interests to prevent me being cheated by persons bringing round stolen donkeys for sale.

As by the 15th March we had only succeeded in purchasing altogether some twenty-two donkeys, and there seemed no prospect of obtaining sufficient animals to remove all the remaining stores left with me at Goré in one trip, I decided to send off another convoy of ten mules and eighteen donkeys to carry stores as far as Azaj Cheronet's. This consignment was to be left here under a suitable guard, and the empty animals to return to Goré as expeditiously as possible.

The small convoy left Goré on the morning of the 15th, and by making double marches on the return journey, were back on the 20th, leaving one mule behind. The information they brought regarding the advanced party with the Omdurman animals was to the effect that, by secret orders of Gabriel, and unknown to me, it had been stopped at Azaj Cheronet's, and permission to proceed to the Baro denied it. This in spite of Gabriel having seemingly relented and assured me he had written to Azaj Cheronet's to help the advanced party with food, and to provide men to assist in the descent from the plateau into the Baro Gorge.

Owing to the exceptional drought—the rains had not yet broken—the country all round the Buré district had become much parched and dried up, and there no longer existed any grazing where the animals were being detained. On hearing this unwelcome piece of intelligence, I asked Kanyazmach Gabriel to come up and see me, and requested to know his reasons for stopping a party sent by my orders to the Baro River without informing me of the fact. He replied it was true he had ordered the

party to be stopped, as an army of the King's was down at the French boat, which was being taken to pieces for transportation to Addis Abbaba. He feared, therefore, that if it should fall in with my party, unaccompanied by a European officer, it might attack and loot it. To prevent any such unfortunate contretemps he had ordered the party to be detained until I could accompany it from the Baro myself. This was an obvious lie, as the men at the French boat were chiefly Gallas and Abyssinians from the Buré and Goré districts, to whom my men and animals must have been perfectly familiar.

In order to avoid open rupture, however, it was necessary to pretend credence, so Gabriel was thanked for his kind consideration and forethought, but, at the same time, it was pointed out to him that the animals had been detained at a place where there was absolutely no grazing now, of which fact he was, of course, not aware (?), and that, as plenty of grazing was obtainable two marches on at the edge of the plateau camp, he would, I hoped, have no objection to their being detained there instead. He then agreed to allow the advanced party to proceed there, but this detention of over a week at Azaj Cheronet's resulted in the death of some fifteen to twenty donkeys from sheer starvation, so there was a considerable amount of method in Gabriel's plans.

During the absence of the small convoy we had purchased a few more donkeys, so could, on their return, now muster some twenty-six donkeys and eight mules, which was just sufficient to enable the remainder of the stores at Goré to be removed as far as Azaj Cheronet's. I informed Gabriel, therefore, that I proposed leaving next day. I had previously given Gabriel and other officers at Goré handsome presents; but in spite of these no assistance in the way of porters, though so frequently promised, was forthcoming, and we finally left Goré on the 21st March with little of that pomp with which we had been welcomed. To say we were glad to shake the dust of that place off our feet, after our enforced residence there of three weeks, is to put it mildly. In order to prevent any semblance of friction we had calmly put up with indignities such as I trust we may never be called upon to undergo again at the hands of any foreigners—be they black or white.

I do not propose now to write at any length regarding the various incidents that took place during our dealings with the Abyssinians at Goré and elsewhere; but as I have kept a most careful daily record of all that happened, I am prepared to supply a full and detailed account if required.

At the same time I wish to place on record my opinion that, had it not been for the lying promises of the Abyssinians, which were never fulfilled, and to the obstructions placed in our way regarding transport, and the consequent delay resulting therefrom, it would have been quite possible to have accomplished eventually a successful survey of the regions between the Sobat River and Lake Rudolf.

On the 19th March, before I was aware of the detention of the advanced party, I had written surreptitiously to Captain Harrington at Addis Abbaba, regarding the attitude of Kanyazmach Walda Gabriel, and subsequently received a reply from that officer (at Gambela on the 13th April), in which he informed me that the Emperor Menelek was exceedingly angry at the treatment we had received, and had sent for Gabriel in order to punish him. In order to get this done, Captain Harrington desired me to forward formal complaints to Addis Abbaba against Gabriel, which were dispatched from Gambela on the same date.

During our stay at Goré I had received several letters from Dejaj Tasamma, then at Addis Abbaba, informing me that he had instructed Gabriel to supply me with what food and sheep we required for our journey south. Gabriel had told me repeatedly the food (eighty bags of flour and thirty goats and sheep) were all ready for me at Azaj Cheronet's, where we had arranged I was to have it handed over to me.

On arrival, therefore, at Azaj Cheronet's on the 25th March, I asked for it, but was calmly informed by the Wakil in charge—Azaj Cheronet was absent from Buré, being down at the French boat—that there was no food for me. This I knew to be untrue, as the men who had previously been to and returned from Azaj Cheronet's whilst I remained at Goré, had told me the food was already ground and ready to put into bags.

As I was in any case obliged to stop here for several days, whilst I removed, as before, the stores in two trips to the edge of the plateau camp, I decided to send off one convoy at once, and, during its absence, to try and purchase grain from the Gallas.

The convoy left on the 26th March, and were back again on the morning of the 29th.

In the interim Gabriel suddenly arrived from Goré, *en route* also to the Baro, and I had, therefore, an opportunity of complaining to him regarding his breach of faith with respect to the promised supply of food. He pretended to be astonished, said there must be some mistake, and assured me I could have as much as I wanted, and left in the early morning of the 29th to continue his journey down to the Baro. To put his assertion to the test, I sent to the Government store for food, and was there informed orders had been received to supply me with only six bags of flour and four of grain; no goats nor sheep had been sanctioned. Eventually I received fourteen bags of musty flour, but no live-stock. Whether Gabriel thought that this small amount was insufficient to enable me to leave the country or what, it was hard to say.

At all events, I had no intention of remaining one day longer than necessary amongst such charming people, and as I had been able in addition to purchase a few bags of peas and some condemned dura, used as rations for their animals by the Abyssinians, I decided to start off with this, trusting to be able to purchase more flour from the Anuaks, when we reached the thickly-populated parts. The rains appeared to be breaking, and I feared delay might render the descent into the Baro Gorge from the plateau more difficult should we be overtaken by them, especially without the assistance of porters, which might necessitate the abandonment of valuable stores.

The convoy returned as before stated on the 29th March, and the following day we were able to make a final move to the edge of the plateau camp with the remainder of the stores. Two marches took us there, and as Shaweesh Fadlalla and the advanced party with the remnants of the Omdurman animals were still waiting for us, the whole expedition was once more reunited on the summit on the 31st March, after being split up for close on three weeks. During that time not a few anxious moments had been spent regarding its safety, considering the not particularly friendly (although outwardly eminently so) attitude of the Abyssinians.

We were now able to take complete stock of the whole of the transport at our disposal. Of the eighty-two donkeys which left Goré on the 12th March, forty-five only remained, and of these not more than thirty were capable of carrying loads. We had, however, got thirty-eight strong Abyssinian donkeys as we had purchased about a dozen on the road after leaving Goré, so we could rely on sixty-eight donkeys for transport.

Of the original ten mules taken from Omdurman three only were left, but we had purchased three Abyssinian ones at Goré, so could count on six of these animals. One solitary camel was all that remained of the seven we once took so much pride in.

From the above figures it will be at once evident that our carrying power was reduced by about half what it was formerly.

Now that the whole expedition was concentrated at the summit of the plateau, the problem immediately before me was the accomplishment of the descent of over 3,000 feet to the Baro below, without the assistance of porters.

Although many Gallas were going down daily empty-handed to the French boat past our camp, we were left severely alone, and none were detailed to assist us in the undertaking—a fact of which Gabriel was perfectly aware, as he was at the French boat also and kept duly informed of our movements. It was decided to get all the loads down first to the camp at the foot of the final ascent of 1,800 feet, and this was entirely done by the employment of the Abyssinian mules and donkeys, who were wonderfully active on the steep hill sides.

On the 4th April the final move from the summit was made and loads carried straight down to the Baro. On the 5th a party returned to the half-way camp at the foot of the steep ascent to bring on down the remainder of the stores left there under a guard; and eventually, on the morning of the 6th, the whole expedition had accomplished the descent, had ferried everything over the Baro in the Berthon boat, and were quietly camped on the south bank of the river when Gabriel suddenly turned up from the French boat.

The look of astonishment—I may say almost disgust—depicted on his face was a perfect study, as I feel certain he was quite convinced that without porters we could not accomplish the descent without abandoning a considerable amount of stores. We had brought everything down with us, and although we had not the transport necessary to remove everything, I intended to do so by means of double stages rather than leave anything behind for these grasping Abyssinians. Gabriel and I parted with

very few words, and crossing the river he camped on the opposite bank and continued his journey back to Goré the following day.

We were over the Baro none too soon, as the very night we were camped on the south bank we were visited by a terrific thunderstorm before 9 P.M.

In an incredibly short space of time veritable torrents were descending the hill sides, and the whole camp was flooded out by a large volume of water knee deep, which carried many things away into the Baro. It was an exceedingly miserable night as the tents were levelled to the ground in a few moments by the resistless rush of water.

The main difficulty had now been overcome; but we had more stores than we could possibly carry with our transport now so reduced in number. For some time, therefore, double trips had to be made from stage to stage. Grazing for the animals was still meagre in the extreme, and in order to maintain the strength of the animals the stages had necessarily to be very short ones. It was not until the 17th April therefore that we came across green grass again in the Penkio district. We had now just passed the site of where the "Faidherb" lay, and the recent sojourn of the Abyssinians amongst the Anuaks made itself very apparent. Where formerly we had passed through thriving happy settlements of natives, whose standing crops of corn, and clean well-kept houses had given an air of prosperity to the district, we now found deserted huts, torn down fences, and overturned granaries. The natives had fled before the ruthless raiding of the Abyssinians, and one could not but feel saddened by the change which had so quickly come over so cheerful a scene of some three months before.

Then, the natives unhesitatingly came out of their huts, men, women and children, and laughingly greeted the column as it wound its way skirting their fields. Now, they all fled in dismay at its approach, imagining the dreaded Abyssinians were once more coming to loot for grain, and they could be seen from some distance off wading across the river carrying all their household goods on their heads, and leaving their huts bare. On the opposite bank they would sit all huddled up together, wondering what fresh calamity was now about to overtake them.

On the 18th April we camped in a thickly-populated portion of the Penkio district, and gradually reassured the natives, who slowly began to recross the river, and return to their huts, when they saw no harm was intended them. Like wise people, and possibly having often before suffered from Abyssinian raids, they had taken the precaution to skilfully bury all their previous harvest, so when they understood we were anxious to buy flour, and saw our varied assortment of beads, the ladies at once commenced to pound up their dura, and a brisk trade ensued. In the first afternoon we had purchased some ten bags of flour. We halted on the 19th and 20th to purchase more, and started off on the 21st towards Itang, one of the most westerly villages of the Anuaks on the Baro or Upeno River. The Anuaks carried the food we had purchased, and received presents of cloth for their assistance. Still marching by double stages, and buying flour as we went along, we eventually reached Itang on the 24th April.

As we were now some considerable distance from the Abyssinian plateau, we decided that this would be a safe and convenient place to leave behind all stores we were unable to carry, as the place should be easily attainable by steamer, for the rocks and rapids so common in the upper reaches of the river do not exist here.

Arrangements were therefore made with the Sheikh Fagoi (Mormor's son) who agreed to store the things for us in a hut until called for by steamer, when he was to receive an additional present for their safe custody. He also supplied us with two guides for the journey south; as even now, at the eleventh hour we were prepared, in spite of losses in transport, &c., to make the attempt to reach Lake Rudolf, provided we were not too late on account of the rains.

We still had seventy-five donkeys left, of which sixty-eight, we anticipated, would be able to carry loads, whilst we could, in addition, rely on one camel and six mules, at the start at all events. We had seven mules in all, as an additional Abyssinian one had lately been obtained, but one of the Omdurman mules was too sick to carry. We had succeeded in purchasing sufficient flour to last for some five weeks, before which we hoped to obtain more from the Anuaks living on the Gelo, and perhaps the Akobo or Juba River.

Storing everything that was not absolutely essential at Itang, we started south on the 29th April, trusting that we might still be in time to work our way to Lake Rudolf before the rains rendered the undertaking impossible. The first day's march, however, we encountered a formidable swamp some 12 miles from the start. This had

been formed by numerous spills from the Aluro River, already nearly bankful, owing to heavy rains in the Abyssinian hills. Several of the spills were waist deep, which necessitated the unloading of the animals, and the loads being carried across by men. It was close on 6 P.M. that night before we reached a piece of high ground, a mere mound in this area of swamp, on which it was possible to camp.

Floundering through another half-mile of swamp next day, we arrived at the bank of the Aluro, a rapid stream 15 to 20 yards broad, in heavy flood, and breast deep. To reach it we had been forced to cross several more deep overflow channels. The Berthon boat was now got ready, and the remainder of the morning spent in transferring all loads, &c., to the south bank. Early in the afternoon we were visited by a heavy downpour of rain, which continued until after dark, converting the camping ground on the river bank into a swamp, so that all night the animals were standing in some 6 to 9 inches of liquid mud and water.

We pushed on through the swamp next day, but only succeeded in making 1 more mile in a southerly direction to another mound. This was occupied by a small colony of Anuak fisherman, who assisted us in getting the loads carried to this point, as many of the donkeys were quite unable to travel through the mud, and the camel carrying the Berthon boat frequently slipped and fell, and became exhausted. Fortunately, after pitching camp on this mound, we were treated to a bright sunny afternoon, which rapidly dried the soaking tents, garments, and blankets of the men.

The following day another mile took us through the swamp, and we reached firm, though scarcely dry, land again, and continued to a swampy khor—the Bela by name—some 11 miles distant.

On the 3rd May a long march of 14 miles in a southerly direction brought us to the bank of the River Gelo, which, like the Aluro, was in flood. We did not reach the village of Patok, between which and the river we camped in a thick belt of wood until nearly dark, as progress on the march at times had been rendered slow in the extreme, owing to the donkeys sinking into boggy tracts nearly up to their knees and collapsing. In one place twenty-five donkeys were down in a space less than 30 yards square. Each donkey had individually to be unloaded and forcibly lifted out of the bog, and conveyed to the drier ground before it could be reloaded and started off again. It was heartbreaking, but the men were splendid, and worked uncomplainingly in the filthy mud, lifting and hauling the helpless donkeys as though they were so many sacks of coal.

On reaching the Gelo it had been my intention to follow the river up close to where it issues from Lake Tata, and there to cross it and strike across to the Akobo or Juba River. We were too late, however.

The Gelo in heavy flood had already recently overtopped its banks, and the Anuaks informed us that it was quite impossible now to travel with transport animals south-east to Lake Tata as the whole country round about there was swamp, and the river unapproachable. A short reconnaissance made by Major Bright and myself along the river in that direction was sufficient to show us that the Gelo had in many places broken through the banks and formed large areas of swamp, so there appeared no reason to doubt the assertion of the natives.

We were unable to obtain any food from the Anuaks, who said that all their villages on the Gelo as well as those of their tribesmen living along the Akobo had recently been raided by the Abyssinians, who visit these parts yearly in large numbers on elephant-shooting expeditions, and during that time live entirely on the country by looting.

This fact the Abyssinians do not pretend to deny, as at Goré on the return of one of these large expeditions under Fitorari Hili, a high official, who had massacred some sixty elephants, big and small, for their ivory, I asked him regarding food to be obtained in these regions where he had done his shooting. He replied that they had been able to get it from the natives, and when I inquired what articles of barter were most in request, he smiled good naturedly, and said: "You know our soldiers are bad men, and when we come to a large village they just fire a few shots, on which the natives run away, and all their grain is then brought into my camp." This, however, is a digression.

We could count, therefore, on purchasing no food ahead. The health of the men had suffered very severely in the few days of swamp we had been through since leaving Itang, and already 25 per cent. of them were down with fever and more or less incapable of work.

The donkeys, too, were also apparently suffering from fever, and before long ten died and another six or eight were unable to carry loads. The outlook was gloomy

in the extreme, as heavy rains were falling almost daily, and our main anxiety was lest we should get hopelessly involved in swamp unless we made every endeavour to get out of the country without delay. With much reluctance, therefore, we were compelled to abandon all idea of pushing further south to Lake Rudolf.

On the 5th May we started off again in the afternoon, after a wet morning, and marched some 7½ miles in a westerly direction down the Gelo, but some distance from it, as its banks were unapproachable owing to swamp. During the next few days our animals travelled wretchedly, being apparently saturated with fever, and to get along at all we had to abandon, burn, and destroy all our trade goods (except two loads of beads and a little brass wire), spare saddles, ammunition, the mess tent, and other valuable stores which were now not absolutely necessary.

It was not until the 8th May that we were able actually to camp on the river bank again, our road from Patok hitherto having taken us some distance from the river skirting the village of Otwol, Chiro, Oran, Goin, Ungela, and Perbong. These are all some miles from the river, and, with the exception of Perbong, are skilfully concealed in thick belts of wood, and strongly stockaded. Some of them are of very considerable size, and must harbour a big population. The Anuaks of the Gelo are, however, a much less prosperous-looking race than those living on the Upeno, and had practically no cultivated fields of dura. At all events we did not see them beyond a few very diminutive cleared spaces in woods.

We reached Perbong after a long day, on the 7th May, during which we lost by death our last remaining camel, who had carried the Berthon boat for us. This was a very serious loss, as it necessitated throwing away more stores, including two loads of ammunition (Martini and Remington), in order to free a mule. The boards were removed from the boat and made up as a donkey-load, which sufficiently lightened the outer shell to enable two of the last three remaining Omdurman mules to carry it alternatively day by day. The boat was too long and clumsy for the Abyssinian mules, which are short small animals.

At Perbong we found the natives using wells sunk to a depth of 12 to 14 feet in the bed of a dry khor, for obtaining their water supply.

A short march of 4 miles south from Perbong took us to the Gelo River bank, on the 8th May, just clear of the long belt of swamp which extends along both banks in an easterly direction. Here we found the Gelo from 80 to 100 yards wide, and its waters almost level with the top of the bank. We were able to proceed in a westerly direction along the river until the 12th May, when further progress was stopped by a large area of swamp at a point where another swampy stream (reported to come from the Mokwai River) approaches within a quarter of a-mile of the Gelo.

There was swamp everywhere before us and to the north and south, so on the 13th we retraced our steps some 3 miles up the river, where it was only 30 to 40 yards wide, but flowing very swiftly. Here we effected a crossing to the south bank, which took six to seven hours to accomplish, as, after the loads had been ferried over in the Berthon boat, the animals had all to be towed over, for there was every probability otherwise of their being carried away and drowned.

Next day we struck in a south-westerly direction across an open grassy plain, and after a march of 15 miles reached the bank of the Akobo River—the Ruzi of Captain Wellby, presumably. I had formed the opinion during the march that it was most improbable this river flowed into the Gelo, and that it probably entered the Pibor by a course of its own. On the March, one of the Omdurman mules, which had been ill for some time, had to be destroyed, as it was unable to march. When the Akobo was reached we were pleased to find it was not in flood, and although about 20 yards broad was only 3 to 4 feet deep. It was crossed the following day, and here we lost our two Anuak guides, who, fearing to enter Nuer territory, decamped without receiving the present due to them for their services. I felt pretty certain, however, that if we followed the river we would strike the Pibor in two or three days' time about 7° 50′ north, where Major Capper, in his map of the course of that river, shows a large khor entering the river bank at about that latitude. From the point of crossing we followed the river by a most extraordinary winding course, and yet flowing generally almost due west.

On the 17th May we reached the junction of the Akobo with the Pibor at latitude north 7° 47′ 41·4″ The Pibor at this point was some 70 to 80 yards wide and 11 feet deep, with practically no current, as it was not yet in flood.

It was crossed the following day above the junction, and the march along its left bank continued on the 19th. We had only proceeded some 6½ miles, however,

when we were confronted by a deep khor issuing from the river, and as this was 30 yards broad and 10 feet deep, it was necessary once more to unship the Berthon boat in order to ferry the loads over to a deserted village on the far bank, where camp was pitched for the day.

At the end of our next march we were only 4 or 5 miles distant from Sheikh Yowe's capital, and towards evening a visit was paid us by his son and four other Nuers, who promised to return early next morning to show us the road. They were particularly anxious, however, to get hold of the guides who had brought us here, and quietly remarked that they would cut them into small pieces if they fell into their hands.

The non-commissioned officer, who was interpreter, replied that in that case they would have to operate on me, as I had done so by looking at the stars and making a map of the country. They appeared somewhat incredulous, and cast furtive glances round the camp looking for their intended victims, but in vain.

Next day these same men returned and conducted us towards the cluster of villages, Koratong, Uentau, Wanding, &c., which comprise the head-quarters of old Sheikh Yowe, and as we neared them many other Nuers joined in our train. The villages, all being some distance from the river, were not visited, but camp was pitched on the river bank some 2 to 3 miles from them.

Here guides were obtained to take us in to Nasser, and in the afternoon the camp was inundated with natives, who brought dura, flour, fish, and the lalob fruit for sale. In a short time we secured some four bags of dura for our mules, especially for the only remaining Omdurman one, whose companion had died the previous day. Thanks to this timely grain ration, his strength was revived considerably, and he safely reached Nasser, carrying the Berthon boat daily unaided.

On the 22nd May we reached and camped at the junction of the Gelo and Pibor Rivers, and on the 24th camped some distance below, where the Mokwai enters the Pibor. We had been obliged to leave the river some distance above the latter junction owing to a large area of swamp which had been formed there, and extended north as far as the Sobat–Pibor junction.

Our last camp on the Pibor proper was therefore on the 23rd May, near a large populated village—Kur by name. This, with the exception of the Koratong group, was the only inhabited one we passed. Many others were deserted at the time we came down the Pibor, as they are merely used as fishing villages during the dry seasons of the year, the occupants returning to their permanent homes on the Baro, Sobat, and Pibor when the rains break and the rivers begin to rise.

Although we had been visited by storms of rain almost daily, we had still been able to march; but on the 25th, just as camp had been struck, and we were shortly about to start, we were subjected to a tremendous downpour, which continued until past midday.

The camping ground became a bog, and everything was soaked through. During one of the lulls in the storm the men were ordered to repitch their blanket shelters, as all idea of marching with the ground in its present condition was out of the question. Fortunately, late in the afternoon we were treated to a little sunshine, and as no further rain fell during the night we marched next day through heavy sodden ground, and eventually reached the Sobat River some 3 or 4 miles below its junction with the Pibor.

We were now on familiar ground again, and having no desire to be subjected to any more storms in this marshy country whilst on the march, we pushed straight through to Nasser post on the 27th May, arriving there late in the afternoon.

As the work of the survey party may be regarded as having terminated on our return to Nasser, it may not perhaps be out of place to mention briefly the loss of men and animals suffered during the five months, from the time we left the Dom Palm camp on the 28th December to the 27th May. I am happy to say that beyond the death of the Jehadia Hamadan, already mentioned, none other occurred amongst the men.

Although at times considerable amount of sickness was prevalent, chiefly fever towards the end of the expedition, the general health of the men was good throughout. Several bad cases of dysentery appeared; but as arrangements were made, as far as possible, to carry men on the march who were seriously ill, all recovered after the usual treatment had been administered to them for some time. We were less fortunate regarding the transport animals: we lost by death the whole of the seven camels we left Omdurman with, and only one of the ten mules survived to reach Nasser.

We had left the Dom Palm camp with 129 donkeys, and subsequently purchased 38 more in Abyssinia—bringing the whole total of those animals in our service at one time and another up to 167. We returned to Nasser with 59 only, so during these five months we had lost no less than 108 donkeys, in spite of everything being done to consider their welfare throughout. Of those, I need hardly say, over 100 formed part of the original 129 from Omdurman. Five of the six cows we had taken with us for purposes of barter had also died; but, on the other hand, very few goats and sheep succumbed to climatic causes.

I do not propose to enter into any detailed account regarding the country traversed by the survey party, nor the methods adopted for its survey, for the maps prepared by me make the former sufficiently clear, and the latter are known to you.

Before closing this Report, however, I wish to place on record and bring to your notice my high appreciation of the very valuable assistance rendered me throughout by Captain and Brevet-Major R. G. T. Bright, Rifle Brigade; both as regards the survey and the numerous and varied details that have to be considered in the conduct of an expedition of this sort; he always proved a most indefatigable worker and thinker, and I trust his services may meet with some well-merited recognition at the hands of the Egyptian Government.

The escort of the 11th Soudanese deserve nothing but praise from me. From first to last they showed themselves to be a well-conducted, hard-working, and willing body of men, and many days of real hard (and what must at times have been uncongenial) work they had. I might more especially instance the ascent and the descent of the Abyssinian plateau, and our days in the Aluro swamp amongst many others. When their original food brought from Omdurman had been exhausted, their rations were not of the best nor plentiful; but in spite of this they worked well and loyally to the end.

Mulazim Ahmed Effendi Shukri, the young officer in charge of the escort, proved well worthy of his choice, and though suffering almost continuously from a more or less chronic state of dysentery in a lesser form, this seldom prevented him from carrying out his duties with great pluck and determination. I trust his good services may be brought to the notice of his commanding officer with a view to his obtaining promotion when opportunity arises.

The three non-commissioned officers, Shaweesh Fadlalla, and Ombashis Jardin, and Karasit did excellent service throughout, which, I think, fully deserves recognition. Shaweesh Fadlalla more especially is a man of unbounded energy, and one of the hardest working and most capable men in his position I have met. I have already referred in the body of this Report to his conduct of the advanced party sent off from Goré, which left nothing to be desired, and I consider accordingly that he would make a most efficient native officer. I have had special opportunities of gauging this non-commisioned officer's merits. He is a splendid man for such work as he had to perform during the expedition, and, I hope, may be substantially rewarded for his able services.

The Jehadia, who accompanied the expedition as transport drivers exceeded my most sanguine expectations, as they proved very quick in learning how to load the animals, and in a short time became really efficient at this work. Hard-working, willing, and steady, their conduct was most satisfactory throughout, and they deserve much credit for the manner in which they performed that most irksome duty of donkey driving and others of a similar nature.

I propose dealing with the question of the boundary between Abyssinia and the Soudan south of the Baro River, together with that regarding the railway and telegraph line under a separate cover, and as an Appendix to the narrative Report herewith submitted (see Appendix A).

The abandoned stores left at Itang at the end of April were eventually recovered towards the end of June in the steamer "Amkeh," and a final start was made from Nasser on the 29th June—the delay being due to Ed Dueim having to be visited in order to procure a sandal for the transport of men and animals from Nasser to Omdurman.

Omdurman was reached on the 7th July, and the survey party there broken up.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. H. AUSTIN, *Captain and Brevet-Major, R.E.,*
Commanding, Sobat River Survey Party.

APPENDIX (A).

ALTHOUGH I was unfortunately unable to complete the survey between the Sobat River and the north of Lake Rudolf for reasons which I trust are sufficiently clear in the narrative Report submitted, I think it may still be possible for me to indicate approximately a suitable boundary to the south of the Baro between Abyssinian and Soudan territory.

After careful consideration, it appears to me that what one would naturally regard as the most obvious boundary, viz., that formed by the Abyssinian escarpment, rising abruptly out of the plains, is one that will never be entertained by the Abyssinians at present.

Every year large elephant shooting expeditions are organized by the Abyssinians living near the western edge of the plateau, who descend in considerable numbers to the plains below for the purpose of obtaining ivory, which forms one of their main sources of revenue. Seemingly for years past, since, in fact, their permanent occupation of the Galla country seventeen years ago, they have regarded these open plains, extending as far west as the Pibor River and even beyond, and south to Melile on the Juba or Akobo River, as their legitimate hunting and raiding grounds. The one is the natural accompaniment of the other, for during these expeditions the Abyssinians rely almost entirely on looting the natives for food, as their own commissariat arrangements are practically nil. This I was able to see for myself when hundreds of Gallas and others were taken down to the Baro in order to bring up the "Faidherb" in sections to Addis Abbaba by order of the Emperor, and had to feed themselves as best they could.

It seems to me, therefore, that south of the Baro there are only two possible boundaries that can commend themselves to, or are likely to be acceptable to, the Abyssinians.

The first is partially a tribal one, which I should suggest would hand over all Anuak territory as far south as the Akobo River to the Abyssinians, whilst the Nuers are retained to the Soudan.

The Nuers extend along the Baro as far east as about longitude 34° 10′. Thence the boundary runs roughly in a south-westerly direction to the Gelo to about east 33° 30′, and north 7° 52′ 30″. From this point a line might be taken due south until it strikes the Akobo, and thence the latter river observed as the boundary between Abyssinia and the Soudan, as I shall presently propose under the second suggestion. The main drawback to the tribal boundary is that it is not clearly defined, and further investigation would probably be necessary before it could be definitely ascertained which is exactly Nuer and which Anuak territory across open, grassy plains, which are uninhabited and a veritable no-man's-land.

The second suggestion is a physical one, and something tangible, although it necessitates our surrendering part of Nuer territory over to the Abyssinians, viz., the line of the Pibor River.

In this case the boundary would run south from the junction of the Pibor and Sobat Rivers (about 10 geographical miles to the south and 10 miles to the east of Nasser Post), latitude 8° 26′ north to latitude 7° 47′ 40″ north, where the Juba or Akobo River flows into the Pibor. The boundary would then run in a south-easterly direction up the Juba to about longitude 34° 30′ east and latitude 6° 40′ north, the approximate position of Melile.

From that point the boundary might take a southern trend round the mountains, which are long spurs, of the Abyssinian range, and keeping to the south and west of Mount Aguzzo or Naita, the summit of which is approximately longitude 35° 16′ east, and latitude 5° 30′ north, run east to Murle, on the River Omo (about longitude 36° 11′ east, and longitude 5° 12′ north), where I formerly made a Treaty with the natives in September 1898.

This latter boundary, following the line of the Pibor and Akobo Rivers, is, I think, the minimum boundary we should agree to, as the Abyssinians have no sort of claim whatever to the Nuer territory, which it is suggested should be surrendered to them, being absolutely worthless to the Soudan; and I very much doubt if the Abyssinians have any great desire to take over a portion of the Nuers. Still, by handing over this worthless tract between Anuak country and the Pibor, it might be possible, in exchange, to obtain further concessions to the north of Lake Rudolf, and instead of carrying the boundary south from Melile, Menelek may be prevailed upon to recognize the Juba or Akobo (or, as the Abyssinians call it, the Ajibur) River as the boundary to near its source; then, crossing the spurs from the Abyssinian Escarpment, the river shown to rise on the southern slopes, and flowing south (to the east of Mount Neita) into Lake Rudolf (to the west of Koras Hill, in the Nakua district), might be observed as the boundary to the northern end of Koras, and a line taken across from that point to Murle, on the Omo.

Navigation rights along the Baro should be insisted on, in order to tap the fertile food-producing districts of the Anuaks, and later, probably, trade in coffee, live-stock, donkeys and mules in addition, and, perhaps, gold and ivory in smaller quantities, will spring up with the Gallas when they find a ready market for their goods. A trading station, with the consent of the Abyssinians, might be established at Itang, in the centre of the food-producing districts, as the locality is a charming one, and far healthier than Nasser.

The question of a sanatorium on the plateau is hardly worth considering hereabouts, unless the Soudan Government is prepared to construct a road from the Baro Gorge to the summit of the Buré Plateau.

Under existing circumstances no loaded pack-animals can make the ascent, owing to the excessively steep nature of the hill-sides for the last 1,800 feet, and as porters are not readily obtainable in the Soudan, it would be quite impossible to maintain a staff for transport purposes unless provided by the Abyssinians with Gallas.

The edge of the plateau, although a most bracing and delightful spot, is uninhabited hereabouts, and the sanatorium would probably have to be established near our camp of the 8th

February, some 7½ miles further on in an easterly direction, where food, fowls, milk, eggs, and so on, are procurable.

The stockaded inclosure placed at our disposal by Azaj Cheronet during our stay there would be an admirable site for the building.

"Keating" will have to be supplied liberally, as the plateau swarms with fleas, and considerable discomfort was experienced both at Buré and Goré on account of them.

As regards a possible railway or telegraph line from Khartoum, I consider these should be confined almost, if not entirely, to recognized Soudan territory, rather than leasing territory from the Abyssinians in order to obtain perhaps a shorter and more direct route south. This, I think, could be done without much difficulty.

The Sobat could be crossed from the north near the existing Nasser Post, where a large island divides the river into two channels, neither of which are more than from 80 to 100 yards in width. Thence the line would run in a southerly direction by the inland route to Koratong, a route reported to be quite free of swamp for the greater part of the year. From Koratong the line of the Pibor would be followed to near the junction of that river with the Akobo, above which it would be crossed by a bridge 80 to 100 yards in length. The line would then continue along the south bank of the Akobo to Melile. The boundary I have already proposed south of that might, perhaps, equally well indicate the line of the railway to Lake Rudolf.

There appear to me, however, to be two considerations which would govern the alignment of the railway south of Melile, viz.:—

1. Is the line to form part of the much-talked-of Cape to Cairo Railway scheme; or
2. Is it to link up with the Uganda Railway, with Mombasa as its objective?

If the former, I presume it would have its terminus somewhere on the northern shores of Victoria Nyanza, assuming that the line from the Cape has its terminus on the southern shores of the lake, and that the two would be connected, at first at all events, by a service of steamers. If this assumption be correct, the line from Melile should undoubtedly have Mumia's, in Kavirondo, as its objective, and Port Victoria as its terminus, at the mouth of the Nzoia River, on the lake. In this case, the line from Melile would run approximately due south through Karamojo to Manimani, latitude 2° 20′ north, and, passing round the eastern slopes of Mount Elgon, across the Guas' Ngish plain, strike the Nzoia there, and follow that river down to its entry into Lake Victoria.

If, on the other hand, Mombasa is its objective from Melile, the line might follow the boundary-line to south of Mount Naita, and thence strike across to the north-west corner of Lake Rudolf. Thence the lake shores might be followed in a southerly direction to about latitude 3° 52′, and then left to cross a desert patch meeting and crossing the River Turkwel, at latitude 3° 6′, north, where it makes a big bend to the east.

The line would then continue along the east bank of the Turkwel River to Ngaboto, and subsequently along the Weiwei to near Kivas, in Suk.

The Kerio would then have to be crossed, and, keeping to the east of the Kamasia escarpment, Lake Baringo could be reached without much difficulty, and the valley of the Molo or Nyuki River followed until the Uganda Railway is met with near the Equator, and about longitude 36° east.

Two Maps.

No. 3.

Supplementary Report by Major Austin.

Notes on the Country traversed and the Inhabitants met with by the Sobat Survey Party.

IT is proposed in these notes to deal only with that portion of the country actually traversed by the survey party, as little reliable information is obtainable by report from the natives themselves; these appear ignorant of, or incapable of speaking the truth regarding the geography of their own country.

Shilluks.

At the junction of the River Sobat with the White Nile, both banks of the Sobat are occupied by the Shilluks as far as Anajok village, from the vicinity of which a road is reported to run south to Bor.


30°
31°
32°
33°
12°
11°
10°
MAP
OF THE
FRONTIER REGION OF ABYSSINIA
BETWEEN THE BLUE NILE AND LAKE RUDOLF
Reproduced at the Intelligence Division, War Office from maps compiled by Major H.H.Austin, R.E. (assisted by R.G.T. Bright, Nile Brigade) and Lieut. C.W.Gwynn R.E. (assisted by Lieut. I.C.Jackson, R.E.) to illustrate their Reports on the proposed EGYPTO-ABYSSINIAN Frontier.
Frontier recommended by Survey Officers. (Minimum Claim)
Alternative proposals for a more favourable Frontier
Limit of Abyssinian Effective Occupation between the Blue Nile & Sobat
Captain Harrington's original proposal (approximate)
Extreme limit of Abyssinian influence in the Sobat Valley
Abyssinian Posts
Note — Topographical detail added from previous maps the accuracy of which is uncertain is drawn in red.
Blue Nile
Bahr El Abiad or White Nile
Kaka
Ghrab el Eish
Fashoda Ft
Mt.
Mt.
Mt.
Dinjol Villages
SHILLUK
DINKA
BARI
KOOOOO

SHEET I.
CONFIDENTIAL.
35°
36°
12°
11°
10°
Roseires
K. Abu Zaguli
Kharaba
Dakhila
Blue Nile
Abu Gemai
K. Tarafa
K. El Ghana
JEBEL SAMINA
Ardeba
Abu Shanina
J. ABU RAMLA
J. MENZE
J. BAMESA
JEBEL GUBA
D A R
Famaka
Fazokli
Kiri
Kukuru
Musarkum
Armida
Barjuyu
K. Hassan
K. Amilla
J. TAZA
JEBEL
F A Z O K L I
FARFIRA
J. AGARU
FALUGUT
K. Dumba
K. Tumat
Dandi
Abay or Blue Nile
D A R
K E H L I
J. FARONGE
J. GHEZAN
J. GAMBELA
J. GAINSHUR
J. DISHU
J. MAIAK
J. KURMUK
BENI SHANGUL
Beni Shangul
K. Tumat
D U L
J. DUL
J. ANDU
GOMASHA
J. MINDOR
Gooa
Azossa (Agotdi)
R. Yabus
Ganti Gallas
River Didessa
ASSOSA
J. MUGUR
J. GARGANGA
Belsur
K I R A N
Fadasi (Gorguru)
Shiebu Gallas
J. TUNGSHUR
J. BERSAMA
J. ISHIGOGO
Gabugola
J. ZAWA
JEBEL GAZAR



I.D., W.O. N° 1492 (a.)

Scale 1/1.000.000 or 1·013 Inches to 16 Miles

Miles 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Miles

Compiled in the Intelligence Division, War Office
August, 1900.

10°
9°
8°
34°
35°
36°
K I R P I N
Kirimera
Kiriman
Kiriman Hill
Kiriman Hill
Kiriman Hill

CONFIDENTIAL




SHEET 2.
34°
35°
36°
UGANDA
Perbom
R. Aliwa
R. Bira
Patok
Deba
(Bottego)
Remak
L. Tata
Kamaton
R. Sukani
Bakialbu
Tedo
Lira
R. Aswa
R. Bora
MT ISHENO
Melile
R. Juba
(Bottego)
MT AGUZZO OR NEIFA



I.D., W.O., No. 1492 (6)

Scale 1/1,000,000 or 1·013 inches to 16 Miles

Miles 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Miles

Compiled in the Intelligence Division, War Office
August, 1900.



Heliozincographed at the Ordnance Survey Office, Southampton, 1900.

iles

Dinka.

The Dinka tribe thence occupy both banks of the River Sobat to about 32° 14′ east, villages being very numerous from the Sobat mouth up to this point, near the village of Lajak.

For the most part the Dinka territory along the Sobat consists of open, treeless, grass plains. 15 to 20 miles east of Lajak the river banks are uninhabited until the small village of Ashel is reached, which is the commencement of a small tract of Anuak country, sandwiched in between the Dinkas to the west, and the large and powerful Nuer tribe to the east.

With the exception of a large Khor, Filus by name, which enters the south bank of the Sobat some 11 miles from Sobat Fort, no other tributary appears to enter the river on either bank, until the Nuer country is reached.

Anuaks West of Nasser.

The small section of Anuaks referred to above only occupy some 25 to 30 miles of the river bank as far as the village of Wegin, which is the boundary between them and the Nuer tribe. The different tribes hereabouts are considerably intermingled, as they appear to intermarry to a large extent, and Anuaks may be found living amongst the Nuers even as far east as Nasser. Their position would not, however, appear to be a very enviable one, as the men are more or less slaves of the Nuers, and are called upon to perform many household and menial duties for their more powerful neighbours.

At the same time the Anuaks appear to have no fear of entering the Nuer territory, and the survey party was accompanied by several as far as Nasser Post.

The chief villages of the Anuaks between Ashel and Wegin on the left bank of the river are Yakwoik, Fatiwanyang, and Shwai. A very friendly Sheikh, Aiwel, lives at Fatiwanyang. He is constantly to be seen at Nasser Post, and also occasionally even at Fashoda.

This section of the Anuaks is a small and unimportant one; in general appearance they closely resemble the Nuers. They appear to grow very little food, barely more than sufficient for their own requirements; but at the same time have flocks of goats and sheep and a few herds of cattle. Their country is well wooded for the most part, and from native accounts numerous herds of elephants constitute a very real source of danger to travelling, more especially at night time. In the vicinity of the Dom Palm camp, where the survey party disembarked, game was plentiful on both banks of the river in December 1899. Very little trade was indulged in with these natives, but a few goats and sheep were purchased for brass wire at Aiwel's village—the price paid being about a 6-foot length of wire for a sheep. Latterly, however, since more intimate communication with Nasser Post has been established by Yusbashi Ali Talat Effendi, the demand for cloth has increased.

Nuers on Sobat and Baro.

The Nuers are by far the most powerful and numerous tribe living along the Sobat River. Originally they appear from native accounts to have occupied tracts of country south of the Sobat in the neighbourhood of Bor, but were driven north, and in turn ousted the more weakly tribes living on the Sobat, and occupied their country. The Falangs and Bonjaks no longer exist, their territory being occupied by the Nuers. There appear to be three separate factions of Nuers at the present day occupying the Sobat Valley, who, if native accounts are to be believed, are more or less at enmity with each other, owing to family disagreements. It is often difficult in consequence to get guides from one part of the country to enter that occupied by a rival section. For instance, Sheikh Yowe's people will not readily enter the territory of the Nuers in the neighbourhood of Nasser Post; whilst these again will refuse to proceed further east along the Baro than the village of Barrakwik.

Another powerful section of the Nuers is still reported to occupy a large area of country south-west of Nasser Post, presumably between the Bahr-ez-Zaraf or Shambe and Nasser, but little is known of them except from native accounts. Whilst at Nasser in July 1900 Talat Effendi dispatched a party to open negotiations with them, but with what result I have not yet heard. They were reported to be very rich in flocks and herds, and also in ivory. So much of the last named exists in the country that, according to native

report, there is one large village entirely fenced in by huge elephant tusks. This statement is merely given for what it is worth.

The Nuer territory along the Sobat and Baro Rivers extends from about east 32° 33′ to about 34° 10′. From Wegin village to Nasser Post the country is probably the finest occupied by the Nuers, as it is for the most part well wooded, and in places the Survey party passed through really beautiful park-like country. Villages are numerous and several of the districts, such as Fauwel and Jurwel, are well cultivated.

Although the huts and villages of the Nuers, hereabouts, are well and substantially built, the natives themselves are shy, suspicious, indolent, and altogether a very low type of humanity. They appear to cultivate only such small plots of ground in the immediate vicinity of their villages as will suffice for their own requirements for perhaps six months in the year, whilst during the remainder of the year they live chiefly on fish, which, existing in great quantities, are easily speared during the dry season of the year in the river.

Physically, the men are tall and well built, but show little signs of muscular development, being generally long-limbed and wiry. They are all stark naked, and as protection against cold merely smear themselves from head to foot with wood ash, which gives them a particularly filthy appearance, and renders their skin extremely rough and coarse. They make no attempt to adorn themselves, but are extremely anxious to procure brass wire with which to make for themselves bracelets extending from the wrist to near the elbow. This seems to be about their only vanity. They are all armed with spears, of which every man carries two or three. Their weapon of defence consists of an oval shaped buffalo-hide shield. Bows and arrows they do not appear to possess.

The elder married women are as filthy as the men in appearance. They all, however, wear a leather apron, or skin fastened round their waists. The younger girls and unmarried women wear no such covering, and like the men are quite naked.

The right bank of the Sobat near Nasser Post is densely populated as far as the junction of the Sobat and Pibor Rivers, there being several large and important villages, such as Kwoilualtong, Torpot, and Ajungmir in addition to smaller ones. The left bank of the Sobat is not inhabited, as from Nasser to the Pibor a considerable portion of the country is inundated when the rivers are full.

The first village met with on the left bank after Nasser is passed—going east—is that of Taiyau, on the margin of a large lake in the angle between the right bank of the Pibor and the left bank of the Sobat.

East of the Sobat–Pibor junction, the country through which the Baro flows may be described, until Anuak territory is reached, as worthless. For the most part it consists of open treeless grass plains, which in the vicinity of the river are inundated for months at a time. The population is small, and confined to villages some distance apart, and absolutely no signs of cultivation were seen, except on a large island near the border of Anuak territory.

This perhaps may be explained by the fact that the Nuers in the dry seasons of the year occupy villages near the river banks, which are merely used as large fishing villages during the time the rivers are low; they subsist almost entirely then on the fish speared in the many pools which are formed by the receding waters of the rivers. When the rivers become full again, and the country is inundated they withdraw to their permanent winter quarters further inland, where they probably merely cultivate during the rainy season of the year, between the months of May and November.

Several of the large villages to the east of the Pibor–Sobat junction, such as Taiyau, Gunjang, Gadjak, and others, which were teeming with life in the month of January, were deserted in July when a visit was paid by steamer to Itang. A large loop of the Baro takes off from the main stream from near the village of Gadjak on the south bank, and enters the Baro again some 11 or 12 geographical miles to the east of the Sobat–Pibor junction. This river is known by the natives as the Adura. Although seemingly a large and important loop, it was found to be quite unnavigable in July, when the river was nearly full, owing to the existence of a large number of sand-banks and islands. Another loop south of the Adura is said to be formed by a stream known as the Mokwai. This has a very insignificant exit from the Baro, only some 5 or 6 miles to the east of the Adura exit, but is reported in its lower reaches to be an important stream in flood-time, possibly after it is joined (as it is said to be done) by the Bela River. The combined streams enter the Pibor, by native report, and, in that case, the river followed by Major Capper for some 20 miles of its course is probably this one.

Only one other river from the south of any importance in Nuer territory enters the Baro in addition to the Pibor. This is known to the Nuers as the Nigol, and to the Anuaks as the Aluro. It appears to have its origin in the Abyssinian plateau, and

in flood-time is a most formidable obstacle, as it forms large areas of swamp. Its entry into the Baro near the border between Anuak and Nuer territory is a very insignificant one, and barely discernible, as it spills out into a large swamp near the village of Methok before it reaches the actual river, and apparently the water gradually finds its way into the river through a thick forest-growth of trees by two small channels only a few feet wide. From the point where the Adura takes off from the Baro the banks of the latter river are thickly wooded with sycamore and other trees as far as the eastern boundary of the Nuer territory.

With the Nuers of the Sobat and Baro Rivers very little trade was done, as they possessed little or no grain, living chiefly at that time on fish. They possess, however, numerous flocks of goats and sheep in the vicinity of Nasser Post, and also some magnificent herds of cattle at Ajungmir. Thirty-five goats and sheep were obtained in exchange for a cow. Large opaque white beads, about the size of a pea, are most in request as articles of barter, but the small white glass ones, which were the only kind procurable in Cairo by the survey party, were not much sought after. Brass wire is also much in demand; and a desire for cloth is beginning to arise.

Nuers on the Pibor.

On the Pibor River there is a large settlement of Nuers on the left bank of the river, located in the villages of Koratong, Uentau, and Wanding, where old Sheikh Yowe has his head-quarters, and further north again on the river is another largely populated village, Kur by name. These appear to be the permanent homes of this section of Nuers, but in the dry season they occupy other villages both north and south along the Pibor, the most important of which is Bil, near the junction of the Gelo and Pibor Rivers. With the exception of a large belt of trees and thorn in the neighbourhood of Kur village, the Pibor is not well wooded until the Koratong group of villages is reached, as the lower portion of the river for some distance above its junction with the Sobat is mainly swamp when the river is full. From Koratong in a southerly direction up the river, however, the banks are generally well wooded, more especially on the right bank. There are some beautiful park-like tracts for some miles above the junction of the Pibor and Akobo Rivers. In addition to this important stream, which enters the Pibor from the east at latitude north 7° 47′ 41″, the large River Gelo flows into the Pibor at about north 8° 8′ 45″, and further north again the Mokwai at about north 8° 20′ 30″. From the left bank a large khor Geni flows out of the Pibor at latitude north 7° 32′ 15″, and is reported to enter the Sobat again some 6 or 7 miles to the west of Nasser Post, past the village of Tolor.

Exactly how far up the Akobo River the Nuers extend it is difficult to say, as no Nuer villages were seen on that river, but it must at least be for some 20 miles, as a Nuer encampment was found on the Gelo River near the point where the survey party left that river to march across to the Akobo. The banks of the Akobo are well wooded as far as it was followed, more especially on the south bank, where a large tract of thorn bush approaches close to the water's edge. The Nuers of the Pibor do not differ in any essential degree from those of the Sobat and Baro Rivers. Dura was purchased from Sheikh Yowe's people for small white and dark blue beads, not very much larger than a pin's head. A string sufficiently large to pass over the head on to the neck purchased from 1 lb. to 1½ lb. of unground grain. A spear length of brass wire, about 9 feet in length, purchased a goat of average size. In a short time there is also likely to be a demand for coloured fancy cloth as well as beads.

The hand-book of the Soudan gives a very good description of the Nuers, so it is unnecessary for anything more to be said regarding this powerful tribe.

Anuaks east of Nasser Post.

The eastern Anuaks of the Baro (or, as it is called by these natives, Upeno River) inhabit that portion of the river bank extending east of 34° 10′ to the mouth of the Baro River gorge at the foot of the Abyssinian hills.

This tract of country is probably the most fertile anywhere along the river after it enters the plains. It is well wooded and to a large extent free of those large expanses of swamp found lower down the river in Nuer territory. The numerous huts and hamlets with which the river banks are dotted, are generally built close to the edge of the bank overlooking the river, usually on mounds slightly raised above the normal level of the

bank. These huts are neatly built of mud and wattle with grass roof, and are scrupulously clean and well kept. They are, as a rule, surrounded by a fence work of tall reeds and grass, giving absolute privacy to the occupants. Within the enclosure so formed, in addition to several huts for the family, are the granaries, and also other enclosures for the herding of goats and sheep at night time. The interior is most carefully plastered over with mud and free of dust and dirt. The natives of this region are to my mind more advanced in ideas of civilization than any other living along the Sobat and Baro on the plains. This is possibly due to their being closer in touch with the Gallas (with whom they trade considerably) than any of the more western tribes are.

They are a most peaceful, friendly and industrious race, and are great agriculturists. Miles and miles along the river banks are diligently cultivated by them twice a year, and splendid crops spring up from the generous soil.

Although it is proposed that these natives should be handed over to the Abyssinians, we certainly ought to maintain navigation rights along the Baro up to the point where Marchand was compelled to abandon the "Faidherb," in order to tap this natural granary of the Anuaks. An advance post for trade purposes might be established at Itang with the consent of the Abyssinians.

Although it would be unable, for probably five or six months in the year, to maintain direct steamer communications with Nasser, the post should be absolutely self-supporting; and, moreover, during the navigable periods of the year would be capable of sending grain down in large quantities for the maintenance of the Nasser and Sobat garrisons, instead of those places having to draw, as they do at present, on Omdurman.

The presence of a British trading post in their midst would undoubtedly also protect the natives to a large extent from Abyssinian raids, although this, of course, would not be ostensibly its raison d'être. In addition to grain of various kinds, cotton is also grown by the natives in small quantities, and tobacco is very commonly to be obtained. Flocks of goats and sheep are numerous; but the natives will not readily part with their live-stock. Cattle are only to be seen very rarely, as the natives fear to possess these lest they should attract the cupidity of the Abyssinians. On one occasion I offered a guide a cow if he would accompany me to Lake Rudolf and back to Nasser, after which I promised to bring him to his home again by steamer. He agreed, but subsequently returned and asked if I would make it two or three sheep instead, as he feared spoiliation by the Abyssinians had he a cow in his possession.

Physically the Anuaks are not such a tall race as the Nuers; but their muscular development I should say was finer. This is probably due to their more nourishing grain food all the year round; but they also supplement their grain largely with fish during the dry seasons of the year. Although they rarely seem to kill their goats and sheep for food, like the Nuers, they are extremely fond of meat, and will constantly beg a white man to come and shoot a hippo for them, so that they might indulge in a real gorge. We were on several occasions able to supply both the Nuers and Anuaks with hippo meat, which went far to create a friendly understanding with the natives of these regions.

As a rule the men are more decently clad than the Nuers, as many of them wear beautifully cured skins, as soft as chamois leather, round the loins. They are far cleaner, better groomed, and smarter looking in every way than the Nuers. A large number of the Anuaks, especially in the neighbourhood of Pokum and Penkio, wear splendid ivory bracelets on the arms. Some of these are as much as 4 to 5 inches in depth, and it was by no means uncommon to see a man with one such bracelet on the upper arm, and two somewhat smaller ones on the fore-arm. Some of these were purchased at ridiculously small prices by our men, five or six half-piastre pieces, or millimes being taken in exchange.

One very curious weapon, we saw nowhere else, we found among the Anuaks. This consisted of a spear, the head of which was manufactured from a leg bone of a giraffe, polished down to about an inch or three-quarters of an inch in diameter and sharpened to a fine point. These curios were also obtained for about five half-piastre pieces.

The Anuaks would not appear to be either a courageous or warlike race like the Nuers, and seem content to merely cultivate their fields and remain at peace with their neighbours. Their spears are generally small-headed with long handles, and it is by no means unusual to see some men armed with merely sharp-pointed sticks hardened at the ends. Knobkerries are carried by most men. The older married women all wear skins, cured or otherwise, round the loins. Some of these are daintily picked out with a border of vari-coloured small beads. A large quantity of beads are also very commonly worn

both round the waist and neck. The attire of the younger women and girls is really most attractive. In addition to a numerous accumulation of beads round the neck, they wear a large number of strings of beads round the waist of many different colours, whilst a small fringe, as it were, of generally white opaque, or light blue and white beads depends in front and behind, some 2 to 3 inches in length round the body. As the girls are often very beautifully formed, and possess pleasant, laughing, and occasionally really pretty faces, a group of them together forms a most charming picture of modest maidenhood.

The upper reaches of the Baro are not well cultivated, and beyond the point where the "Faidherb" was abandoned, the population is very scanty, and little or no food is obtainable from the natives; the river banks become very stony and thickly wooded, and what little cultivation there is to be seen hereabouts is generally on the islands.

When the stony region is entered, several large khors, which were dry when the survey party traversed that tract, enter the left bank of the Baro from the south, but owing to the close nature of the country it is quite impossible to accurately conjecture the source or course of any of these. I think it is unlikely, however, that any of them, until the Bonga River is reached, take their rise in the Abyssinian hills. The Bonga River was a running stream, some 15 yards in width and 6 to 9 inches in depth in February, when all other streams except the Baro were dry, so it probably has its source in the Abyssinian plateau.

On the right bank three large khors only were seen to enter the river from the north. Two of these are in the Penkio district, and the third and most important is the Sako or Tak River, some 2 or 3 miles to the west of the Bonga, and near our Gambela camp of the 28th January. This also was a running stream.

We found on our return journey from Abyssinia the Anuaks very ready to sell flour and grain in exchange for beads, more especially in the Penkio district, which is very largely populated.

The most popular bead was a small light blue opaque one, the only opaque species of small bead we were able to obtain in Cairo. A string of this bead, sufficiently large to pass over the head on to the neck, purchased from 1 to 1½ lbs. of flour, and perhaps 2 lbs. of grain. A fowl was also obtained for about the same quantity of beads. I am inclined to think that white or small green opaque beads would be equally sought after; but a blue and white bead, known in East Africa as the "punda malia" (zebra), I feel sure (everywhere in these regions) would be eagerly sought after by the natives. Many of the Anuaks were wearing these beads, though how this species has got into the country—except, perhaps, gradually from the north of Lake Rudolf, where I bartered them in 1898—is difficult to understand. These beads are very extensively used in the British East Africa and Uganda Protectorates now, but, as far as I know, have only been on the market during the last few years. If a post is established at Itang, I would suggest white, green, pale blue (all must be opaque, and not glass), and punda malia beads to be the main purchasing medium for grain, and perhaps brass wire and cloth for goats and sheep.

In a short time I fancy money might be introduced—as at Fashoda amongst the Shilluks—as the Gallas, being neighbours of the Anuaks, and familiar with the Maria Theresa dollar, would readily bring down goats and sheep for sale, and the Anuaks would probably soon follow suit.

Anuaks of the Gelo River.

The Anuaks of the Gelo River district need very little description, and as practically little was seen of them, except when passing their villages, not much information was obtained regarding them. As compared with their compatriots on the Upeno River, they appear to be a far less prosperous race, and, physically, might be described as an anæmic-looking tribe, probably due to the fact that the tract of country they inhabit is for months at a time one vast swamp, and unhealthy in consequence. They are more suspicious and shy than the northern section, but not really unfriendly in any way, as we had no difficulty in obtaining guides from them. They do not take the same pride in their personal appearance as those of the Upeno, and few of the men wear skins. The women are less particular also, and unhesitatingly entered the river at Patok devoid of all clothing, and washed themselves on the bank before our men. The unmarried women, like those of the Nuers, deem it unnecessary to provide themselves with any covering. Beads are worn, but not in the same quantities nor with the same taste as further north.

The right bank of the Gelo, as far west as about east 33° 30′ is generally well wooded some little distance from the river; but the left bank west of about east 33° 50′ is

absolutely devoid of a tree or even almost a shrub. An open treeless grass plain appears to extend south until the Akobo River is reached.

Patok, the first village on the Gelo reached by the survey party, is one of very considerable size, skilfully concealed in a thick belt of wood, the interior of which has been cleared to a large extent. The village is inclosed by a stockade of tree trunks and branches for defensive purposes.

Most of the large villages along the Gelo, such as the Otwol, Chiro, Oran group, Goin, and Ungela are similarly concealed inside belts of tall trees, and surrounded by stockades.

These villages are situated some distance from the river, as the expanse of swamp bordering the Gelo prevents villages being built nearer to its banks. At the height of the rainy season it appears probable that the whole country north of the Gelo and between that river and the Baro is one vast swamp quite impracticable for transport animals.

During the time the Gelo was followed along its banks no other stream appeared to flow into it, although several swampy khors issuing from the river were crossed, flowing in a northerly direction. These were reported to join the Bela River and so into the Mokwai.

Along the Gelo, beyond a small patch of cultivation on the river bank near the village of Patok, no other signs of cultivation were seen by the survey party except in a few diminutive cleared spaces in the woods; no food was obtainable from these natives. That they must subsist on grain to a large extent appears to stand to reason, so it is possible their fields, like their villages, are concealed in the midst of woods, with which the country abounds. Like the Nuers and Anuaks of the Baro these natives possess small dug-out canoes for crossing the Gelo and employ them also in their fishing operations.

To the west of Perbong two other villages, Ametha and Otwol, are reported to exist in Anuak territory hereabouts, and these two probably depend on wells for their water supply as they must be quite 3 to 4 miles distant from the river, and no signs of tracks leading from or to the Gelo were visible. Goats and sheep were only seen in very small numbers.

In normal years it is doubtful if this tract of country can be traversed much later than the middle of April with transport animals, as once the rains set in the whole country is rapidly converted into bog, through which laden animals, especially donkeys, are quite unable to travel. During the dry seasons of the year large herds of elephants roam over these grassy plains and find both food and shade in the forest growth on the north bank of the Gelo. It is to these regions the Abyssinians descend in large numbers yearly from the western edge of the plateau, on ivory-hunting expeditions, and traces of recent Abyssinian encampments were on several occasions met with. Before the rains break, however, these parties return to their homes, and we were warned at Goré by Fitorari Hili that we would find the country impracticable for animals once the rains set in. To give the man his due, this remark of his was one of the very few words of truth spoken by an Abyssinian during the whole time we had any dealings with them.

Gallas.

The Gallas met with by the survey party occupy the summit of what is now known as the Abyssinian plateau. They inhabit an enormous stretch of country extending along the western portion of this plateau as far north as the Blue Nile, and the southern portion of the present Abyssinian kingdom was also formerly Galla country. By force of arms the Abyssinians have in a large measure subjugated this populous nation, who owe allegiance to Menelek alone at the present day. As the survey party only traversed that portion of the country inhabited by the Gallas of the Buré and Goré districts, the following remarks are intended to apply to that section alone:—

The contrast between the country of the plains of the Baro River and the summit of the plateau is exceedingly marked. The intense heat and stuffiness of the Baro gorge, shut in on all sides by high steep hills, at once gives place to a most exhilarating fresh atmosphere.

The ascent from the Baro gorge of over 3,000 feet is long and difficult, but once the summit is attained one experiences the sensation that one's troubles are amply repaid by the grand air, and still grander view.

The actual edge of the plateau hereabouts is uninhabited, and it is not until one has proceeded some 6 or 7 miles in an easterly direction over undulating grass land, and through beautiful stretches of wood that one begins to enter the first populated districts

of the Gallas. Then for the next 11 or 12 miles to the end of the Buré district, one passes through a most fertile tract of country, intersected by numbers of small valleys and streams, along which, and on the ridges overlooking which, as far as the eye can see are small habitations and hamlets of the Gallas dotted about in every direction.

The population for Africa is dense, and such large areas of this neighbourhood have been cleared for purposes of cultivation that quantities of grain are grown and are obtainable in Buré.

After descending, however, from a ridge from our camp of 23·2 (whence a distant view is obtainable of Goré on a fine day) into a seeming hollow and entering the Abiu district, the country becomes very thickly wooded, and inhabitants less numerous, as there are not the same facilities for cultivating the ground, owing to this forest growth. The physical features of the country still remain very much the same, but more confusing, if anything, as an amazing labyrinth of valleys, some big but mostly small, is stretched before one on every side. The country is so close that whence they come or whither they go must remain to a large extent mere matters of conjecture, for it is quite impossible to see. As the Gomoro River is approached the district becomes quite uninhabited, and remains so until the foot of the Goré ridge is reached.

The whole of this portion of the country traversed lies between 5,000 and 6,000 feet above sea level, and, as can readily be imagined, is very hilly.

We found it impossible, marching from Buré to Goré, to take our plain camels loaded over this route, as many of the ascents from, and descents to, the numerous streams were far too steep for them to negotiate. Somali camels might perhaps be able to travel over this road in the dry season; but the Sudan camels appeared quite incapable of doing so. They, like the remainder of the transport animals, felt the excessive cold at night extremely, and a good many losses occurred from this cause, as donkeys died every day, and two mules and two camels also succumbed before Goré was reached.

From the bank of the River Gomoro, which flows through a swampy hollow, an ascent of over 1,100 feet is made to the summit of the Goré Ridge, which lies at an altitude of about 6,580 feet above sea level. The head-quarters of the Abyssinians, under Dejaj Tasamma, who governs this region, is situated on the summit of this grassy horse-shoe-shaped ridge, which is crowded with huts, houses, and offices of Abyssinian officials and soldiery, in addition to those of a large Galla population. The climate is of a most bracing nature, and from this commanding position a magnificent view is obtained on a clear day of the whole surrounding country. The country, as far as one can see, is thickly wooded, and is much intersected by numerous valleys and ridges. The many streams appear to flow north and then west; but it is well nigh impossible to trace their course. They, however, eventually find their way into the Birbir River, like all the streams crossed between Buré and Goré.

The Goré and Abiu districts are not extensively cultivated like Buré, and in a large measure the population of Goré town is dependent on the fertile Buré district for its food supply. In addition to cereals of all sorts—such as dura, Indian corn, peas, and beans—tomatoes, potatoes, and coffee are also grown by the Gallas. They are rich in flocks of goats and sheep, and also possess cattle, but in lesser numbers. Fowls, eggs, butter, milk, and honey are generally easily obtainable. Mules and donkeys are bred extensively by the natives of this region, whilst horses and ponies are also seen in large numbers.

We saw no cotton grown on the plateau, but the Gallas trade with the Anuaks of the Baro for this merchandize. It is no unusual thing in the Buré district to see Gallas in large parties returning from the plains with great skins full of raw cotton carried on their backs. This they weave into a thick coarse cloth, very strong, and very serviceable, with which the better class of Gallas, and most of the Abyssinians, are clothed. The Anuaks apparently make no other use of the cotton grown by them, as they are evidently ignorant of the weaving art.

Although the Gallas have been subjugated by the Abyssinians, to whom they pay taxes, and for whom they do all manual labour, they enjoy a considerable amount of liberty, and appear in every way to be most prosperous under Abyssinian rule. Abyssinian officials are placed in authority over certain districts, and are responsible for the collection of all taxes and the general prosperity and welfare of their charge; but the Gallas have their own hamlets and tracts of ground for cultivation purposes, and generally seem to be on friendly terms with their conquerors, but most respectful in their demeanour towards them. Large numbers of the Galla men are armed with rifles, many of which are of modern breech-loading, and even magazine, pattern.

The Gallas are all decently clad, even the poorest among them; the men are as a rule dressed in a sort of cloth pyjama trousers, with a long sheet of their home-manufac-

tured cloth wound round the upper portion of their bodies. The better class of women are also dressed in a long cloth garment, whilst the peasant women of the Buré district wear skins in the place of cloth. At Goré, however, all classes are dressed in cloth, and skins are not seen. These Gallas are, with few exceptions, Mahommedans.

As regards trade, all private trade amongst the Gallas appears to be prohibited by the Abyssinians. Certain days in the week are observed as the market day in Goré and Buré, and at the market places set aside for this purpose all trade is done. Natives having live-stock, grain, and other goods for sale bring these in from miles around, and all buying and selling is under proper supervision; a tax is collected on certain articles sold—for instance, a man who sells a donkey has to pay into the Treasury 1-dollar tax from what he receives for his animal.

The coinage employed in these transactions consists of bars of salt about 8 inches long, 2 to $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches broad, and $\frac{3}{4}$ of an inch thick. These are generally bound at intervals with grass to prevent their cracking or getting destroyed. The value of this commodity, of course, varies in different parts of the country, but in Buré district ten bars of salt without a flaw were given us in exchange for 1 dollar, or twelve bars, which were slightly cracked and not quite perfect.

Maria Theresa dollars would readily be taken anywhere in the country, but it is most essential that these should all have the appearance of being absolutely new. The Gallas are most suspicious, and decline to take any of these coins which show signs of wear—for instance, if the brooch is in the slightest degree obliterated they will not accept it. The Maria Theresa dollar is more readily taken than even those coined by the Negus Menelek.

Beads we found useless for purchasing food, but cloth of all sorts and single Terai hats are particularly sought after by the Gallas.

The following were some of the prices we paid in Buré and Goré:—

A baggage mule we obtained for from 40 to 45 dollars.

Donkeys varied from about 8 to 12 dollars, according to their size and condition. We purchased some thirty-eight donkeys at an average cost of a trifle over 10 dollars a-piece.

Three bags (*i.e.*, weighing about 55 lbs. each) of unground Indian corn we purchased for 10 slabs of salt or 1 dollar.

Four bags of peas we obtained for 4 dollars, and six bags of condemned dura for 2 dollars.

A sheep or goat was procurable for from 1 dollar to 2 dollars according to size.

A Terai hat would purchase a small goat or sheep. These Terai hats were obtained from Messrs. Rylands and Sons (Limited), 55, Wood Street, E.C., at an average cost of 1*s.* $0\frac{1}{2}$*d.* each, and were amongst the most successful articles of barter we possessed.

Although on the Abyssinian plateau we saw no signs of precious metals, gold undoubtedly is to be found in the Baro gorge. When the river was low in February a large colony of Gallas (and Soudanese from Berta) were settled near the mouth of the Baro gorge, where extensive gold washing operations were being carried out by them in the bed of the river. The gold so obtained from the sand was melted down and made into rings and small trinkets. A sample of this sand was brought back by us, but as it has not yet arrived in England from Cairo we have not been able to get it analyzed.

Tobacco is very generally smoked by the Gallas, and is obtainable at their market places; but none of the Abyssinians we met with indulged in the habit.

Physically the Galla men are thin and slight, with very little muscular power, and although they are usually employed in large numbers by the Abyssinians for carrying loads (which is generally done on the head), they make very indifferent porters. They appear lacking in stamina and unable to carry loads for any distance, without indulging in numerous halts and rests. As one would expect, their skins are much fairer than those of the natives living in the plains, who are quite black. The Galla complexion more nearly approaches that of the natives in Northern India than of any tribes I have before seen in Africa. The Galla women are physically much finer than the men, and are strong sturdy creatures, built very much on the lines of a Dutch frau. Many of them have pleasant regular features, and indeed are often pretty. Unlike their naked sisters of the plains, however, their morality is not above suspicion, and prostitution amongst these ladies is very general, and thought little of by their men folk, who appear to encourage it rather than otherwise. The consequence is that venereal disease is very prevalent amongst the Gallas, and a large number of the Abyssinians also suffer greatly from the ravages of syphilis. The majority of the people who used to come for treatment to us at Goré and elsewhere were either suffering from open syphilitic sores or from causes directly due to syphilis.

Abyssinians.

So much has already been written and said of the Abyssinian nation, who, under the powerful rule of the Emperor Menelek, have now become such an important factor in African questions, that it is difficult to find anything new to say about them. One is more struck coming from the west into this kingdom than perhaps from any other quarter, as the transition from naked savagery to well clothed semi-civilization is so abrupt (and one might almost say unlooked-for in those regions), that one cannot help but experience a sensation of astonishment, or at least surprise. The form of Government and Administration appears so firm and so admirably suited to the natives, that in a short time one ceases to marvel at the prosperous and seemingly contented condition of the country, only so recently as seventeen years ago occupied by the Abyssinians. The authority of prominent Galla Chieftains appears to be little interfered with by the Abyssinians, and to this day they, to a large extent, govern their own districts and are only directly responsible to the Abyssinian Governor, who has been placed over them by Dejaj Tasamma, the conqueror of this section of the Gallas. Even Galla women, who by reason of birth are entitled to the power and position of Chiefs amongst the Gallas, and formerly governed tracts of country, have their authority recognized by the Abyssinians, and maintain considerable state.

The Abyssinian Governor of the Buré district is an old man, Azaj Cheronet by name, whose Secretary and Deputy is a man named Walda Hanna. In addition to these two, who are mainly responsible to Dejaj Tasamma for the well-government of the district, there are several other Abyssinian minor officials in charge of sub-districts directly under Azaj Cheronet. The Abiu district is an unimportant one, and not thickly populated, as has already been stated. The two most important officials of this neighbourhood are Grazmach Aichek and an officer named Barambaras.

Goré town is, however, the centre of Government, and here Dejaj Tasamma has his offices, audience chamber, arsenal, and work-shops, and here all business of State is transacted. During his absence from his dominion the government of these districts was intrusted to Kanyazmach Walda Gabriel, but this man is reported to have lately died.

The Abyssinians, as is well known, are Christians of the Coptic Church, and at Goré they have erected a small church, where services are held every Sunday, and which we attended on several occasions. The services were conducted by Abyssinian priests, who are trained from early youth in the tenets of the church. In the grave-yard adjoining the church, the remains of the French officer, the late M. Clochette, who died at Goré a few years ago, are interred.

The Abyssinians of this region are exceedingly well armed, and the larger majority of the soldiery possess modern French and Italian breech-loading rifles provided with magazines. Ammunition is much prized by the Abyssinians, who do not appear to possess a great deal; but it is not unlikely that Dejaj Tasamma has large stores in his arsenal, which we were not allowed to enter. In addition to a small gun, I am inclined to think what Maxims Marchand and his party brought up to Goré are also stored in the arsenal. Although the Abyssinians do not scruple to beg for ammunition, it is extraordinary in what a senseless and dangerous manner they waste what they have. No feast or drunken orgie is complete without a reckless firing off of rifles, the bullets from which on more than one occasion passed most unpleasantly close over our tents. This nuisance at length became so great that we were compelled to remonstrate with Walda Gabriel, and ask him to put a stop to it—in our direction at all events. The Soudanese of the escort occasionally became so indignant at bullets falling near their guard that it is quite likely, had one of them been hit, it would have been difficult to prevent them going off in a body to take reprisals.

The Abyssinian officers all wear swords, and seldom move about, no matter how insignificant their rank, without being accompanied by a train of followers. One man carries his precious rifle, another his beautifully-embossed circular shield; another holds his horse for him, and so on; whilst, if he is a high official, he will probably be accompanied by twenty or thirty retainers, armed with rifles as well. It appears to be Dejaj Tasamma's custom to provide all his officers at the expense of the State with one horse and two mules free of charge. The Abyssinians are all well clothed, and, in addition to shirts and trousers, invariably seem to wrap themselves up in a large winding sheet species of garment of coarse home-made cloth, white in colour, with a broad band of red across the centre. They are exceedingly partial to Terai hats, and cheap umbrellas I feel sure would also be much appreciated. Cloth of all colours, red, green, yellow, pale blue,

and purple, having a glossy silk-like surface, are also much prized, as these are worn over the head on big occasions, such as the return of a successful elephant-shooting expedition from the plains, when a triumphal entry is made into Goré on horseback. Every official who possesses a horse rides out in his gaudy attire to meet the home-returning party, and joins in the cavalcade, which generally assumes most imposing proportions by the time Goré is reached.

Fire-arms are more highly sought after than anything else by the Abyssinians. Revolvers, pistols, rifles, and ammunition are much in request, but a shot-gun is not considered particularly desirable. Swords are, I think, acceptable to the Abyssinians, but as they possess numbers of very good ones, they do not exhibit any special eagerness for them. The higher officials generally wear a black cloak or gown over their other clothes; this is braided, occasionally lined with red, and sometimes provided with a hood, and are, I believe, procurable in Cairo for about a sovereign. Although, as compared with all their neighbours, the Abyssinians are such a civilized race, one could not help being struck with the comparatively few officers of rank we met who were capable of either reading or writing their own language. This work was always done by special clerks, who were retained for this work alone, and had necessarily to be the confidants of their masters. Every Abyssinian of any rank in the Goré district has a large number of Galla servants, both male and female, in his establishment to perform all household duties, looking after his horse, mules, cattle, and so forth. These servants in reality are little more than slaves.

The Abyssinians are full of racial pride, and have an extremely exalted opinion of their own importance. The casual way in which an officer will make his way into one's tent or hut, and calmly seat himself and make himself thoroughly at home if not promptly ejected, requires to be seen to be believed.

The pomp and show indulged in on all possible occasions is often really ludicrous in its intensity. Horsemen will dash about hither and thither pursuing each other, and hurling long, sharp-pointed sticks to represent spears, which are deftly caught by their opponents on circular shields, as though it quite impressed one as being their most successful tactics in actual warfare. In spite of their outward show of magnificence to impress foreigners who may enter their country, in his house the Abyssinian observes very little state, and lives in a humble manner, somewhat after the fashion of the poorest class of Irish peasant. We paid visits to the houses of several of the higher officials at Goré, and were much surprised to find our aristocratic friends sharing their abodes along with their wives, children, Galla maid-servants, horse, mules, and donkeys, whilst goats and sheep walked in and out the house, as though the place belonged every bit as much to them as to their owners. Although the Abyssinians we met never smoked, they appear to be fond of drink of various kinds, the most favourite being "marissa," made from grain, and a honey-water beverage known as "asalia." A very potent liqueur is distilled from "asalia," not unlike benedictine, but very fiery. Strong coffee is also drunk in large quantities, and is generally of most excellent quality. Samples of it were brought away by us, but were unfortunately destroyed when our camp was flooded out in the Baro gorge. Cognac brandy is much appreciated by the Abyssinians.

Like all native tribes the Abyssinians and Gallas have the greatest confidence in the white man as a physician, and daily many sick would be brought round to our camp for treatment. Gratitude for such treatment is rarely shown, as the natives appear to look upon it more as a right to which they are entitled rather than a favour. I must, however, do justice to some of the poor people, as on several occasions poor Galla women, who had little of this world's riches, brought their little mite, consisting, perhaps, of a little jar of honey, or a small fowl as a thank-offering for benefits received, and would really feel extremely hurt if they were told we did not doctor for money. I may, perhaps, be biassed in my opinion regarding the Abyssinians as a people; but from our dealings with them at Goré and elsewhere I must frankly admit that never have I met before such a lying, hypocritical and knavish race. I hope this may not apply to the nation as a whole, and that intercourse on the western borders of the kingdom with the deceitful and suspicious Gallas has brought about this insincerity of manner when dealing with Europeans, is, I think, perhaps, the most charitable view to take of the case. It was almost impossible ever to believe one single word uttered by the Abyssinians on any subject, no matter how trivial and unimportant. We gradually came to the conclusion that it was a physical impossibility for any man to speak the truth, however much they might be tempted to do so. Moreover, they are the most shameless and persistent beggars, from the highest to the lowest. The open and unabashed way in which some of the officials would bring round a small present of perhaps a fowl, bread and some eggs, and throw out exceedingly broad hints that a rifle or revolver was what they most

desired in this world was really most amusing, as one never paid any serious attention to these naïve hopes. A European official in Addis Abbaba is reported to have remarked, "they bring you four eggs and expect a gun in return," and this most aptly and tersely describes the presents question.

I think all credit has been given to the Abyssinians for their able and intelligent government and administration of the Galla country, now part of the Abyssinian kingdom. When they, however, descend from the plateau to the plains below and make expeditions, their treatment of the natives is both harsh and cruel, as they ruthlessly raid every populated district they pass through in search for food.

I have already referred in the body of the narrative report to some of the results we saw for ourselves in the Baro Valley, and later again on the Gelo, and these are not in the slightest degree overdrawn.

I do not wish to imply that the Abyssinians mercilessly slaughter defenceless natives, as I believe this is far from being the case as a rule. There is little doubt, however, that besides plundering the natives, they do carry away slaves with them. We were overtaken on the road to Goré by a party of two or three soldiers returning from the plains, accompanied by half-starved women and children they had captured on some foraging expedition. This sight so raised the compassion of our Soudanese, as it was a bitter morning, and the natives were perishing with cold, that, entirely on their own initiative, they built a fire for the wretched creatures to warm themselves at, and provided them with their own food taken from their haversacks.

(Signed) H. H. AUSTIN, *Major*,
Commanding Sobat River Survey Party.

APPENDIX.

ASTRONOMICAL Positions of Points fixed by Major H. H. Austin, D.S.O., R.E.

Place.	Longitude East.	Latitude North.	Height.	Remarks.
	° ′ ″	° ′ ″	Feet.	
Omdurman	32 29 30	15 38 15	1,250	Khalifa's house.
Goz Abu Guma	32 41 25	13 10 54·2	..	Telegraph office.
Fashoda Fort	32 7 37·5	9 53 21·2	1,430	Bastion des Anglais.
Sobat Fort	31 33 52·5	9 21 48·5	..	Observations taken in fort, near flag-staff.
Wood Station (16.12) ..	31 36 0	9 19 21·8	..	Left bank of Sobat.
Stopping place (17.12) ..	31 50 53	9 19 49·3	..	Left bank opposite few palm trees.
,, ,, (18.12) ..	32 13 45	9 7 14·2	..	Right bank.
,, ,, (21.6) ..	32 13 30	9 6 24	..	Left bank, near Lajak.
Single Dom Palm Camp ..	32 24 39	9 5 1·5	1,490	Commencement of survey.
Camp (28.12)	32 27 0	8 58 35	..	
,, (30.12)	32 35 52	8 51 35	..	Near Fedwil.
,, (1.1)	32 43 30	8 39 46·7	..	Near Nyangdeng.
,, (3.1)	32 56 37	8 35 36	..	Near Manajok.
Nasser Fort	33 3 52·5	8 35 36	1,525	Interior of fort.
Camp (7.1)	33 8 55	8 31 29·5	..	
,, (26.5)	33 11 15	8 27 30	..	
Adura–Baro Junction I ..	33 25 30	8 25 17	..	Right bank on River Adura, ½ mile above junction.
Camp (13.1)	33 36 55	8 26 49	1,580	Near Barrakwik village.
,, (16.1)	33 46 0	8 19 27	..	On River Adura.
Sobat–Pibor Junction ..	33 14 8	8 26 4	..	On left bank of Pibor, ⅛ mile above junction.
Stopping place (3.6) ..	33 43 7	8 22 32	..	River Baro.
Baro–Adura Junction II ..	33 52 15	8 17 30·7	..	On River Baro, at junction, left bank.
Small island	34 2 15	8 14 11	..	
Camp (19.1)	34 5 0	8 13 13·5	..	Near Methok.
,, (20.1)	34 10 15	8 9 48	1,680	
Itang	34 15 22·5	8 10 12	..	
Pokum	..	..	1,715	
Penkio Camp (24.1) ..	34 29 10	8 13 48	..	
Camp (26.1)	34 41 15	8 11 26	..	Near French Boat.
,, (27.1)	..	..	1,855	In Gambela.
,, (28.1)	34 51 45	8 11 28	1,900	Near Sheikh Moro's village.
,, (2.2)	35 0 0	8 11 58	..	Marchand's old camp.
,, (5.2)	35 4 15	8 16 20	5,200	Buré I, summit of plateau.
,, (23.2)	..	..	5,670	
,, (24.2)	35 23 45	8 11 20	..	
,, (26.2)	..	..	5,650	
Goré	35 35 0	8 9 10·2	6,580	Camp on summit of ridge, close to church.
Camp (29.4)	34 11 0	8 0 11·5	..	Near Aluro River.
,, (2.5)	34 5 15	7 54 39·5	..	On River Bela.
Patok village	34 0 10	7 44 4·5	..	
Camp (8·5)	33 42 55	7 50 42	1,600	On River Gelo.
,, (11.5)	33 28 52	7 52 36·6	..	Ditto.
,, (14.5)	33 17 45	7 46 32·3	1,630	On River Akobo (Juba).
Akobo–Pibor Junction ..	33 5 3	7 47 41·4	..	Angle between left bank Akobo and right bank Pibor.
Camp (21.5)	33 7 30	8 4 41	..	Near Koratong.
Wadi	33 2 30	7 52 15	..	A large deserted village.
Camp (23.5)	33 12 8	8 15 26	..	On left bank Pibor River.
,, (26.5)	33 11 14	8 27 25	..	Ditto.
Ed Dueim	32 20 0	13 59 33·5	..	Telegraph office.
Reng	32 48 11	11 45 3·2	..	North end of small khor, on sandy foreshore, right bank Nile.
Jebelain	32 48 42·5	12 35 2*	..	* From two observations of North Star. Position taken near telegraph office.